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Abstract 
Studies of interethnic integration in Central Eastern Europe have sought to account for the 
impact that institutional settings, structural conditions and elite-level interaction have on 
the accommodation of and conflict resolution between ethnic groups. Much existing 
literature has placed particular emphasis on the importance of institutional factors, both 
domestically and as a result of international pressure. Simultaneously, scholarship on the 
issue has left out of focus the contributions of non-dominant minority actors to the 
dynamics of interethnic relations. Where minorities are taken into account, this happens 
largely in terms of their failure to recognise structural opportunities for their inclusion into 
majority society.  
This study analyses interethnic integration in the Central Eastern European context from 
the perspective of structuration theory. Structuration theory provides a sound theoretical 
foundation in order to study non-dominant agency and its impact on the structures of 
integration, owing to its ability to reconcile dichotomies. The thesis comprises a 
comparative case study of interethnic interaction in Estonia and Slovakia, focusing on the 
Russian-speaking and the Hungarian minority respectively. A structuration approach is 
applied to the empirical findings in order to problematise practices of integration and their 
constraints that lie in the institutional and interaction context of Estonian and Slovak post-
Communist society. I argue that although Russian-speakers in Estonia and Hungarians in 
Slovakia are constrained by institutional environs and majority-dominated structures, 
minority members actively participate in and shape institution-building and group 
formation in their interaction with majorities. Minority integration is analysed in terms of 
the minorities’ co-operation within, counteraction against and formulation of alternatives 
to the status quo structures of interethnic relations.  Table of Contents 
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Chapter 1: Post-communist multiculturalism and the 
challenge of social integration: an introduction to the 
problem 
1.1 Introduction 
Two decades after the demise of socialism in the multinational federations of Central and 
Eastern Europe (CEE), the Soviet Union (SU), Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and in 
their associated states of the 'Eastern bloc', the parameters of social, economic and political 
transformation across the region have changed dramatically. As part of the process of state- 
and nation-building, the dynamics of interethnic power relations have established unequal 
conditions for ethno-linguistic majority and minority members to renegotiate interethnic 
relations and their respective positions in relation to the state. In the context of the 
Europeanisation of the region, interethnic integration has become a contested field of 
interaction between multitudes of actors. Recent studies of democratic developments and 
of the democratic inclusion of national minorities in the post-socialist countries have 
pointed out the persistently problematic relations between dominant and marginalised 
ethnic groups in the region. In numerous cases, this is reflected in minority groups' partial 
exclusion from the democratic processes in general and is manifested in their partial 
exclusion from the processes which determine state-building and community-formation 
specifically. In reaction to these developments, the integration of dominant and marginal, 
or majority and minority groups, as well as the analysis of these processes, have become a 
major preoccupation both for political institutions and agents, as well as for scholars 
studying recent social and political developments in CEE.  
The fundamental argument of the thesis is that social integration is a matter of the creative 
response of social groups to the structural situation constituting the collectivity which they 
inhabit. I suggest that, in the face of undergoing structural change, groups also change the 
perceptions they have of these circumstances, of their position therein and of themselves as 
a group. In turn, these understandings generate the agency that helps re-establish the 
boundaries of their collectivities, either re-confirming existing boundaries or modifying 
them. Social integration then refers to the interaction of groups in the form of stable and 
maintained cooperative relationships. Essentially this argument draws upon a 




the centre of social integration processes. In this introductory chapter, I provide an 
overview of approaches to the study of interethnic relations in post-socialist Europe and 
introduce the structurationist approach to social integration that will be applied in this 
thesis. This discussion will enable a better understanding of the dynamics and factors 
impacting interethnic relations in the context of institutional and structural change. 
1.2 Society integration in CEE: systemic and agentic approaches 
This section engages with a range of approaches that have dealt with questions of ethnic 
group relations and interactions, including theories of state- and nation-building, 
nationalism studies, as well as ethnic bargaining and mobilisation theories. My discussion 
will show that, while providing crucial insights into certain aspects of interethnic relations, 
these approaches do not generate an understanding of intergroup integration, first, as a 
process of interaction and, second, as a process that is dependent on minority agency. As I 
argue in this section, the limited potential to understand the trajectories of integration of 
institutionalist and rational-actor theories is rooted in the flawed or undertheorised 
concepts of group agency and social action underlying these theories.  
The issue of national sovereignty has framed interethnic relations across the region. This 
has made social integration a central question for studies of nationalism and 
democratisation. Filling the ideological gap left by the fall of communism, both processes 
featured as functions of the transitions that post-socialist states went through. Tensions in 
interethnic relations were said to be a prime cause of the destabilising effects of political 
and economic transition as well as of social stratification, helping to reduce these processes 
to a common denominator: the nation. Understood as the result of democratisation 
processes, national sovereignty was supported by the emergence of laws, rules, regulations 
and guidelines aimed at fostering national cohesion.  
Typically, the dynamics of ethnic diversity within the nation have been analysed in terms 
of historical structures, pointing to the re-emergence of historical conflicts and to the 
influence of the structures and details of the socialist federations' nationality policies. 
Shaping group structures, these historical legacies impacted the power relations of state- 
and nation-building (Harris 2002). Accordingly, as a result of these historical legacies, 
group structures generated contradictory images of the nation among the different groups. 
Interpreted as constitutive aspects of ethno-national groups, the logics of nation-building 




competition for power, which regularly favoured titular groups over ethno-linguistic 
minorities, said aspects were demonstrated to have dominated state-building processes in 
the region, hampering the achievement of national unity in light of the diversity of the 
population (Saidemann & Ayres 2008; Csergo 2007). As a result, at least during the 1990s, 
interethnic integration in many parts of CEE appeared to be in danger of failure due to an 
apparent incompatibility of the norm systems represented by the states' political 
institutions, which have on the one hand reproduced the titular group's national sovereignty 
and, on the other, driven the processes of democratisation.  
Extant literature on the developments of interethnic relations and nationalism, specifically 
the literature focusing on the CEE region over the last two decades, has suggested that 
interethnic relations were temporarily stabilised as a result of the logics of nationalism and 
democracy (Lauristin & Vihalemm 2009; Fisher 2006; Harris 2002). Nationalism and 
democracy, however, follow competing logics. In the long run, democratic claims have 
brought into question the legitimacy of the unilateral concept of national sovereignty that 
creates structures that divide society into 'winners' and 'losers' (Lauristin & Vihalemm 
2009, p.13). However, changes to the status quo underlying the process of democratic 
consolidation are often presented in terms of outside impulses for transitions within the 
nation-state. In the light of minority kin-states' efforts to provide protection to their 'kin' 
abroad, the structures of the 'triadic nexus' (Smith 2002; Brubaker 1996) have forced these 
states to frame integration in more inclusive terms in order to avert the perils of 
destabilisation, further disintegration and geopolitical insecurity predicted by the concept. 
Similarly, the CEE nation-states' early orientation towards their 'return to Europe' has 
increased the openness of political institutions to norm-diffusion from western Europe. 
While as part of the application of conditionality criteria, the reorientation of domestic 
policies induced the selective permeability of group boundaries, European norms also had 
a stabilising function with respect to the nation-state logic on the grounds of the European 
minority-rights framework (Galbreath & McEvoy 2011; Pridham 2008). Overall, analyses 
of the embeddedness of interethnic relations across CEE in the 'quadratic' structures of 
domestic minority-majority antagonisms, kin-state bilateralism and Europeanisation have 
argued that these generated a new equilibrium in the relation of nation-state building and 
ethno-linguistic diversity.  
The institutionalist and structural approaches of state- and nation-building show that these 
have explained interethnic integration in CEE by the allaying impact of democratisation on 




institutional framework of the nation-state. Area-studies discussions have been engaged 
with the question of the maintenance and stability of a unitary political system imposed 
over a heterogeneous society. Because societies in the CEE region represented diversity 
which was hard to accommodate, many of the contributions to the debates tended to reduce 
minority groups to obstacles in the construction of unitary nation-states across the region 
(Vachudova 2005; Linz & Stepan 1996). Others ascribed minority communities the role of 
'watchmen' for democratic deficits in their states, responding to increased nationalising 
processes within states by asserting minority national identity (Budryte 2005; O'Dwyer 
2004). In both cases, the minority groups are largely thought of as functions of political 
processes which they appear not to determine, except 'qua existence'. Once the systemic 
provisions for integration are in place, minorities are expected to adapt. Alternatively, they 
are expected to exercise self-restraint under the imperatives of stability and democracy and 
thus, until the nation-state has responded to the functional requirements and groups' 'need-
dispositions' (Parker 2000, p.19), continually represent a challenge.  
As a result, the minority groups' role in integration processes is limited either to integration 
according to the system's logics, in this case the requirements of national sovereignty under 
the majority - that is titular dominance - or to contradicting this logic where minority 
ethnic identities permeate the political, social and economic systems. Crucially, the 
processes of minority groups' adjustment or resistance to constraints of the nation-state 
have not been of interest to institutionalist approaches. As has been criticised widely in 
social theory, agency is not the (explicit) concern of functionalist approaches; rather, actors 
are conceptualised as bearers of social roles, and these roles are determined post hoc, that 
is: by the functions they fulfil or the consequences the fulfilment of the role has for the 
system. Thus, in these approaches, agency is solely a requirement of the maintenance and 
perpetuation of the social system, not a factor of social change (Homans 1964; Giddens 
1984; Mouzelis 1995). 
Theories of ethnic conflict and interethnic bargaining provide an alternative perspective on 
interethnic integration, focusing on the rational interaction of minority and majority 
groups, analysing it as conflict over national sovereignty. In contrast to the role 
sovereignty takes when it is analysed as an outcome of the democratisation and integration 
process, here national sovereignty is understood as the contested subject and outcome of an 
interethnic conflict. Sovereignty is portrayed as a zero-sum game, where only one group 
can have its way in the conduct of political business. Majority and minority groups are 




Wolff 2010). Although largely expressed in terms of economic motivation, the rationality 
of conflicting agents in post-socialist ethnic conflicts is based upon emotional interests and 
interests in avoiding anticipated modes of sanction. According to the actor-centred 
approaches, these are the factors that drive actors in their engagement in state- and nation-
building (Hale 2008; Horowitz 1985).  
Examining actors' motivation for ethnic contestation, actor-centred studies have looked at 
preferences for unitary nation-states as a desire or a perceived right of ethno-national 
groups, hostility and disrespect towards other groups and the reluctance to share a state 
with them, and fears of violations of a state's territorial sovereignty (on side of the 
majority) and of suppression (on side of the minority) (Budryte 2005; Jenne 2007). 
Essentially, all these interests and motivations, discussed as part of ethnic conflict studies, 
are understood to be concerned with the outcomes of bargaining; in this sense, these 
approaches share with rational choice theory the limitation that they are 'essentially 
conditional and future oriented' (Elster 1989, p.99). Thus, while actor-centred approaches 
allow contextualising actors in the interactive space with other actors, whose actions are 
taken into account in calculations of the potential outcomes of own and other actors' 
actions, they fail to explain the origins of the interests that individual actors follow other 
than the anticipated consequences, or in some cases structural or institutional demands 
(Coleman 1986).  
Mobilisation theories of ethnic conflict have linked ethnic bargaining more closely to the 
structural position of actors. Ethnic identity and nationalism are conceptualised as tools in 
the hands of majority and minority elites. These tools are used to mobilise support, in order 
to promote the preferred vision of the nation, and to secure access to power and crucial 
resources for the group and its elites, which are perceived as discriminated against or under 
threat (Barany & Moser 2009; Kolstø 2000). These perspectives have avoided assumptions 
of the salience of primordial identities and de-randomised actors' goals. At the same time, 
researchers were keen not to over-generalise from structural conditions (Cordell & Wolff 
2010). Particularly against the backdrop of the armed conflicts and wars in the former 
Yugoslavia and parts of the former SU, research centred around questions of how to avoid 
both general violations of democratic rules and the outbreak of interethnic violence and 
potential break up of even more states, and to enable interethnic integration within these 
societies (Galbreath 2005; Kelley 2004). However, parallels made by some western 
researchers between the Yugoslav and Moldovan-Transnistrian cases, on the one hand, and 




(Kolstø 2002). Across the geographical belt from the post-soviet Baltic, via Poland, the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, and Romania to Bulgaria, the conflicts between 
ethno-linguistic majority and minority groups remained without large-scale violence. This 
remarkable development raised the question as to how violent conflict had been avoided, in 
contexts that appeared structurally similar, and to what extent the answers to this question 
were transferable to other contexts of ethnic conflict. As part of the process, kin-states and 
international organisations are discussed as crucial resources, potentially representing 
strong allies for both sides of the bargaining process (Jenne 2007; Jurado 2003). Overall, 
theories of resource mobilisation have emphasised the structural resources at hand both for 
majority and minority groups and their realisation in interethnic bargaining processes 
(Olzak 1983).  
International actors are also analysed as actors in their own right with their own 
(geopolitical) interests and national ambitions in the process, complicating the interest 
situation and potential alliances (Waterbury 2010; King & Melvin 1998). In contrast to 
functionalist and structurally-oriented rational choice theories, here the social requirements 
according to which actors direct their action refer to intersubjective norms and 
acceptances. Analyses of CEE's Europeanisation as a socialisation process have borrowed 
heavily from symbolic interactionism. This theory proposes that actors act according to the 
meanings that they attribute to aspects of social reality, while these meanings are 
constantly re-constructed or modified in social interaction (Diez & Stetter 2008; 
Christiansen et al. 2001). Unlike the functionalist conceptualisations of the 'quadratic 
nexus,' which emphasised the role of external impulses for the change in domestic 
interethnic integration (Smith 2002c), in the analysis of their re-interpretations and re-
productions of the social context the interactionist or 'learning' approaches bring states 
'back in' as actors, and emphasise their agentic potential (Emirbayer & Mische 1998). 
From this perspective, approaches to European integration in the field of minority rights 
are particularly interesting (Rechel 2009; Agarin & Brosig 2009; Schimmelfennig & 
Sedelmeier 2005). However, it has been argued that in symbolic interactionism the 
structural context looses the constraining aspects of institutions and structures so clearly 
pointed out by functionalists: structure is reduced to actors' representations and 
interpretations of things, leaving the question of the maintenance of stability unanswered. 
In the field of European integration of minority rights this seems to be reflected in a 
vaguely defined set of norms, which so far have been used for policy changes in CEE far 
more than in the former EU-15, and whose long-term effect on the interethnic integration 




Another reservation in relation to the explanatory force for interethnic integration has to be 
made in relation to approaches of intersubjective norm generation, as the latter have largely 
looked at states as actors, which are dominated by majority groups, while neglecting 
minority groups' actions (Budryte 2005; Berend 2003; Cohen 1999). The now-popular 
notion that integration is a 'two-way process' (give and take between state and minority 
instead of one-way assimilation) is a variation of this approach. With regard to the 
minorities' possible responses to state provisions for minority participation or majority 
preparedness to power-sharing, theories of integration have identified various options for 
non-dominant groups to begin to participate in decision-making processes where state- and 
nation-building (and thus, integration) are determined. Once such provisions are in place, 
however, the onus for minority integration is placed on minorities themselves – while 
states and international organisations are analysed through an agency perspective. In this 
respect, the role minorities take in constructivist approaches resembles their role in the 
functionalist approaches, as discussed earlier: minorities appear as recipients of policies or 
alternatively as refusing to cooperate with the state.  
As a result, these approaches to interethnic integration in the CEE region imply that the 
institutionalisation of certain minority rights can serve as a remedy for interethnic conflict. 
Tending to portray minorities as a problem for policy-making, it follows logically from this 
perspective that minority members are not seen as actors of integration, but its recipients. 
In contrast to the implications of such approaches, my research suggests that integration 
can never be fully accomplished, nor can a state or society be called 'fully integrated' at any 
stage. Rather, as I argue throughout the thesis, (social) integration denotes the process of 
interaction between social and political structures and the actors, translating structural 
conditions into practices. In and through these practices, they continuously renegotiate the 
boundaries that denote groups as different, and form the institutions that determine the 
different social groups' relations to the state. 
1.3. Social integration: starting assumptions 
The role of minority groups and their visions of how the fundamental political institutions 
should frame interethnic coexistence have remained relatively undefined in the approaches 
discussed so far. How can minority groups impact state- and nation-building when they are 
expected to adapt to the requirements of nation-state building set by the titular group? 
Moreover, studies of minority nationalism have asked whether minorities even want to 




from their country of residence is considered a viable option for groups on the basis of the 
self-determination narrative, such as across the former socialist Yugoslavia. In response to 
these and similar questions, studies of nationalism, ethnopolitics and ethnic relations have 
identified factors that support interethnic co-operation and minority participation. 
Decisively, in this section I argue that these contributions are valuable and will be reflected 
upon throughout the thesis. However, as this section demonstrates, both realist and 
constructivist approaches to integration through the prism of nationalism and ethnicity 
remain concerned with the entities and outcomes of integration. The section therefore 
provides for initial reformulations of core terms and concepts from nationalism studies and 
related theories to elucidate their usage in this study. As argued throughout the thesis, in 
contrast to such approaches this study investigates the trajectories of integration as a 
process that is shaped, if never fully controlled, by the agency of the social actors involved. 
While the argument of the thesis draws from the constructivist critique of essentialist 
understandings of groupness and national narrative, it goes beyond this critique by 
deploying a relational concept of groups, as will be further elaborated in chapters 2 and 3.
1  
Many studies have highlighted the importance of cooperation between majority 'moderates' 
and minority actors for interethnic integration against the strongly ethno-nationally-minded 
majority political elites (Nedelsky 2009; Henderson 2002). These point to the diversity of 
majority actors and demonstrate that 'allies' for minorities do not have to come from the 
outside –for instance, in the form of kin-states' protection of, or involvement with, 
international organisations (Csergo 2007). All these approaches share, however, the 
understanding of minority-majority relations as impeded by the ethnic conflict over 
national sovereignty or, in case of cooperation, enabled by agreement on an alternative 
civic understanding of sovereignty. National sovereignty itself continues to be 
conceptualised as the object of national aspirations and the route to control over those 
resources. Despite its focus on actors, this perspective disregards the more participatory 
aspects of national sovereignty, represented in citizens' visions of state-society relations. 
Importantly, national sovereignty is not necessarily limited to questions of dominance, but 
also to those of representation and contributions to state-building. That said, it is striking 
that the impact of minority strategies of integration have featured so little in the research of 
                                                 
1 What is distinct about the relational approach is that it emphasises relations, transactions and changing 
figurations over substantialised actors, things or entities. In relational thinking, power is not something that 
one possesses or does not possess, but that flucturates in the interactive social relations, such as ethnic or 
gender relations. Moreover, ethnicity is also not something an individual possesses, but crystallises and alters 
in the transactions between actors and structures (for a discussion of the relational approach cf. Emirbayer 
1997). This is not to say that we cannot talk about actors anymore, but that these actors need to be understood 




interethnic integration in post-socialist Europe, even though their demands – expressed in 
political activities – are acknowledged as part of the conflict analysis that contrasts 
national sovereignty and minority claims.  
In studies of nationalism and interethnic bargaining, minorities have received attention. 
However, here both majority and minority groups have tended to be treated as 
homogeneous groups. In this context, ideologies of nationalism and sentiments of ethnic 
belonging, often discussed under the ambiguous term of 'identity', have been suggested as 
determining factors of intergroup interaction and the trajectories of nation- and state-
building (Harris 2009). Nation-building, here, is understood as the effort, largely of elites, 
to 'construct an overarching collective identity which can bind the political community in a 
more meaningful way' (ibid., p.39). Consequently, nationalism theories have demonstrated 
how nations and ethnic groups are constructed, and therefore potentially can be subject to 
de-construction and alternative re-construction. Moreover, theories of nation-building have 
made clear that these processes are distinct from, if however closely related to state-
building. As a result, the  literature often distinguishes the political and the ethnic nation, 
enabling discussions about civic versus ethnic nationalism, which in turn has led to many 
contributions exploring the boundaries of liberal-democratic (nation-)states' capacity to 
accommodate diversity or act as a 'neutral' framework for multicultural societies 
(Kymlicka & Opalski 2001). Because of their focus on identities, if 'constructed', at their 
core these theories tend to be based upon reified concepts of ethno-national groups and 
their interests or sentiments, which had originally been criticised by these theories, and the 
'homogenisation' of groups in research.  
In part, this substantialist understanding of nations in nationalism studies reflects demands 
from majorities engaged in nation-state-building as well as minority communities to 
expand the provisions for minority recognition; however, it does not reflect fully the 
diverse positions and perceptions of both majority and minority members and tends to 
conflate the 'nation' as a 'category of analysis' with a 'category of practice' (Brubaker 1996, 
p.16, paraphrasing Pierre Bourdieu). The experience, social realities and perceptions of 
minority and majority group members however are multitudinous. Regarding interethnic 
relations, they result from overlapping social, economic, regional and other cleavages on 
the one hand, and from majority-dominated integration as it develops in pursuit of the 
imperatives of national sovereignty on the other hand. Moreover, reflections on actor-
centred approaches above make it clear that the concept of 'actorness' should also reflect 




of majority-minority interaction proffered by this study demonstrates, both majorities and 
minorities in the two countries have developed diverse approaches to integration, which 
partly superseded group boundaries rather than being congruent with them.  
Extant literature on interethnic deliberation has tended to reflect the heterogeneity of 
majority groups, specifically as political actors, but neglected the diversity of minorities as 
a factor that impacts the integration process. Crucially, this thesis argues, integration is 
always an ongoing process, which can be analysed with respect to its changing 
manifestations in the ethnopolitical order of political communities and their institutions. 
Understanding integration as interaction between groups demands taking a perspective that 
looks at minorities as actors in their own right. It is important to understand that both 
majorities and minorities constitute relational groups whose members are embedded into 
societal relations in multiple and intersecting ways. Political, social and economic 
marginalisation is not limited to members of minority groups alone, nor does it apply to all 
of them. As argued earlier in this chapter, this thesis is concerned ultimately with non-
dominant agency, for which the agency of ethnicised groups in nationalising states is 
selected as a case study. Because of this, it is assumed that - while for example socio-
economic cleavage characterises social relations across the board of all ethnic or linguistic 
groups - with regard to political and social participation in the nation-state, majority 
members have a head start compared to minority members, who in some cases have to deal 
with a range of intersecting inequalities. In addition, it is the heterogeneous minorities' 
contributions to integration that have been neglected in scholarship. 
Therefore, this study sets out to examine the routes minority members chose in order to 
impact state- and nation-building in two post-socialist CEE countries, Estonia and 
Slovakia, and by which they shape the integration processes as heterogeneous actors with 
complex sets of interests and intentions in the context of the constraining impacts of 
political and social structures. As part of my argument, I will show the importance of non-
dominant agency for the trajectories and temporal outcomes of integration, starting with an 
explanation of my theoretical claim that non-dominant participants of social processes do 
indeed exert their agency in these processes. In addressing the trajectories of interethnic 
cooperation, competition and bargaining in the pre- and early state-building phases, I 
discuss how these have shaped interethnic interaction to the present. I emphasise the role 
state institutions play in the continued efforts of the majority groups towards nation-
/community-building and analyse their impact on the boundaries between majority and 




minority activists' strategies of engagement with the disadvantageous structural context, I 
seek to ascertain how the different preferences minority groups exhibit with regard to 
interethnic integration in the states in which they reside have resonated in the institutional 
framework and impacted majority-minority group formation and integration in Estonia and 
Slovakia.  
The thesis is concerned with problems of group relations. This is not to deny that social 
integration could be examined at every and any level of interaction between agents, 
including individuals or institutional macro-actors. However, my argument is precisely that 
that an individual's agency is always structured by their groupness, which shapes both how 
they perceive their social situation and how they are perceived by others. Likewise, macro-
actors such as states frequently fail to represent equally all those social groups that 
constitute a particular society (Brubaker et al. 2006). The analysis of individual integration 
or macro-actor integration therefore presupposes an examination of group relations. The 
group is therefore chosen here as the central category of inquiry for studying social 
integration; other levels of integration are taken into account where this is deemed 
appropriate and necessary.  
I understand groups in a non-essentialist way. Neither their structural properties nor the 
psychological relation of their members to their groupness are taken as givens. Instead, as I 
conceptualise groups, their existence is intrinsically embedded in processes of 
institutionalising boundaries between 'categorised' individuals, normatively, socio-
structurally and in relation to individual sentiments of belonging and solidarity. As Social 
Identity Theory argues, group categories are established and re-confirmed by groups in the 
process of differentiating one's own group in demarcation from others (Rupert 2000; Tajfel 
1974). Social integration between groups becomes a problem, when demarcation is related 
to, or congruent with, the different command over crucial resources, that is: when in-group 
favouritism becomes out-group discrimination and turns into a power conflict (Tajfel 
1982). Where this is the case, power conflict transforms relations between socially defined 
groups into those of competition between more and less powerful groups, or in the case of 
institutionalised conflict in the social system, between dominant and non-dominant groups.  
Thus, I define social integration as the cooperative interaction between groups by which 
they participate in establishing a common social system. Crucially, this thesis and its 
concept of social integration do not ascribe certain characteristics to the system that the 




of integration is left to the negotiations of the actors involved. I take no stance regarding, 
for example, the suitability of different forms of power-sharing, or a position concerning 
the problem of minority rights or affirmative action between 'diversity' and 'equality'. 
However, this approach to integration does ask to what extent non-dominant, and so less 
powerful, groups are able to shape their social relations with the dominant group and 
change their position within the social circumstances. Proposing a non-prescriptive account 
of integration, I ask about the nature of integration processes and the determinants of their 
varying directions.  
In this sense, the present study differs from accounts of nationalism and multiculturalism 
studies. Unlike the latter's, its subject of enquiry is not the 'nation' or nationalism of any 
group. These are considered aspects of the structural context that shape the integration 
process. Instead, the approach to integration proposed here scrutinises the structuration of 
majority-minority relations by looking at minority agency as it figurates in the structural 
context of nation-state-building. In order to do so the present thesis utilises the analysis of 
minority activism in order to draw wider and more generalisable conclusions about the 
process of social integration and the role of non-dominant agency therein. The thesis deals 
with concepts commonly used in nationalism studies and ethnopolitics, however 
reformulates these from a structurationist perspective, rejecting reifying and substantialist 
understandings of the concepts and enabling the analysis of processes rather than entities.  
Decisively, this thesis analyses the role and options of non-dominant groups in evoking 
social change. By bringing allegedly powerless actors to the centre of analysis, I argue that 
these do in fact have agency, which is understood as the 'capability of doing [things they 
intend to do]' (Giddens, 1984), p. 9) and develop the theoretical frame for analysing social 
integration through the prism of what Giddens termed the 'dialectic of control' (ibid., p. 
16). In doing so, I hope to open up the space for understanding social integration as 
ultimately dependent on non-dominant creative responses to the structural or institutional 
circumstances, rather than seeing social integration as re-actions of non-dominant actors, 
determined by these circumstances. The source of the non-dominant agency lies in the very 
structures that constitute constraints for the actors in the first place. Their handling of 
social structures and their own position therein play a crucial role in maintaining or 
changing the parameters of a social system.  
The thesis then revisits a fundamental problem of the social sciences: the relation of 




conceptualisation of non-dominant actors as able to draw upon social structures as 
resources for them to act. Based on a historic and non-deterministic concept of agency 
inherent to the approach, non-dominant group agency, then, is not restricted to re-actions to 
structural constraints, but is capable of drawing creatively upon structural resources to 
impact the group's own position within these.  
1.4 Case studies, terminology and concepts 
This study sets out to examine the role of minority agency in the process of interethnic 
integration by comparative study of Russian-speakers in Estonia and Hungarians in 
Slovakia. In this section, the choice of the case studies is outlined. The two case studies are 
selected, because they have the advantage of sharing crucial features which together form a 
structural context that is 'similar enough' to be suitable for comparison. These include the 
policies of state- and nation-building, the countries' relation to the broader structures of 
Europeanisation as well as the minorities' kin-states, and the historical legacies of group 
relations that continue to shape group interaction. At the same time, the cases are also 
'different enough', a fact that allows the researcher to distance herself from the 
particularities of each case, while reflecting upon the individual trajectories of integration 
in view of the respective other case. Thereby, interesting arguments can be generated about 
the processes of state-society interaction in general, and minority agency in different 
structural contexts specifically.  
In recent years, both Estonia and Slovakia have received their share of public and 
academic attention, when ethnic group relations appeared to have deteriorated to the extent 
that minority members took to the street, while majority politicians declared that 
'multiculturalism has failed' (Slovak Minister of the Interior Daniel Lipšic, according to 
Sme 31/08/2011). As recently as 2007, Estonia faced an unprecedented outbreak of protest 
by Russian-speakers, the country's large minority population of Soviet-era migrants. These 
protests turned into the infamous 'Bronze night' riots in the old town of the capital Tallinn, 
lasting for three subsequent nights. The demonstrations were triggered by the removal of a 
monument that has come to have great symbolic value for the Russian-speaking 
community in Tallinn, which constitutes just under half the capital's population. The 
protests addressed much more than 'memory politics', bringing to the surface the 
inconvenient but hitherto obscured fact that Estonian integration policies towards the 
minority population, initiated in the late 1990s, had failed. In 2009, an entirely non-violent 




Slovakia, the country's largest minority population took place in the stadium of Dunajská 
Streda, a town with close to 80% Hungarians among its population, against the 
government's move to tighten language legislation. The new law threatened to restrict the 
opportunities for minority members to use their language in public, a right that minority 
members felt was already insufficiently respected. Twenty years after Estonia and Slovakia 
had become independent states it is apparent that neither have yet come to terms with their 
populations' ethno-linguistic heterogeneity. Rather, majority members dominate political 
processes, while minority members are largely excluded from the institutions considered 
important for meaningful political participation and the groups' cultural-linguistic self-
determination. These incidents as well as persistent tensions between ethno-linguistic 
groups across CEE have revived the questions of long-term conflict resolution, which for 
minority members and some researchers were never, in fact, 'solved'.  
The conditions under which debates over integration unfolded in the two countries 
accentuate particularly well the ambiguity of minority rights institutionalisation in the 
context of nation-state building. In both states, the minority groups have challenged the 
dominant vision of the unitary nation-state. At the same time, they have also developed 
strategies to make do - for the time being - with the status quo, adopting practices of 
adaptation according to the terms set by the majority. The realisation of minority rights in 
Estonia and Slovakia has, at times, generated fears among majority groups about 
sovereignty and geopolitical security. As part of the dynamics of interethnic cooperation 
and challenge, the involvement of the minorities' kin-states (i.e. Russia and Hungary) has 
contributed to the reluctance of majorities to share political power with minority citizens, 
due to painful histories of conflict over territorial sovereignty and oppression. 
Simultaneously, ambiguous signals from Europe as part of the countries' 15 years of 
Europeanisation before their accession to the EU in 2004, while temporarily stabilising 
interethnic relations, have added to the complexity of institutional resources for both 
majority and minority groups to legitimise and challenge status quo power relations.  
At the same time, Hungarians in Slovakia and Russian-speakers in Estonia represent 
different instances of the challenge of post-socialist multicultural integration. The 
differences between the minorities point both to structural and agentic differences, which 
shall be discussed here briefly. They concern specifically the particular forms of how the 
categories of group belonging are institutionalised in the two states; the normative and 




political, social and cultural organisational structures the minorities in the two countries 
have been able to maintain.  
Even though both states are relatively young and have, prior to 1991, only existed as 
independent states for slightly more than two decades - in the case of Estonia - and for only 
a few years during the Second World War - in the case of Slovakia -, the claim to the right 
of national sovereignty reaches back much longer. Large parts of the Russian-speaking 
minority in Estonia are being viewed as immigrants, because the largest proportion of the 
group residing in the country today moved there as part of inner-Soviet labour migration. 
This is despite the overlap of the Soviet-migrant group with Russians and other minorities 
that have been settled in the Estonian region for much lengthier periods (though in smaller 
numbers). In contrast, Hungarians in Slovakia have argued in a similar vein to Slovaks – 
and this view is accepted by most Slovaks – that their kins have settled in the region at 
least as long as Slovaks (Krekovič 2007). The arguable difference between 'indigenous' 
Hungarians and 'migrant' Russian-speakers has – indirectly – shaped the research on 
interethnic integration in the region, where direct comparisons of the situation of Soviet 
migrants and national minorities are extremely rare.
2 These differences, I suggest, are 
compelling reasons for an extended comparison of the two cases. As I hope to show in this 
thesis, the different categorisations of minority groups have functioned as a resource for 
some minority actors, while they constrained others in their claims for participation and 
inclusion.  
Categorical differences inevitably bring up the substantive question of terminology. 
Whereas references to 'Slovaks' and 'Hungarians' have been relatively undisputed, the 
distinction of 'Estonians' vs. 'Russian-speakers' has not.
3 Many contributions to the analysis 
of the latter group in the Baltic states refer to the difficulties involved when making this 
distinction (Agarin 2010; Galbreath 2005; Laitin 1998). The term Russian-speakers does 
not denote an 'ethnic' group, either as it is defined in research or in national statistics. As a 
state-imposed category of nationalist practice in Estonia, 'Russian-speakers' comprise the 
large group of Russians and russified nationalities who, during the Soviet era, moved to the 
Estonian Socialist Soviet Republic (ESSR) and where, if it was not already, Russian 
                                                 
2 Although edited volumes on minority rights across the CEE region often include contributions on Russian-
speakers in post-Soviet countries alongside historical minorities in other post-socialist countries, and Kelley 
(2004) uses both country cases of Latvia and Romania, there is only one direct comparative study of the 
Estonian and Slovak cases that has been conducted in recent years (cf. Brosig 2011).  
3 Throughout the study the term 'Hungarians' will refer to the members of the Hungarian minority in 
Slovakia, except indicated otherwise (such as in references to Hungarians in Hungary). In so doing, I follow 
the predominant practice in the literature on the issue, where the alternatively used term 'Magyars' is not 




became their primary or only language of communication. In practice, however, it can also 
incorporate some Russians who are officially categorised as an 'historical' Russian 
minority, i.e. those Russians who settled in Estonia before 1940. The distinction of 
Russian-speaking and Estonian populations implies that the use of the languages is 
mutually exclusive. Of course, this is not the case: many Russian-speakers speak Estonian 
and vice versa. It is for that reason that a parallel construction of Estonian-speakers does 
not help in any way with the problem of accuracy. At the same time, the group of Russian-
speakers is so heterogeneous in terms of the members' citizenship (including Estonian, 
Russian, Ukrainian, Lithuanian, Armenian citizens and many other, as well as the group of 
Estonia's large stateless population) that political membership does not provide a helpful 
category either. For this study, I assume that language use is the most important signifier of 
group membership in the context of minority integration in the two countries. As I hope to 
show, nation-state policies affect societies in multiple ways, and 'Russian-speakers' seems 
to be the term that comes closest to identifying the impact these policies have on minority 
members' strategies for integration in Estonia.  
In addition to these categorical differences inscribed into the institutions and structures of 
intergroup relations, the specific structures provided by kin-states - claiming responsibility 
for the minority groups to very different degree - and international actors force the groups 
to interact within similar structural contexts. The literature on diaspora politics has pointed 
to the 'instrumentalisation' of (perceived) kins residing in neighbouring countries by states 
in support of their own domestic as well as bilateral and international political interests 
(King & Melvin 1998). In this respect, both Russia and Hungary have been analysed as 
states engaging in active diaspora support, which can become a resource for mobilisation 
of minorities in their countries of residence (Waterbury 2010; Zevelev 2001). At the same 
time, the structures of kin-states for the two case studies also exhibit important differences, 
in part due to the EU membership of Hungary and the difficult relations between the EU 
and Russia. Moreover, Russia's diaspora politics in the Baltic states have been identified as 
aimed primarily at a domestic audience, rather than to the benefit of Russian or Russian-
speaking minorities abroad (Smith 2002c). In contrast, Hungary's claim to consult with 'its' 
sizable diaspora communities, specifically in countries that share borders with Hungary, in 
order to provide support, has been described in more appreciative terms by minority 
members, as I will demonstrate in chapters 8 and 9 of this thesis.  
Throughout the thesis, I argue that the most important structural factors for interethnic 




similarities with the scholarly contributions made by nationalism studies. In line with the 
latter, my thesis emphasises the structural relevance of institutions that are based on the 
agendas of ethnically and territorially defined nationalisms (Horowitz 1985). However, I 
do not take the view that "the right" institutional framework can resolve the problems of 
nationalist conflicts. Rather, I concur with critical nationalism theorists such as Brubaker 
(1998) who argues that 'nationalist conflicts are in principle, by their very nature, 
irresolvable' (p.273), because nationalism itself is always dependent on boundaries 
between groups that are themselves contested and disputed. At the same time, this does not 
mean that the conflicts between majority and minority groups in CEE are 'irresolvable' or a 
'necessary' consequence of the suppression of nationalist sentiments during socialism, as 
other scholars of nationalism in the region have suggested (for a critical discussion of these 
arguments cf. ibid.; also Verdery 1996). Essentially, these often primordialist and 
orientalist approaches are based on the assumption that nations, as groups, maintain 
'identities' that distinguish their members from those of other nations and groups, making 
them 'unique', determine the interests of their members (which are said to lie in the strife 
for 'national self-determination'), and also enable their continued existence as an entity 
through the ages (Harris 2009).  
My approach differs from many contributions also of constructivist nationalism studies in 
that it does not take identities, however 'constructed', to be the core driving forces of 
integration/disintegration processes, neither as a determining psychological structure, nor 
as shaping the rational action of majority and minority actors. While taking into account 
the valuable contributions made by theories of nationalism, the focus is shifted away from 
questions of nationalism in general and (group) 'identity' specifically. Instead, the study 
concentrates on the interaction between ascribed groups and the boundaries that constitute 
their role in society in the first place, as inscribed in the political institutions. The relational 
approach to groups deployed in this thesis highlights that groups emerge (and are being 
altered) in the processes of 'categorisation and identification', self-understanding and self-
representation, and 'commonality, connectedness and groupness' and therefore in the 
interaction of agents (Brubaker & Cooper 2000). Decisively, the interest of this study is not 
the question of majority and minority groupness, but how the members of differently 
situated and categorised groups are able to shape social and political relations in the society 
they inhabit.  
In other words, the thesis engages with the interaction between, on the one hand, 




and economical cleavages, and in-group/out-group perceptions - and, on the other hand, 
the agency of groups. I argue that these groups only come into being through the 
interaction of structure and agency, and are thus expressions of the trajectories of social 
integration. In this sense, when studying the integration of societies, what is interesting is 
to look at the processes that help maintain or alter the structures which affect social and 
political participation. The focus of this thesis, therefore, is on the question of the 
interaction between political structures and social actors, rather than on the entities that 
constitute the potential outcomes and representations of these processes, i.e. nations or 
ethnicity.  
It is for this reason that the concepts of ethno-linguistic groups and nations that is applied 
in this thesis are different from conventional usages. I will refer to ethnic, ethno-linguistic 
or linguistic groups as those social groups that differ in their preferred practices of self-
identification with a cultural or language group and/or language use. They become political 
entities because of the ways in which ethnicity and language are inscribed into the political 
institutions of the states in which these groups live. In the interaction with political 
institutions, in both states the majority groups have successfully shaped political 
community formation by inscribing ethno-linguistic group membership as decisive factors 
for political and social participation. It is on this basis that participation and access to 
crucial social and political resources is unequally distributed between different ethno-
linguistic groups, and that these groups' political mobilisation is - sometimes deliberately, 
sometimes necessarily - framed in ethno-linguistic terms. The thesis analyses, how in this 
context the interaction of groups impacts the processes of institution-building and group 
formation. Nation-state-building is used as a term that denotes this specific overlapping 
form of state-building, i.e. the consolidation of state institutions, intertwined with nation-
building, i.e. the efforts of political actors to define normatively and institutionalise 
structurally the political community.  
Within the conceptual framework outlined above, this thesis constitutes an attempt to 
understand the process of integration between majority and minority groups in Estonia and 
Slovakia, and state-society interaction in more general terms. In order to do so, in this 
thesis I will analyse comparatively the trajectories of nation-state-building and the political 
roles assigned to majorities and minorities respectively. This will allow me to understand 
both the Estonian and Slovak majorities' preferential interaction with the state structures 
and the structural context within which minorities in both countries interact with the state. 




Russian-speakers in Estonia and Hungarians in Slovakia have developed and applied in 
this interaction. While strong identification with their group and a strive for 'self-
determination' may be among the agendas of minority activists, it is one argument of the 
thesis that it is not the identification with one group that constitutes an obstacle to minority 
participation. Simultaneously, minority nationalisms must not be neglected as a factor 
shaping interaction between the groups altogether. This study then supports the view that 
these aspects are part and expressions of the changing forms of the interaction between 
majority and minority groups, and eventually between society and state, rather than entities 
that precede agents' interaction with structures.  
From the beginning of independent statehood in Estonia and Slovakia, the perceived 
difference between, firstly, majority and minority communities, and secondly between 
indigenous and migrant communities has shaped the specific approaches of both states to 
integration. At the same time, both states ultimately followed the same imperatives of 
state- and nation-building. Taking the theoretical approaches to, and case studies of, 
interethnic relations in both countries as a point of departure, my work compares and 
contrasts these two country cases. In so doing, I am able to assess integration as interaction 
and minority strategies as strategies of engagement with disadvantages resulting from 
structural positions, rather then individual dispositions. My comparison has the advantage 
of pointing out the aspects frequently overlooked as intrinsic characteristics of each case, 
yet when perceived in an holistic analysis obtain greater explanatory value as comparable 
processes.  
1.5 Methodological considerations  
Two forms of empirical data inform this study. On the one hand, document analysis was 
used as a complement to the secondary literature for thorough analyses of minority policies 
in Slovakia and Estonia as well as public debate on the issues. Three types of primary 
sources were used here, simultaneously constituting sources of information on the 
developments of negotiation processes and representing the international observers' stance 
as participants in the processes: First, policy documents issued by the Slovak or Estonian 
governments are utilised in the analyses of state- and nation-building; second, progress 
reports authored by domestic and international monitoring committees, particularly the 




Protection of National Minorities and the European Commission,
4 and in Estonia also by 
the monitoring committees analysing the impact of the national integration strategy, help 
evaluate the developments and outcomes of state policies. The analyses of these documents 
include a review of national policies and international agreements underlying these; third, 
public representations, information material and (political) programmes of minority 
organisations are used in the analysis of how minority actors have presented their 
arguments to the public. In the analysis of these documents, I was particularly interested in 
policy changes generally as well as changes in how these policies are justified by their 
proponents, potentially representing changes in the representation of integration and in the 
states' approaches to multiculturalism. Moreover, I sought to contrast policies with 
monitoring documents and identify correlations and the direct impact(s) of individual 
actors on policy developments.  
Semi-structured in-depth interviews with both participants in and observers of the 
integration processes in the two countries formed the other main source of empirical data 
for the study. The partly structured interview has at least three advantages over the 
unstructured interview or fully structured questionnaires (for a discussion of the 
differences see Bryman 2008): It employs guiding questions that allow for (relative) cross-
case comparability in a double case study; it gives the researcher leeway in the formulation 
and adjusting of questions to a specific context; it gives ample space to the respondent to 
answer freely to questions, which enables to enhance the researcher's understanding of 
perceptions and emphases the respondent would like to make. By and large, the semi-
structured interviews conducted during my fieldwork were structured conversations. The 
interviews with minority representatives in particular were employed in this thesis to 
understand the perceptions of social and political processes, learn about the framing of the 
problems of integration and the reasoning for political and social actor formation.  
In total, I conducted interviews with 54 individuals and small groups in the two countries, 
as well as an additional interview with an Estonian academic in Glasgow and a telephone 
interview with a representative of the German Rosa-Luxemburg-Foundation which had, in 
the past, provided funding for a Russian-speakers' organisation in Estonia (cf. appendix A). 
The interviews with small groups were designed in the same way as individual interviews, 
but generated different dynamics in the process of interview. Although the small groups 
                                                 
4 Progress or Regular Reports by the Commission assess the progress of the two countries towards EU 
accession. The implementation of the Framework Convention is regularly assessed by state parties, 
independent minority rights experts in the countries' as selected by the Council of Europe for this task, 




brought together individuals and representatives of the same organisation and similar 
backgrounds, during the interview the participants produced interesting responses to the 
researcher's questions, which represented the participants' deliberations on the interview 
questions. In this way, these group interviews supported the researcher's understanding of 
groups as heterogeneous and 'knowledgeable' actors, who continuously deliberate their 
perceptions and actions in relation both to majority and other minority actors.  
Choosing adequate interview partners and gaining access to them is usually a difficult task 
for researchers. Interview partners were chosen primarily on the basis of web-based 
research on individuals and organisations engaged in the field of integration and minority 
participation. Interviews were arranged by email in most cases; a smaller number of 
interviewees was recruited via 'snowballing', that is through other interviewees and 
acquaintances in the field, and were often arranged directly at an interview. Interviews 
were conducted with politicians, academics and minority cultural and political activists. 
These included, among others, representatives of the Legal Information Centre for Human 
Rights in Tallinn, a leading minority institution independently monitoring Estonian 
legislation and policy implementation from a human rights and international legal 
perspective, and of the Forum Institute, the leading research and documentation institute on 
matters of the Hungarian minorities in Slovakia and abroad that also offers trainings for 
civic and political activists, and engages in minority advocacy. Other interviews included 
those with representatives of organisations such as youth centres, sports and cultural clubs, 
students' organisations and others. Moreover, several interviews were conducted with 
minority and majority representatives who have, over the past twenty years, functioned in a 
variety of roles in the integration process, such as Tanel Mätlik, currently head of Estonia's 
integration foundation and Kálmán Petőcz, former diplomat for Slovakia and Director 
General of Human Rights and Equal Treatment at the Government Office of the Slovak 
Republic (cf. appendix A).  
The study was prepared following the guidelines for Social Science Ethics issued by the 
University of Glasgow, which is also summarised in the Plain Language Statement in 
appendix B. In all cases, already in the invitation for interview, researcher and research 
study were introduced. The brief outline stated the purpose of the study and specific 
reasons, why the participant was selected. Further, the option of full anonymity was given 
and confidentiality of data storage and use were outlined. All interviewees agreed to the 
interview being recorded and transcribed by the researcher. At the interview the 




risks to participants arising from involvement in the study and the option of full or partial 
anonymity (i.e. the option that selected statements could only be quoted anonymously) 
were discussed. All participants declared that they did not require anonymity, except for 
one statement of one respondent. The questionnaire used was approved by the Ethics 
Committee of the Faculty of Law, Business and Social Sciences/School of Social and 
Political Sciences, University of Glasgow.  
The interviews were very different in form and length, and also changed over the course of 
my research progress. Rather than one continuous field stay, I chose to visit the countries 
repeatedly for stays that lasted between one week and over three months. This helped me 
getting acquainted with the field contexts gradually, while being able to retreat from it for 
phases of reflection, where I could embark on the writing process in the context of British 
academia. For my research, having had both longer and shorter stays in the countries, I 
found the repeated visits rather than one in-depth stay helpful as well as practically more 
feasible. It allowed the interviews to reflect the dynamics of academic work much better 
than a one-off stay. I started interviewing just half a year into my doctoral studies, in April 
2008, and did the last interviews in May 2010. In both countries, preliminary interviews 
were not recorded, but served as an introduction into the questions that participants of 
integration in Estonia and Slovakia raised themselves, and which potentially differed from 
the questions international academia highlighted. The second, and longer, phase of my 
fieldwork included semi-structured interviews which were recorded and then transcribed 
by the researcher. The interview data are stored securely and were used only for the 
purpose of the PhD research.  
Although I did not receive a response to all requests for an interview, in the majority of 
cases a (mostly positive) response was the rule. Interview partners were open and 
welcoming to my research in general, and I received many questions about the reasons for 
my interest in what many participants perceived as 'of little interest to Europe'. Throughout 
my fieldwork I experienced as an advantage the fact that I was considered an 'outsider'. 
This was particularly important with respect to interviews with Hungarians in Slovakia 
who conveyed to me that the comparison between the 'historical' Hungarian minority and 
the Russian-speaking 'migrants' would be received very badly by fellow Hungarians, if a 
Hungarian were to conduct such research. Interview partners were also curious to learn that 
I had no family or other relations to any of the groups involved in my study. In response to 
my outsider position, many were eager to explain very elaborately their perceptions and 




interviews were characterised by mutual respect and while gender and age issues may have 
played a role in some interviews, as in all social interactions, overall these did not impact, 
neither positively nor negatively, the data gathered.  
The interview situation itself generated potential issues of power relations between the 
interviewer and the interviewee. On the one hand, interviewees were in a potentially 
vulnerable position due to their lack of control over the researcher's use of interview data. 
The vulnerability was increased by the fact that some of the interviews were conducted 
with non-professionals. For example, members of minority organisations in both countries 
who had rarely been interviewed in the past, and if so not by an academic from abroad, 
were excited about the interest in their work. In order to ensure that interviewees fully 
understood the purpose of the interview and that the interview did not raise unreasonable 
expectations on side of the interviewees, this aspect was explicitly and repeatedly 
discussed at the beginning of and during the interview. On the other hand, the fact that 
some of the interviewees (have) worked professionally for the promotion of their cause and 
claims - several being politicians, advocacy campaigners and advanced academics - made 
them strong actors in the interview situation. The purpose of the questionnaire, recording 
and transcribing of interviews was to moderate the control some interviewees attempted to 
take over the trajectory of the interview.  
To support my research, I could rely on English as my working language, which is the 
languages most of the interviews were conducted in, and my native German, which served 
as language of interview or helped facilitate communication in around 5 interviews. 
Additionally, I used Russian as main language of interview in three cases, and as means of 
communication outside the interview situation with several individuals. Most interviews in 
which English or German could not function as the main languages of interview, the 
interview situation was in fact relaxed by the mix of languages, and characterised by the 
wish to communicate and a mutual interest in a successful conversation. Using Slovak in 
order to initiate interviews proved to be a helpful tool. Overall, in most interviews it was 
neither the researcher's nor the interviewee's first language of communication. It was 
therefore crucial for the analysis of the interviews not to weigh every word. Instead, 
throughout the analysis, a form of 'empathetic hermeneutics' - in a loose sense - was 
deployed, seeking to understand the argument and perceptions the interviewee conveyed 




While document analysis supported the analysis of the context of minority activism, 
interviews were the main source for understanding the constraints as well as supportive 
and empowering factors for minority groups' political and civic activities. For the analysis, 
I repeatedly revisited the notes made during interviews as well as the transcriptions and 
recordings throughout the writing period. Initially, core themes of the interviews were 
identified in order to help structure the theoretical argument and the presentation of the 
thesis. Later, the constant revisitation enabled me to reflect upon the interviews in light of 
the development of the argument, and allowed me to refine assumptions and contextualise 
interviewees' responses.  
Interviews were conducted in Tallinn, Tartu, Jõhvi and Kohtla-Järve (Estonia) as well as in 
Bratislava, Košice, Šamorin and Galanta (Slovakia). My particular aim was to circumvent 
the bias often found in interview-based research on minorities in CEE, which is largely 
limited to capital cities. While Bratislava and Tallinn were the most important sites of my 
fieldwork, southern Slovakia is represented as well as North-East Estonia, the areas where 
large proportions of the populations are minority members. It is admitted that my research 
does not give a voice to those who are entirely outside the political debates on integration. 
In part due to the focus of the research question, in part reflecting lack of access due to 
language constraints, my research therefore perpetuates the elite-bias that also shapes most 
other research on the issue. I researched those people, who are already visible (even if only 
to a limited extent) and have thus found ways to voice discontent or support of policies and 
political demands. This aspect merits more research in the future and will require refined 
research methods. Many of the interviewees in fact represent several functions in the 
integration process. For example, Estonian academics interviewed as researchers 
simultaneously were experts who had elaborated the state's integration programme, or were 
part of the team monitoring the integration process. Similarly, in Slovakia several key 
players of the Hungarian minority had worked as researchers, authors of the political 
programme of the Hungarian minority party, and as members of the minority elite were 
highly educated, skilled, and fluent speakers of the titular language. 
A second bias became very clear to me during my field work in relation to the 
representation of women and men in my research. Although in general my sample of 
interviewees largely reflects the representation of men and women occupying the functions 
that I was interested in, women are actually underrepresented among my interviewees. 
Effectively I interviewed fewer women than would have been ideal, as more men than 





 5 (a great pity was that former Estonian Minister for Ethnic and Population 
Affairs Urve Palo was unavailable for interview, and an interview with the current 
Estonian Minister of Culture did not materialise either).
6 Despite these limitations, the 
interviews constituted the most important basis of my research, and allowed me to contrast 
minority groups' engagement with the perceptions of activists as regards their aims, their 
strategies for attaining them, and the success of (or constraints experienced upon) their 
activities.  
1.6 Structure of the thesis 
My thesis is divided into three parts consisting of three chapters each. The first part, 
starting with this introductory chapter, introduces my approach to researching integration 
and sets out to develop the theoretical background for my study. In chapters 2 and 3, I put 
in place the theoretical groundwork of the thesis. Discussing structuration theory as it was 
developed in reaction to the persisting problems of the structure-agency divide in social 
theory, I establish the fundamental categories of analysis that will guide my research. 
Essentially, structuration theory conceptualises structure as constraining as well as 
enabling agency, which allows for a new perspective on minorities as self-determined 
actors and renders possible the impact of minority action on social and political processes. 
Building upon the structuration approach, in chapter 3 I discuss the contributions of 
assimilation theory and social movement theory to the understanding of how boundaries 
between groups become meaningful for the trajectories of intergroup interaction. Further, 
the chapter identifies a thorough analysis of the institutional context as crucial pre-
condition for the analysis of non-dominant actors' role in the dynamics of interethnic 
relations.  
Part two of the thesis provides an analysis of the structural-institutional context of 
interethnic integration. I particularly focus on the strategies and means majority groups 
have applied in the process of state-building in the context of international integration and 
                                                 
5 Moreover, I noticed that the role women took in interviews was in several cases, but clearly not always, that 
of assistant (adding to the interview, whose main respondent was male rather than taking the role of main 
respondent) or interpreter.  
6 However, while a study of a particular impact of ethno-linguistic discrimination on women, researched 
extensively in relation to multiculturalism in societies across the world – note the extensive literature on the 
intersection of various forms of exclusion (sexism, racism, ageism etc), questions of international gendered 
division of labour and the more recent debates on multiculturalism and gender (Phillips 2007) - is yet to be 
conducted, I would hazard a guess that gender discrimination in the societies that I research runs transverse to 
society, including ethnic belonging intersects with economic rather than ethnic discrimination and both 
Russian and Estonian communities on the one hand, and Slovak and Hungarian on the other hand are 




bilateral conflicts with minority kin-states. In chapter 4, I review the historical legacies and 
background of state-building, nation-building and democratisation in Estonia and Slovakia. 
The chapter sheds light on the complex histories of aspirations for national self-
determination and oppression in the regions that today constitute the two countries, and 
discusses the role of minority policies in these processes. Following this, chapter 5 
investigates both states' fundamental political institutions that determine the boundaries of 
the political community. In response to the restrictive institutions of formal and practical 
political membership both states gradually opened the political community to minority 
members – I discuss the context of these changes and their impact on minority citizens' 
actual membership in the Slovak and Estonian political communities. Chapter 6 analyses 
the ways in which the understandings of state-ownership and national sovereignty were 
translated into further 'nationalising' of the state and thereby impacted the boundaries 
between majority and minority groups. A detailed analysis of the political steps taken looks 
at the ambiguous effect policies of limited minority recognition have had on majority-
minority group interaction. The effects of state- and nation-building in both countries have 
prompted debates on the detrimental effects of the particular majority-minority relations 
enforced in Estonia and Slovakia.  
The third part of the thesis then investigates the responses of minority groups to the 
majorities' state- and nation-building efforts, analysing minority contributions to state-
building and discussing their overall role in shaping the integration process. Chapters 7 and 
8 examine the political strategies applied by political actors and parties established by 
minority members. I investigate the ways in which minority political activists have 
attempted to find inroads into the political decision-making in order to change their 
disadvantageous relations to the state and to the majority group. In so doing, I argue that 
minority actors have creatively used the multiple structures of domestic and international 
minority legislation to support their strategies, and re-adjusted these in response to 
changing institutional contexts. Simultaneously, I identify main obstacles to meaningful 
political participation as well as the unintended consequence of such continued exclusion 
for minority mobilisation. Chapter 9 then looks at the alternative strategies the minority 
groups have developed outside the political institutions. In order to determine their 
situation in the social and political processes, minority groups have engaged in civic and 
cultural activism, attempting to create new opportunities and at the same time 
communicate their demands in a non-contentious way to authorities. I conclude that, 
although minority groups have continuously sought and found forms of activism to impact 




contributions to integration both inside and outside the political institutions has been 
limited.  
Overall, my thesis discusses non-dominant groups' contributions to majority-minority 
integration. In the concluding chapter, I briefly revisit the major findings of the thesis. I 
argue that both majority and minority groups need to be described as heterogeneous actors 
who dynamically adjust to their structural contexts, and who use (even limited) access to 
powerful institutions in order to shape these according to their own needs and demands. 
Scholarship on interethnic relations in CEE has so far focused on the preparedness of 
majority groups to the limited opening of states' political institutions, by providing certain 
minority rights aimed to allay minority demands for participation, which characterise 
integration policies in the region. In contrast, the agendas and strategies of minority 
members as actors, representing both their perceptions of interethnic relations and their 
active responses to these have been unrecognised by researchers, except where loud 
minority protest appeared to portend or express some imminent threat to stability. In so 
doing, scholarship has also largely neglected the contribution non-dominant groups have 
made to state-building and the redrawing of group boundaries in CEE. My thesis seeks to 
fill this gap.  Part I - Chapter 2 
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Chapter 2: Social integration as structuration process 
2.1 Introduction: System and social integration 
The introductory chapter determined intergroup integration and specifically non-dominant 
groups' contributions to this process as the core problem of this thesis. The approaches to 
interethnic integration in CEE discussed in the previous chapter have pointed to the 
structural constraints that limit minorities' influence on intergroup processes. At the same 
time, the agentic approaches discussed have given little to the understanding of how 
antagonistic groups constitute and maintain the social system they inhabit. Enquiring as to 
how minority groups can realise their agentic potential, while the statal society is 
simultaneously maintained, raises theoretical questions about the relation of agency and 
structure. Thereby it refers to the distinction between social and system integration that has 
haunted social theorists for over a century. The predominant focus of examinations of 
system integration lies with the compatible or contradictory relationships between the 
'parts of social systems' (for example institutions), while that of social integration lies at the 
heart of theories on conflict or cooperation between the actors in a system (Mouzelis 
1995).  
Crucially, this distinction between social and system integration must be understood in 
purely analytical terms. David Lockwood was the first to point to the inherent connection 
between the systemic and agentic levels and their interrelations in the process of mutual 
constituency. In his Social and System Integration (Lockwood 1964), he suggests the re-
visitation of the dichotomy by distinguishing system integration from social integration. 
Lockwood's main contribution consists of his interpretation of the system-social (or 
structure-agency) divide as a question of perspective of the researcher on the moving 
forces of social change. A system integration perspective analyses these processes from an 
'objective,' outsider perspective. Social integration, on the other hand, allows for the 
analysis of integration from the view of the actors involved, enabling the researcher to 
identify facilitators and constraints for agency at the level where integration processes are 
interpreted, evaluated, and decisions are made by actors. The main difference between both 
approaches and the analytical advantage of the distinction lies in the research perspective. 
As has been argued by Lockwood, social and system integration constitute two aspects of 
the same process.  Part I - Chapter 2 
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While the term integration has gained a high profile, its usage tends to confuse rather 
than clarify the issues discussed. To complicate matters further, the term is widely used in 
public and political debate to discuss related problems, without however operating with the 
conceptual and theoretical precision required of an academic analysis (Government 2008; 
Government 2000). Numerous studies today are set at the interface of theoretical and 
policy discussions of integration (see for example Muižnieks 2010; Vetik 2002). Time and 
again, the analytical and the normative aspects of the term are conflated, with the 
concomitant danger of confusing how integration processes pan out in a specific situation 
with what is seen as their desirable development. To be sure, both approaches to the topic 
of integration are perfectly legitimate. However, while a normative perspective can provide 
a useful framework for analysis, it becomes problematic when the normative fundaments 
are not disclosed or discussed by the authors. At the same time, analytical approaches that 
look at outcomes rather than processes can face the same problem, because they 
necessarily establish norms regarding the 'desired' outcomes. 
My own approach to integration is dynamic and cannot determine the 'contents' of 
integration – this is to be left to the actors participating in the process, as will become clear 
in the discussions of this and the next chapter. What I can determine, however, is the extent 
to which actors can shape integration processes. This approach requires a theoretical 
framework concerning the interaction of the actors in a social system and how they 
constitute or impact upon the social structures, or the relations between actors and 
structures. Such a perspective on integrating social systems then requires an analysis of the 
actors' capacity to act and react in the environments and situations they encounter, of their 
ability to interpret and (re)conceptualise the structures they are intertwined with, and of the 
social structures as constraining or enabling actors to maintain or change their relation to 
institutions and structures.  
A consequential theory of structure and agency is essential for understanding why and how 
human actors are able to impact upon the societal structures they are embedded in – even 
more so when we think about actors considered 'less powerful' than others. Picking up 
Lockwood's suggestion of looking at structure and agency as 'two aspects of the same 
process', structuration theory has set out to provide a theoretical framework that 
conceptualises structure and agency as a duality, which allows for understanding both 
components as mutually constitutive. As I demonstrate in chapters 2 and 3, this enables an 
approach to integration from the minority actors' perspective. In what follows I introduce 
and discuss the concepts of structure and agency as outlined in structuration theory, and Part I - Chapter 2 
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relate these two to social action and the question of unequal power relations between 
actors as fundamental categories of social change through social integration. Thus, the 
discussion provides for the theoretical understanding of majority-minority integration in 
CEE.  
One reservation needs to be made in relation to the overall theoretical approach, however. 
In this thesis, structuration theory is utilised as the overall theoretical framework that 
enables us to understand why it makes sense to analyse non-dominant agency in the first 
place. It has been criticised that the abstract language of structuration theory is unsuitable 
for empirical research. I partially agree. As such, the overall theoretical framework of 
structuration explains, why and how social integration in the two case countries develops 
in the ways it does. However, as this chapter will elucidate, structuration theory allows the 
researcher to conceptualise integration as the process that is generated in the 'dual' relation 
of structure and agency, in which the social action of, for example, minority members 
represents the diachronic materialisations of the structural and agentic potential of social 
actors. In order to account for the empirical analysis of the social interaction of state and 
society in the two countries, this thesis utilises concepts from assimilation theory, social 
movement theory, as well as the studies of nationalism, ethnopolitics and multiculturalim, 
which will be discussed and reformulated from a structurationist perspective in chapter 3. 
Throughout the thesis, the language of structuration theory is largely omitted, however will 
be returned to in the concluding sections of the empirical chapters as well as in chapter 10. 
Thereby, I aim to enable empirical analysis in a less abstract language in order to align this 
research with the debates of minority integration in CEE, while at the same time I maintain 
the thread that links the overall theoretical argument on non-dominant agency with the 
empirical analysis of institutions and minority actors' conduct (Giddens 1984; Stones 
2005).  
2.2 Social structures: Constraints and resources for human agency 
Structuration theory was originally outlined by Anthony Giddens and then further 
developed by, among others, William Sewell, and Mustafa Emirbayer and Anne Mische 
(Giddens 1984; Sewell 1992; Emirbayer & Mische 1998). It provides a framework to 
explicate the relation between structure and agency, and contains theoretical tools for 
analyzing the relation to the structural properties of a system of differently powerful actors, 
and by extension, power itself. The central idea of structuration is the 'duality of structure'. 
Emphasising the constraining as well as enabling properties of structure, this theory 
understands agency as tied to and conditioned, but not determined by the structures. Part I - Chapter 2 
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Structures are activated by situated agents in multiple ways in a given situation. Thus, 
structures are conditioned by agents' interaction, the reproduction or transmutation of 
structures depends on human action. In turn, this action is not conceivable without the 
structures, which simultaneously guide the ideas and perceptions that precede actors' 
actions, limit their agency and provide the resource base for it.  
Giddens' formulation of structure outlines the basis from which to continue into a more 
thorough elaboration of the concept. The structurationist understanding of structure differs 
from its usual conceptualisation in social theory. In his critique of the common 
understanding of structure in social theory and social analysis, he identifies (at least) four 
problems: Structure is mostly conceptualised as (1) 'external' to individuals, (2) equated 
with constraint, (3) outcomes of pre-existing actors' actions or activities, (4) independently 
existing from agents' knowledge of them (Giddens 1984, pp.16–26). In the introduction to 
this thesis, these limitations were identified with respect to functionalist approaches to 
integration in CEE. Post-structuralist approaches have attempted to better integrate actors 
into the concept of structure. Focusing on human practices, the theories have emphasised 
the 'virtual' aspects of structure. Social reproduction was explained by the actors' cultural 
knowledge, their habits and conventions, by which they enabled the maintenance of society 
(Bourdieu 1984). Ultimately, the emphases on cultural or 'mental' structures have failed to 
overcome the limitations of structure to constraint, as they could not explain creativity and 
change of actors' strategies.  
Structuration theory adopts both the classical and the post-structuralist concepts of 
structure, referring to them as actual and virtual structures. In order to enable a theory that 
recognises the 'structuring properties allowing the "binding" of time-space in social 
systems' (Giddens 1984, p.17) while simultaneously emphasising human agency in the 
reproduction or transformation of systems, the concept of structure needs to be further 
elaborated. Virtual structures function as rules of social interaction and have two aspects: 
they relate to 'the constitution of meaning and […] to the sanctioning of modes of social 
conduct' (Giddens 1984, p.18, emphases in the original). Thus, they refer to 'normative 
elements and codes of signification' (ibid., p. xxxi), which cannot, however, be 
conceptualised without and apart from the structural properties or actual structures that 
have the potential to serve as a 'source of power in social interaction' (Sewell 1992, p.9). 
As a consequence, virtual structures function as 'schemas' that inform the activation of 
actual structures, while the actual structures function as the 'resources' for the realisation of 
virtual structures.  Part I - Chapter 2 
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The structural properties that mediate social transformation can be further distinguished 
as authoritative (human) and allocative (non-human) types of resources (ibid.). Allocative 
resources have an existence beyond the virtual structures; their materiality alone, however, 
is not what makes them resources. They become resources in the actualisations and 
instantiation in human agency based on the 'schemas' or inter-subjectively established 
norms that inform their activation. Schemas can be thought of as (informal) conventions 
and habits, procedures, repertoires of interpretation schemes, scenarios and action recipes, 
or strategies that are applied in the reproduction of social life (Giddens, 1984). It is what 
people know, both consciously and unconsciously, as part of their memory, experience, or 
routine. They differ from 'publicly fixed codifications of rules' (Sewell 1992, p.8) such as 
laws, because the latter can be actualised as resources by actors, and thus go beyond the 
virtual realm of interpretative structures. Structure, then, is a set of schemas and resources, 
which exist as virtual and actual properties of social systems. Schemas depend on their 
instantiations in social practices, on being regenerated and validated through their 
actualisation as resources, in order not to lose their structuring role for agency. As 
indicated, according to Giddens, schemas  
'cannot be conceptualized apart from resources, which refer to the modes whereby 
transformative relations are actually incorporated into the production and reproduction 
of social practices' (Giddens 1984, p.18).  
In this sense, resources should not be understood as material entities that are powerful due 
to essentiality; at the same time they are not reducible to schemas. Schemas are validated 
and realised through the actualisation of resources. Resources are those abilities or 
possessions that actors use as means of interaction according to cultural schemas. The 
accumulation of resources in turn depends on the enactment of schemas. Only in the 
actualisation of schemas do material entities or features existing in time-space get 
attributed the necessary information or guidance on their social use. Resources are sources 
of power, the power to do something. It is the actualisation of particular resources via the 
application of certain schemas that empowers actors to engage with their environments. 
Schemas, in turn, are dependent on their validation through application to resource 
allocation or enactment of (for example) hierarchies. 
Because structure is conceptualised as a duality of schemas and resources, it can be 
transformed. Crucially, the realisation of schemas is not limited to a certain context, but 
holds for a variety of social situations; this means that they can be actualised in different 
situations at different levels of social interaction and in relation to various resources, Part I - Chapter 2 
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allowing for the transposition of schemas from one context to another (Sewell 1992, 
p.8). As patterns of action they are inter-subjectively available, which highlights their role 
as the ties of social systems. Moreover, social systems are not only constituted by one 
structure, but by structures, that is 'isolable sets of rules and resources' (Giddens 1984, 
p.17), which differ immensely in various aspects. The variability and complexity of 
coexisting structures, and the combination of the various elements determine how 
changeable or taken-for-granted they are conceived of by social actors, and how powerful 
they are in structuring agency. In this sense, structures can differ in their depth, durability, 
scope, and in character. They can be particularly stable and taken-for-granted or vulnerable 
to debate and/or change (deep structures or structures on the surface); structures might be 
exceptionally durable or rather short lived; they can also differ in proximity and 
accessibility to actors (local, regional, global structures). Their particular character and 
form (organisations, formal or informal networks, etc.) is closely connected to the specific 
subsystem the particular structures constitute (Morawska 2001, pp.51–52). 
The multiplicity of structures creates tensions between and within structures, making them 
more susceptible to change. Structures are multiple, as different logics and dynamics apply 
to e.g. educational or religious structures, enabling actors to enact  
'a wide range of different and even incompatible schemas and have access to 
heterogeneous arrays of resources' (Sewell 1992, p.17).  
These different schemas are known by actors as a 'system of transposable dispositions' 
(Bourdieu, 1977, p.83, cited in Sewell 1992, p.17). Schemas are the (cultural) knowledge 
of agents, who can use a schema learned in a specific context and transpose it to an 
unfamiliar context. The transposability of schemas in turn makes it impossible to know 
exactly how resources can and will be accumulated. Moreover, resources themselves, 
embodying cultural schemas, can be interpreted differently, as the cultural schemas that 
inform their use is always, to some extent, ambiguous. Lastly, both schemas and resources 
are activated by different actors who are situated in different sets of structures as well as by 
individual actors who encounter different structural sets. By transposing schemas from one 
situation to another, agents are able to interpret the new situation from their accustomed 
view and react accordingly, or reinterpret the schema in relation to the new situation, and 
thus to potentially revise their perception of the past, present and future. The intersections 
of structures, then, allow for the 'distancing' of the actor from the structures, who can apply 
schemas from one 'structural complex' to another, which enables theorising or applying 
theory to social reality. These five axioms – the multiplicity of structures, the Part I - Chapter 2 
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transposability of schemas, the unpredictability of resource accumulation, the polysemy 
of resources, and the intersection of structures – are what allow structural change to be 
conceptualised as inherent to structural operations (Sewell 1992, pp.16-19). This aspect of 
the structurationist conceptualisation of structure makes it possible to overcome the 
problems Giddens identified with common understandings of structure.  
Although the theory of structure, as suggested by Sewell (following Giddens), proffers a 
concept of social change as inherent to the concept of structure, the many references to 
agency and actors allude to the fact that social change cannot be understood completely 
without conceptualising agency. Schemas and resources are transposable, applicable, and 
capable of being activated in various contexts only insofar as that there is an actor to 
transpose schemas through which resources are (re)interpreted. The concept implies that 
structures can be enacted and applied by different actors. Moreover, newly reinterpreted 
resources can enable agents to try and change the power relations with others. This concept 
of structure, centred on the relation of schemas and resources, allows for the analysis of 
social change as much as of social stability. Despite structure and agency being mutually 
constitutive and sustaining, the reproduction of social systems does not happen 
automatically, but requires constant effort of agents. Therefore, structures are always 'at 
risk', if only to some extent (Sewell 1992, p.19). Change functions according to the same 
reproductive biases of structures that explain the powerful continuities of social relations 
and also make it possible to explain the paths followed in episodes of change.  
Overall, according to the structurationist understanding, structure cannot be equated with 
constraint only, because it enables agency as well as the transformation of former 
constraints into assets (and vice versa). Moreover, structures are not simply the outcomes 
of actors' doings, but also enable social action in the first place, however in a 'dual way' 
style. It is now possible to argue that structural change is not imposed onto a system from 
the outside or by 'voluntaristic' actors as traditional functionalist or rational choice theories 
suggest; instead structures, as conceptualised here, do not exist independently from the 
actors' knowledge – structures are only realised as structural constraints and resources 
through the agents' application of their cultural knowledge to human or non-human 
characteristics, possessions and physical surroundings. This conceptualisation of structure 
so far has three crucial consequences for the understanding of structuration. First, it 
enables us to see structure as inherently related to agency, because schemas and resources 
need an actor to enact them in social reality; structures provide the virtual and actual 
resources for agency, thereby simultaneously making it possible and limiting it. Second, Part I - Chapter 2 
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there is an inherent temporality to structure, based on its dependence on being 
reproduced over and again by agency. Third, as resources are normally unequally 
distributed, structures represent power relations, expressed as (unequal) resource allocation 
and domination. Subsequent chapters focus on questions of agency, temporality and power 
aspects of structuration to elaborate on these aspects further.  
2.3 Human agency: Iteration, Evaluation and Projection 
Structuration is a theory strongly focused on agency: structure and system accordingly 
require the conceptualisation of agency. In turn, structure needs to be incorporated into the 
theory of agency. Giddens's critique of common approaches to agency identifies at least six 
problems with how human conduct and action are explained: the flaws (inherent in 
functionalist and interpretative sociology) of either (1) overemphasising or (2) 
underemphasising structural constraints were already discussed in the introductory chapter. 
Moreover, according to Giddens, common approaches conceptualise human action as an 
(3) 'aggregate or series of separate intentions, reasons and motives' (Giddens 1984, p.3) or 
as (4) the sum of individual acts. Many concepts of agency also (5) fail to relate it to the 
'coherence of an acting self' (ibid.), neglecting the mediating role of the body and its 
properties through or by which agency is exerted. Finally, (6) agents' knowledge and 
reflexivity of situations are underelaborated in most theories of agency (ibid., especially 
pp.2-5). In sum, agency has often been taken out of its context in both the circumstances 
and the conditions under which it takes place. In so doing, it necessarily presupposes pre-
existing units (individuals) generating 'self-action' as the basis and the 'ultimate starting 
point of social analysis' (Emirbayer 1997, p.287), which the notion of duality does not 
accept. Instead, in Giddens's own formulation of agency, the duality of agency is 
conceptualised as recursive social practices, which are not  
'brought into being by social actors but continually recreated by them via the very 
means whereby they express themselves as actors' (Giddens 1984, p.2, emphasis in the 
original).  
The reproduction process requires some form of 'knowledge' of the agents about exactly 
how the continuity of practices can be ensured. Giddens discerns three levels of 
'knowledgeability' of actors: unconscious motives/cognition, practical consciousness, and 
discursive consciousness, with permeable boundaries, however, between the different 
levels (ibid., p. 7). These layers of knowledge enable agents in different forms of 
behaviour. The stratified model of the agent allows for the reflexive monitoring of action, 
its rationalisation and the motivation for action. Giddens also insists that agency 'refers Part I - Chapter 2 
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[…] to [the] capability of doing' (ibid., p.9, my emphasis), not to the actors' intentions or 
knowledge about things. So, knowledgeable human agents continuously reflect on their 
own and others' activities and the context in which they are conducted. But what is it that 
makes people act and how does this engender social change?  
Agency not only relates to unconscious and conscious motives and reasons, and the 
perception of current conditions and contexts, but also to the unacknowledged conditions 
and unintended consequences of action. According to Giddens, social change occurs 
primarily due to the unintended consequences of actions and the 'imperfect' reconstruction 
of contexts in social practices. While much of human agents' everyday activities are 
routines, actors are capable of reflecting on contexts, including other actors' activities, on 
their own motives, and on the potential outcomes of action. Moreover, the concept of 
structure as elaborated in section 2.2 reminds us of the relative flexibility of the actors' 
evaluative and projective capabilities. Schemas by which or within which contexts are 
monitored or judged are transposable; the repertoire of such schemas is potentially ever-
expanding. Importantly, the actors' knowledge is socially constructed in the sense that it is 
acquired through socialisation and learning, and reconstituted through social action in 
relational processes with others. Therefore, agency is conceptualised here first of all as 
dynamic. The dynamics of agency enable it to be directed towards the ever-changing 
structural contexts, but also to the changing boundaries of what is considered the (relevant) 
context in the first place.  
Emirbayer and Mische's reformulation of Giddens's idea of dual agency, based on their 
'relational' approach to sociology, allows for expansion and more precise specification of 
agency that follows Giddens, but overcomes problems of the original theory as criticised 
by social theorists (Emirbayer & Mische 1998; Emirbayer 1997). Emirbayer and Mische 
incorporate these aspects without giving superiority to any of them, thus providing 
theoretical tools for analysing diverse forms of agency or practices. Their disaggregation of 
the elements of agency enables us to understand it as social practices of temporally 
embedded agents. Founded in 'relational pragmatism' (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, p.973), 
their theory sees agency as lying always in the interaction of actors with their contexts in 
the form of an ongoing 'dialogue', and so they conceptualise the actor as a 'dialogical 
structure' (ibid., p.974). Emirbayer and Mische develop agency as a triadic concept, 
incorporating an iterational, a projective and a practical-evaluative element. These 'chordal' 
dimensions of agency refer to its orientations towards the past, future and present, 
conceptualising agency as inherently temporal. Thus understood, agency allows for the  Part I - Chapter 2 
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'selective reactivation […] of past patterns, [the] imaginative generation […] of 
possible future trajectories [and the evaluation of] alternative possible trajectories of 
action […] [in] presently evolving situations' (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, p.971).  
Although all elements of agency are ever-present in every response to encountered 
situations, they are not always balanced; usually one dimension is prevalent in the process 
of concretely situated social action.  
As Emirbayer and Mische argue, each of these dimensions exhibits a triadic structure, in 
themselves oriented towards past, present and future, thus always carrying aspects of the 
other two components as well (ibid., p.973). It is the agent's temporal orientations that 
allow for switching between the dimensions and changing the agent's relationship to 
structure. The iterational element describes those reactivations of agency patterns that refer 
to the actor's past, established or past routines, and incorporated practices; it helps agents 
to maintain their identities and general stability in relation to the social structures, 
particularly in the face of change. The projective element includes the capacity to imagine 
possible trajectories according to the actor's own orientations, desires, apprehensions; it 
allows for reconfiguring the agent's habitual patterns of thought and action in relation to 
these imaginative moments. The practical-evaluative element encompasses the ability to 
judge practically, normatively, or discursively, in response to the situational contexts. This 
goes along with the ability of actors not only to monitor their own relation and interaction 
with the structures, but also the other actors' (inter)actions and relations. Following this 
understanding, in situations the individual encounters, he or she might react according to 
learned routine, habits and so on. Still, even then, variations and modifications are 
possible. Neither the situations nor the reactions are usually identical, as situations may 
have slightly different contexts or actors might make 'mistakes' in their re-enactment of 
schemas. In new situations this seems to hold in particular.  
Emirbayer's and Mische's disaggregation of the elements of agency allows for analysing 
the relationship between the reproductive and the transformative dimensions of social 
action and for explaining how reflexivity on past, present, and future in a given situation 
can possibly lead to differently oriented action, either by 'increasing routinization or 
problematization of experience' (ibid.). Agency denominates the concept of the ability to 
act in various contexts. It provides the patterns to engage with the structures, and the 
ability to reflect on them and the actor's relation to them. These temporal patterns are 
selectively activated in order to exert impact on a given context. The iterational component 
gives the actor the scope to pay attention to aspects of the context according to Part I - Chapter 2 
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biographical, experiential and motivational relevance. Recognising types and categories 
of patterns, the actor can draw from the repertoire of routines and habits. In turn, this 
'schematisation' results in patterns of knowledge and expectations about one's own future 
action and that of other agents, providing for frames of stable social interaction; it also 
enables actors to maintain an identity, despite and in the face of changing circumstances 
(ibid., especially pp.978-981).  
The projective dimension, too, is inherently structured as a chordal triad. The actor's 
projections on future outcomes of potential action are based on retrospective categorisation 
of types of action and their outcomes, placed in a sequence which provides for the 
narratives of causal relations between actions and development patterns. In processes of 
'symbolic recomposition' actors creatively combine components of potential action and 
possible outcomes as scenarios for the future. These, in turn, are assessed in light of the 
'moral, practical, and emotional concerns arising from lived conflicts' (ibid., p.990). 
Crucially, this is an inter-agentic process. Just as 'moral, practical, and emotional concerns' 
are generated in interaction among actors and in relation to their contexts, so too are the 
narratives and projections they invent and recompose in response to the latter. Moreover, 
actors are capable of selecting past interaction patterns to deliberate upon possible future 
trajectories in order to develop joint strategies for change and innovation. This aspect of 
deliberation is close to one dimension of the third, the practical-evaluative element of 
agency. 'Contextualising' social experience, deliberation offers the actor the opportunity to 
make their decisions based on consideration and reflexion in interaction with others. 
Practical evaluation is relevant when actors find themselves in a situation where old 
habitual patterns do not offer an appropriate response. This is not only the case in 
situations of large scale change, but holds for many routine practices too, for example in 
everyday interactions with others (Sewell, 1992).  
In practical evaluation, aspects of the present context are related back to the schemas of 
interaction, and potential responses to the problem are identified. It is then for the actor to 
deliberate (in a self-reflective process or public discourse) the projections in light of the 
particularities of the current situation. The actor's choice and the exertion of the subsequent 
response, however, must not be seen as the ideal fulfilment of a balance of the actor's best 
interest, moral standards and practicability. Rather, the execution of a decision represents 
the 'contextualization of our habits, ends, duties, and projects' (Emirbayer and Mische 
1998, p.1000). Moreover, Giddens's incorporation of Robert Merton's notion of unintended 
consequences into the structuration concept of agency reminds us that a decision to act and Part I - Chapter 2 
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its execution are no more identical with the outcomes than rational choice theory's 
intentions. Instead, the chordal triad of agency provides the theoretical tools to understand 
the temporality of situated agency in relation to ever-changing contexts, which actors can 
never fully overlook. The capability 'to do things' is always related to the actor's 
embeddedness in multiple structures, which not only limit the options available or 
perceptible to the actor, but also provide her with a potentially expanding repertoire of past 
patterns, current challenges, and desires, interests or anticipations concerning future 
trajectories.  
2.4 Structure, agency and action: Accounting for social continuity and 
change  
Central aspects of Giddens's approach to structuration have come under scrutiny from a 
variety of theoretical stances (Parker 2000; Mouzelis 1997; Held & Thompson 1989; 
Archer 1996). Among the critics who have gone furthest in the elaboration of their own 
understanding of structuration are Nicos Mouzelis and Margaret Archer. Mouzelis 
conceptualises system and social integration in relation to social hierarchies. These exist as 
structures in the form of institutions and figurations of actors, and are reproduced or 
transformed through interaction of micro- and macro-actors in social games, which differ 
in kind and in impact, depending on the position of the actor in the hierarchy (Mouzelis 
1995). Archer emphasises social and system integration as 'qualitatively different aspects 
of society' (Archer 1995, p.11, emphasis in the original), whose relation is that of interplay, 
rather than of interpenetration (ibid., p.15).  
A major point of critique is Giddens's notion of the duality of structure and agency, which 
is often interpreted by critics as the 'identity' of the two. This would render the heuristic 
value of the approach doubtful. It is argued that, when understood as duality, structure and 
agency are practically reduced to one another, inhibiting the analysis of their interplay as 
they, the critique goes, could not be understood as distinct from each other. Mouzelis and 
Archer argue that both can and should be related to one another only in the form of non-
identity, that is as analytical dualism. The question whether to think of structuration as a 
duality or a dualism might appear to be a philosophical problem, with little relevance for 
social analysis. Indeed, some comment that the main problem of the controversy lies in the 
fact that Giddens's concept of structuration remains too much at the philosophical level, 
producing highly abstract and generalising ontological concepts of structure-agency 
(Stones 2005), rather than providing a theory explaining the relation between the two, as 
Archer claims to do.  Part I - Chapter 2 
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The problem of duality certainly needs consideration. The point that the concept of 
duality leads to conflation is not quite so easily cast aside as a purely philosophical 
problem, as it has consequences for how structure and agency are conceptualised as such; 
it is crucial, moreover for our understanding of how social change is possible and how it 
takes place. Giddens's own formulation of the relation of structure and agency and his 
attempts to formulate a more applicatory theory by developing strategic conduct and 
institutional analysis, falls short in its elaboration of the concepts. The positioning of 
differently powerful actors and their shifting relations to the system is not only an 
empirical, but an analytical question, which needs to be incorporated into the elaboration 
of structuration theory. I argue, however, that it is the concept of duality of structure and 
agency, rather than dualism, which enables us to understand social integration as a 
relational process between groups, permanently re-constituting and possibly ever-changing 
their situational contexts. In turn, the assumption of ever-changing relations between 
groups allows one to ask interesting questions about the relative permanence of most 
aspects of these relations as expressed in social integration. It is this conceptualisation of 
social integration that addresses the contribution of relatively autonomous agents to social 
stability and change.  
Both structure and agency carry elements that share dynamic relationships. Schemas and 
resources can be combined innovatively and thus support the actors' ability to re-adjust 
their relations to the structural context. Simultaneously, orientations in agency can be 
refocused, emphasising projective elements where habits have dominated, or representing 
practical evaluation of current contexts, where projection has guided the direction of 
agency. It should be clear by now that agency and structure refer to a potential, to the 
capability of historical actors to enact schemas and resources in situational contexts. 
Agency is not to be equated with concrete social action, as if it were the sum of every 
empirical instantiation of this potential in social reality. Nor is structure to be equated with 
the concrete representations of schemas or resources. Social action and interaction are 
diachronic, following the time-line of human (social) existence. However, the structural 
contexts and the agentic triad constrain and enable social action synchronically.  
While agency and structure are inseparable, mutually constitutive in a relational way, both 
are inherently dynamic, allowing for them to never be completely determined by the other. 
Not only can schemas and resources be enacted in different and innovative combinations, 
but the different orientations of agency allow for variety in the interaction with structure. 
This variability however is only a potential, as long as the social actors and their specific Part I - Chapter 2 
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encounters with the structural contexts remain eclipsed by the analysis. Generating their 
responses to the temporal-relational context, actors are enabled by both the multiplicity of 
structure and the agentic orientations; however, it is only the concrete actor's  
'constitution of such orientations within particular structural contexts that gives form to 
effort and allows actors to assume greater or lesser degrees of transformative leverage in 
relation to the structuring contexts of action' (Emirbayer and Mische 1998, p.1004).  
Partly as a consequence of the former, we need to specify structure as relational structural 
contexts of empirical social action (and agency), also accounting for the differentiation 
between structure as represented in the boundary of the model and structure as it appears in 
the scripts. Mustafa Emirbayer and Jeff Goodwin provide an elaboration of this thought in 
their approach towards a new theory of collective action. They argue that social action is 
always 'embedded within, and simultaneously shaped by a plurality of relational contexts 
of structural "environments"' (Emirbayer & Goodwin 1996, p.364, emphasis in the 
original), which they call the cultural, social-structural and social-psychological contexts of 
agency and action. Crucially, social action relates not only to one, unitary structural 
context, but instead unfolds at the intersection of three contextual dimensions, which 
constitute the specific context of every specific instance of action. Moreover, as noted 
above, it is not the overlapping structural contexts alone which shape social action, but 
actors are capable of differently orienting towards the specific relational contexts. 
Importantly, the three contexts of action, again, are not represented by specific units or 
entities, but capture processes of transactions and ties between the dynamic, relational 
actors.  
The cultural context of action denotes the conceptual and symbolic patterns that shape the 
actors' normative and interpretive frames of reference, their 'understanding of the world 
and of their own possibilities within it' (ibid. p.365), such as ideas of nationhood, 
democracy or equality. The social-structural context refers to the relations between human 
and organisational actors, and how allocative and authoritative resources are unfolding in 
transactions and patterns of access to such resources; for example, this can refer to legal 
contexts regulating the relations between groups, the distribution of wealth, and access to 
political power. The social-psychological context encompasses the relational structures of 
emotion and commitment, identity and solidarity, which provide both enablement and 
constraint to agency and action, such as intergroup attitudes. All three structural contexts 
are deeply intertwined, sometimes coherently, sometimes are mutually incompatible. They 
follow different logics, however, which need to be theoretically distinguished (ibid.). Part I - Chapter 2 
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Decisively, it is the intersection of these different logics in specific situational contexts 
that provide for different combinations of sets of structures for every actor. Moreover, the 
temporal-relational orientations of agency enable actors to enact different 'scripts' (Barley 
& Tolbert 1997) from the intersection of contexts at different points in time, or instance of 
social action. These 'scripts' represent the specific intersection of contextual structures that 
can be enacted, replicated or revised by a specific historical actor. It is individually altered 
'scripts' that actors can exert leverage on, or their own specific figuration of overlapping 
contexts.  While actors are often able to modify these patterns of interaction in their 
immediate social proximity, this much less often leads to the 'objectification' or 
'externalisation' of revised patterns of interaction of a broader set of agents, or in other 
words to structural-institutional change.  
2.5 The structuration of groups: Collective subjectivity, power and 
domination 
While the question concerning how likely change is in a given context is mainly an 
empirical question, I concur with Barley and Tolbert that it is generally more likely under 
contextual change affecting more than one actor. Even though it seems to say that change 
occurs, when change occurs, this is not a circular argument. Instead, it suggests that in 
contexts when the intended and unintended consequences of earlier actions have led to a 
situation where particular schemas have generally lost their validity, or habitual action 
does not lead to the envisaged outcomes anymore, it is more likely to generate collective 
questioning of patterns or principles than situations where habits are adequate to their 
contexts. Clearly, such situations often generate active responses that apply corrections, for 
example by employing mechanisms to avoid unintended consequences, identified as causes 
of the problems which led to contextual change. However, in the same way collective 
questioning bears the potential for collective deliberation, reflexion on current social 
relations and institutions, by expanding the actors' options. To be sure, for a possible 
institutionalisation of new processes and relations to be lasting, an adjustment of social 
actors both in terms of structure and agency is required. This, however, is a process that in 
turn requires the common effort of all actors involved in shaping the specific intersection 
of contexts for each actor affected.  
The notion of the actors' impact on the structural context brings us back to the notion of 
power and differently powerful actors. Despite the 'dialectic of control' that is inherent to 
structuration, arguing that actors are always both constrained and enabled in their action by 
structures, Giddens, too, is aware of differences in control that can be exerted by different Part I - Chapter 2 
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actors. Decisively, continuity or change in the structure of a social system do not depend 
on individual (micro or macro) actors' changing behavioural patterns (alone), but require 
relational agentic effort at many levels of social structuration. Regarding the exertion of 
political power and domination, for example, orders have to be fulfilled by the 
subordinated; decision-making of the few on behalf of the many others requires some form 
of legitimation; the rules according to which domination and legitimation function have to 
be put in place. Giddens referred to these three aspects as structures of domination, 
legitimation and signification (Giddens 1984, pp.28-34). All three are expressed in various 
ways in the contextual structures, where 'meaning, normative elements and power' interlace 
(ibid., pp.28-29). Again, it is a question of empirical historical manifestation, exactly 
which norms are signified as important, and what kind of power structure crystallises. The 
framework suggests, however, that while change can be initiated by deliberating on only a 
specific, context-bound expression of (for example) power relations, significant social 
change is only to occur when change is observable with regard to the respective 
interpretative schemes, norms, and facilities of domination (ibid., p.29), affecting the social 
system as a whole.  
While social change often is the effect of gradual shifts in the relational structures of a 
social system and the often unintended consequences of institutionalised patterns of 
interaction, it can also be brought about purposefully by actors particularly aiming at 
change (Olson 1965). Theories of collective action, social movements or revolutions 
emphasise the importance of discursivity, of active distancing of actors from the structural 
contexts that shape them, and their 'cognitive liberation' (McAdam 1982) from these. 
Essential to form a collective actor with 'collective subjectivity' are webs of relational 
actors who establish a common interpretation of the causes of the problems they encounter, 
as well as possible and desirable alternatives to the current situation (Benford & Snow 
2000). In short, they have to develop relative coherence with regard to their agentic 
orientations (Melucci 1995). The formation of a collective actor, in turn, is then based on 
some form of perceived, experienced, or imagined groupness. Understanding groups as 
potential actors in their own right, formations of relational webs of actors exhibiting 
similarity with respect to one or more properties relative to structures, can thus have a 
normative, socio-structural and identificational representation. Naturally, individuals are 
embedded in numerous intersecting webs of interaction. Many group boundaries can be 
expected to be congruent with respect to normative, identificational and socio-structural 
properties.  Part I - Chapter 2 
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Active and conscious processes of collective actor formation are just one route by which 
movements of 'powerless' actors become a 'match' for more powerful actors. However their 
importance lies in the discursive, deliberative and interactional conscious processes of a 
group becoming an actor. The argument of discursivity and collective action supports 
another aspect of understanding groups as agents. It allows us to understand individual 
group members' adjustment to systemic requirements not simply as a 'reaction', but at least 
potentially as social action, based on deliberation and conscious evaluation. Thus, it is 
possible to say that not only purposeful political collective action, but also everyday action 
of individuals is embedded in deliberations about, and evaluations of, situational contexts 
by relational individuals. In structural contexts of domination/subordination between 
groups, non-dominant group 'members' might therefore attempt to impact their situation 
not only by openly challenging the normative and institutional patterns according to which 
the system works, but also by responding to the structures in less openly challenging, 
everyday action even without wanting to support a 'group identity', nonetheless supporting 
or subverting the system intentionally or unintentionally. Social integration, then, analyses 
the interaction processes between dominant and non-dominant actors.  
Conclusion 
In this chapter I elaborated a theoretical framework for understanding the relation of 
structure, agency, social action and social change. In so doing, I discussed how both social 
change and social integration are enabled by the properties of social systems, its virtual and 
actual structures. I demonstrated that these structures depend on their actualisation in 
human agency, while in turn agency is made possible through these structures as the 
resources for situated social action. Change of a social system over time is enabled by the 
multiplicity of structures, allowing individual actors to reinterpret given situations or enact 
resources in new contexts, and developing preferences and strategies in relation to their 
memory traces, current requirements of action and projections of future trajectories. While 
this theory, in principle, explains how human action can impact the structures that 
constrain the actor, it has not been elaborated sufficiently, why and how specific groups 
form as actors, and how group interaction contributes to the maintenance or change of a 
social system. Structuration theory has been criticised for its limited applicability to 
empirical research. Indeed, it is hard to apply the highly abstract theoretical language used 
in this chapter to the analysis of Russian-speakers' and Hungarians' interaction with 
Estonia's or Slovakia's political structures. The questions of how to engage in a 
structurationist analysis of integration in the two countries are therefore central to the Part I - Chapter 2 
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theoretical and conceptual elaborations of chapter 3. The following chapter sets out to 
identify the empirical actors and crucial structures, determining these actors' relations to 
each other, in the context of interethnic integration in multinational societies, such as 




Chapter 3: The generation of groups and collective 
actor formation 
3.1. Introduction 
My thesis explores the role played by ethno-linguistic minority groups in the process of 
interethnic integration, which constitutes a crucial aspect of state- and nation-building in 
multinational societies. The previous chapter introduced agency and social action, 
fundamental categories that enable the investigation of non-dominant or minority groups as 
social actors on the basis of their capacity to interact with the social and political structures 
which they inhabit. The present chapter seeks to identify the properties of ethnic or ethno-
linguistic groups specifically. Extant theories of assimilation dealing with interethnic 
integration have understood the significance of ethno-linguistic, minority-group belonging, 
first and foremost, as a constraining aspect of an individual's position in social interaction. 
Classical assimilation theory, however, tends to eschew any direct and substantial 
discussion of 'group belonging' itself, neglecting the constituting role of political 
institutions in determining group boundaries. As I demonstrate in this chapter, a 
structurationist approach to group boundaries allows these to be understood as generated 
through social practices of aggregate groups in relation with state (and social) institutions. 
It is this relationship that makes group boundaries malleable and thus integration a possible 
development of intergroup relations. The pattern and process of the formation of group 
boundaries lies at the centre of interethnic interaction. They represent the relations between 
groups and the forms and directions of cooperation and adaptation. This chapter 
demonstrates that the latter, though conditioned by institutional structures, can be modified 
by group members in interaction with the structures constituting the institutional 
framework as well as of group relations.  
In this chapter, I discuss ethnicity (in lieu of ethno-linguistic groupness) and the different 
moments that ethnicity carries both as a constraining element and as a resource for 
collective action. In a second step, I review aspects of social movement theory in search of 
clues as to how groups establish themselves as actors. In conclusion, this chapter discusses 
factors that were identified by assimilation and movement studies which impact ethnic 
group relations. Overall, the chapter provides a reformulation from a structurationist 




3.2 Assimilation theory and the study of interethnic integration  
Integration as a group-based social phenomenon has been researched most coherently in 
assimilation theory.
1 It was long the central aim of assimilation theory and assimilation 
studies to demonstrate the influence of minority group adaptation to mainstream (or the 
'host') society on the minority population's participation in the mainstream. The starting 
point for analyses and theories in the field are immigrant, indigenous or other minority 
groups, distinguishing sets of ethnically or culturally differently 'equipped' individuals. 
Initially, taking these groups as givens, the emphasis of integration studies was primarily 
on the reduction of social inequality between existing groups. 'Structural assimilation', 
often analysed as a mode of social mobility, ultimately compares the social and human 
capital of individuals with different group memberships, who compete for access to crucial 
resources and the rights to participation in decision-making (Gordon 1964). Group 
belonging, decisively, represents an aspect of individuals' capital and thus a relative 
constraint or an asset respectively for their participation in society. In this understanding, 
integration between groups therefore increases with the individual group member's 
advancement in society, and the resulting aggregate group's integration into the societal 
mainstream.  
On this basis, both classic and segmented assimilation theory have identified ethnicity as 
the determining variable in structural processes of social mobility, providing for a certain 
predictability vis-à-vis future developments in contexts of group adaptation in 
countries/societies of immigration. In virtually all cases, language – or, more precisely, the 
command of the host state's official language – is not only one of the most pronounced 
group markers, but also a – if not the – key determinant for the minority members' ability 
to compete with the majority population, for social mobility and integration (Gordon 
1964). Focus on ethnicity as group members' specific human and social capital allows for 
an analysis of structural assimilation as relations of differentiation or accommodation of 
groups, expressed particularly in terms of social, economic, and spatial structures, as well 
as political participation. In turn, persistence of ethnic segregation – for example, in the 
labour market – can be related to the perpetuation of ethnic boundaries in other structures.  
                                                 
1 This approach, though rooted in the American tradition of sociology and the construction, development and 
problems of US American society as an 'immigrant society', has developed into a number of related theories, 
finding applicability in societies far beyond the US context. However, its explicit 'liberal' tradition with the 
strong focus on individual achievement is evident even in many more recent studies, despite numerous 
reformulations and reconsiderations (Yans-McLaughlin, 1990). Though its original realm of research is 
immigrant integration, conclusions can be drawn also for the context of (national/ethnic) minority 




The role of language is qualified, however, when its intersection with other 
fundamental determinants of social mobility is considered, including age, gender, class and 
race/ethnicity. For example, it makes a crucial difference for the individual's adaptation to 
majority society beyond the acquisition of the majority language, whether the minority 
member has spent most of their life in a different cultural and structural context, or was 
socialised and educated by and within majority structures and institutions (Zhou 1997; 
Portes & Zhou 1993). Moreover, despite increasing majority language acquisition by 
minority members over time, inequalities tend to persist. Assimilation theory, then, makes 
a strong case for the argument that, at least structurally, ethnicity and race continue to 
constitute the most important reference points in the construction of boundaries between 
'host' and 'immigrant' societies, or majority and minority groups more generally.   
Despite this emphasis on ethnicity, for a long time the essential term itself remained a 
'black box' in assimilation theory (Zhou 2005, p.131). As Zhou argues in a critique of pre-
existing approaches, ethnicity was often explained as a static effect of either cultural or 
structural processes. Working on the basis of these unwarranted assumptions, it is 
impossible to account for the 'interaction patterns, institutions, personal values, attitudes, 
lifestyle, and presumed consciousness of kind' that co-determine the emergence and 
salience of (ethnic) group belonging, practices and potential assimilation (Yancey, Juliani, 
and Erikson, 1976, quoted in Zhou 2005, p.141). Moreover, the focus on ethnicity as a 
notion of individual human and social capital being the sole determinants of integration 
neglects the complexity of ethnic integration contexts. It overlooks both that ethnicity is 
not a social feature that can be 'overcome' in a one-way process through individual effort 
over time, and that ethnicity itself is the (temporary) outcome of complex interactions 
between the members of a specific ethnic group and powerful actors determining social 
boundaries, primarily the state. Particularly where other group markers, such as language 
use, lose their salience while ethnicity and other forms of group distinction along (former) 
ethno-linguistic boundaries persist, it is crucial to understand that the latter can be a 
category of subjective belonging as much as it represents 'objective' criteria. The members' 
embeddedness within social networks, family relations and emotional ties can be pursued 
by practicing an explicit ethnic identity, which might entail no more than sentiments of 
closeness or solidarity (Morawska 2005; Yans-McLaughlin 1990); individuals choose 
between different forms of ethnic belonging, depending on the situational context (Loury, 




In contrast to the limited notion of ethnicity in much of classical assimilation 
theory, the conceptual approach followed here defines ethnicity as a complex of structural 
relations, interactions, and resources. This enables us to move beyond understandings of 
ethnicity as either an unchangeable unit of essentiality, something that people 'have' rather 
than 'make', or as a voluntarily changeable affiliation, to be taken up or disposed of freely 
by the individual in the process of assimilation. Reformulated from a structurationist 
perspective, ethnic group belonging is a reciprocal process of in-group and out-group 
distinction, informal ascription, official categorisation, and social identity, expressed in 
practices which create, maintain, modify or shift the boundaries between the groups 
involved, in which the state serves as a powerful tool in forming, perpetuating or 
dissolving ethnic identities (Wimmer 2004). These group boundaries, for majority and 
minority groups alike, constitute means to reduce social complexity, legitimise structures 
of power and resource distribution, and enable access to specific material and emotional 
support (Lamont & Molnár 2002). Over time, the maintenance of group boundaries 
therefore can become a goal in itself for any side involved, providing for the respective 
group's members' normative frames, social networks, identity formation, and specific 
resources (Olzak 1983).  
While in some cases ethnic boundaries are simply by-products of the transactions between 
participants in society, they can also refer to the actors' 'borrowing' or transposing 
boundaries between situations or forms of social organisation, such as when the existence 
of group differences becomes institutionalised in the form of differently ascribed roles or 
denial of access to certain spheres or resources (Alba 2005). Moreover, group structuration 
through the institutionalisation of boundaries can entail the 'invention' of boundaries. These 
processes overlap, so that boundary construction often involves both unacknowledged and 
acknowledged, as well as inventive and borrowed, elements. To be sure, 'invention' of 
categorical boundaries does not require the invention of their components, but may refer to 
the sudden emphasis that is put on a line of distinction which had not formerly played a 
role (Tilly 1999). In this sense, the institutionalisation of new polities following border 
changes after wars, dissolution of state federations or struggles for (national) independence 
may be accompanied by the crystallisation of (new) minorities, such as, prominently, 
across the map of Central and Eastern Europe.  
Thus, ethnicity as a categorical relation expresses domination and subordination, inclusion 
and exclusion, identification and prejudice, marking 'sets of actors sharing a boundary 




excluded by that boundary' (Tilly 1999, p.62). In other words, although the 
boundaries may refer to ties and relations between sets of individuals, they thereby produce 
groups and identities along the boundaries of which social arrangements configure. 
Unsurprisingly, subordination, exclusion and prejudice constitute sometimes 
insurmountable barriers to minority participation in society. However, as noted above and 
in line with the structurationist argument, these not only constrain minority members, but 
also provide for alternative agency.  
Building upon this conceptualisation, ethnicity and group belonging of minority groups can 
be understood not only as barriers to assimilation or resources for ethnic minority 
'retention' (Gans 1997), but also as resources at hand emerging from and responding to the 
requirements of migration/border change (etc.) itself (Eve 2011), in confrontation with the 
demands posed by the majority context (Waters & Jiménez 2005), or even as one of the 
few routes to participation in 'mainstream' society (O'Toole & Gale 2009; Banducci et al. 
2004). Minority group institutions, then, are decisive for the group's ability to allocate and 
pool group resources, providing also means of minority-identity mobilisation. Whereas 
these institutions provide the frames of reference for individual sentiments of belonging, in 
multiethnic societies they are potentially incongruent with formal and 'objective' forms of 
membership, such as citizenship.  
This political dimension of assimilation brings to attention the limited leverage of minority 
members to determine their adaptation and social advancement (Wimmer 1997). Both the 
explicit requirements for formal membership and public policies deploying restrictive 
access criteria for full participation in society impact the minority's ability to respond to 
these demands. At the same time, policies are themselves embedded in economic and 
social processes, underpinning ideological and strategic battles between political actors, 
including those regarding the problems of integration. However, politics and political 
institutions can also shape integration. This might include the redistribution of resources 
and support for marginalised or excluded groups, by initiating debates and promoting 
recognition and acceptance of other groups and refraining from political games at the 
expense of minorities, by cooperating with minority groups or involving them with 
decision making in order to include their views, problems and demands for devising 
policies, or by helping sustain minority self-organisation.  
Integration is not to be mistaken as a one-way process in either direction. As argued in this 




majority context even if its members desire to assimilate nor is it the specificities 
of the institutional and policy frame that 'automatically' lead to intended outcomes. 
Critically, integration is not a sequence of causal effects. Instead, as a complex and 
reciprocal, often parallel process, in which actors' anticipations of future developments 
play a role as much as their experience with former, similar processes and their current 
interests and evaluation of the situation, the existence of socio-ethnic groups is a 
consequence of societal differentiation, representing value and power conflict, resource 
inequality, inter-group prejudice and in-group sentiment. Both in institutional boundary-
drawing and group interaction, groups are constituted as carriers of different roles in 
society, as differently positioned sets of society members, as adherents of different values 
or beliefs, as equipped with specific capabilities, and as in the process of an in-group group 
distinguishing itself from out-groups (Alba 2005; Lamont & Molnár 2002).  
'Political institutions create incentives [for minorities] to organize in a particular way' 
(Loury, Modood & Teles 2005b, p.451); however, they do not and cannot determine the 
actual forms of organisation evolving from interaction between minority and majority, or 
the state. Minority presence in a society itself is often, at least initially, the unintended 
outcome of policies or developments focusing on different aims, without fully 
acknowledging potential effects beyond the intended goal. So-called 'gastarbeiter' ('guest 
workers') in the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and other countries, hired for 
temporary employment during the 1950s and 1960s, were intended by politicians 
responsible for these (temporal) immigration policies, as well as by many migrant workers 
themselves, to leave the countries after a few years of work. However, many of them have 
not left even 50 years after their arrival in the countries; instead complex minority, de facto 
immigrant structures developed in the countries of residence, along with policies allowing 
for their accommodation (Avci 2006). Institutions impacting such processes are not 
confined to those directly dealing with ethnicity or migration. Labour market, education 
and social welfare policies affect minority opportunities and structuration, as do economic 
and general political developments, including secularisation, (cultural and social) 
liberalisation, or devolution. 
Although these interlacing institutional structures are all important factors in the processes 
of integration, nationalism theories have argued that the concept of the 'nation' 
institutionalised in the political framework of a country is the most important determinant 
of how majority-minority group relations can develop. The line can be drawn between 




referred to as ethnocentric/ethnic and civic nationalisms (Peleg 2007). While it is 
inherent to all types of nationalism to draw a distinction between those who are part of the 
nation and those who are not, and in this sense all forms of nationalism are, ultimately, 
exclusivist, exclusivist and accommodationist approaches draw their lines differently with 
regard to their definition of the 'nation' (Harris 2009). Consequently, they are based on 
very different understandings of the state and its purpose. Whereas exclusivists and 
ethnocentricists see the state as possession of the titular group but not the other groups, 
resulting in citizenship differing from the polity, accommodationists and civic nationalists 
do not make such claims, leaving the polity ultimately more open to diversity. The 
prevailing understanding of nation and state is decisive for the implementation of 
integration measures, and eventually for the options of intergroup approximation 
(Horowitz 1985). When much of the 1990s' literature on nationalism in the post-socialist 
context has highlighted the 'ethnic' aspects of CEE nationalisms, this distinction became 
increasingly contested. Many authors criticised the 'orientalisation' of CEE nationalisms 
and questioned the underlying assumption that 'Western' nationalisms were automatically 
less problematic or could even be described in terms of civic nationalism (Johns 2003; 
Kymlicka 2000; Brubaker 1996).  
 
Peleg's account of the ethnoconstitutional order as a dynamic scale of more or less 
accommodationist regime types aims to overcome these limitations of the ethnic/civic 
divide in nationalism studies. Accommodationist regimes differ in their logic of integration 
from exclusivist and ethnocentricist regimes: The latter's aim is the perpetuation of the 
'state-ownership' and dominance of the 'core' group by assimilating, repressing or even 
eliminating other groups, which are perceived and 'constructed' as a threat to the dominant 
group's claim on ownership, sovereignty and hegemony. Unlike in ethnocentric regimes, 
the accommodationist interest of 'integrating' the political community lies in peaceful 
conflict resolution between ethnic groups and in thereby achieving stability, rather than in 
the survival of one group; the state is a tool for providing recognition and participation of 
several or all groups while stability and unity are expected to depend on the 
acknowledgement of diversity. Critically, regimes and states are no unchangeable entities. 
On the contrary, despite their institutionalised nature, the fundamental constitutional orders 
of states and the question of inclusion in the political community are dynamic (Peleg 
2007). As a result, most states can be characterised as somewhere between the two 
extremes and differ in degree, not in substance 




As argued in chapter 1, the literature on nationalism points to institutional-
structural determinants in the process of interethnic accommodation. Three contexts have 
been identified as primary factors to impact the dynamics of regime type with regard to 
nationalism. First, the specific capacities and characteristics of the institutional frame and 
its components shape how both internal and external calls for change can be adopted and 
strategies be implemented that allow for regime transformation; second, the system’s 
embeddedness into international structures plays a crucial role with regard to both a 
country's international integration and its bilateral relations with minorities' kin-states; 
third, the power dynamics between majority and minority groups impact the process. 
Analyses of the impact of these structures on majority-minority integration, as suggested in 
chapter 1, largely neglect minorities as heterogeneous agents of change, as well as 
minorities' role in creating alternative structures of integration or segregation. It follows 
from the above, however, that the different concepts of the nation provide ambiguous and 
dynamic resources not only for the majorities, but also for minority actors in the 
intersecting structures of integration within which the groups operate. 
Minority structures in the countries of residence as well as transnational structures with 
actors in their countries of origin, so-called kin-states or international minority and migrant 
networks constitute resources for minority groups', sometimes powerful, action. Instead of 
analysing integration as shifts in the adaptation strategies of members of aggregate groups, 
the reciprocal and structurationist approach enables us to understand minority responses to 
changing contexts as the self-determined collective action of groups sharing more than the 
common experience of assimilation or exclusion. This includes looking at minority 
networks, interactions and the 'ways in which common struggle, shared social relations, 
and group control affect […] the fates of whole categories' (Tilly 1990, p.81) of minority 
groups. In very rare cases, integration represents the strategy of isolated individuals, but 
more often than not involves loosely or tightly interconnected people linked by personal 
ties or common experience (ibid., p.83). Unlike aggregate groups, minorities often not only 
share statistical parameters, but constitute collectives.  
Extant minority structures are crucial for a group's ability to develop their own approach to 
accommodation with the majority: that is, to transform themselves, as a collective, into a 
collective actor. A minority group with well-institutionalised group structures, social 
institutions and the ability to discipline members will have fewer problems organising the 
group for collective action; a group struggling to organise its members around binding 




identity produced at least as much by outsiders as by themselves' (Loury 2002, 
quoted in Loury, Modood & Teles 2005a, p.5). Threat of direct (minority) resource denial 
as a strategy for mobilising their membership can function only for minorities whose 
resource base has something to offer to its members; minority groups with a weaker 
institutional and resource base are dependent on more symbolic identity enforcement in 
order to expand the groups' resourcefulness (ibid.).  
Boundaries or minority categories can have a liberating effect for some minorities, while 
hampering others in their efforts to adapt to society. Boundaries are sometimes directly 
targeted in group conflict in the struggle of groups to self-determine their own categories. 
Often particular (sub-)group identities are emphasised for strategic reasons, or to get 
control over the boundaries of their own groupness (Modood 2005). In contrast to this, 
sometimes groups unite under more inclusive categories, in order to engage in a common 
struggle germane to all those groups involved (A. Stepick & C. D. Stepick 2011). Re-
defining categories by directly targeting these in the minority's discursive and political 
actions or indirectly changing them through larger shifts in membership is an action 
embedded in the intersecting contexts of integration which need to be taken into account in 
order to evaluate the process. New, or reinterpreted  and 'refreshed' categories, which are 
distinguished from larger categories can enable the respective minority to establish more 
coherent or politically stronger collective actors, as their identity enhancing abilities might 
grow, or participation in collective struggle becomes more promising for the group's 
members.  
It follows from the above that boundary making involves (at least) three levels of action: 
first, policies and politics are powerful means for decision-makers to shape and constrain 
constituting boundaries in society; second, as intended and unintended consequences of 
these policies, interaction, boundary change (boundary crossing, blurring or brightening 
between majority and minority groups) affects aggregate groups of differently 
accommodating individuals, often creating tension between political norms and 'social 
reality'; third, minority members' identity and collective action mobilisation re-defines 
group belonging and challenges the politics of membership. Often overlapping and 
mutually responding processes, these three impacts on boundary making correspond with 
the potential outcomes of integration.  
Classically, the main configurations of these processes have been identified in a four-




assimilation processes, referring to the forms of integration of the minority into 
the majority's or the minority's structures. Distinguishing assimilation, integration, 
separation and marginalisation respectively, the processes refer to a) the minority giving up 
or losing its characteristic cultural, socio-economic or political features; b) the minority 
practising a balance between both minority and majority characteristics, usually 
conceptualised with regard to the perpetuation of some aspects of minority culture, while 
displaying the socio-economic and political features of mainstream society;  c) the 
minority being characterised by both culturally and socially very distinct characteristics, 
living separately or excluded from majority society with respect to most or all spheres; d) 
minority members or the whole group being unable to form coherent minority structures 
while simultaneously not adapting to majority society (Berry 1997). However, as argued 
above, integration seldom if ever takes place between just one minority group and one 
clearly defined majority or mainstream frame. Concerning the latter, it is not only the 
heterogeneity of majority society that allows for 'segmented assimilation', for cultural 
hybridity, and for multiple frames of reference for those potentially assimilating. (Parts of) 
the majority and (parts of) the minority can also integrate into a common framework new 
to both (Laitin 2003); minorities may integrate with other, perhaps stronger minority 
groups, forming one large heterogeneous minority group rather than several (Modood 
2005). Moreover, and particularly in the face of the extension of cultural space beyond 
state or territorial borders, minorities can draw from different cultural frames, including 
those of 'kin-states' or transnational ties with (diaspora) kins with greater flexibility 
(Morawska 2001).  
To conclude, assimilation theory offers arguments about a number of factors determining 
the dynamics and directions of integration processes. However, as argued previously, these 
processes are not social mechanisms, but can be controlled or managed, though never 
entirely, by political actors. This highlights that the forms of integration, including 
segregation or marginalisation, can be part of the agenda of dominant and non-dominant 
political actors as well as the unintended consequences of their politicking. Structural and 
interactive integration at group level therefore cannot be analysed sufficiently without 
taking into account the activities of the political actors involved. Whereas the dominant 
group's agendas are sufficiently covered by the analysis of the political community and 
regime, non-dominant group politics need specific attention beyond structural membership. 
This is not to neglect the structural constraints that impact majority political action. Both 
majority and minority groups are embedded in an array of social, socio-economic, and 




boundaries. For the purpose of this thesis that analyses the significance and 
changing role of interethnic boundaries for political participation it is assumed that 
majority members have a head start in interacting with state structures in relation to 
minority members. While the theoretical approach taken in this thesis always reflects, to an 
extent, the impact of majority agency, the focus - and the specific merit of the thesis - is on 
minority agency, which allows us to explore an understudied aspect of the interaction 
between groups.  Importantly, assimilation theory and political approaches to minority 
integration can provide only to a limited extent the conceptual tools for analysing non-
dominant groups as collective political actors. In order to enable such an examination of 
minority agency I also draw on social movement and collective action theories, which are 
discussed in the next chapter.  
3.3 Social movement theory and the formation of collective actors 
Minority members do not necessarily constitute entities in their own, overt evaluations and 
perceptions. We speak of groups as social actors only in cases where there is sufficient 
acknowledgement of groupness expressed in the actions of these groups, for instance, 
when 'objective' groups activate this groupness as a resource for their agency. Theories of 
social movements have contributed to understanding this process by providing theoretical 
tools that conceptualise the deliberation and identity construction involved in transforming 
an 'objective' group into an in group with a 'subjective' or perceived sense of itself as a 
group. Although social movement action differs from other forms of non-dominant group 
action, and far from all minority groups can be said to engage in ethnic movement 
activism, these theories offer categorisations and insights into processes of creating a 
collective actor that can help understand minority self-organisation. These also provide 
some methodological implications that help outline research steps for empirical analysis.  
Studies of collective action, aimed at understanding the mechanisms of revolutions and 
'contentious politics' (McAdam et al. 2001), have pointed to the indispensible precondition 
of some form of collective grievance in order to evoke a particular group's desire for social 
or political change (Crossley 2002). However, for a grievance to turn into collective action 
much more than just objective groupness and its individual members' grievance are 
required. A discriminated group does not automatically organise as a collective actor, even 
in the face of a beneficial political opportunity structure and a good resource base. Doug 
McAdam introduced the term 'cognitive liberation' to account for the process of bringing in 




structural conditions and their own role therein (McAdam 1982). This meaning, 
as Piven and Cloward write, is enabled by three aspects, namely the loss of the system's 
legitimacy in the group's members' eyes, the change in the group's world view from 
fatalistic to the assertion of some form of 'rights' they feel entitled to claim, and the trust in 
their own capacity or power to evoke change (Piven & Cloward 1977, pp.3–4, quoted in 
McAdam 1982, pp.49-50).  
However, this approach still seems to accept as givens the (subjective) groups who, 
potentially, become social actors. In his seminal study, McAdam describes the construction 
as a 'collective actor' of a group that initially only existed as an 'objective group' by 
analysing the role of the local churches in black insurgency in the United States. Later, 
Melucci develops this concept into what he calls a social movement's collective identity 
(Melucci 1995; Melucci 1989). While many social groups seem to construct and share an 
identity of belonging or emotional ties, this is not always transformed into a collective 
actor's identity. Identity construction thus involves the notion of purpose. It is a relational 
and interactive process providing for a tool to help overcome a situation that is perceived 
detrimental to (and by) the group members. Importantly, this identity is created in the 
process of group members' exchange of experiences, and the understanding that their 
grievances are not individual, but based on systemic conditions and shared by others (Della 
Porta & Tarrow 2005). Discursively establishing the reason(s) for the grievance, the group 
'discovers', or more accurately establishes itself as collective: developing alternative 
scenarios to the status quo constitutes the basis for determining the 'ends, means, and fields 
of [collective] action' (Melucci 1995, p.44).  
Decisively, collective actors exert their agentic potential based upon their ability to 
understand and evaluate current arrangements and envisage alternatives; collective actors 
constitute agents who, as a group, exercise this process practically through interaction and 
negotiation. They are constructed purposefully, in order to achieve change according to the 
group's overarching agenda. These agendas are created, again, in inter-subjective 
deliberation among group members. Moreover, they are not fixed, but can be changed over 
time, as collective actors develop their plans of action in constant relation to the social 
arrangements. Based on their understanding of the current situation and projected 
alternative arrangements, they also devise their clear agentic strategies. Unlike individual 
actors, however, collective actors (like some macro-actors, cf. Mouzelis 1995) require 
deliberation and their explicit construction as actors in order to act. In the same way, other 




unacknowledged dynamics. Identity construction precipitates the remits of 
collective actors' activities, manifested in their agendas, strategies and tactics. In everyday 
individual action, agendas and strategies are often not articulated explicitly or even 
acknowledged, but performed as routines or habits (Giddens 1984). In contrast, as guiding 
schemes of deliberate action as is the case for collective actors, agendas and strategies are 
purposefully developed and made explicit in a direct relation to the construction of a 
collective actor identity (McAdam et al. 2001).  
As carriers of projective and evaluative elements, framed in the specific ideas, ideals, fears 
and desires the group members articulate, and of experience and memory, agendas 
determine the sort of change the group desires, by identifying the aspects of the status quo 
they oppose and the outcomes they envisage (Benford & Snow 2000). On this basis, 
strategies and tactics are developed that govern which and how collective actor practices 
are exerted; neither self-explanatory, nor generated 'out of the blue', these guiding schemes 
of action are dynamic and necessarily entail their own readjustment to changes in agendas, 
just as agendas are adjusted in response to the experience with successful application of the 
devised strategies. In collective action, group agency is realised through the interaction and 
negotiation among group members, consciously and deliberately taken out of the routine 
context and made explicit, with the ultimate aim of fostering or averting specific forms of 
(social) transformation.  
Framing their agendas and strategies, actors apply three 'core framing tasks' for collective 
actors, including diagnostic, prognostic and motivational action framing (Benford & Snow 
2000). In these processes, activists 'negotiate a shared understanding of some problematic 
condition or situation they define as in need of change, make attributions regarding who or 
what is to blame, articulate an alternative set of arrangements, and urge others to act in 
concert to affect change' (ibid., p.615).  
Benford and Snow (2000) developed their concept in the context of social movement 
theory. Unlike social movements, not all collective actors aim at some form of social 
change. Often, the 'problematic condition' identified by representatives of minority 
organisations consists simply of their interest in creating space for less represented cultural 
practices, without 'blaming' anyone for the lack of such space. However, I would argue that 
even the latter's activities are embedded in action frames carrying, ultimately, the same 




specific idea of how society, and here in particular inter-group relations, should 
be shaped, and what the collective actor's contribution could be to this.  
Collective actors engaging in framing processes, however, are not only concerned with the 
reasons for their discontent and ideal future scenarios: their diagnostic frames entail 
analyses of the present opportunity structure, the resources available to them in order to 
further their interests and their anticipations of reactions of political actors opposing their 
cause.  Similarly, the choice of strategies is impacted by the opportunity structure, potential 
allies and adversaries, and the available options in cooperation with existing institutions 
(R. Koopmans & Statham 1999; Kriesi et al. 1998). Devising alternative scenarios, 
collective actors incorporate and transpose frames from other, related contexts. In many 
cases, they avail of frames used by those the collective actors oppose. This is particularly 
well illustrated by cases in which movements draw upon higher level institutions, 
international conventions and moral declarations or normative commitments of their states, 
in order to combat what movement activists see as their violation (Keck & Sikkink 1998). 
However, diffusion processes are not limited to the direct challenge to one state, but can 
also be observed where strategic repertoires and frames are transposed across movements, 
in a 'transnational' process (Kolins Givan et al. 2010).  
For the concern of this thesis, which lies with the impact non-dominant group members 
have on their structural contexts, the analysis of action frames underlying non-dominant 
group collective action allows us to understand the collective actors' perspective on the 
status quo and the need for change, as well as how they aim to achieve this. However, 
framing analyses cannot account for the consequences of movement framing. The study of 
consequences and the 'success' of social movements has generated a range of explanations 
aiming to account for the numerous outcomes of movement activities. Crucially, the 
identification of success is conditioned by the definition of success in the eye of the scholar 
and by the field of study. In this sense, researchers might see success only in terms of 
policy responsiveness and general change in the political opportunity structures or by 
increased openness or intransigence toward movement activities; others might deem a 
movement successful only if it is able to sustain itself as a collective challenger over time, 
with or without modifications of its movement identity, either emphasising the 'survival' of 
the movement or its success in changing people's attitudes towards them and in mobilising 




More problematic than the definition of social movement and collective action 
success, however, is the methodology used to capture the relationship between the two. 
The difficulty for the researcher lies in the claim of a causal relationship between the 
collective actor's aims and activities on the one hand, and on the other, potential changes in 
the distribution of social goods, in the access of different members of society to the 
political structures or other forms of social and political change. How is it possible to be 
sure about the collective actor 'causing' the modifications in the structural contexts? 
Numerous actors that are not part of the movement, and may not share its goals, can be 
involved in bringing about change for their own reasons. Even more so, when we are 
talking about changes to a state's institutional structure, external actors have often proved 
more powerful in persuading states to implement certain provisions that movements within 
the state also pursue in their activities. However, the international actors may not even be 
aware of the movement, or not interested in its grievance, but follow their own agenda. 
Moreover, it has often been argued that the opening up of the political opportunity 
structure is what brings people to address the institutions by forming collective actors 
where they see chances to further their interest, rather than the other way around (Amenta 
& Caren 2004, p.475).  
Aware of these methodological issues, and drawing upon the insights into political and 
social accommodation of diverse interests from preceding chapters, I argue that no clear 
one-way causal relation can be established between collective action and socio-political 
change; this is even more so, since collective action is multilayered and involves a plurality 
of interaction forms with the structural context. Accordingly, political change and 
collective action are therefore deeply interrelated. In order to evaluate the impact of 
minority collective action, it is necessary to base any analysis of non-dominant contention 
on an examination of the contexts for minority activities, as outlined in preceding chapters. 
Second, an analysis of the non-dominant actors' framing of contention enables us to 
identify how they devise their approach to challenging the status quo. Simultaneously, this 
defines the ideal scenario and, by extension, what can be understood as 'success' of their 
collective action. Third, the aims need to be related to the applied strategies and activities, 
in order to allow for an evaluation of the success of the collective actors with respect to 
their mobilisation of supporters, of institutional resources, and of allies outside the 
institutional setting. Fourth, revisiting the structural contexts and the changes therein over 
time, we can now relate these to the actions of the various actors involved, ruling out 'clear' 
cases of other actors' sole impact and identifying forms of impact by the non-dominant 




formations as collective actors and activists, the question of 'success' is 
necessarily relative. This, I suggest, can be complemented by an evaluation of the 
perceptions both challengers and actors representing the institutions have of the reasons for 
changes in policies and institutions, and the reasons they give for the failure of non-
dominant actors' inclusion. While this does not always give us clear-cut evidence of any 
immediate inclusion of e.g. movement representatives in decision-making, it does allow us 
to draw conclusions about the difficulties experienced by non-dominant political actors 
both in generating a politically more influential collective actor, and in impacting upon 
structural contexts.  
Conclusion 
By way of conclusion to this chapter, I suggest that in order to address the central research 
question of this thesis what is needed is a 'genuinely political analysis' (Loury, Modood & 
Teles 2005b, p.453), first, of how ethnicity/minority group boundaries are explicitly 
encoded in politics and public policy and the processes that provide for the perpetuation or 
change of group boundaries; second, of the structural contexts of group interaction, which 
themselves are subjects to change and therefore impact the dynamics of political 
interaction between the groups; and third, of minority self-organisation for political action 
as defined above. The review of assimilation and social movement theories showed that the 
institutional context, in particular state policies, representing the outcome of the interaction 
of powerful actors, constitutes the most important structures that constrain majority-
minority interaction. The institutional-structural context for minority agency therefore 
constitutes the subject of part II of this thesis. In part III then my analysis of the actual 
forms minority interaction with the institutional-structural context will shed light on the 
minorities' role in interethnic integration processes in Slovakia and Estonia.  Part II - Chapter 4 
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Chapter 4: Historical background of interethnic relations 
in Slovakia and Estonia 
4.1 Introduction 
The challenge of interethnic integration has long characterised the region currently 
occupied by modern-day Slovakia and Estonia. The restructuring of European political 
geography after the break-up of the great continental Empires following World War I 
represented an opportunity for the many nationalist movements of the 19
th century to 
institutionalise their aspirations for 'national self-determination' (Harris 2009). The borders 
drawn during the peace negotiations near Paris in 1919 and 1920, as well as the 
restructuring of the Baltic region, and particularly the Tartu Peace Treaty of 1920, continue 
to shape Central Eastern Europe today. As a result of the nation-state-building processes 
across the region, the coexistence of the many 'nationalities' inhabiting the territories 
formerly belonging to multicultural empires generated an antagonistic relationship between 
the titular nations' claims for unitary nation-states and the heterogeneity of the populations. 
In both Estonia and Czechoslovakia, interethnic relations during the interwar period were 
shaped, by and large, by forms of 'multiculturalism'. These went furthest in Estonia's 
cultural autonomy scheme, but were also reflected in Czechoslovakia's recognition of 
minority rights in the fields of language, culture and (specifically) education. In both 
countries, these rights enabled self-determination for at least some of the countries' many 
minority groups (Nedelsky 2009; D. J. Smith & Cordell 2008).  
The situation changed dramatically with the onset of World War II. At the same time, the 
events during the war in Estonia and the country's subsequent incorporation into the Soviet 
Union led to a very different development of interethnic relations than in the case of 
Czechoslovakia. Between 1940 and 1989, enormous political, economic and demographic 
shifts helped to alter significantly the ethnic make-up of the Estonian Soviet Socialist 
Republic (ESSR), and these changes were accompanied by Soviet nationalities policies, 
which oscillated between Russification and korenizatsiya, or indigenisation (R. J. Kaiser 
1994). In contrast, with the exception of the war years, Slovakia existed as part of varying 
federations with the Czechs, in which Czechoslovak nation-building and gradual 
assimilation of minorities prevailed, despite the granting of some measure of minority 
rights (Heimann 2009). The first two subsections of this chapter seek to provide an outline 
of the history of interethnic relations in the two regions over much of the 20
th century. It Part II - Chapter 4 
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highlights in particular the ways in which group antagonism and minority rights were 
framed by the various regimes regulating interethnic group relations. The purpose is to 
provide an historical background to processes of interethnic integration and accompanying 
debates in both countries during the 1990s and 2000s. Following discussion of the 
'multiculturalisms' of the ESSR and Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (ČSSR) in sections 
4.2 and 4.3, I explore the developments that helped the countries eventually break away 
from the federations with Russia/the Czechs and the role nationalism and interethnic 
quarrels played therein (sections 4.4 and 4.5).  
4.2 Interethnic relations in Czechoslovakia 
Czechoslovakia was primarily a product of Czech and allied efforts to find a 'convenient' 
solution to the problems the region's multi-ethnicity generated, after Czechs, Slovaks as 
well as the Germans, Hungarians and other groups had become independent from the 
Austro-Hungarian Empire (Innes 2001).
1 With the new state failing to represent Slovakia's 
desire for self-determination as a 'cultural nation', the tensions between 'Czechoslovakism' 
and Slovak nationalism were inscribed into the constitution of the new state (Kirschbaum 
1995). Slovak nationalism before 1918 had been a struggle against the policies of 
'Magyarisation' that came to prominence over the second half of the 19
th century in the 
Hungarian part of the empire and affected, besides the political and economic spheres, the 
rights of Slovaks to native-language education. Inter-war 'Czechoslovak' nation-building, 
often emphasising the ethno-national aspects of the titular groups, meant that Slovaks were 
included in the state-bearing nation, while Germans and Hungarians – as well as other 
minorities – were not. Czechoslovakia was not built upon a broad consensus of its 
constituent groups, but shaped by the manifold ignorance of émigré Czech elites and the 
allies towards the other groups' sentiments and claims (Heimann 2009). As such, the First 
Czechoslovak Republic did not reflect the Slovak elites' visions of self-determination, and 
failed to fulfil the many Slovaks' hopes regarding the promise of modernisation through 
Czechoslovakism. At the same time, the new state respected the linguistic and cultural 
                                                 
1 Innes argues that the members of the Czech and Slovak political elite who negotiated state-making at the 
Paris Peace Conferences of 1918 calculated that 'neither region was likely to achieve independent statehood 
alone, nor, if independence was achieved, could they sustain it in the face of those German and Hungarian 
minorities who would find themselves demoted from overlords to underdogs' (2002, p.4).  Part II - Chapter 4 
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rights of the German and Hungarian minorities, but did not respond to their collective 
demands for the status of a 'nation' rather than a nationality (Kirschbaum 1995).
2  
The first Czechoslovak constitution did not reflect the objections of Slovak nationalists to 
the formation of a Czechoslovak nation. These objections and the lack of any response to 
them provided grounds for Slovaks' recurrent arguments that they were dominated by the 
'arrogant' Czechs. However, unlike other ethnic groups inhabiting the country, Slovaks 
were included in the 'state-bearing nation', even if largely formally. In the view of many 
Czech leaders, granting Slovaks too much autonomy or authority in the new state could 
have resulted in similar demands from the other large minority groups (Leff & Mikula 
2002, p.307), and would have been unwise given the strong clerical tendencies and alleged 
political immaturity and 'backwardness' of the Slovak lands (Heimann 2009; Nedelsky 
2009, p.74).
3 The Slovaks' unsatisfied demands for national self-determination came to the 
surface in the course of the Second World War, when Slovakia eventually gained 
'independence' (albeit as a highly dependent ally of Nazi Germany), and Hungary regained 
parts of southern Slovakia (Jelinek 1976).  
After the war Slovakia was counted as part of the anti-Nazi forces, thanks partly to the 
efforts of Czech émigré elites, and partly to the timely turn of Slovaks against the Nazis in 
the National Uprising of 1944. Slovakia integrated into Czechoslovakia with the Czechs, 
while Hungary again lost recently annexed territories that today make up southern 
Slovakia. As a result, the situation for the residents of this region changed once again. The 
Czechoslovak state attributed 'collective guilt' for the break-up of Czechoslovakia to 
Germans and Hungarians, who became subjected to the so-called 'Beneš decrees', 
effectively depriving virtually all members of these groups of Czechoslovak citizenship 
rights, expropriating much of their property, evicting large groups of Hungarians to 
Hungary in an exchange for Slovaks residing south of the border, and annulling all 
minority rights with respect to language use in the public sphere and education in minority 
languages (Heimann 2009). The situation changed only in 1948 when Communist 
Czechoslovakia was established and minority rights were introduced (Jelinek 1976). 
                                                 
2 The Czech and Slovak languages differentiate between nation and nationality (národ, národnost'); the latter 
refers to a person's ethnicity, the former alone is considered an entity that has the right to its 'nation-state' 
(Kirschbaum 1995).  
3 This presumption of 'backwardness' partly reflected the different degrees of democratisation and 
decentralisation Czechs and Slovaks had enjoyed under Austrian and Hungarian rule after 1867 respectively. 
Bohemia, as part of the Austrian monarchy was more decentralised and independent from the Crown than the 
lands under Hungarian rule. The Czech lands also became increasingly industrialised, while the Slovak lands 
remained agrarian. Moreover, the national movements of Slovaks and Hungarians were closely linked and 
had a strong catholic core, distinguishing them from the Czech national movement (Kirschbaum 1995; 
Heimann 2009).  Part II - Chapter 4 
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Although parts of the Slovak elite continued to demand the status of a separate, but 
equal nation with the Czechs, Czechoslovakism asserted itself. Until 1992, Slovaks had the 
same status as Czechs as part of the Czechoslovak majority; their status was particularly 
distinct from that of Hungarians, Ruthenians, Romanies and other minority groups.  
In post-war Czechoslovakia, and in comparison to the situation of minority rights in other 
countries even during the inter-war years, provisions for the cultural reproduction of 
minority groups have been relatively extensive (Jelinek 1993). However, from the 
Hungarian minority's perspective, most important was the question of how minority rights 
and related structures developed in their region over time. The provisions for education in 
Hungarian in particular have changed repeatedly and sometimes dramatically since the end 
of the Habsburg rule. With the exception of the years following the end of the Second 
World War, when the Czechoslovak state suppressed all group-based activities and 
institutions of the Hungarians and Germans, education in Hungarian has been provided 
continuously within the territory of Slovakia since the break-up of the Habsburg Empire 
(Bakker 1997).  
The effort to construct a 'Czechoslovak' nation-state, unsurprisingly, drew much from 19
th 
century nationalist thought and the emphasis was particularly on the support of the 
linguistic nation. Since Czech and Slovak educational institutions had been neglected in 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire, efforts were put into the development of Czech and Slovak 
language schooling (ibid.). This was, to some extent, to the detriment of Hungarian 
language schooling. At the same time, provisions were made as early as 1919, when the 
National Assembly adopted a law on minority schooling, setting the legal basis for the 
almost 750 primary, medium and secondary schools across southern Slovakia with full or 
partial education in Hungarian (László 2004, p.199). The fact that most of these institutions 
belonged to the Roman Catholic Church undermined the effective maintenance of 
Hungarian language education. The ongoing land reform, which redistributed the often 
inefficiently used properties of the owners of large estates, affected the church's financial 
basis and so too that of Hungarian education (Bakker 1997, p.73; Pavel 1930).
4 As a result, 
Hungarian education lost some of its independence from the state, which made it more 
vulnerable to the state's changing concepts of nation- and state-building and the roles 
                                                 
4 The land reform was an enormous project of redistribution of property in Czechoslovakia, where much of 
the land property was concentrated in the hands of a few landowners. The Roman Catholic church was 
among the landowners with considerable proportions of land in the form of latifundia (i.e. comprehensive 
estates of more than 1,000 hectares) which were low in production
 (Pavel 1930, p.268)
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majority- and minority-language education should play therein.
5 In higher education, 
opportunities to study in Hungarian were significantly decreased, while opportunities to 
take up studies in Hungary were also impeded (Bakker 1997). In addition, many members 
of the Hungarian educational elite left the country after 1920, partly because they were 
denied citizenship, partly because civil servants of Hungarian nationality lost their 
positions and incomes. Thus, the community was also deprived of its intellectuals and 
professionals, a loss which significantly affected the social composition of the community 
in the inter-war period (ibid., p.40; Csergo 2007).  
The war and post-war years had an even more drastic effect on interethnic relations due to 
several border changes. During the war, those Hungarians who remained on the territory of 
the independent Slovak state could maintain many of the minority rights granted them by 
inter-war Czechoslovakia, including the right to be educated in Hungarian (Jelinek 1976). 
In contrast, after 1938, the situation in Hungarian-occupied southern Slovakia changed 
markedly, and while the Hungarians who lived there regained the status of the titular 
nation until the end of the war, Slovaks became a minority again. The changes meant 
(among other things) that Slovaks lost most of the opportunities to study in their own 
language. As Henderson claims, in Horthy's Hungary Slovaks 'were subjected to even 
greater oppression than in the latter decades of the Austro-Hungarian empire, and also 
suffered economically' (Henderson 2002, p.13). While for Slovaks the war-years in the 
annexed region are remembered as the most oppressive time, for Hungarians in the region, 
the immediate post-war period was by far the worst, when the territory that today 
constitutes southern Slovakia again became Czechoslovak.  
The post-war 'population exchange' between Czechoslovakia and Hungary affected to a 
large extent the Hungarian elite that had been able to remain in the country after 1920 
(Csergo 2007). According to Bakker, the departure of much of this elite does much to 
explain the current, lower educational attainment of Hungarian minority members in 
comparison with their Slovak cohorts (Bakker 1997, p.74). Of course, education was 
neither the only nor the most important sphere impacted by the 'Beneš decrees'. Hungarians 
temporarily lost their citizenship rights, were deprived of minority rights, and in many 
cases lost their homes and land (Heimann 2009). Moreover, Slovak elites within 
Czechoslovakia campaigned for the Hungarians' 're-Slovakisation', suggesting that 
                                                 
5 Also, in other respects, the development of Czech and Slovak education was to the expense of minority 
education. The reduction of church-financed Hungarian schools in the late 1920s cannot be explained by the 
nation-building plans alone, as it was an outcome of the land reforms; yet, the state also did not introduce 
compensatory measures. Moreover, in some of the state-owned Hungarian and German schools the state 
changed the language of instruction to Czech or Slovak (Bakker 1997, p.73).  Part II - Chapter 4 
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Hungarians living in southern Slovakia really were Slovaks who had been turned into 
Hungarians during Magyarisation. Non-compliance with re-Slovakiastion often resulted in 
further curtailment of rights and potential transfer to parts of the Czech lands or to 
Hungary (Jelinek 1993).  
The institutional framework for interethnic relations changed again after 1948. 
Czechoslovakia and Hungary were both part of the emerging Socialist bloc, and in 
Moscow anti-Hungarian policies were now perceived as expressions of 'bourgeois 
nationalism' (Murashko 2000, p.94). In a country strongly influenced by the Stalinist 
Soviet Union, Slovak demands for a federal solution of the revived, Czechoslovak state 
were soon dismissed, and the proponents of this arrested on grounds of alleged 'bourgeois 
nationalism'.
6 This again left those Slovaks still claiming some form of autonomy 
unsatisfied.
7 At the same time, the situation of the Hungarian and other minorities 
improved. Most importantly, citizenship rights were reinstalled. Moreover, minority rights 
were introduced, allowing for the foundation of the Cultural Union of Czechoslovak 
Hungarian Workers (CSEMADOK) as part of the National Front (Národný Front in 
Slovak),
8 and other minority rights in the realm of group reproduction. The proportion of 
Hungarian children studying in their mother tongue increased during the 1950s, but 
declined steadily from the 1960s onwards (László 2004, p.202).
9 Thus, the Hungarian 
education system existing today has its roots in the 1950s. Whereas two decades after the 
                                                 
6 Among those arrested was Gustáv Husák, whose reputation was restored in 1960 and who later became 
Slovak Deputy Prime Minister during the liberalisation period of 1968 under party leader Alexander Dubček, 
remarkably also a Slovak.  
7 This was despite the acceptance in the Košice Agreement of 1945 of both nations as equal. However, the 
Constitution of 1960 'had severely limited Slovak autonomy' (Nedelsky 2009, p.137), as was criticised by 
Slovaks. This could not be compensated for by the simultaneously established separate Czech and Slovak 
National Committees, who featured some authority over their parts of the federation, 'at least on paper' 
(Cutler & Schwartz 1991, p.518). 
8 The Slovak name of the organisation is Kultúrny zväz mad'arských pracujúcich v Československu, in 
Hungarian it is Csehoszlovákiai Magyar Dolgozók Kultúregyesülete, abbreviated as CSEMADOK. The 
National Front was the state-wide umbrella organisation of the – with the exception of the Komunistická 
strana Československa (Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, KSČ) mainly impotent – political parties and 
society level organisations. They were effectively controlled by the KSČ, and during the first two post-war 
decades CSEMADOK leaders followed the line of the party (Varga 2004).  
9 While in the school year of 1950/51, thus shortly after the 'Beneš decrees' were revoked, the proportion of 
Hungarian children studying in Hungarian nurseries constituted 7.24% of all children in nurseries in 
Slovakia, in 1958/59 this had risen to 12.61%. Similarly, primary school children studying in Hungarian 
constituted 8.18% of all primary school children in 1950/51, and 10.43% in 1958/59. The development in the 
upper secondary schools (gymnázium) was delayed, and while in 1950/51 the proportion of children 
receiving education in Hungarian was at 0.88%, this had increased by 1966/67 to 10.46%. Since the mid-
1960s, the numbers of Hungarian schoolchildren studying in Hungarian schools or classes dropped, and 
increasingly parents send their children to study with Slovak as the main language of instruction. In 1958/59, 
the proportion of Hungarian children studying in Slovak lay at 10.07%. Four decades on, in 1990/91, the 
proportion had increase to 26.45% of all Hungarian children; at secondary schools the proportion had also 
more than doubled, from 10.37% in 1968/69 to 22.11 in 1990/1991 (all percentages retrieved from Szarka 
2004, pp. 202, 205).  Part II - Chapter 4 
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end of the war institutions offering elementary and intermediate level education had 
reached numbers that were sufficient to meet the needs of Hungarian school children, the 
situation of secondary and university education remained limited (Bakker 1997, pp.74-75). 
In 1968, minority rights were enshrined in the Constitutional Law on the Status of National 
Minorities (Sobotka 2009, p.91), which were however never fully realised (Marušiak 
2002).  
During the 1960s, Hungarians attempted to use the window of opportunity presented by the 
liberalisation of the political climate to push for increased minority rights, especially in 
education. CSEMADOK's leadership became more outspoken about the situation of 
Hungarians during the period of liberalisation, especially during the Prague Spring of 1968 
when democratisation and decentralisation were promoted more generally (Varga 2004). 
Although, under Dubček, some Hungarian demands were accepted, they were never 
translated into practice during the subsequent 'normalisation' period under Husák 
(Marušiak 2002). In fact, during the 1970s, the authorities made several attempts to reduce 
the proportion of Hungarian-language education both in Hungarian and in bilingual 
schools, which was increasingly perceived as discrimination by Hungarians (Varga 2004). 
Despite some limited protest on the part of the Hungarians and efforts by a Hungarian 
underground group which focused on Hungarian language education, the number of 
Hungarian language classes and schools declined gradually over the 1970s and 1980s, 
disproportionally compared to the number of all schools in Slovakia (László 2004 p.202; 
similarly Gabzdilová & Homišinová 1994, cited in Csergo 2007, p.162). By the late 1980s, 
more than a quarter of Hungarian school children received education with Slovak as the 
language of instruction.  
The Czechoslovak state's policies towards minorities were not overtly assimilatory; that 
said, the importance of the Czechoslovak nation-building project did not decline between 
1948 and 1989. This ambiguity formed the background of the interlacing processes of 
democratisation and increasing demands for minority/national rights, which I discuss 
further in section 4.4.  
4.3 Interethnic relations in the First Estonian Republic and the ESSR 
The situation in Estonia differed substantially from that in Czechoslovakia. In 1918, the 
First Estonian Republic was created as a nation-state of the titular nation. Initially 
dependent on the unity of all social groups against Soviet Russia and its local Estonian Part II - Chapter 4 
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supporters, the new state soon failed to live up to the promises it had made towards 
minorities. Interethnic relations were shaped by mutual distrust and conflicting 
understandings of 'ethnic equality' (Alenius 2004). This changed only in 1925, when 
Estonia introduced its scheme of Cultural Autonomy, which was subsequently granted to 
the German and Jewish national minorities and praised internationally for its appeasing 
effect on the relations between Estonians and the former dominant Baltic Germans (D. J. 
Smith & Cordell 2008). As a consequence, inter-war Estonia was considered one of the 
most democratic countries in Europe in the 1920s and early 1930s.  
Approximately 8.2% of Estonia's inter-war population was Russian, thereby forming by far 
the largest minority community of the time (Raun 1991, p.247). Among others, this 
number includes those Russians who had settled in Estonia for centuries as Old Believers, 
those who had come to the Estonian part of the Russian Empire in the course of 
industrialisation to find work there (particularly to Tallinn and Narva), and those who had 
deserted the Russian army, or fled as members of the 'White' armies in the Russian civil 
war. However, in many cases other minorities, such as the Finns, reported Russian 
ethnicity in censuses (Alenius 2004, p.43; Kaiser 1994). Perhaps due to its structural 
heterogeneity, the Russian minority was politically disunited and failed to establish 
Russian cultural autonomy (Smith 2002, pp.16-17). It was only in 1937 that Russian 
organisations eventually did file a petition to establish cultural autonomy. This was denied 
them, however: as the authorities explained, after the coup d'état of 1934 the constitution 
was no longer valid and therefore also the basis for cultural autonomy was not given 
(Osipov 2008, p.19). The coup was the beginning of an overall nationalising turn in state 
policy under the leader Konstantin Päts, which among other things was made responsible 
for the increasing support of Baltic Germans for the 'Back to Reich' propaganda from Nazi 
Germany (Smith 1999).  
Although the Russian minority in Estonia did not organise under the cultural autonomy 
scheme, it did enjoy cultural rights as a national minority, in particular the right to 
education in its mother tongue, and in this respect profited from geographically 
concentrated settlement, particularly in the North-East (Smith 1999, p.461). However, even 
in this respect relations were not without problems. The difficult relations of the 'triadic 
nexus' of the Estonian state, the Russian minority and the (Soviet) Russian kin-state were 
evident even at this time, for example, when Russian schools in Estonia used textbooks 
from Soviet Russia. The events of 1939 and 1940 resulted in the Soviet annexation of the Part II - Chapter 4 
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country, based on the secret annexe to the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939, resulting in 
a drastic change in the parameters of majority-minority relations in Estonia (Smith 2002).  
The war years were shaped by the Soviet and German occupations of 1940-1941 and 1941-
1944 respectively, which for Estonia also meant substantial population loss: large sections 
of the population of Estonia fell victim to deportations and purges, which fuelled the 
resentment and pain many had felt since the first intrusion of Soviet troops (Misiunas & 
Taagepera 1993). Deportations continued after Estonia's re-incorporation into the Soviet 
Union in 1944. The 'different waves of cleansing and repression' as part of Soviet mass 
violence in Estonia were by no means ethnically motivated. As Mertelsmann and Rahi-
Tamm argue, the repressions and purges  
'targeted at different times the national elite, "social alien elements," "kulaks," 
"bourgeois nationalists," "former people" (in Russian byvshie liudi), ethnic minorities, 
"collaborators with the Germans," etc' (Mertelsmann & Rahi-Tamm 2009, p.309).  
The consequences of war and Sovietisation have impacted profoundly on the debates of 
collective and individual memory and attitudes towards the Soviet regime, as well as on 
the potential to utilise 'history' in today's political conflicts. Mertelsmann and Rahi-Tamm 
emphasise that it was initially émigré historians who constructed the frames of Baltic 
collective memory by referring to Stalinism as the 'years of genocide' (see for example 
Taagepera 1993). In nationalist discourse this narrative was adopted and has shaped 
Estonian historiography as well as public perceptions of the Soviet era in general (Onken 
2007).  
The demographic changes also affected the immediate economic basis of the republic, 
particularly in the face of Soviet industrialisation (Raun 1991; Misiunas & Taagepera 
1993). Moreover, years of war had run down Estonia's economy and its material basis of 
production, with the industrial and agricultural capacity of the region almost halved, 
infrastructure almost entirely destroyed, and housing capacity significantly diminished 
(Misiunas & Taagepera 1993, p.74). The Soviet Union, aiming to quickly industrialise the 
otherwise relatively well-developed region (in comparison to other republics) sent Soviet 
citizens from other republics to strengthen economic development, including 'Russian 
Estonians' who had emigrated to Russia in the late 19
th/ early 20
th century. The migration 
of people who had undergone twenty years of Soviet socialisation from other parts of the 
Union to the new member republics also served another purpose: namely, to 'solve' the 
problem Soviet authorities had with their new citizens, whom they deeply distrusted (ibid., Part II - Chapter 4 
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p.78). Under Stalin, purges and deportations continued, while collectivisation and 
industrialisation continued to change both the country's demographics and economic 
distribution. Again, these deportations and arrests did not target Estonians on the basis of 
ethnicity, but on 'political grounds', largely as 'kulaks' and 'nationalists'; nonetheless, in the 
late 1940s/early 1950s they effectively targeted Estonians more consistently than other 
groups (Mertelsmann & Rahi-Tamm 2009, p.316). Already by the late 1950s, Russians 
constituted more than 20% of the population of the ESSR, while the share of Estonians had 
declined to below 75% (Raun 1991, p.247). Changes in ethnonational demography 
continued until 1989, when Estonians constituted 61.5% of the population, while Russians 
made up to 30.3% and other groups, including largely Russified Soviet nationalities, made 
up 8% (ibid.).  
From the period of intensive Sovietisation until the early 1950s, migration from other parts 
of the Union was related less to official distrust of new Soviet citizens and concerned more 
with expanding the labour supply. Estonia, as well as Latvia and (to a lesser extent) 
Lithuania, were the most developed Soviet republics in terms of industry and also 
agriculture. Moreover, they acted as a 'laboratory' for planned economic-industrial 
development in other regions, with new technologies being tested and introduced here first 
(Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993). As a consequence of the progress in industrial 
development, there was (according to the central planning from Moscow) a recurrent 
labour shortage in the region. From the late 1960s onwards, after years of decentralised 
(republic-based) planning, economic planning in the republics was again subject to the 
central authorities' decision-making (ibid.).  
After Stalin's death, the Soviet Union allowed for some decentralisation in political 
decision-making to the republics' Communist Parties. As a consequence, the role of 
Estonians in the Eestimaa Kommunistlik Partei (Estonian Communist Party) increased 
notably; practitioners of national culture, for example composers for the Estonian song 
festivals, earlier charged with engaging in 'bourgeois nationalism,' were rehabilitated; 
Estonian non-violent dissent began to reconfigure itself (Raun 1991, pp.169–220). The 
'indigenisation' further strengthened inter-war understandings of ethnic or national 
'ownership' of the territory. As Brubaker (1996) puts it, the Soviet regime institutionalised 
both ethnoterritorial federalism and personal (ethnic) nationality (natsional'nost'). 
Simultaneously, the regime institutionalised tensions between these fundamental categories 
of its nationalities policies and the strict limits it set to ('bourgeois') nationalism. In this 
context, mass settlement of Soviet citizens from other republics, predominantly from the Part II - Chapter 4 
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RSFSR – encouraged by the centre – and a consequent ethno-demographic shift, were 
by many Estonians conceived of as gradual Russification (D. J. Smith 2003). The 
migration of Russians in particular into the ESSR was criticised openly by Estonians from 
the mid-1950s (Raun 1991, p.128). Each group was reluctant to learn the other's language, 
and neither was inclined to integrate socially, an attitude represented well by the existence 
and maintenance of group specific institutions such as schools (ibid., pp.210–212). 
The Soviet-era migration of industrial workers and technical intelligentsia from other 
Soviet Republics not only increased the proportion of people who used Russian in the 
vernacular and in formal settings. Because it was their mother tongue, the status of Russian 
as a 'language of inter-ethnic communication' was fostered by all-Union policies. For 
example, this included the penetration of education by tuition in Russian with the 
educational reform of 1958/59, with an increasing effect from the 1970s onwards 
(Kirkwood 1991). By the late 1970s, the Leninist doctrine that 'no language, and especially 
not Russian, should be given the status of 'state language' (ibid., p.61) and of 'national self-
determination' were replaced by increased promotion of Russian and less emphasis on the 
languages of the Union Republics to encourage a 'national-Russian bilingualism'. At this 
point, less than 50% of the Union's non-Russian population had Russian as their first or 
second language in 1979 (ibid., p.69).
10 As Ehala indicated, linguistically, Estonians did 
not integrate well with the Soviet Union (interview with the author, Glasgow, 12 February 
2008). Still, by the late 1980s the situation was such that 33.57% of the Estonians claimed 
to speak Russian well, while only 13.49% of Russians in Estonia were fluent in Estonian 
(Agarin 2010, p.50). Overall, in terms of political representation, Soviet nationalities 
policies aimed to avoid creating or reinforcing the perception that the regime was 
surreptitiously promoting Russian domination. While local Russians bought into the vision 
of a multinational Soviet political community, Estonians did overall perceive Sovietisation 
as Russification.  
4.4 Democratisation and interethnic relations in Slovakia 
Analyses of democratisation in Czechoslovakia tend to focus on the role of Czech 
dissidents, with a strong 'Prague-bias'. Comprehensive approaches or studies of Slovakia's 
role in the democratisation processes suggest that the movement was more heterogeneous. 
Early activities for democratisation saw Czech, Slovak, Hungarian and other group 
                                                 
10 For Estonian the number was only 28.7%, Kirkwood claims (ibid.).  Part II - Chapter 4 
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members acting together or in parallel for similar goals, aiming to establish democratic 
rule in the federation while increasing individual citizens' access to and impact on 
structures of power through decentralisation and other forms of institutional reform, as 
well as bringing decision-making on many issues closer to citizens and enabling their 
participation therein. The development of the debates and conflicts over the future of the 
federation, however, saw the articulation of a whole range of interests, among which 
cultural-ethnically founded group rights and (territorial or non-territorial) sovereignty 
ranked highest (Nedelsky 2009). Claims for more rights for the non-Czech nationalities 
had repeatedly surfaced in different phases of the Czechoslovak era (Heimann 2009). 
Although parts of the Slovak political elite had continually striven for more Slovak 
autonomy and sovereignty over republican issues, and Magyars and other minorities had 
voiced demands for more minority rights (particularly during liberalisation in the late 
1960s), national or ethno-cultural group integration still constituted only one aspect of 
Czechoslovak dissent, which was primarily concerned with democratisation.  
For the Slovak political elite in Czechoslovakia, democratisation was closely intertwined 
with the question of nationalism, or national sovereignty (Brown 2008; Harris 2002). In the 
1960s, the Czechoslovak constitution eventually included paragraphs that reflected the 
objections of Slovak nationalists to the formation of a Czechoslovak nation by 
institutionalising separate Czech and Slovak National Committees. These latter had some 
authority over their respective parts of the federation, 'at least on paper' (Cutler and 
Schwartz, 1991, p. 518). It was not until after 1968, however, that federalisation became 
more feasible in practice. The period of limited 'liberalisation' before the entry of Soviet 
and Eastern bloc troops into Prague and Bratislava had again made visible and reinforced 
the dividing line between Czech and Slovak proponents of general democratisation, on the 
one hand, and Slovak 'federalists' on the other. The former supported some form of 
federalisation where nationalities' rights would be one aspect among many; for the latter, 
federalisation was the main aim, and they felt their cause was being met with indifference 
by many Czechs (Nedelsky, 2009).  
With the reforms of the late 1960s, federalisation was one of the very few desired goals 
that was actually achieved (Heimann 2009, p.270). It institutionalised separate Czech and 
Slovak National Councils as well as a federative council. The republics formally gained 
sovereignty in political decision-making over most issues (Innes 2001).
11 This was 
combined with more autonomy for the Slovak economy in particular, allowing Slovakia to 
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74
catch up somewhat with the Czech lands, which had continuously enjoyed better 
economic development. Slovak nationalist demands were satiated for a time. While 
national power-sharing was soon overruled by the policies of normalisation, the two-tier 
system of political 'representation' remained formally intact (ibid.).  
At the same time, inter-war minority rights had been largely restored in the realm of 
schooling and the support of Hungarian culture: minority rights were based on the formal 
recognition of the equality of Hungarians and Ukrainians with all other Czechoslovak 
citizens (Marušiak 2002). In particular, CSEMADOK repeatedly demanded more rights 
and support for their group in the political arena. In March 1968, the leadership of 
CSEMADOK insisted it was  
'necessary to create such national minority bodies and institutions [národnostné organy] 
which, as part of the state authorities, will actively participate in the work of political, 
economic and government bodies on behalf of different minorities. As such, they can 
contribute to the solution of minorities' problems through the principles of self-
government' (Central Committee of CSEMADOK, 12 March 1968, quoted in Varga 
2004, p.435, author's translation)  
In response to such demands, the constitutional law on the federation of 1968 recognised 
and emphasised the cultural rights of minorities (Marušiak 2002, Sobotka 2009); however, 
the authorities did not respond to demands for group based political representation. 
Doubtless, such minority demands did not conform to the idea of a socialist and 
'supranational' society (Kalvoda 1988, p.11). Moreover, neither in the direct aftermath of 
the constitutional act, nor at any point later before Czechoslovakia ceased to exist was 
there any legislation that would have guaranteed the practical realisation of this law 
(Marušiak 2002, p.222).  
Members of the Hungarian community had participated in the dissident movements; 
CSEMADOK in particular had played its role in the dissident movement by promoting 
minority rights. CSEMADOK was excluded from the National Front as a punishment for 
the activities it had pursued more and more openly between 1968 and 1969 (Marušiak 
2002). Additionally, as a long-term consequence, CSEMADOK was subordinated to the 
Ministry of Culture, losing some of its decision-making authority in questions of 
Hungarian minority culture (Varga 2004). While normalisation was a setback to the 
minority situation in the eyes of Hungarian activists in the 1980s, Hungarian dissent started 
to crystallise again and more strongly during that same time (Sándor 2004). In particular, 
Hungarian dissidents continued to criticise ongoing minority discrimination as part of the Part II - Chapter 4 
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Charter 77 movement - primarily alongside Czechs - and as part of the Catholic 
opposition in Slovakia (ibid., p.30). In the 1980s, different opposition groups emerged 
within Hungarian dissent. Activities and demands were focused primarily on questions of 
minority members' opportunities for mother-tongue education, the condition and quality of 
minority schooling, the support for and decision-making in minority cultural affairs, and 
the use of minority languages in public life, including the use of Hungarian denominations 
for geographical and topographic places (Marušiak 2002, p.246). It also concerned 
minority activists that the Beneš decrees continued to survive formally, even if they were 
no longer applied in practice.
12 While many of these questions were of limited concern to 
Slovak (and Czech) dissidents, these groups did actively protest when Miklós Duray, one 
of the best known Hungarian activists (who still is a leading politician in today's Hungarian 
Coalition Party MKP/SMK) was imprisoned for 'Hungarian nationalism' (Sándor 2008, 
p.31). 
Thus, although disagreement on a number of historical and minority rights-related issues 
persisted during the Czechoslovak era (Marušiak 2002; Heimann 2009), dissidents of all 
national backgrounds increasingly cooperated over the course of the 1980s. Out of the 
various dissident groups that emerged in that decade, a movement grew in the form of the 
Slovak Verejnost' proti nasiliu (Public Against Violence, VPN) and the Czech Občanské 
forum (Civic Forum). In order to have their views represented, Hungarian dissidents 
formed the Független Magyar Kezdeményezés/Mad'arská nezávislá iniciatíva 
(Independent Hungarian Initiative, FMK), Miklós Duray's political movement Együttélés 
Politikai Mozgalom/Politická Hnutia Spolužitie (Political Movement Coexistence, 
Együttélés) and the Hungarian strand of the Magyar Kereszténydemokrata 
Mozgalom/Mad'arské krest'anskodemokratické hnutie (Christian Democratic Movement, 
MKDM) (Öllös 2004). Despite initial engagement in common activity through the Public 
Against Violence movement, aimed at overcoming Czech and Slovak Communism, lines 
of disagreement arose not only between representatives of the Slovak and Czech factions, 
but also between the Slovak and Hungarian groups. In the context of the democratisation 
of the late 1980s/early 1990s, the VPN reiterated its demands for more Slovak autonomy 
and sovereignty, initially within a common framework with the Czech Republic, later as a 
confederation, and lastly as a separate nation-state (Ramet 1994). The power of the 
                                                 
12 This is the case until today. In a recent decision of the National Council, the Beneš decrees are considered 
inviolable by the Slovak state. However, in the same debate in the National Council, Slovakia has 
condemned the principle of collective guilt (Malová & Učeň 2007). Minority politicians in post-communist 
Slovakia have also fought for the restitution of dispossessed property, proposing that at least those houses 
and land that was owned by the state should be conferred on the municipalities where the property is located 
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Communist Party had dominated the political arena despite the various political organs 
that had been institutionalised in response to nationalist claims: with its gradual wane, any 
mitigating impact on Czech-Slovak relations also faded. As a consequence, identification 
with Czech or Slovak (or minority) nationalisms came to the fore during the events and 
debates of the late 1980s/early 1990s in relation to political institution-building.  
The importance of autonomy relative to general democratic issues was mirrored in the 
different national groups, not only supporting their own group's cultural expressions, but 
also in voting almost exclusively for ethnically-based political parties (ibid.). However, a 
significant proportion among the population of Slovakia supported some form of 
federation with the Czechs according to opinion polls – this included the Hungarians, who 
in 1989 had made up 4% of the Czechoslovak population, but would constitute 11% of the 
Slovak Republic's inhabitants (Leff 1997, p.139; Jelinek 1993).
13 However, there was no 
consensus on how a future common federation should be formed; the support for various 
forms of future statehood was ambiguous and changing. Even under the condition that the 
two republics would have continued to form a (con)federation, the conflicts over 
sovereignty were likely to have continued. In this context, the influence of the VPN's 
nationalist wing grew. Simultaneously, the democratisation of the late 1980s/early 1990s 
had led to the creation of an array of cultural organisations by the different ethnic groups 
inhabiting Slovakia, including the Slovaks. The demands and identities articulated, while 
not entirely new in the context of interethnic relations in the country, posed the challenge 
of establishing institutions and a state that provided the structures and means to integrate 
these diverse groups into one community.  
Despite the disagreements on a number of historical and cultural/minority issues, the VPN 
united Slovaks, Hungarians, and members of other minorities. The conflict that began to 
dominate interethnic relations and the democratisation process was that between Czechs 
and Slovaks. In early 1991, the VPN's two large blocs separated, leaving Christian 
conservative and moderate reform groups together with the Hungarian groups as a 
weakened VPN, which was already displaying internal ethnic divisions. The stronger 
branch of the VPN, including the Slovak National Party (SNS), the Slovak Democratic 
                                                 
13 According to Jelinek (1993), the Czecho-Slovak embassy in Israel supplied the following data as of 3 
March 1991. Nationalities in Czechoslovakia: Czechs 8,426,070; Slovaks 4,819,948; Moravians 
1,360,155;Hungarians 586,884; Romanies (Gypsies) 114,116; Poles 61,542; Germans 53,418; Silesians 
45,223; Ukrainians 20,954; Ruthenians 18,648; Russians 5930; other and unsure 55,078. 
Nationalities in the Czech Republic: Czechs 8,327,648; Moravians 1,356,267; Slovaks 308,269. 
Nationalities in the Slovak Republic: Slovaks 4,511,679; Hungarians 566,741; Romanies 
(Gypsies) 80,627.  Part II - Chapter 4 
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Left (SDL') and the new Hnutia za democratické Slovensko (Movement for a 
Democratic Slovakia, HZDS), reconfigured the direction and character of the democratic 
transformation (Harris 2002). HZDS, under the leadership of Vladimir Mečiar, 
successfully capitalised on Slovak nationalist sentiments, while at the same time the 
alliance between the Slovak and Hungarian movements was broken (Csergo 2007, p.32). 
In the political debates of 1991/1992, the focus shifted from the question of how the issue 
of sovereignty in the Czech and Slovak Republics was to be solved democratically when 
democratic sovereignty was understood differently by Czechs and Slovaks, to sovereignty 
being increasingly debated as a question of ethnic sovereignty, without necessarily 
debating its implications for democracy (Heimann 2009).
14  
Tensions between the Czech and the Slovak Republics were exacerbated by the problems 
of an unequally developed economy, which worried the two republics differently. The 
Slovak economy, which since the 1960s had engaged in a more 'Soviet style' 
industrialisation, relying on heavy and military industry, now faced far more difficulties 
than the Czech economy as it 'transitioned' to a non-socialist economy in order to sustain 
local demand to replace production based on exports to the Soviet Union (Henderson, 
1999). Rather than this being mirrored in political divisions – for example, in a left-right 
divide – the economic differences were again framed along republican lines and couched 
in terms of whether the burden of economic transformation was to be shared and, if so, 
how that would be done. The economic issue then served further to fuel nationalism. Thus, 
the conflicts were not ethnic in principle, but represented mainly the traditionally different 
understandings in Slovak and Czech political thought of how to institutionalise democratic 
principles. However, with the goal of Slovak self-determination becoming increasingly 
popularised, politics were ethnicised (Nedelsky 2009; Csergo 2007).
15  
When, in September 1992, Slovakia's National Council passed a separate constitution for 
the country, the future of (Czech and) Slovak statehood had still not been settled. The 
Slovak political elite had emphasised for decades its perception of relative exclusion from 
                                                 
14 Another debate emerged after Havel's somewhat imprudent suggestion of omitting the term 'socialist' from 
the common state's denomination in 1989 and calling it Czechoslovakia. Bitter memories of Slovaks led them 
to suggest Czecho-Slovakia instead, which was disapproved by the Czechs as for them 'it was too painful a 
reminder […] of the Slovaks' and Ruthenians' 'betrayals' of 1938 and 1939' (Heimann 2009, p.318). It took 
three weeks to solve the dispute by agreeing on the state's new name Czech and Slovak Federative Republic.  
15 While there was public support for both a federalist and a separatist solution, demonstrations in Bratislava 
particularly represented the nationalist spectrum, not only displaying and shouting anti-Czech, anti-
Hungarian and anti-Semitic slogans, but even attacking Havel, when he turned up at such a rally 
unexpectedly (Heimann, 2009, p. 317). Public commemoration of Hlinka and Tiso as 'pioneers' of Slovak 
independent statehood also expressed the strong support among a large part of the population for Slovak 
independence regardless of its rather inglorious history; the Czech public was appalled by this (ibid.).  Part II - Chapter 4 
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the Czech-Slovak political community during common statehood. The newly formulated 
demands and identities posed the challenge of integrating these diverse groups into one 
community. Moreover, demands were raised claiming the sovereignty and self-
determination of the nation that was increasingly defined in ethno-cultural terms, which 
also affected the way in which minority members framed their political participation and 
projections of future statehood (Harris 2002). While common statehood would have been 
an equally realistic option for the developments after mid-1992, most analysts attribute the 
actual split to the uncompromising negotiations on the future federation of the two leaders, 
Vladimir Mečiar and Václav Klaus, who steered the situation towards the 'inevitability' of 
separation. They are cautious, to point out that it was not so much a conflict between the 
Czech and Slovak groups that made the eventual split inevitable, but the failure of the 
Czech and Slovak leaders of the negotiations (Henderson 1999). Nonetheless, the political 
foundations for the split had been laid out in the months and years leading up to the 'failed' 
talks between the heads of the two republics, rather than developing naturally, as the claim 
of inevitability seems to suggest.
16 As Shepherd argues, Slovakia's eventual independence 
was a  
'no nonsense solution when everything else was blurred. […] Once the deed had been 
accomplished, there was no great outcry and the issue is, of course, completely off the 
agenda now' (Shepherd 2000, p.140).  
Some authors have argued that this result contradicted the views of the majority of the two 
republics' populations (Leff 1996). After all, the main conflict of the time was that of 
democratising a former Communist state, for which both republics had  
'moved in tandem to remove the regime. Civic Forum and [VPN] were formed 
simultaneously, in response to the same events, and the same deeper political, economic 
and social problems. They had compatible demands, and similar visions of the future' 
(Henderson 1999, pp.31-2).  
However, the two movements were formed in parallel with each other, not as one. Other 
scholars have therefore argued that, for example, the number of Slovaks estimated to have 
been opposed to the split has to be reconsidered, and was probably lower than previously 
assumed, not the least because most members of the Hungarian community were known to 
be opposed to the split and constituted 10% of the Slovak population (Nedelsky 2009). 
Thus, Heimann argues convincingly that the decision taken by Mečiar and Klaus 
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'followed quite logically both from the course of the Velvet Revolution – which had 
really been two revolutions, one Czech and one Slovak – and, more profoundly, from 
Czech-Slovak tensions which had dogged Czecho-Slovakia/Czechoslovakia from its 
inception and meant that, while most Czechs were able to identify with the state, a 
majority of Slovaks considered their nationality to be Slovak, not Czechoslovak' 
(Heimann 2009, p.321).  
At the same time, the Hungarian group anticipated the restriction of their recently gained 
rights, and therefore preferred to continue a more centralised common statehood with the 
Czechs, fearing that the Slovaks would turn against them once 'turned loose.' In very much 
the same language utilised by the Slovaks in arguing against 'Czech domination', 
Hungarians demanded recognition as a state-bearing group against efforts by the Slovak 
majority to institutionalise its dominance in the political system of the emerging state. 
However, they also feared the curtailing of rights in a Slovak nation-state, not least because 
of the historical animosities between the Slovak and Hungarian groups. Unsurprisingly, 
therefore, they protested strongly against the formulation of the Slovak constitution, which 
declared the Slovaks as the single, state-constituting nation, when it was passed in 
September 1992 (Nedelsky 2003). 
Importantly, the split of Czechoslovakia was never put to a referendum. With hindsight, it 
can be assumed that, even though many Slovaks did not support an independent Slovakia, 
their support for a common state with the Czechs lacked sufficient strength and depth to 
make them bring this demand into the streets at a time of 'triple transition' (Shepherd 
2000). Perhaps unsurprisingly, therefore, the divorce was as 'velvet' in character as the 
preceding revolution, particularly in comparison to other countries that underwent regime 
change and fell apart into new states. That said, such a statement should not go without the 
qualification that the 'velvet' split was accompanied by eruptions of xenophobic, 
particularly anti-Hungarian, anti-Semitic, and anti-Czech demonstrations in Bratislava,
17 
and thus taken by observers, as well as minority members, as heralding repressive, 
intolerant political practices and policies (Fisher 2006).  
In the struggle for a new consensus regarding the definition of the political community in 
Slovakia, three strands had emerged in Slovak politics. These have since shaped the state's 
institutional development. They consist of a nationalist, a moderately liberal-conservative 
and a pluralist concept of political community. These are not easily assigned to political 
parties, but rather represent tendencies in the changing politics of dynamic and 
                                                 
17 In the Czech Republic, skinhead attacks as well as nationalists' rhetoric were aimed particularly against 
Gypsies and Vietnamese (Heimann 2009, p.322).  Part II - Chapter 4 
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heterogeneous political actors (Csergo 2007). The nationalist principle has dominated 
political thought far beyond parties that usually count as 'nationalist'. Simultaneously, parts 
of the moderate camp support the idea of a unitary nation-state, usually opposing the 
broadening of minority group rights; others favour more liberal concepts of Slovakia as a 
civic nation, which overlaps with the ideas some minority representatives support. Pluralist 
concepts, almost exclusively represented by the Hungarian camp, encompass a broad range 
of ideas, from loose demands for recognition of minorities as legitimate political actors to 
concepts of co-nation and equal status of majority and minority groups (ibid.). Although 
the latter two strands have always played a role in Slovak policies, the 1990s and beyond 
were dominated by the idea of establishing a Slovak nation-state.  
The first signs of the institutionalisation of the ethnic principle as a guide for Slovak state 
politics were already evident when the country was still part of the federation with the 
Czech Lands, namely in 1990 with the adoption of the Official Language Law, discussed 
in more detail in chapter 6. This document was read by observers and politicians not only 
as a counter to Czech domination, but also as a preemptive move against other ethnic 
groups living in Slovakia, particularly the Hungarians, whose demands for recognition in 
the federal Slovak state were only to a very limited extent represented by the new law 
(Daftary & Gál 2003). A much more important step to institutionalise Slovak sovereignty 
to implement a multifaceted ethnic principle was the HZDS's draft for a Slovak 
constitution, which was adopted on 1 September 1992 (Ústava 1992). The preamble of the 
constitution resembles the text of the Slovak declaration of independence from June that 
year, in which the National Council  
'proclaims the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic as the foundation of the sovereign 
state of the Slovak nation' (quoted in Nedelsky 2009, p.182). 
The National Council adopted the constitution with the support of the vast majority of the 
MPs, though it was clearly rejected by the Hungarian representatives and - for reasons of 
lack of catholic imprint on the constitution - also by the representatives of the Slovak 
Christian Democratic Movement. The Hungarian parties sensed that the Slovak concept of 
the nation was not inclusive of other nationalities. Therefore, they proposed a draft version 
with a more inclusive wording, suggesting the constitution began with the phrase 'We, the 
citizens of Slovakia', rather than 'We, the Slovak nation'. When this was rejected, the 
Hungarian representatives walked out in protest and were absent for the final decision on 
the adoption of the constitution. As a consequence, the constitution was adopted with the 
exclusion of substantial parts of the population and despite the strong criticism of the Part II - Chapter 4 
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minority representatives (Nedelsky 2009). With respect to its impact on the development 
of interethnic relations in independent Slovakia, the decision to not engage in a debate with 
minority representatives and to avoid mention of interethnic consensus formation on 
common statehood and the place and role of minorities in it cannot be overestimated. As I 
discuss in chapter 5, this exclusivist approach was mirrored by the fundamental identity 
documents of the political community.  
4.5 Democratisation and interethnic relations in Estonia 
As was the case in Slovakia, the processes of glasnost' and democratisation during the 
1980s in Estonia which eventually led to the country's independence in 1991 were closely 
intertwined with national sovereignty and nationalism (Budryte 2005). Estonia's 
incorporation into the Soviet Union was perceived by many Estonians as an ongoing, 
unlawful occupation by an oppressor that had ruled the country for centuries. The Soviet 
era has been portrayed by Estonian writers, historians and dissidents as having been a peril 
to the 'survival of the Estonian people' (cf. Raun 1991, p.xviii). Indeed, several aspects of 
Estonia's Soviet history concern drastic demographic changes (as mentioned earlier in this 
chapter). As a result, long before perestroika set in, grass-root initiatives had made national 
sovereignty and the use of Estonian language in all realms of society a matter of human 
rights (Vardys 1981). Dissident groups in the 1970s raised demands to end Russification 
and initiated a referendum to secede from the Union (Misiunas & Taagepera 1993, pp.266-
267). Particularly in the 1980s, criticism grew stronger, when Estonians argued that they 
could not take the permanent influx of Russians into the republic, as this caused the 
continuous decline of Estonian language, knowledge of Estonian traditions, and the general 
decline of the Estonian proportion in the population (ibid., p.269). Moreover, Russian 
migration was understood as directly related to economic and environmental exploitation. 
For many Estonians,  
'Russaphones were the immediate cause of environmental decay because Russian 
speakers' hands razed the land, opened the sewer spigot, thieved Estonia's mineral 
wealth, and discarded as waste all extracted resources not part of the production plan' 
(Auer 1998, p.666).
18 
These accusations and the demands for an end to Russian migration to Estonia and even 
secession were published in samizdat: although negative sentiments towards Russian-
                                                 
18 This was not least because Estonians had shown reluctance to work in the oil shale mines (Auer 1998, 
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speakers existed among Estonians, there is evidence that many, if not most, citizens 
were unaware of any ethnic tensions in the Republic or the Union as a whole, and believed 
in the notion of peaceful coexistence of Soviet nationalities (Agarin 2010, p.67).  
Still, in the ESSR, demands for democratisation known across the Soviet Union and 
Central Eastern Europe were inextricably linked to the future of the Estonians as a cultural, 
linguistic or ethnic group. Among other reasons,  
'[t]he Soviet regime never managed to eradicate entirely the legacy of the interwar 
period [i.e. Estonian independent statehood 1918-1940], nor did it necessarily seek to do 
so in the years after 1953' (D. J. Smith 2003, p.161).  
Estonian dissent had broadened its social base during the 1970s and 1980s, mobilising 
around ecological, economic and democratic development of the republic and Estonian 
national self-determination (Raun 1997; Raun 1991). The reforms under Gorbachev's aegis 
evoked even stronger and more loudly articulated demands for cultural and political rights 
vis-à-vis Moscow. Group sentiment grew among Estonians towards Russian-speakers, and 
primarily Russians, and even led to anti-Russian marches and clashes between the groups 
(ibid.). This was, however, not a new phenomenon, as already during earlier protests 
demands for Russians to leave the ESSR had been voiced (Vardys 1981). As a 
consequence, not all strands of the democratisation movement could be considered open to 
Russians and Russian-speakers. However, it would be incorrect to assume a general 
political divide between Estonians and Russians. Many Russians supported some form of 
Estonia's 'native inhabitant[s'] […] final word on the destiny of their land and people' 
(Open Letter From the Estonian SSR, quoted in Vardys 1981, p.295). In so doing, they also 
did not oppose the increasingly open display of Estonian national symbols, their demands 
for safeguards for the Estonian language or the increasingly vehement demands for 
dissolving the ties with Moscow. And despite anti-Russian sentiments on the side of the 
Estonians, both Estonian and Russian activists engaged in the Popular Front, the reform-
oriented strand of the emerging movement for democratisation and autonomy. Russian-
speakers' support for independence grew over the months of 1989 and 1991. In September 
1989 only 9% of Russian-speakers supported independence according to opinion polls 
(Agarin 2010, p.78); in March 1990, the Russian-speaking deputies of the Supreme 
Council decided not to participate in a vote on independence, thereby expressing their 
suspicions regarding the growing nationalism that accompanied the vote, but 
simultaneously allowing for the vote to go ahead in support of independence (Smith 2002, 
pp.56-57); in March 1991, a referendum was organised by the Popular Front in which all Part II - Chapter 4 
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residents could participate and it was estimated that between 25-40% of the Russian-
speakers voted for independence then (Smith 2002, p.59). Among Estonians, the support 
for independence grew even more rapidly. While, in April 1989, 56% of Estonians were 
pro-independence, in May 1990, the proportion had risen to 96% (Raun 1991, p.229).  
While the majority of Russian-speakers did not actively participate in the movement, those 
who did agreed with Estonians in their demands for decentralisation (ibid.). Consequently, 
Estonia's path to independence in the turbulent years between 1987/88 and 1990 was 
shaped by the emerging movements for autonomy, mutually reinforced by similar 
movements in Latvia and Lithuania (Misiunas & Taagepera, 1993). The Estonian 
population along with a substantial part of the Russian-speakers supported this 
development, initially only claiming autonomy within the Union and only later calling for 
independence, a fact increasingly neglected in the academic literature on the topic in the 
subsequent years (Agarin 2010). Public pressure mounted against many centrally-led 
economic policies, and these were decidedly not sanctioned by Moscow.  
Russian-speakers' hesitancy to support independence was due to several factors. On the 
one hand, it was far from clear what 'independence' meant. The Popular Front continued to 
support varying forms of autonomy and independence within a loose federation with other 
(former) Soviet republics, and promoted a reform course on the basis of existing 
institutions. A number of Estonian parties that had formed since 1987 with the aim of 
(re)gaining national self-determination, including the Eesti Muinsuskaitse Selts (Estonian 
Heritage Society, EMS) and the Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei (Estonian National 
Independence Party, ERSP), which mobilised on the basis of strong anti-Soviet rhetoric 
and supported the restoration of the pre-Soviet Estonian state (Raun 1991). Part of the 
Russian population organised to counter the progressing decentralisation, fearing 
particularly for their language-related rights and privileges (Misiunas & Taagepera 1993, 
p.312).  
On the other hand, a 'counter-movement' developed that advocated the goal of maintaining 
the status quo, claiming (with only limited justification) to represent the Russian-speaking 
population. These movements opposed the course of the Popular Front as much as that of 
the Estonian nationalists, and supported a pro-Soviet course. The 'Internationalist 
Movement' (Interdvizhenie, Intermovement) gained support almost exclusively from the 
ranks of Russian-speakers – predominantly among the non-Estonian nomenklatura and to 
some degree the older population. However, due to their 'conservative' stance on glasnost' Part II - Chapter 4 
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and perestroika, they received little support from Moscow (D. J. Smith 1998). Although 
2-3,000 supporters could be mobilised to rally against the Popular Front's 'nationalism' in 
summer 1988, Intermovement was supported by only around 15% of the Russian-speaking 
population in the ESSR, according to an opinion poll in 1988; it eventually lost most of its 
support among even them in the following years (Raun 1991, p.226). Joint activities with 
the Ob''edinennyi Soyuz trudovykh kollektivov (United Council of Work Collectives, 
OSTK) – largely consisting of managers of the large industrial sites, particularly of the 
Estonian North-East and old-guard CPE leaders – allowed the Intermovement's leadership 
to continually influence the Russian-speaking industrial workers.
19 However, the Russian-
speakers' support for both counter-movement organisations did not exceed around a third 
of the group's members (D. J. Smith 2002, p.49).  
On the initiative of the radical ESRP, in that year the Eesti Kodanike Komiteed (Estonian 
Citizens' Committees) organised a register for all citizens of inter-war Estonia and their 
descendents (D. J. Smith 2002). Inviting all persons registered to participate in elections to 
an unofficial and non-Soviet Eesti Kongress (Congress of Estonia), the radical nationalists 
saw the Congress of Estonia as the only institution able legitimately to decide on the future 
of Estonia. The registration campaign had emerged from discussions among the 
movements for autonomy about who would have the legitimacy to take decisions in an 
autonomous Estonia. Given that a third of the population had come to Estonia during the 
course of the past five decades, or had in many cases stayed in the country only a few years 
previously, this part of the population were now increasingly perceived by Estonians as the 
ugly remnants of equally ugly Sovietisation and Russification policies (Semjonov 2002). 
The vast majority of Estonian inter-War citizens followed the citizens' registration 
initiative (Smith 2002). The underlying restorationist understanding of the Estonian 
political community simultaneously declared the Soviet period unjust, as times of alien 
occupation, which had interrupted the just and normal path of Estonian statehood. The 
restorationist concept established an understanding of Estonian independent statehood as a 
continuum, which in 1990 resumed what had been interrupted by Soviet occupation (D. J. 
Smith 2003).  
Underlying this campaign was the argument of legal continuity which, rejecting the view 
that Estonia had joined the Soviet Union voluntarily, perceived all Soviet-era settlers as 
representatives of an occupying force, who could not be trusted in their ambitions for a 
                                                 
19 Although it had attempted to exert direct influence on Estonian workers too, most Estonian representatives 
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fully independent Estonia (Chinn & R. Kaiser 1996). Based on the notion that the polity 
of any new Estonian state should necessarily be unaffected by the population changes 
under the Soviet regime, the Citizens' Committees' initiatives laid the foundation for the 
Estonian approach to statehood and polity that still exists and continues now to shape 
Estonian integration. The nationalist stance of the movement for change gradually gained 
the upper hand in public debate and population's support, and by spring 1990, the Congress 
of Estonia declared itself the representative body of the citizens of Estonia, assembling 
both nationalist and moderate parties and being supported by many members of the 
Popular Front (Smith 2002, p.54). Moreover, during the events of 1991, when Soviet 
armed forces intervened in Vilnius and Riga, killing 21 unarmed demonstrators, the Soviet 
Union and its 'reformers' lost all their credibility. In late August 1991, in response to the 
imminent threat from the advancing Soviet military in the aftermath of the August coup 
and violent attacks of Soviet troops in Lithuania and Latvia, radical and moderate 
nationalists in Estonia joined forces. Estonia finally declared its independence and began to 
reinforce and legitimise this by restoring pre-war Estonia's international diplomatic links 
and adopting large parts of the first Estonian Republic's constitution (ibid., p.60).  
The Popular Front had long supported autonomy within or secession from the Soviet 
Union without (in contrast to the nationalist approach) relying on the legal continuity 
argument; this approach was compatible with claims that all residents of the ESSR would 
be included as citizens of a new, federative, autonomous Estonian Republic or an 
independent state. This did not go far enough for the Congress and its supporters. Insisting 
that independent Estonia needed to be restored, they iterated that the Soviet-era migrants 
could not become citizens of the state automatically (ibid.). When the Supreme Council of 
Estonia, formally the most important representative body of the ESSR, voted on Estonian 
independence in March 1990 and again in August 1991, Russian-speaking representatives 
abstained (D. J. Smith 2002, p.56). However, even under the conditions of ethnicised 
conflict and serious concern among many Soviet-era settlers, in a referendum on Estonian 
independence in March 1991 which was open for all residents to participate, an estimated 
25-40% of the non-Estonian population voted in favour of independence (D. J. Smith 2002, 
p.59).
20 Undoubtedly, though a significant and increasing minority of Russian-speakers 
supported Estonian independence, the nationalist movements had also not done enough to 
attract and include most parts of the Soviet immigrant population; with events accelerating, 
                                                 
20 Raun claims that 77.83% of the overall population voted yes, suggesting that 'nearly all Estonians' and 
around 30% of the Soviet-time settlers supported independence (Raun 1991, p.239). A controversial 
referendum organised from Moscow later that year also suggested that the majority of non-Estonians (also) 
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many of these parts of the population were left behind (Misiunas & Taagepera 1993, 
p.322).  
This development hampered the inclusion of the Russian-speaking migrant population into 
the decision-taking on the future of the state. The exclusion of Russian-speakers was not 
absolute; some 34,000 Soviet-era migrants applied for Estonian citizenship before 
independence, which was appreciated as a 'patriotic act' by the nationalists (Raun 1991, 
p.228). Also, the option of naturalisation was envisaged by most nationalist parties. 
However, the argument of legal continuity adopted with the decision on independence 
meant, first and foremost, that all demographic changes that were caused by Soviet-era 
immigration were illegitimate. As a result, Soviet-era migrants had no automatic right to 
become citizens of independent Estonia. In effect, this excluded the vast majority of 
Russian-speakers from the Estonian citizenry and therefore from the political community 
that would decide on the form of statehood, membership and institutions of the new 
political community. This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5. 
Conclusion 
This chapter provided a discussion of the difficult historical legacies of interethnic 
relations in Slovakia and Estonia. It showed the complex ways in which nationhood, 
national sovereignty and democratisation have been interlaced in the two countries. The 
following chapters attest to the continuous role of historical tensions. They suggest that the 
groups in both countries have not drawn conclusions from the past that would have enabled 
state-building and community formation on the basis of co-operation and integration.  Part II - Chapter 5 
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5 State-building in Estonia and Slovakia: 
Institutionalisation of political membership  
5.1 Introduction 
In the theoretical part of this thesis I suggested that an analysis of interethnic integration 
requires a discussion of how interethnic relations are encoded in the political institutions 
and processes. In light of the specific paths to independence in Slovakia and Estonia 
examined in the previous chapter, the question can now be put more pointedly: To what 
extent have the ethnicised power relations that emerged during democratisation been 
inscribed in the fundamental institutions of the state? If the political institutions do exhibit 
an ethnic bias, how is this reflected in the political structures that these institutions 
generate? What are the dynamics of this ethno-cultural bias and how have these dynamics 
been mirrored in the political-institutional frameworks of Slovakia and Estonia since 
1992/93?  
This chapter seeks to investigate how the foundations of political membership in the 
constitutions of the two states have been derived from latent discursive institutions of 
Estonian and Slovak nationalisms; how they have shaped the design of political 
membership in the institutional structures of the two states; and to what extent changes in 
the policies of political membership have contributed to a re-formulation of the boundaries 
of the political community in Slovakia and Estonia. These nationalisms re-surfaced, were 
further developed and became powerful tools in the political competition of the 
democratisation and independence movements, as discussed in the previous chapter. I 
analyse political membership at three levels: Identity institutions – that is, those institutions 
and crystallised narratives which form the normative underpinnings of a political 
community; regulations of the political system – the policies and legislation that regulate 
and structurate group relations with the state; and practices of interethnic inclusion – those 
programmes of political actors that result in the cooperation between groups in the political 
sphere and the de facto inclusion of the minority group into political processes. In so 
doing, I follow a distinction made by Juviler and Stroschein, who suggest that an analysis 
of the interlacing of institutions at these three levels provides for a comprehensive 
understanding of how political community/membership is conceptualised (Juviler & 
Stroschein 1999).  Part II - Chapter 5 
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In order to support and structure my analysis, I draw upon the idea of discursive 
institutionalism, which suggests that political 'philosophies, policies, and programmes' 
carry both cognitive and normative ideas about 'what one ought to do' and 'what is good or 
bad about what is' (Schmidt 2008, p.306). As such, the institutions of political membership 
simultaneously represent the background and the outcome of the decision-making of 
majority elites, as well as changes therein, and constitute the structural context of 
interethnic integration. Although I do not engage in a full analysis of the Estonian and 
Slovak discursive institutions, I suggest that for understanding the continuities in 
Slovakia's and Estonia's approaches to state-building and interethnic relations it is helpful 
to look at the normative and cognitive ideas imparted by the discourses and fundamental 
institutions of statehood and political membership.  
Discursive institutionalism also reminds us that it matters not only what is being said, but 
who says it to whom in what circumstances (ibid. p.310). Therefore, power relations 
between actors as well as the role different political institutions play in the hierarchies of 
the political system are relevant to the opening of opportunities for change in the 
regulations of political membership. The state's constitution represents the most 
fundamental artefact imparting the understanding of political membership and the roles 
ascribed to members of society (Juviler & Stroschein 1999). Citizenship policies 
essentially regulate formal access to membership; in cases where access is granted, the 
political system can impact political membership by manipulating the participation of 
different groups differently. At the same time, political institutions can also be designed to 
compensate for formal exclusion or disadvantage of a specific group in relation to the state. 
Decisively, the relative autonomy of majority elites to adjust policies and their political 
programmes to institutional and structural demands allows actors to change policies and 
programmes according to changing contexts.  
This chapter analyses how the political institutions in Estonia and Slovakia have envisaged 
participation in state-building and how changing policies of political membership have 
impacted the normative foundations of interethnic relations. In section 5.2, I discuss the 
constitutional consensus on the boundaries of the political communities in both countries, 
and how the normative institutions were devised from the histories of group antagonism. 
The following sections look at the limitations of political membership implemented in 
Estonia and Slovakia. In the Estonian case Russian-speakers were formally excluded from 
citizenship, when Estonia was declared an independent state; the subsequent policies on 
naturalisation and, later, 'legal-political integration' are discussed in sections 5.3 and 5.5. In Part II - Chapter 5 
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Slovakia, political membership of Hungarians was institutionalised in a less systematic 
form; however, nationalist governments modified the political and electoral systems in 
ways that aimed to undermine the Hungarians' political participation. Sections 5.4 and 5.6 
discuss these measures as well as their partial revocation later.  
5.2 Institutional and discursive constructions of sovereignty 
Estonia and Slovakia's specific paths to independence determined that no real consensus 
was sought or achieved among the opposing political parties, and crucially, between ethnic 
groups in either country. The power dynamics of the early 1990s and the wide popular 
support for the more expressively nationalist approaches to statehood catapulted radical 
nationalists from the democratisation movements into the governments in the first national 
elections of the independent states in 1992 (Estonia) and 1993 (Slovakia) (Fisher 2006; 
Metcalf 1996). However, the fundamental boundaries of the political community were 
already drawn before independence. As such, the boundaries of the political community 
were set by those who participate in the negotiations that lead to its (re)formulation (ibid.). 
The very power relations at the time when the boundaries of the political communities in 
Estonia and Slovakia were defined are crucial for an understanding of political community 
and the processes by which it is further shaped. I take the institutionalised understanding of 
the 'sovereign' and the definition of the 'nation' in the Slovak and Estonian states' 
constitutions as an indicator of the inclusivity both of the underlying normative framework 
of political processes and the permeability of the boundaries of the political community.  
The Estonian and Slovak constitutions set out the bases for their respective liberal-
democratic state orders. They include guarantees for fundamental human rights and 
freedom from discrimination by ethnicity, language, or group belonging. Although 
declaring all citizens equal, both constitutions exhibit an ethno-linguistic bias, in 
stipulating that the titular languages have the status of 'state' (rather than 'official') 
languages.
1 Introducing a privileged status of the majority groups' languages, the 
constitutions also aim to 'compensate' for the lesser status of minority languages by 
stipulating minority rights with specific articles. These minority rights do not, however, 
immediately guarantee minority protection in said realms, but need to be translated into 
ordinary law; this makes them dependent on the political will of policy makers and their 
                                                 
1 Language policies are discussed at length in chapter 6. The notion of state language declares one language 
to be a state institution, often making it an obligation and 'citizen's duty' to speak the language rather than 
minority languages, as we will see; this is in contrast to 'official languages', which describe those languages 
that are officially recognised by a state as being widely or regionally spoken also in public proceedings.  Part II - Chapter 5 
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interpretations of constitutional law. Importantly, both constitutions provide the 
normative backdrop against which constitutional law is interpreted: the preambles of the 
constitutions outline the ideas on the political community as envisaged by their authors. 
Even though the preamble of the constitution has only symbolic significance and is not 
legally enforceable, this part of the constitution provides for the interpretation and the spirit 
in which the constitutional articles are written and the 'identity' of the political community 
as envisaged in and inscribed into the political structures of subsequent state-building 
processes.  
Decisively, the preambles of the Slovak and Estonian constitutions enunciate different 
relationships between the state and distinct groups of citizens, while the boundaries 
between groups are drawn along ethno-cultural lines. The Slovak preamble distinguishes 
between the Slovak nation on the one hand and the citizens of the Republic, the latter 
including 'national minorities and ethnic groups', on the other hand; similarly, in Estonia, 
citizenry ('rahvas') and the ethnic nation ('rahvus') are the two categories used. Both 
preambles declare a specific relationship of the state to the titular nation, which is not 
paralleled in the relation of other (minority) citizens to the state. It is the remit of both 
states to protect the ethno-cultural 'core' nation. Therefore, this should be the concern also 
of the citizenry as a whole, meaning that all citizens are expected to support the prosperity 
of the titular nation, its language and culture. This is something that other groups cannot 
expect for their cultures. As a result, in both preambles the state-owning nation is denoted 
in explicitly cultural terms. The cultural difference between nation and minorities is 
acknowledged also by the articles of the constitution that establish the titular language as 
the sole state language and mirrored by those which refer to minority rights (Põhiseadus 
1992, §§ 49-52; Ústava 1992, §§ 33-34). The latter refer to minority difference in respect 
to language – in the Estonian constitution these are referred to as 'foreign languages' – 
identity, and culture, and even recognise specific interests emerging from the membership 
of a national minority.  
These articles represent minority rights that aim to protect these groups from cultural 
assimilation or discrimination. At the same time, they are only vaguely defined, cover only 
some aspects of group belonging and represent necessary responses to the titular privilege 
rather than prescribing or implying affirmative action. In so doing, they make 
unmistakeably clear that minority members deviate from the set standard of membership in 
the state community. The distinction between the nation and national minorities or ethnic 
groups means that, although the latter are included into the citizenry, i.e. the state Part II - Chapter 5 
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sovereign, they are not part of the state-bearing nation. Moreover, the symbolic 
distinction between groups in the preamble becomes tangible where the constitution 
confirms not only the recognition of diversity, but also a hierarchy between the different 
cultures in relation to the state. In Järve's words,  
'one ethnic group has manifested its specific claims to the state in which it establishes 
itself constitutionally as a single core ethnic nation. Because of this logic, it is legitimate 
to regard the Preamble as the constitutional pillar of ethnic ascendancy in Estonia' 
(Järve 2004, p.68).  
This hierarchy is particularly pronounced in the Slovak constitutional discourse. In her 
analysis of Slovak political elite understandings of the terms 'nation' and 'nationality', 
Nedelsky elucidates the relation of the state-forming nation and the state (Nedelsky 2003). 
The state, in the interpretation of the Slovak political elite, is the means of a nation to 
realise its 'right to self-determination'. Nationalities lack this right, as in this perspective 
they already 'own' a state elsewhere, where they can realise their sovereignty as a part of 
the core nation (ibid.). As in Estonia, this interpretation of the Slovak constitution is not a 
politically neutral distinction: rather, it divides the citizenry into two classes of citizens, 
depending on individual group membership.  
While the nation as state-owner features strong relations with the state, nationalities hold 
weaker ties to it, lacking the right to realise national ambitions through it (ibid.). 
Distinguishing the state-founder and the citizenry, the preamble thus establishes a power 
relation between the nation and the citizenry: The former is in the position to grant rights to 
the latter, but these rights themselves are never constitutionally secure. Though less 
pronounced in the Estonian preamble, one finds there also a discernable difference in the 
relationship of nation and minorities to the state.  
It will be remembered that both constitutions were adopted without seeking a consensus 
with the Russian-speaking and Hungarian political representatives regarding either the 
future of the state in general and the wording and content of the constitution specifically 
(see chapter 4). While in Slovakia the population in general was excluded from the 
decision on independence, in Estonia a referendum on Estonia's constitution was 
conducted in summer 1992; however, only inter-war citizens and their descendents were 
eligible to vote. The electorate simultaneously rejected a proposal of Keskerakond to allow 
those Soviet-era migrants who had applied for citizenship before Estonian independence to 
vote in the first national elections of 1992 (Smith 2002, p.78). Essentially, Soviet-era 
settlers were excluded both from the decision on the future, independent Estonia and from Part II - Chapter 5 
 
92
the decisive first elections of the new state. In both states, group representatives as well 
as opinion polls in Slovakia and Estonia had made clear that Hungarians and Russian-
speakers were hesitant about the specific forms of nation-state that were established (D. J. 
Smith 2002; Leff 1997). As a result, the groups were de facto excluded from the adoption 
of the constitution, though not explicitly on ethnic grounds. In Slovakia, the Hungarian 
representatives even proposed an alternative reading of the preamble of the constitution, 
which was rejected by the National Council (Nedelsky 2009). In Estonia, Russian-speakers 
who supported independence opposed restorationism (Smith 2002). As a consequence, the 
fundamental artefacts of the two states represent the outcome of the ongoing political 
conflicts at the time when they were adopted, and at the same time represented a powerful 
tool in the hands of the majority group for the process of state-building in the two states. In 
both countries more recently the constitutional preambles were confirmed in their wording 
and in their meanings in more recent years,
2 supporting the claim that the imparted 
interpretation of statehood and state-ownership was not a 'one-off' that emerged from the 
power conflicts in 1991 and 1992 respectively. These political conjunctures saw only the 
beginning of a process whereby nationalist discourses, formed in reaction to extraordinary 
political events, were institutionalised in the foundation of 'normal,' democratic nation-
states.  
In the ongoing state-building processes, the normative implications of the different groups' 
relations to the state stipulated in the constitutional preambles are also a resource for the 
nationalist discourses that have dominated popular political debates in the two countries. 
They have shaped debates far beyond the explicitly nationalist political spectrum. In 
particular, the discourse of national self-determination simultaneously purports the 
cohesion as well as the acceptance of a common fate among all nationals over centuries, 
serving to establish a 'community of fate', united, besides cultural and linguistic 
commonalities, by a common, historical destiny. Establishing a direct line of statal 
existence and a tradition for today's independent Slovak Republic back to the Great 
Moravian Empire, the preamble of the state's constitution mirrors descriptions in popular 
historiography of the 9
th century empire as the 'First (Slovak) State' (Kirschbaum 1995, 
pp.23-38), constructing an historical continuity and an ethno-national identity from ancient 
times to present. Despite the existence of more cautious and less a-historical approaches to 
history, this view features among the fundamental historical discourses in Slovakia today 
(ibid.; Gyárfášová 17/06/2009). However, the discourse acknowledges that the alleged 
                                                 
2 Estonia included a reference to the Estonian language to be preserved and protected by the Estonian state in 
2007; as part of the administrative reform in Slovakia in 2001, the constitution was reconfirmed by 
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sovereignty of the ancient Slovak nation ceased with its subjection to foreign rule. In 
Kirschbaum's own words, this meant  
 'that their destiny was not entirely in their own hands. As a result, a new leitmotif 
appeared in Slovak national life, that of survival' (Kirschbaum 1995, p.38). 
In Slovakia's contemporary historical-political discourse, the idea of a 'centuries-long 
struggle for survival' (again, emphasised in the preamble of the constitution) portrays 
independence as a necessary and especially precious aspect of the fulfilment of the Slovak 
nation's destiny. This discourse on self-determination fulfils several functions for the 
consensus of the political community: It serves to legitimate territorial claims in the 'who-
was-here-first'-controversy fought by nationalist historians on the sides of Slovaks and 
Hungarians (Krekovič 2007); it establishes a narrative of a 'heroic' nation's suffering under 
foreign oppressors, supporting the claim for today's privileged role in the state as a form of 
historical compensation and reward (Kirschbaum 1995, p.38); it also severs to justify 
measures of 'precaution' against representatives of former oppressing powers. The notion 
of victimisation and uniqueness provides the basis of widespread defensive nationalism in 
both countries (Noreen & Sjostedt 2004).
3 Supporters of defensive measures argue for the 
need for protection of their 'small' nation against demands from internal and external 
'enemies', for example by constraining the national self-realisation of minorities in the 
Slovak state (Deegan-Krause 2004b). 
Popular Estonian discourses on the nation's history similarly presume an immutable 
Estonian nation, which has accordingly maintained its unique characteristics over 
millennia, despite its co-existence with and subordination to other nations who ruled over 
Estonian territory and people for centuries (Laar 2006; Laar 2005; Hvostov et al. 2004, 
p.45). Self-portrayals as 'the oldest nation in Europe' (M. Feldman 2001, p.13), a common 
historical fate, and ancestral territory underlie the fundamental distinction between titular 
nation and all other nationalities in the country. The distinction becomes politically 
meaningful, because the concept is decisive for the relation between majority and minority 
groups, and their respective relations to the state. As Mart Laar, a historian and former 
Prime Minister of Estonia, puts it: '[…] who else should decide the fate of a country than 
those who live there and who have been attached by a thousand invisible threads to its 
culture' (Laar 2006, p.16).  
                                                 
3 Lauristin & Heidmets 2002 see the transition 'from "ethnic and defensive" nationalism to more pragmatic 
individualism' or to 'a more civic nation' in Estonia almost complete (p.20; 22). As should become clear in 
this part of the thesis, I disagree with this view.  Part II - Chapter 5 
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This understanding allows the titular nation's upper hand to be understood as a 'natural' 
condition, while the existence of minority rights can be portrayed as testifying to the titular 
nation's acceptance of multicultural reality, rather than a consequence of the exclusionary 
framework of the nation-state.
4 At the same time, the emphasis on the titular nations' 
suffering is complemented by neglect or downplaying of other groups' suffering and their 
historical memory, as well as of the harm done and crimes committed by members of the 
titular nation. In both countries, tensions have emerged around issues of historical memory 
and interpretations of historical developments in terms of injustice and guilt. These ideas 
have also guided the policies on public commemoration. This has become particularly 
evident with respect to public monuments dating from the Soviet era, which play an 
important role in Russian-speakers' historical memory, while for many Estonians they 
represent the continued and unwanted symbolic presence of a former 'occupier'. In 
Slovakia, these tensions are illustrated in such varied issues as the controversy on the 
Beneš decrees, the scandal around school textbooks that downplay Slovakia's role in the 
deportation and mass murder of minorities, especially Jews and members of Romani 
communities, during its alliance with Nazi Germany in the early 1940s.
5 Although in more 
recent years in both states the preparedness to officially acknowledge minority groups' 
historical suffering has increased, gestures that convey this openness are often limited to 
the initiatives of individuals.
6 
It can be concluded that the cultural notion of the nation Laar emphasises in his argument 
is misleading. Although the interpretations of the Estonian and Slovak nations as cultural 
entities, which have developed through interrelation and interaction, could be perceived as 
open to minority members, they have been described repeatedly as relations of kin or blood 
by leading political figures. For example, in the protocol of a roundtable talk to bring 
together Estonian majority and minority representatives and politicians organised at the 
European Centre for Minority Issues, the Estonian Minister for Population Affairs Andra 
Veidemann was paraphrased as saying that Estonian citizenship was essentially based on 
the concept of ius sanguinis, arguing that the 'population of Estonian origin [was] too small 
[…] for keeping its culture and identity alive if a ius solis approach were adopted' 
(Poleshchuk 2001, p.11). In other words, the nation is understood as malleable to a definite 
                                                 
4 Such self-portrayals were particularly frequent in relation to EU accession talks, where both Estonia and 
Slovakia claimed to outrun many other countries within and outside the EU with regard to minority 
provisions (M. Kuus 2004, p.201).  
5 It is further illustrated by the reluctance of policy-makers to support the introduction of jointly developed 
history books by the Slovak-Hungarian history commission (Šutaj 23/06/2009).  
6 František Mikloško, a Slovak MP, apologised individually for post-war deportations and repressions under 
the 'Beneš decrees', cf. Economist 21/07/2005; BBC News 12/03/2001).  Part II - Chapter 5 
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point in history, namely 1940, while changes to Estonian society after that point are not 
accepted as part of the core nation's history. The Slovak debate presents a somewhat 
different angle, when as part of calls for the 're-Slovakisation', extreme nationalists claimed 
that Hungarians in southern Slovakia 'really' are magyarised Slovaks, in a follow-up debate 
to the post-war re-Slovakisation campaign (Gyurgyik 2002). The idea of an original 
cultural belonging as opposed to an adopted one suggests that, for example, language is 
'carried' by individuals as an ingrained trait rather than as a practice. In both states, the 
discourses on political membership are based on a selective understanding of the cultural 
nation, in which hindsight interpretations of what is convenient for today's state-and-
nation-building dominate perceptions of history. As a consequence, from the vantage point 
of the underlying philosophy of the Estonian and Slovak states, a merging of groups into 
one (civic) nation of equal citizens irrespective of ethnic group membership is neither 
desirable nor possible; access to and inclusion into the state-bearing nation essentially 
requires assimilation of individuals in order to safeguard the continued existence of the 
nation. This has been the declared purpose of the Slovak and Estonian states.
7  
How have these conditions impacted the framing of sovereignty as the property of the 
titular nation in Slovakia and Estonia? What were the factors that have determined the 
political participation of minority groups and how have these been changed over time? In 
what follows, I show that state ownership has become an important resource for the titular 
group to legitimise its stewardship over the state and its policies, by restricting political 
membership.  
5.3 Institutionalisation of political membership in Estonia 
In Estonia, the formation of the political community followed logically from the 
restorationist narrative on the legal continuity of the Estonian state. Recourse to the 
political legacy of the interwar republic was ambiguous due to the authoritarian legacy of 
the 1930s and the consequences that the miscalculations of the strong president had for the 
Estonian Republic under the Päts regime, which facilitated the Soviet invasion of Estonia 
in 1940 (Smith 2002, pp.23-26). In order to 'restore' Estonian independence, the 
Constituent assembly therefore went back to Estonia's original constitution of 1920 and 
                                                 
7 The discourses on the Estonian and Slovak nations have not been limited to the past, and not only to the 
glorious past of the titular nation at that. Scholarship on the Estonian discourse on the nation has identified 
the 'othering' or Russian-speakers as well as 'anything Soviet' as a key aspect of how the identity of the 
Estonian state has been created since 1991 (M. Kuus 2004; G. Feldman 2003; Merje Kuus 2002b; Merje 
Kuus 2002a; G. Feldman 2000). In Slovakia, the relation between Hungarians and Slovaks is described not 
so much in civilisational terms, as is the case in Estonia with relation to Russians, but concentrates on both 
nations' common history (Šutaj 23/06/2009).  Part II - Chapter 5 
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included aspects of Western Germany's post-war constitution, limiting the powers of the 
president to the role of a mainly symbolic or representative Head of State (ibid., pp.71-72). 
Importantly though, the political elite reinstalled the regulations and status quo of political 
membership of the late inter-war period, by deciding that only interwar-time citizens and 
their descendents were entitled to immediate citizenship. Naturalisation was made an 
option for all other residents of Estonia (with the exception of former military and secret 
service personnel of the Soviet state) based on the citizenship law of 1938 (ibid., p.72). In 
doing so, formal membership was not stipulated in ethnic terms. At the same time, 
Estonian political membership was restricted in terms of group belonging in order to 
safeguard the 'survival of the Estonian nation'. The threat to the Estonian nation was seen 
primarily in terms of Soviet-era migration and the consequent demographic and socio-
linguistic changes it implied. Soviet predominance has been portrayed in Estonian national 
discourse as a continuation of centuries-long Russian oppression, presenting Soviet 
migrants as representatives of this regime. Because it regulates the political participation of 
Soviet-era migrants, formal political membership has become a cornerstone of Estonian 
state- and nation-building and political as well as social integration.  
Debates over citizenship were already heated prior to actual independence, when the 
unofficially elected Congress of Estonia challenged the Supreme Soviet – still the official 
legislative power in 1990. Citizenship policies have been a bone of contention from the 
beginning of democratisation. Differences emerged between nationalists and Russian-
speakers, but also between different Estonian political parties. For example, the Popular 
Front initially promoted a 'zero-option' of citizenship and proposed various measures to 
facilitate the quick inclusion of those minority members who wanted to participate in the 
Estonian state- and nation-building; the Citizens' Committees did not reject outright 
Soviet-era migrants as future citizens of Estonia, and were open to the inclusion of 
minority members who were prepared to undergo naturalisation (Smith 2002). In the 
spring of 1991, the Citizens' Committee began drafting criteria for political membership 
that aimed to supplement the 1938 citizenship law with a transition period for civil 
residents in which they would be able to register as Estonian citizens without language or 
residence requirements (Kask 1994). The change of political context after the Moscow 
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leading instead to the politics of (limited) restoration, which was presented even by 
many moderates as the only way to go (Smith 2002, p.65).
8  
On 26 February 1992, the Estonian Supreme Soviet re-enacted the citizenship act of the 
interwar period, which was a 'copy-and-paste document of the law dating back to 1938' 
(Sarv 2002, p.60). The old law readopted defined the citizenry of the newly independent 
state. A direct result of the implementation of a law from the pre-War period, only people 
who could claim to have been citizens of pre-War Estonia or were descended from such 
citizens received Estonian citizenship automatically. Consequently, citizenship was granted 
automatically only to citizens of the interwar republic and to their descendents, whether 
they lived in Estonia or not. As the population of the ESSR was subject to almost constant 
changes, those who had entered the country after 1940 in their vast majority became 
residents of an independent state of which they had no citizenship, while simultaneously 
being citizens of a now defunct state – the USSR (Smith 2002). In practice this meant that 
about a third of the Estonian residents of 1991 were excluded from the citizenry and 
factually 'stateless'. Only a small number of Soviet-era migrants were granted Estonian 
citizenship immediately, as a reward for 'special services to the Republic', in most cases 
referring to some form of explicit pro-independence activism for Estonian independence.
9 
As a result, 454,990 adults or almost 40% of the electorate of 1991 was disenfranchised 
(Järve & Poleshchuk 2010, p.4).  
Immediate options for people without Estonian citizenship were a) to leave Estonia and go 
to the Republic of the FSU where they or their ancestors had lived prior to migrating to 
Estonia; b) apply for another state's (usually Russian, Ukrainian, Belarusian etc.) 
citizenship, while staying in Estonia on the basis of a permanent residence permit; c) 
undergo the process of naturalisation in order to become a citizen of Estonia or, if these 
three options were rendered impossible by the individuals or were impossible due to legal 
                                                 
8 The 'restoration' of Estonia's independence affected mainly the question of political membership. The 
constitution of 1920 was modernised generally (Smith 2002).  
9 The Citizenship Act allows for a simplified process of naturalisation for those who participated in the 
elections to the Estonian Citizens Congress and registered for Estonian citizenship before 1990; between 
1992-1995 a fast track option allowed the simplified naturalisation of 24,102 persons who had 'supported 
Estonian independence' by registering with the Citizens' Committees before 1991 (Järve 2009, p.58). 
Additional to acquiring Estonian citizenship via birth or naturalisation, it can be granted due to 'special 
services' of particular non-citizens, if the government of Estonia wishes to do so. This has been made use of 
particularly between 1992-93 in order to 'co-optate' (Pettai & Hallik 2002) leaders of the minority 
communities from Tallinn and the North-East who were seen as 'moderate' or 'political allies' (ibid., p.520). 
Not all Estonian politicians, though, agreed with this regulation. As a result the 1995 Act restricts the number 
of naturalised people on basis of special merits to 10 per annum, bringing this regulation back to its original 
purpose of benefitting individuals for great achievements in sports, culture and the like (ibid.). As a more 
recent facilitation, since 2002 naturalisation of disabled people is not conditioned on taking the civic or 
language exams. Part II - Chapter 5 
 
98
restrictions including naturalisation requirements that could not be fulfilled, the 
respective persons would d), remain stateless sine die. This prospect had already caused 
alarm among Russian-speakers before the decision on restoration was made, but fears were 
temporarily allayed after Estonia and Russia had agreed on political and economic 
relations in early 1991, which promised a timely solution of the problems related to 
imminent statelessness of many Russian-speakers (Smith 2002, p.57). The disputes on 
granting citizenship to Soviet-era migrants were particularly fierce due to the question of 
the future of former Soviet troops. Army pensioners who wanted to spend their retirement 
in Estonia were, as direct representatives of the former occupying force, decidedly not 
welcome. Troop withdrawal remained central to the conflicts between Estonia and Russia 
for several years to come.  
Initially, naturalisation was conditional on permanent residence status issued for a 
minimum of two years before the application, which was counted only as of 30 March 
1990; moreover, citizenship was not granted before one year had passed after the 
application. According to Estonian officials, these steps were to guarantee that only long-
term or permanent residents, who could claim to have established long-standing ties to the 
Estonian state, would be able to adopt Estonian citizenship. In effect, no applicant could 
receive Estonian citizenship before 30 March 1993. Moreover, the law stipulated 
knowledge of the Estonian language as a requirement, the exact regulations of which were 
still to be determined by a separate law (Järve 2009).  
Immediately after the adoption of the citizenship act in 1992, the Estonian government 
began drafting legislation to regulate the status and rights of the enormous proportion of 
residents who had become stateless and whose political and social status was largely 
unregulated. This was met with protest from the non-citizen population, who feared that 
such legislation would only constrain further their rights (Budryte 2005). Fuelling such 
fears, the Estonian government issued a law that excluded non-citizen permanent residents 
from standing in local elections in early 1993 (Local election act 1993). When, in June 
1993, the government presented a draft act to parliament to govern the status of non-
citizens, and a few days later adopted the act, the Russian-speaking population, largely in 
the North-East of the country (Ida-Virumaa county), took to the streets (Smith 2002). The 
outrage and fear among minority members were related, among other things, to the 
potential of expulsion imparted by the wording of the law (Sarv 2002, p.42). The law set 
requirements for a minimum income to grant permanent residence, which was perceived as 
a serious threat in times of economic restructuring and mass unemployment.  Part II - Chapter 5 
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The protests, becoming known as the 'Aliens' crisis', were fanned by other measures 
curtailing the opportunities for minority language broadcasting as well as minority-
language education (Sarv 2002). Russian-speakers in Ida-Virumaa occupied the large 
Estonian power plants almost entirely located in areas with a predominantly Soviet-era 
migrant population, threatening to cut Estonia's power supply. Speakers from the protestors 
demanded autonomy for the Russian-speaking population in the county bordering Russia. 
Responding to the seriousness of the conflict situation, the Estonian president, Lennart 
Meri, refused to sign the law, and called for the Council of Europe (CoE), Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the OSCE High Commissioner for 
National Minorities (HCNM) to observe and mediate in the situation (Sarv 2002). 
Moreover, Meri convened the Presidential Roundtable of National Minorities, a 
consultative body to represent the non-citizen minority population and also help mediate 
between the conflicting parties. In addition, the Estonian government decided to give fast-
track naturalisation to selected non-citizens, on the basis of 'special services to the 
republic', and thus the right to stand as candidates in local elections, in effect moderating 
the composition of local councils in Ida-Virumaa while simultaneously allowing for some 
political representation (Sarv 2002, p.46). Naturally, the complex of problems that came as 
a legacy of the restoration of the Estonian state was not solved. Still, when a new version 
of the law on aliens was adopted in July 1993 that responded to most of the HCNM's 
recommendations, and a law regulating the residence permits of former Soviet army 
service people was passed, domestic tensions relaxed. In the aftermath of the regulation of 
the status of ex-army pensioners, the eventual withdrawal of Russian troops also calmed 
ongoing disputes with Russia (Sarv 2002).  
Until 1993 the status of permanent residents was based on the 1990 ESSR Immigration 
Law and has since been regulated by the Aliens Act. While almost fifty amendments have 
been made to modify various aspects of the law, its general principles have remained 
unchanged.
10 In general, the law regulates the requirements for obtaining visas and 
residence permits for both citizens of foreign states and individuals with undetermined 
citizenship residing in Estonia. In principle, the law does not differentiate between the 
status and options of, on the one hand, those who have moved to Estonia during Soviet 
times or were born there but did not apply for another state's citizenship, and, on the other, 
citizens of other states (both those who have lived in the ESSR partly for decades and those 
                                                 
10 Many amendments were made as a response to high international pressure, but already the drafting of the 
law had taken a considerable amount of controversy. While some changes were made upon the 
recommendation of international actors, not all recommendations were taken into account, resulting in a 
permanent state of legal insecurity for many non-citizens (Järve 2009). Part II - Chapter 5 
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who moved to Estonia in recent years ('new immigrants')). Most non-citizens and 
foreign nationals (e.g. Soviet-era settlers) today have long-term residence permits; 
according to the Needs & Feasibility Report Research in January 2007, 112,536 persons 
with undetermined citizenship were holders of long-term residence permits, while 13,263 
were holders of temporary residence permits (Kallas 2008, p.135). Acquisition of long-
term resident status is conditional upon, amongst other things: legal residence for at least 3 
out of the 5 years prior to application (this requirement was tightened recently to 5 years of 
legal residence (Poleshchuk 2009)); a permanent legal income that provides for the 
applicant's subsistence; and a current place to stay, as well as a residence permit for 
Estonia. Up to the mid-1990s, stateless persons did not have any international status at all. 
Only under international pressure did the Estonian state finally issue ID-documents to 
stateless residents of the country, the Aliens' or 'grey' passports, today acknowledged as a 
domestic as well as international travel document. The status of foreign nationals is, of 
course, regulated by the respective home country, with visas processed by home country 
institutions.  
In 1995, a new Citizenship Act replaced the re-enacted law of inter-war Estonia in order to 
fully align it with the new constitution and other legislation. Without changing the 
principles of Estonian citizenship, the new act established further and more demanding 
requirements for naturalisation. These are still effective today.
11 The new requirements 
integrated all regulations that had been established up to that point by different individual 
laws and include tightened residence and language requirements. Moreover, an exam on 
the content of the Estonian Constitution and the Citizenship Act has to be passed in 
Estonian supplementing the 'oath of loyalty' every applicant has to take. These 
requirements were strongly criticised by international observers. It was argued that the 
requirements were far too strict given the current situation of more than a quarter of the 
population being entirely excluded from the political process, while no supporting 
measures had been adopted to promote and facilitate naturalisation among the non-citizen 
population. In 1994-5, the Estonian state had not yet adopted measures to support the 
acquisition of Estonian language competence or explained how non-citizens would be 
supported in fulfilling the new citizenship criteria.
12  
                                                 
11 Only minor amendments have been made since 1995 with regard to selected, particularly vulnerable 
groups (Järve & Poleshchuk 2010).  
12 Since the early 1990s it was only thanks to international organisations that some language and citizenship 
classes were available at all (Budryte 2005; Jurado 2003; Sarv 2002). Part II - Chapter 5 
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By implementing these criteria, part of the radical, nationalist elite hoped to make a 
large number of Soviet-era settlers leave Estonia; with regard to the future of Soviet-era 
migrants, Anatol Lieven quotes Former Foreign Minister of Estonia Jüri Luik on the 
Estonian authorities' hope that 'a third or so will become Estonian citizens, a third may 
remain here with Russian citizenship, and at least a third will leave' (cited in (Järve & 
Poleshchuk 2010, p.6). It was only in 1998, and upon strong international pressure prior to 
Estonia's accession to the EU that the parliament accepted minor changes to the act itself, 
passing a draft law enabling children of stateless parents to gain citizenship, if the parents 
had resided in Estonia at least five years prior to the application.
13 Equally benefitting 
children, language and civic exams taken by non-citizen children attending Russian-
language schools are now recognised as equivalents for the language and citizenship act 
and constitution exams. Requirements regarding the proficiency in Estonian were regulated 
only when the language act was amended in 1999 and 2000, categorising the different 
classes of proficiency, required for citizenship and for political participation. Providing for 
temporary conflict prevention, the situation was far from satisfactory for minority members 
and international actors. The international actors also continued financing the range of 
language courses to which the Estonian government was still not prepared to commit its 
own funds (Jurado 2003). Also, as part of its integration strategy that set in during 2000, 
the Estonian state has started to actively support naturalisation, as will be discussed in 
section 5.5. Essentially, however, these measures have not changed the policies of political 
membership.  
When the government responded to the need for comprehensive up-to-date legislation and 
adopted a new citizenship law in 1995, this effectively increased the uncertainty for many 
non-citizens, rather than stabilising the situation for them. Although the law was much to 
the detriment of many non-citizens, by 1995 the first wave of naturalisation had reduced 
the number of non-citizens in the country: between 1992-1995 64,939 persons had 
naturalised, which enabled them to participate in national elections from 1995 onwards 
(Järve & Poleshchuk 2010, p.6). As a result of citizenship policies, many stateless 
individuals opted for citizenship of other states – primarily, the Russian Federation – 
bringing a potentially powerful external lobby actor into domestic Estonian relations with 
minorities.
14 While the Estonian state managed to restrict and control access to Estonian 
political membership, it institutionalised a situation in which a substantial part of the 
                                                 
13 Children under 15 years cannot apply for citizenship themselves. Prior to the amendment it was stipulated 
that only parents who were Estonian citizens could apply for citizenship for their children.  
14 By the year 2000, 14% of the non-citizens of 1989 had opted for Russian citizenship (Järve & Poleshchuk 
2010, p.6).  Part II - Chapter 5 
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population would permanently remain of foreign citizenship or stateless, at least for the 
time then foreseeable. In so doing, the Estonian state adopted an institutional solution to 
restrict the participation of those deemed illegitimate to decide on Estonia's future; it also 
perpetuated the boundaries between the 'nation' and minority members, potentially 
undermining the latter's allegiance to the Estonian state, in the sense of a self-fulfilling 
prophecy of the threat scenarios conjured up by the nationalists.  
The situation was different at the local level, after the Estonian citizenship regime granted 
permanent residents the right to vote in local elections after 1996. This also helped ease 
mounting tensions that resulted from the permanent exclusion at the national level and the 
restrictive minority legislation that was issued by the national parliament (Järve 2009, 
p.49). On this basis, in the local elections of 1997 and since then, Russian-speakers could 
co-determine political decision-making in their municipalities. However, due to the 
settlement structures, this was mainly noticeable in Tallinn and Ida-Virumaa, and much 
less so in other places. Various language regulations continued to restrict the right to stand 
as a candidate in local elections until after 1999 (Järve 2003).  
5.4 Ethnic and political participation in Slovakia  
After the Velvet divorce, Hungarians and Roma replaced the Czechs as the primary target 
of Slovak nationalist rhetoric and policies. Protecting Slovakia's sovereignty and territorial 
integrity against 'internal and external enemies' became a cornerstone of the third Mečiar 
government's minority politics (Deegan-Krause 2004b). This 'ethnic card' played well with 
nationalistically oriented voters, and helped the HZDS into power three times during the 
1990s.
15 Slovak fears regarding minority rights and minority participation in the decision-
making are grounded in the fundamental understanding of nation and nationality that is a 
constituting element of Slovak nationalism, as discussed earlier. As a consequence of the 
allegedly inextricable link between nationality and the striving for political self-
determination, minority cultural issues are observed carefully to ensure they do not affect 
what is perceived as the state's sovereignty. In this sense, the Slovak constitution (Article 
34, 3) declares that 
                                                 
15 Vladimir Mečiar was Prime Minister of Slovakia first as head of the VPN June 1990 – May 1991; as leader 
of the winning party after the first democratic elections June 1992 – March 1994; and lastly, after his party 
had regained strength despite a lost vote of no-confidence earlier that year, in December 1994 – October 
1998. The latter (and only full) election period with Mečiar's HZDS as the strongest government party saw 
him in a coalition with the far-right Slovenská národná strana (Slovak National Party, SNS), led by Ján 
Slota, and with the small Združenie robotníkov Slovenska (Association of Slovak Workers, ZRS). After a 
decline in popularity, the HZDS and SNS became government members again in 2006, when the winner of 
the elections, the self-styled social democrats of Smer – sociálna democracia (Direction – Social Democracy, 
Smer) invited them.  Part II - Chapter 5 
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'The enactment of the rights of citizens belonging to national minorities and ethnic 
groups that are guaranteed in this Constitution must not be conducive to jeopardizing 
the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Slovak Republic or to discrimination 
against its other inhabitants' (Ústava 1992).  
Purporting to protect the Slovak nation from its potential 'renegade' co-citizens, this 
passage implies a threat emanating from ethnic minorities a priori. This article in the 
constitution has been interpreted as aimed directly at the Hungarian minority. Again, the 
point of departure concerning the characterisation of minority interests and identities in 
such state documents is the underlying assumption about the fundamental relevance of 
national self-determination for every national group, making the securitisation of minority 
issues unavoidable. 
During the phase of explicitly nationalising policies under the three Mečiar governments, 
the Hungarian parties were largely isolated from government and other opposition parties, 
particularly the third Mečiar government of 1994-1998. In many cases on the direct 
initiative of the SNS, policies focused primarily on the Hungarian minority and their 
exclusion from political and social processes (Kelley 2003, p.39). The nationalistic 
governments aimed to change fundamental institutions of the political system, including 
the electoral system and the structures of public administration, to the detriment of the 
Hungarian minority as well as of the moderate opposition.  
In contrast to the situation in Estonia, members of the Hungarian minority are guaranteed 
formal participation in the political institutions of the new state. In a system of proportional 
representation, the settlement structures of the Hungarian minority, which is concentrated 
regionally in the south of Slovakia along the border to Hungary and in many small towns 
and villages constitutes the majority of the local population, enables them to elect group 
representatives into the National Council. As a legacy of the Czechoslovak political 
divisions along ethnic lines, in the late 1980s, Hungarians generated their own political 
representation, separate from the Slovaks (Bakker 1997; Öllös 23/09/2009). Constituting 
around 10% of the population, since 1992, the Hungarians have been represented by 
minority parties in the National Council (Csergo 2007).  
According to the portrayal by the nationalists, the Hungarian political representation was a 
threat to Slovakia's sovereignty. This was fuelled by the Hungarian elite's discussion of 
different forms of autonomy for the Hungarian minority and their repeated call for cultural 
(and, at times, political) self-determination (Csergo 2007; Bárdi 2003). The group also 
lives compactly, in many towns and villages constituting the majority (Gyurgyik 2002), Part II - Chapter 5 
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making the possibility of the implementation of some form of political autonomy not 
entirely far-fetched in practical terms. The settlement patterns of the Hungarian minority 
also enabled its representation at the local level, and helped the minority group send 
Hungarian representatives of three Hungarian parties into the national parliament on the 
basis of proportional representation. Between 1990 and 1994, the Hungarians extended 
their representation among mayors and members of local councils both in numbers and in 
percentage terms, and since then sthe number has been relatively stable, somewhat 
exceeding the proportion of Hungarians in the overall population (Csergo 2007, p.42; 
Kling 2008, p.299). The somewhat disproportionate representation of Hungarians has been 
explained with reference to a slightly higher than average turnout among Hungarians 
(Mesežnikov 14/04/2008; Gyárfášová 17/06/2009). Thanks to proportional representation 
in the national council, Hungarian parties were able to repeat this pattern in national 
elections (Csergo 2007, p.46): in 1990 and 1992, 14 out of 150 seats were taken by 
Hungarian representatives, in 1994 it was 17.  
In order to secure all Hungarian parties' entry into parliament, the Hungarian parties 
formed electoral coalitions; in 1994, the three Hungarian parties that existed independently 
had agreed to form an electoral coalition in order to secure all three parties' representation 
in parliament. Between 1992 and 1994, one of the Hungarian parties was not represented in 
the National Council because it had received fewer than 5% of the national vote, while 
electoral coalitions of Hungarian parties had entered parliament in both 1992 and 1994 
(Csergo 2007). In the advent of the 1998 elections, the Mečiar government introduced a 
decisive step, attempting to undermine the continuous strength of the Hungarian political 
representation at the national level. The government changed the electoral law, raising the 
parliamentary threshold for electoral coalitions from previously 7% for an electoral 
coalition of two or three parties and 10% for an electoral coalition of more parties to 5% 
per party in an electoral coalition. The aim of the law was to weaken a political opposition 
still undergoing consolidation, consisting of a number of rather small parties, including 
three Hungarian parties. The change would have made it very hard indeed for a Hungarian 
party coalition to enter parliament, as with three parties it would have to get at least 15% of 
the national vote, while the Hungarian share of the vote was at best around 10% (Deegan-
Krause 2004a, p.287, appendix 3). Although it affected the parliamentary opposition in 
general, the step of the Mečiar government can be interpreted as a direct attack at the 
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Both Slovak and Hungarian opposition parties reacted to this step by forming coalition 
parties; in the case of the Hungarian parties this was the Magyar Koálicio Partja/Strana 
Mad'arská Koalicija (Party of the Hungarian Coalition, MKP). As a result of this step, 
although the Hungarian parties lost two seats compared to the previous election period, the 
MKP became fourth-strongest party in the new parliament and third-strongest in the new 
government, into which it was invited subsequently (cf. percentages stated by Csergo 
2007, p.46). The formation of a coherent single party had also, arguably, made it a more 
reliable coalition partner in the eyes of the Slovak anti-Mečiar opposition. For the 
following ten years, the MKP maintained or expanded its share in votes; in 2002 it 
received 20 out of 150 seats in the National Council. Thus, ironically, a measure meant to 
weaken the minority party helped strengthen it.  
The consolidation of the anti-Mečiar opposition had been aided earlier by a number of 
other anti-opposition policies, attacking civil society and political opposition to the 
government's course. Prominently, the attempt to introduce a Protection of the Republic 
Law in 1996 threatened to bring government-opposition relations to a whole new level of 
animosity. Purporting the protection of the Slovak Republic against acts that 'undermined 
the country' and periled its territorial and constitutional integrity or the interests of the 
republic, the law did not make clear what was meant by the vague wording. Introducing 
changes to the Criminal Code, if signed by the president, the law would have imposed 
severe penalties for offenders against the law (Haight 1997, p.108). As such, the law was 
held by critics to be extremely vague and represented a potential carte blanche in the hands 
of the government.  
This law targeted the opposition as a whole. Already before 1996, the nationalist parties 
had not only played the 'ethnic card' in political discourse, but also repeatedly portrayed the 
opposition parties as 'anti-Slovak' in an attempt to delegitimise its political opponents. 
Nevertheless, the political rhetoric shaping the debate on the act clearly showed that it 
particularly aimed to restrict the movements, political activities and contributions to 
political debate of Hungarian politicians in particular (Kelley 2003; Haight 1997). 
President Kováč saw the law similarly, and criticised its potential infringement of 
'fundamental human freedoms' (Slovak Spectator, 18/12/1996). After the law had passed 
parliament, the president refused to sign the law. It was also criticised by international 
organisations as in contradiction to international human and minority rights documents 
(Haight 1997, p.109). The EU made a clear statement, linking Slovakia's prospective talks 
with the EU to the revocation of the law (Kelley 2003, p.40). Kelley quotes Béla Bugár, a Part II - Chapter 5 
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leading Hungarian minority politician, in that the international organisations 'had a 
very clear and absolute role' in the eventual rejection of the Protection of the Republic 
Law, at a time when the Mečiar government was still receptive to European advice and 
criticism (ibid.).  
In 1996, the Mečiar government also embarked on a major regional and administrative 
reform. Again, this was widely acknowledged as a direct step towards undermining 
Hungarian political representation (Mesežnikov 14/04/2008). Since 1989/1990, Slovakia 
had functioned according to a dual model of administration and political representation, the 
national government governing from the Bratislava centre against relatively weak local 
self-government. After the regional-administrative level of government was abolished in 
1990, between 1990 and 1993 the local level institutions were gradually strengthened 
(Buček 2002). In line with the general tendency to centralise governance, in 1996 the 
Mečiar government introduced two acts on Territorial and Administrative Division of the 
Slovak Republic and the Organisation of Local Self-Government (Legal Acts 221 and 
222/1996). The acts reintroduced the regional level into Slovak public administration, 
strengthening central government through a 
'two-tier hierarchical structure of regional and district offices, which are controlled by 
the government as the supreme body of executive power of the state' (Nemec et al. 
2001, p.303).  
These new levels of government were not complemented by democratising efforts to make 
regions and districts another, intermediate level of self-government – the regional 
administration was instated by the national government, not elected by the regional 
electorate. The main aim was to make central policy making and implementation more 
efficient (Nižňanský & Pilát 2001). The second aim, however, was to establish 
administrative and electoral units which undermine the factual power and political 
representation of the Hungarians on the basis of the density of their settlement. District 
boundaries were redrawn in such a way that the previously 38 electoral districts in all of 
Slovakia were more than doubled to 79 districts (Buček 2002). Decisively, the Southern 
Slovak regions were barely affected by this, since district boundaries in those areas largely 
persisted, while districts were made significantly smaller in the other regions. This of 
course increased per head representation in the northern half of the country, while leaving 
southern districts larger and therefore often relatively heterogeneous in ethnic terms.
16 In 
                                                 
16 Although in southern Slovakia, the proportion of Hungarians is increasing the closer a village is to the 
border to Hungary, in many cases a neighbouring village may be largely inhabited by Slovaks, making 
individual villages often a 'Hungarian' or a 'Slovak' village; at district level this in many cases is evened out.  Part II - Chapter 5 
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effect, Hungarian parties in the regions where Hungarians had settled would need more 
votes in their districts in order to send representatives to the National Council.
17  
The public administration reform under Mečiar's government in 1996 evoked much 
criticism. While it had reduced the number of local offices of the national government in 
the creation of the regional administrative level, this effectively led to an increase in 
government offices generally, increased public expenditures for the maintenance of these 
new structures, undermined well established cooperative structures of local governments 
and negatively impacted socio-economic disparities between regions (Klimovsky 2010, 
p.35). It was also criticised for a range of democratic shortcomings, particularly by 
European institutions, namely the Commission, after accession talks were resumed with 
Slovakia in 1998 (European Commission 1998).  
These policies, as we will see below, had a lasting impact on the options for political 
change towards the more pluralist political system the Hungarian minority would have 
preferred. However – and perhaps due to the selective character of the policies, and the 
change to different aspects of the political institutional system in place of a direct attack on 
the minority – these policies also had unintended consequences, which ironically helped 
strengthen the Hungarian political representation as well as the consolidation of the liberal-
democratic opposition as a whole. I argue that, overall, the policies on practical political 
membership in Slovakia were essential to the majority nationalists safeguarding the titular 
nation's upper hand in political decision-making. However, the antagonistic way in which 
the nationalists impeded the democratic participation of majority members also provided 
some opportunities for cooperation between the majority and the minority.  
5.5 Estonia's social integration policies as an institutional response to 
societal division 
The large number of stateless persons and foreign nationals were a concern not only for 
international actors who feared the situation could endanger regional stability and impede 
European integration in the region. Concerns for stability as well as geopolitical security in 
relation to the Russian Federation and for democratic development led domestic majority 
actors to call for the adoption of means that would accelerate the naturalisation process and 
the political integration of the minority. Since the mid-1990s, Estonian academics and 
experts had warned that Estonia was facing the problem of a 'dual society', which would 
                                                 
17 Despite these difficulties, the MKP has continuously profited from a slightly better turnout and less 
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deteriorate if the state further ignored the marginalisation of the 'non-Estonian' 
population (Lauristin & Heidmets 2002). Although actors that genuinely supported 
integration were politically in a non-dominant position, international pressure and the 
direct linking of the citizenship question to Estonia's EU accession helped strengthen the 
position of the advocates of integration (Pettai & Kallas 2009; Sarv 2002).  
The Siiman government (March 1997 – March 1999) mandated Andra Veidemann of the 
Progressive Party with the position of Minister without portfolio for Population Affairs 
(Rahvastikuminister) and initiated the institutionalisation of the integration process. This 
step has been decisive for the development of interethnic relations ever since. Under 
Veidemann's auspices, the first fundamental documents of a coherent integration strategy 
were developed, in the Minister's view giving the state's approach to integration of non-
Estonians a clear objective and perspective (Poleshchuk 2001, p.11). Initially, an Estonian 
research group in cooperation with the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
developed a first outline of an integration strategy under the title 'Integrating non-Estonians 
into Estonian Society: Setting the Course'. Under Veidemann, a research group often 
referred to as Vera-group brought the issue of integration to the fore.
18 The Vera-group, led 
by the sociologists Marju Lauristin and Mati Heidmets, could draw upon earlier 
considerations in public discourse of a more accommodating approach to the ethnic 
minorities living in Estonia into the political and societal community, promoted by 
moderates in the independence movement (Lauristin & Heidmets, 2002). In 1997, as a 
result of the debates initiated by the Vera-group, Minister Veidemann appointed members 
of the Vera-group together with other experts to a governmental commission, entrusted 
with the task to outline a policy strategy for minority integration (Järve & Wellmann 
1999).  
Although no consensus was reached as to what the main problems of integration were or 
how to approach these, agreement did exist between the members of the government 
commission on the importance of dealing with minority integration (Pettai & Hallik 2002). 
When the political elites and the wider public began debating integration, disagreement 
emerged particularly regarding the question of how integration should be understood in the 
first place. On the one hand, radical nationalists still opposed any changes to the 
restorationist fundament of the state and argued that even minor support for naturalisation 
undermined Estonian statehood. On the other hand, Russian-speakers still demanded 
                                                 
18 The Vera group had initially been convened by the Ministry of Education in 1996 to research social 
division and problems of Estonia's international integration in relation to the presence of the Soviet-era 
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substantial facilitation of formal political integration and the inclusion of Russian-
speakers into the political processes (Semjonov 2002). Veidemann left the notion of 
integration very vague, referring to 'accelerated naturalization, better Estonian language 
skills, and political integration of Russian-speakers into Estonian politics' while leaving 
open how this should be achieved, which was interpreted as a potential tactic to avoid 
pressure from nationalists by some (Budryte 2005, p.84). At the same time, Russian-
speakers were not included in the early steps of the integration strategy's development.  
Since the first outline of the integration strategy in 1997, four subsequent policy papers 
document the development of the Estonian approach to integration. The Veidemann-
commission developed a first statement on the 'Bases of the Estonian state integration 
policy on the integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society', which was approved by 
the government on 10 February 1998 and by parliament on 10 June of the same year 
(Bases 1998). In the summer of 1999, newly appointed Minister of Population Affairs 
Katrin Saks responded to the public criticism that had emerged around the 'Bases' 
document and initiated changes to the original formulation of the integration strategy. The 
'Action Plan' introduced new aspects of the Estonian concept of integration that had 
previously not been made explicit. Most importantly among these, according to Raivo 
Vetik (who co-authored the state's integration programmes) is the notion of the 'Estonian 
model of multiculturalism' (Vetik 2002). The 'Action Plan' was again subject to much 
debate, during which diverse actors such as Narva City Council and the EÜP challenged 
the promoted understanding of integration (Open Society Institute 2002, p.197).  
On the basis of the two extant policy papers, a newly convened committee developed a 
fully-fledged State Programme: Integration in Estonian Society 2000-2007 (Government 
2000, 'SIP' in what follows), approved by the government on 14 March, 2000. Unlike in 
the preparation of 'Bases' and the 'Action Plan', the commission for the SIP at least 
formally consulted with the Presidential Roundtable for National Minorities, and thus 
formally included Russian-speakers' representatives in the development of the programme. 
The programme was implemented and monitored both by domestic and international 
experts. Understanding that the problems of naturalisation and society integration would 
not be solved by 2007, the envisaged time-frame for the SIP, and after intensive debates 
between commission and parliament, a follow-up programme, the 'Estonian Integration 
Strategy' (EIS), was approved in June 2008 (Government 2008). Part II - Chapter 5 
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Though with every step important changes were made to the integration strategy, 
essentially the five documents have maintained the aim of increasing the naturalisation 
rate, thereby reducing the 'barriers, which hinder many non-Estonians from participating in 
the Estonian society' (Bases 1998). Whereas the first three documents outlined general 
policy goals, the SIP and EIS were comprehensive policy programmes that identified 
specific target groups, stated concrete policy goals and allocated funding to detailed sub-
programmes and projects. Both programmes emphasise the importance of continuing the 
naturalisation of stateless persons. For example, the EIS declares the goal of about 2,100 
successful citizenship applications annually for the period of 2008-2013, again primarily 
targeting children and young people (Government 2008, p.25). Other age or professional 
groups, however, are once more not in the focus of the programme when it comes to 
naturalisation. 
Apart from target numbers for naturalisation, the programmes also claim to aim at the 
increase of active participation of non-Estonians in the political and social processes of 
Estonian society. Already 'Bases' identified increasing alienation of the 'non-Estonian' 
population as well as their 'isolation in a world of their own language and mentality', a state 
which, according to leading sociologists in the country, could lead to the development of a 
segregated society. According to the authors, this was tenable among other things in the 
electoral behaviour of minority members who voted for 'Russian-speakers' parties', rather 
than on the basis of ideological preferences, and a lack of positive affiliation of minority 
members to the Estonian state. The SIP then set the task of increasing the participation of 
both non-citizens and ethnic non-Estonians in the political structures (Government 2000, 
p.14-15). It is important to note that the SIP does not conclude that the observed alienation 
of Russian-speakers from the Estonian state could be related to the specific policies that so 
negatively affected the minority.  
Although it is argued that the integration policies are aimed at increasing minority 
participation, legal-political integration is only one aspect of the integration strategy. 
Rather than being concerned ultimately with the participation and democratic involvement 
of Russian-speakers in political and social processes, the integration strategy responds to 
concerns of policy-makers to guarantee the country's 'rapid modernisation' in order to 
prepare for EU accession, hand-in-hand with the protection and preservation of Estonian 
culture. In response to these demands, the concept of Estonian multiculturalism is 
elaborated in the programmes. Estonian multiculturalism entails three elements, 1) a strong 
common core of Estonian culture to which 2) minority individuals accommodate based on Part II - Chapter 5 
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their own will and commitment, while they are 3) free to practice 'minority belonging' 
in private. According to one of the authors of the programme, Estonian multiculturalism 
thus acknowledges the 'different historic relationships to the country, their different 
cultural traditions as well as different aspirations' of Estonia's heterogeneous population 
(Vetik 2001, p.26). According to Vetik,  
'every individual's right to choose his/her group belonging and define his/her cultural 
identity is emphasized' (Vetik 2001, p.17).  
However, in the SIP and EIS minority interpretations of Estonian history are explicitly 
excluded from the 'strong common core'
19 around which society is to be 'harmonised' 
(Government 2000, p.5).  
That minority adaptation to Estonian culture is an essential aspect of integration is 
emphasised throughout the integration strategy documents. The integration programmes 
focus on three areas of minority integration: legal-political, socio-economic and linguistic-
communicative integration. By far the main emphasis is on the latter, while legal-political 
integration (i.e. primarily naturalisation) and socio-economic integration (i.e. primarily 
labour-market participation) are seen as processes that are supported and generated, once 
linguistic-communicative integration is achieved (Government 2000, p.6). Unsurprisingly 
therefore, the largest part of the funds were allocated to the sub-programmes 'education' 
and 'teaching of Estonian language to adults' (ibid.). Brosig calculated that the linguistic 
component of the SIP received up to 72% of the SIP's overall budget between 2000 and 
2004 (Brosig 2008). This emphasis corresponds with the idea that language knowledge is 
key to, and will eventually generate, integration. The other sub-programmes were 
dedicated to the 'education and culture of ethnic minorities' and 'social competence'. 
Interestingly, the latter aims to change the attitudes of Russian-speakers towards the 
Estonian state, as well as encourage dialogue between minority members and Estonians, 
highlighting the importance of minority participation in civil society (Government 2000, 
p.7). However, actual policies in this area were limited to overcoming the Russian-
speakers' alleged 'questionable loyalties' by changing 'language and mindset', as the 
original UNDP integration programme outline had stated. The programmes emphasise the 
                                                 
19 The definition of the common core in the SIP is as follows: 'The common core connecting members of 
society consists of general human and democratic values, a common sphere of information and Estonian-
language environment, as well as common state institutions and values based on the knowledge of Estonian 
history and awareness of the nature of Estonian citizenship and the multicultural nature of Estonian society' 
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change in attitudes and knowledge of Estonian history required from Russian-speakers 
to politically integrate.  
These key goals of the integration strategy are accompanied by an emphasis on civil 
society development. Essentially, while the task of increasing minority members' equal 
participation in the cultural and civic sphere is emphasised as a goal throughout the range 
of programmes, the related strategies simultaneously suggest that equal participation is 
only possible when minority members learn 'how to live and survive in Estonian society' 
(Government 2000, p.29). The integration strategies are built upon the understanding that 
this knowledge has to be taught to minority members, rather than developed through social 
level interaction and self-organisation. Apart from education, the Ministry of Culture's 
National Broadcasting Strategy initiated a strategy to foster legal-political integration by 
reducing the disparities in media consumption between Estonians and non-Estonians, and 
the increased involvement of Russian-speakers with Estonia-based media (Government 
2008). Although this is welcomed by the minority members, who particularly appreciate 
the improved funding situation for minority language broadcasting, at the same time, 
minority language contributions to the media are rarely taken into account by the Estonian 
language media (Astrov 17/05/2010; Poleshchuk 18/12/2009). The one-way approach of 
integration is maintained throughout the programmes.  
Both programmes see the main goal of legal-political integration in 'strengthening a 
common state identity' and promoting the value and appreciation of Estonian citizenship 
(Government 2000, p.4). Legal-political integration is not designed primarily as the 
bureaucratic procedure of naturalisation, but aims at unifying society 'around a common 
core' (ibid., p.13), attempting to set the stage for this process by cultivating individuals as 
'loyal' citizens (ibid., p.15). Loyalty is conceptualised as the adoption of the Estonian 
interpretation of Estonia's history and practicing the Estonian language. The assumption 
behind these measures seems to be that non-citizens with a positive attitude toward the 
state are more likely to accept the naturalisation requirements and will eventually become 
good, desirable citizens. In that sense, the authors of the EIS argue that citizenship alone is 
not enough for individuals to develop a strong Estonian identity (Government 2008, p.12). 
The admission that the active involvement of Russian-speakers in social life and (political) 
decision-making is important, however, remains under-elaborated in the programme and 




20 In order to support civil society integration only four measures 
of the EIS appear pertinent.
21 All target young people. The financial support assigned to 
these activities amounts to 6.06% of the overall programmes budget for 2008-2013 
(58,670,000 EEK). There are no measures assigned with a budget that target the actual 
development of civil society.  
Such programmes are developed by the Ministry of the Interior. The Estonian Civil Society 
Concept (Eesti Kodanikuühiskonna Arengukontseptsioon, EKAK) was initiated in 1999, 
supported by the UNDP and eventually approved by the Estonian Nonprofit Roundtable, 
which was active until 2004 (Kübar 2008). The aims of EKAK are to foster, support and 
promote the self-organisation of society in order to fulfil functions of at least three kinds: 
a) complementing the state in areas where it is less active (family, neighbourhood, or 
global responsibilities); b) to foster an intermediate level between individuals and the state 
that channels and involves non-represented opinions or demands; and c) the 
communication and fulfilment of national goals among the population (Estonian Civil 
Society Development Plan 2002; author's categorisation). The concept does not explicitly 
refer to minority members, or more specific target groups. Similarly, the Civil Society 
Development Plan 2011-2014 is impressively silent about any concrete measures as to how 
'non-Estonian community groups will be encouraged to more actively participate in […] 
the third sector' (Estonian Ministry of the Interior 2011, p.10). As we will see in chapters 7 
and 9, these measures have not had a significant impact on minority self-organisation. 
Overall, while the topic of naturalisation is included in the aims of the programme 
discussed in the beginning of the SIP, in later sections the focus of the programme shifts to 
emphasising cultural-linguistic integration, i.e. the promotion of Estonian language 
acquisition among non-Estonians and efforts to raise the 'awareness of what it means to be 
                                                 
20 This is evident, for example, in the section outlining the EIS's strategy for legal-political integration: The 
programme sets as a goal to continue the naturalisation process and ensure the involvement of minority 
members in civil society and other decision making processes in society (Government 2008, p.25). The 
programme identifies a single indicator for this goal, which is the number of people applying for Estonian 
citizenship after successfully passing the citizenship exam. The target level for 2013 is that 2,100 people 
(annually) will have passed the exam successfully. The EIS further states that 'We assume there will be an 
increasing trend in political involvement among the people with undetermined citizenship and citizens of 
other countries.' The programme does not specify how this will be supported by the government. Moreover, 
the assumption appears to be that involvement in civic organisations and political decision-making is 
achieved with formal citizenship and knowledge of the Estonian Constitution and the Citizenship Act 2, 
which constitute the components of the citizenship exam, cf. Government 2008, p.25.  
21 These are: the support for Estonian and Russian-speaking youth activities to increase dialogue between the 
groups and decrease negative attitudes (Measure V1, 7.1), the related efforts to increase the competence of 
youth workers in supporting young people's activities (Measure V1, 7.3) and the aim to decrease the 
'differences in participation in civil society organisations between people with different mother tongues' 
(Measure V1, 7.4), Government 2008, p.41; moreover, the aim to involve naturalised citizens in the 
promotion of citizenship among non-citizens (Measure V 3, 1.1).  Part II - Chapter 5 
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a citizen' (Government 2000, p.65). In combination with the SIP's emphasis on 
providing for the facilities that increase the knowledge of the state language, naturalisation 
and legal-political integration become a (potential) outcome of the (cultural-linguistic) 
integration process, but not goals in- and of-themselves. The integration strategy does not 
aim to facilitate the naturalisation process in itself by changing the criteria for 
naturalisation or by broadening the understanding of Estonian citizenship as such – for 
example, by opening the debate on how the Soviet past can be interpreted and what it 
means for today's Estonian society. Instead, it remains unclear how the more active 
participation of non-Estonians, particularly non-citizens can be achieved, as no direct 
measures or imperatives are developed to ensure the non-citizens' inclusion into political or 
social processes. Overall, in the integration programmes naturalisation has the status of the 
final outcome of the integration process and a reward for 'becoming Estonian', not a 
component or an aspect of preceding or parallel political inclusion.  
This is not to say that the integration programme has not changed the state's approach to 
the political integration of minority members. The first documents outlining the integration 
strategy before the SIP assumed 'non-Estonians'' lack of adequate human capital and skills 
were responsible for creating barriers to integration, insufficient knowledge of the Estonian 
language, lack of 'adaptation to the Estonian cultural sphere', electoral behaviour on basis 
of ethnicity rather than ideological difference, and underdeveloped multiculturalism in the 
country's North-East (Bases 1998). The early documents also argued that, among 
Estonians, a 'mental shift' has taken place towards more openness and tolerance, making a 
change in ethnic relations possible. The SIP is more realistic about problems on the side of 
the Estonian majority population, acknowledging that obstacles remain since the majority 
segment of society still does not fully recognise Estonia as a multicultural state and shows 
an attitude of 'non-Estonians as a problem', rather than a 'development potential' for 
Estonia or as 'participants in rebuilding Estonia' as the authors of the SIP demand. 
However, as regards the SIP and also, to large extent, the EIS, these admissions have not 
been translated into sub-programmes that directly target intergroup accommodation. While 
some projects exist that aim to raise the 'multicultural awareness' of Estonians 
(Government 2008; Government 2000; Mätlik 04/12/2009), these are largely limited to 
issuing information material about traditional cultures of minorities (see for example MEIS 
2011; Astrov 17/05/2010; Poleshchuk 18/12/2009). While some minority organisations 
commend positively on this 'ornamental' representation of minority communities as part of 
Estonian multiculturalism, the strategies promote a limited understanding of cultural 
organisation and civic initiative.  Part II - Chapter 5 
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As a consequence, Estonian political membership remains restricted by the underlying 
assumptions about nation- and statehood, group boundaries and the paradoxical goal of an 
integrated, multicultural Estonia under Estonian hegemony. Legal-political integration 
predominantly remains a one-way process in which the state sets the criteria for the 
ideological and practical components of citizenship and rewards conforming individuals by 
granting citizenship. Unsurprisingly, then, the results are limited. Naturalisation is 
happening in that the numbers of naturalised residents, primarily children, are growing 
gradually. Apart from opportunities for Estonian language learning and the distribution of 
information materials, hardly any facilitating measures are taken to enable more adults to 
naturalise or – crucially – to participate in social and political agenda-setting and decision-
making even without citizenship. Even for Russian-speaking Estonian citizens, no 
measures are taken that help to include them in the existing political structures or 
processes. Naturalisation alone, however, does not lead to increased political inclusion of 
Russian-speakers, as has been recognised even by the expert committee charged with the 
development and monitoring of the integration strategy (Lauristin et al. 2008).  
The process of the development and adoption of the EIS illustrates well that integration 
policies are subject to political power conflicts, as ever (Korts 24/04/2009). As a result, 
political participation of minority members has been deliberately undermined.
22 The 
development of the integration strategy is also a history of missed opportunities: Opinion 
polls suggest that during the phase of the adoption of the SIP intergroup relations started to 
relax (Poleshchuk 14/04/2009). Some observers even speak of the Estonian-Russian-
speakers' 'honeymoon of integration' (Ehala 2009). Minority representatives argue that the 
increased talk of integration gave hope to Russian-speakers to expect a better future, 
especially the facilitation of naturalisation. A review of the changes to citizenship policies 
and policies of minority inclusion since the adoption of the SIP and EIS however has 
disappointed such hopeful expectations (Korvalt 19/05/2010; Grigorjan 18/05/2010; 
Ivanov 18/05/2010).  
Generally, the politics of naturalisation, particularly of Russian-speaking Estonian-born 
residents, and the gradual acknowledgement of foreign-born or ethnic non-Estonians as 
Estonians is clearly an opening of the political, and potentially national, community. 
Although the concept of integration, even if limited to one-way integration, is an important 
                                                 
22 The moderate elite that has supported the opening of Estonian society has been targeted by campaigns 
against those who are labelled 'red professors' by media and nationalist politicians for their support of the 
integration process; red referring to 'Soviet', thus imparting that the promotion of integration is dangerous to 
Estonian society (Grigorjan 18/05/2010; Poleshchuk 18/12/2009; Korts 24/04/2009; Vetik 16/04/2009).  Part II - Chapter 5 
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step away from the 1990s' concept of minority dissimilation in the political sphere, the 
approach does not keep its promise. Political membership continues to be conditional on 
minority adaptation to Estonian society, especially in the context of the constant 'othering' 
of minority culture. While the naturalisation via education in Estonian schools, the 
subsequent issuing of certificates testifying the student's knowledge of Estonian language, 
history and the Constitution, gradually includes the younger generation, no significant 
changes were made to facilitate the naturalisation process for adults. This was seen as an 
effort to avert the perceived threat from the representatives of a former occupying power 
by many Estonians (Chinn & Kaiser 1996). The belligerence of political rhetoric around 
the issue of citizenship further dissuaded political opposition to the nation-building project 
in official politics.  
5.6 Slovak regional and administrative reform as a response to 
minority marginalisation 
The Mečiar government's regional and public administration reform had created an 
unsatisfactory situation for local self-government, democratisation and effective 
governance, according to dominant – since 1998 – liberal and international actors, 
especially the EU. Regional administration had not been complemented by a system of 
regional self-government, so that regional level institutions only executed national-level 
directives. At the same time, the cooperation of historically aligned municipalities was 
made difficult by the way the boundaries between regions were drawn.  
With this plan, in 1998 the new government responded to external as well as internal 
demands to resume the public administration and regional reform that had started in 1990, 
but steered into an undesirable direction by the Mečiar government (Nižňanský & Pilát 
2001). Appointing a plenipotentiary and an expert commission in 1999, the issue soon 
gained momentum and in 2000, a programme was elaborated, stating the main aims of the 
reform. The overall goal of the reform was to further democratise and institutionally 
consolidate the Slovak public administration and self-government structures. Key aspects 
of the reform were a regional-territorial re-arrangement; institutional reform, including the 
complementation of the administrative regions generated by the predecessor government 
by introducing regional self-government institutions as well as the 'modernisation' of 
public administration with regard to civil servants as well as administrative processes; the 
decentralisation of political decision-making and fiscal competences (Nižňanský & Pilát 
2001, pp.219–220). The early steps towards reform were well received by the European 
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reform was to play in the accession process (European Commission 1999, p.14); the 
EU also provided PHARE funding in support of the reform (ibid.).  
The envisaged reform touched upon two major issues with regard to political community 
structuring at the regional and municipality levels, which had an ethno-political side to 
them.
23 First, territorial-administrative reform bore the chance of redrawing the borders of 
territorial units and increasing the minorities' share of the respective regional population. 
This could foster their role in regional as well as national level politics due to numerical 
strength. Second, with the introduction of self-government at the regional level, the 
competences of institutions at the national, regional and local levels had to be redefined. 
This bore the chance of increasing local self-determination on a number of issues, 
including those especially relevant for the Hungarians' cultural institutions such as 
minority schooling. Hungarian representatives even saw a chance for renegotiating power 
division along ethnic lines, and the introduction of a Hungarian region resurfaced again, 
potentially rearranging the institutional setting for the group's participation in further 
institution-building.  
After the approval of the general goals and the timeline for their realisation and 
implementation had been approved by parliament, the process slowed down. Disagreement 
arose around the issue of how many regions should be established, where the boundaries 
should run, and whether administration and self-governmental regions should be 
congruent. Suggestions ranged from 4 to 16 regions to replace the existing 8 (Klimovsky 
2010). The government coalition favoured a 12 region system, which would readjust both 
public administration and self-government to the 'historical' regions of established 
cooperation between municipalities and regions that were disregarded by the existing 8 
region system. However, in 2001, the MKP began promoting a 13 region model which 
included one region with a Hungarian majority. This so called Komarňanska Župa 
(Komárno parish) comprised the historical-geographical region of the Žitny ostrov in the 
South West of Slovakia (Šutajová 2008), which includes towns such as Dunajská Streda, 
with more than 80% Hungarians among the population, and Komárno and Samorín with a 
population about two thirds Hungarian; this form of organization would have provided for 
more decision-making autonomy of minority groups at the local levels, a scenario that 
made part of the coalition government vote against it, together with the opposition parties 
(Brusis 2002).  
                                                 
23 This was despite the fact that the reform was not devised in the government programme as a means for 
interethnic integration, but to foster general democratisation (Buček 2002). Part II - Chapter 5 
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When it became clear that such a region was unacceptable for the coalition partners, 
the MKP stated repeatedly that it fully supported the coalition partners' 12-region model 
(Mesežnikov 2001). The support of the SDL' was less clear. Throughout the first Dzurinda 
government the SDL' had repeatedly sided with the opposition, especially in ethnicised 
disputes. In the decisive vote, the SDL' voted against its own government coalition's 
proposal in an alliance with the HZDS and SNS (Nižňanský & Pilát 2001). Preceding the 
vote, the issue had become increasingly ethnicised. This was partly due to the Hungarians' 
move to propose its own model for territorial rearrangement, emphasising the political self-
determination of Hungarians. Largely, however, it was just the continuation of earlier 
arguments about regional administration and self-government between different parties. In 
the immediate advent of the vote in parliament, SNS and HZDS had increased their anti-
Hungarian rhetoric, warning that the 12 region model would foster Hungarian irredentism. 
Eventually, the decision was made in favour of a model according to which the existing 
eight public administration units were complemented by eight equivalent regional self-
government units. As a result, Mečiar's ethnopolitics of the mid-1990s were reconfirmed 
and continue to shape political power relations up until today. The complexity of public 
administration reform makes it unlikely that significant changes with regard to regional 
boundaries are to be expected in future (Domsitz 16/09/2009). The vote did not yet include 
all aspects of the reform though; decisively, the parliament did not adopt acts regarding the 
qualitative aspects of the reform, i.e. democratisation through decentralisation of both 
political and fiscal competences (Klimovsky 2010). 
The failed reform of the public administration system added to the general state of crisis 
that the government coalition was in. The MKP threatened to leave the coalition in 
response to the anti-minority vote of the SDL if the reform was not followed up by 
substantial redistribution of political power to bodies of regional and local self-government 
(Slovak Spectator 01/09/2001). The EU made the successful continuation of the accession 
process contingent on the MKP's continued participation in government and on changes to 
the decision-making competencies of the different tiers of governance (Brusis 2003). As a 
result of this external pressure, in late 2001 and early 2002 the government undertook 
several more steps to ensure the devolution of competencies from national to regional and 
local level governance (Klimovsky 2010). The local levels acquired competencies in the 
running of local services, including the setting up/closing of schools (and the decision as to 
a new school's language(s) of tuition), but also on regional and municipal properties and 
others (Nižňanský & Pilát 2001, p.228). Even though the public administration reform did 
not foster Hungarian political or functional autonomy, general devolution helped increase Part II - Chapter 5 
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the direct participation in local and regional level decision-making of Hungarians. In 
this sense, the public administration reform of 2001/2002 reshaped political membership of 
Hungarians. The minority members have since then argued that the reform has de facto 
increased their decision-making authority also on minority community issues thanks to the 
numerical strength in certain regions/municipalities (Bérenyi 30/06/2009). Moreover, 
because interethnic relations are better, and less ethno-politically contaminated at the local 
level, decisions on community issues can now be taken without the tensions that often 
characterise national level interethnic policy making. Also, devolution did eventually 
enable cooperation as part of 'historical regions', even though regional boundaries do not 
represent the historical regions. MKP politicians have therefore had an interest to press for 
the reform (Slovak Spectator 01/09/2001) and welcomed the changes implemented.  
At the same time, the transfer of competences to the regional and local self-governments 
does not warrant decision-making authority for minority groups on all questions of their 
particular interest. As responsibilities lie more in the managerial, implementing and control 
functions and in concrete organization of public services, this does not allow the shaping 
and designing of policies, for example (Bryson 2008). Legislation on municipal authority 
over the use of local fiscal revenues and the redistribution of financial means between 
different levels of government have been criticised equally (Klimovsky 2010; Nižňanský 
& Pilát 2001); in 2002, the European Commission criticised that the  
'(t)ransfer of responsibilities from state to regional level, however, is not yet proceeding 
satisfactorily hand in hand with fiscal decentralisation' (European Commission 2002, 
p.132).  
This resulted in many municipalities having the competency, but not the means to act. In 
the following months and years, fiscal decentralisation continued, therefore (Klimovsky 
2010). Decisively, however, persisting problems with the issues of public administration 
and local self-government are not discussed as a problem of ethnic inequality and 
exclusion anymore. 
From the perspective of interethnic relations and political membership, the regulation of 
control mechanisms and economic resource distribution at sub-national levels has not 
changed with respect to majority-minority group relations within the established social 
order. Likewise, devolution of competencies to the regional governments in the course of 
the reform has not altered the majority-minority consensus over the institutions of political 
community nationally. However, the reluctance of parts of government actors to give up Part II - Chapter 5 
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competencies in some policy fields to sub-national communities reserves the 
opportunity for redistributing resources between regions and coherent organisation of 
society as a whole. This, theoretically, enables the national government to balance regional 
differences and potentially enhance social integration at the sub-national level. From the 
vantage point of minority participation, the problem here continues to lie largely with the 
ethnic dimension of central state institutions and the remaining problems with interregional 
redistribution and economic integration of the country's periphery (A. Smith 2000). Overall 
I concur with Deets and Stroschein who argue that decentralisation and general democratic 
change have improved the situation of the Hungarians, without moving significantly 
towards ethnopolitical power-sharing (Deets & Stroschein 2005).
24 
Conclusion  
This chapter started with a discussion of the fundamental institutions that determined 
Estonia's and Slovakia's constitutional orders. While in Estonia formal political 
membership was restricted from the beginnings of post-socialist independent statehood and 
political participation of Soviet-era settlers limited as a result of these policies, formal 
membership was given to Hungarians in Slovakia. I have analysed how in both states 
institutions were designed to shape political participation along ethnicised boundaries. 
Following similar routes of nation-state building the institutions of the political system 
were repeatedly modified, effectively aiming to restrict practical political membership of 
Hungarians and Russian-speakers. At the same time, in both states policies towards 
minorities have never been unambiguous, allowing over time for limited institutional 
inclusion of minorities into the political community. The processes of re-negotiating 
membership criteria are conditioned by the fundamental design of the political community 
and in turn condition differences in political participation.  
In contrast to the situation in Estonia, where citizenship policies were introduced as a 
systematic step following logically from the restorationist principle, Slovak anti-minority 
policies that aimed to restrict the Hungarian group's political power appear less systematic. 
The Mečiar government did not attempt to ban 'ethnic' parties, for example. Rather, anti-
minority measures were wrapped in more general changes and reforms of fundamental 
political institutions, such as the electoral system, distribution and boundaries of electoral 
                                                 
24 The reform has not profited other minorities equally well. In its Regular Report 2002, the European 
Commission criticises that '[i]t appears that in a number of cases the discriminatory attitudes of local 
communities towards the Roma make proper implementation of the projects very difficult, underpinning and 
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districts, and consolidation of a centralist system of governance. However, as I have 
argued, these policies were systematic in that they stepwise reduced the access points for 
representatives of the Hungarian community to participate politically. As these policies 
also targeted the political opposition to the government as a whole, minority political 
representation was affected in a double way. However, this effect on the Slovak political 
opposition became an important structural resource to end Mečiarism, further the EU 
accession process and thereby bringing in another important ally for general and 
interethnic democratisation.  
Overall, the chapter discussed the political-institutional structures that resulted from, and 
further shaped, majority-minority interaction in Estonia and Slovakia. The chapter 
demonstrated how the majorities in both countries were able to utilise the structures 
provided by the specific historical legacies of intergroup relations, the narrative of national 
self-determination and the Europe-wide predominance of the nation-state in support of 
building a state for the respective majority group. When the resulting state-building against 
minorities increased the disintegration of society, the constraints of EU conditionality 
policies became a resource for political actors supporting more liberal forms of state-
building. This paved the way for limited majority-minority interaction in the political 
realm on the basis of minority assimilation in Estonia and supported political strength of 
Hungarians in Slovakia based on territorial concentration, effectively reinforcing regional 
segregation. As chapters 7 through 9 will demonstrate, these majority-minority structures 
as crystallised in the institutions of political memberships were significant for the ways in 
which minority actors attempted to regain their political agency.  Part II - Chapter 6 
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Chapter 6: Minority communities in Nation-building  
6.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter demonstrated how political membership was defined and 
implemented in the political institutions of the new Estonian and Slovak states, designed 
according to the requirements of nation-state building. This chapter discusses how these 
states have been further 'nationalised' by policies that aim to 'complete' nation-state 
building and to redress perceived negative consequences of existing social diversity as well 
as perceived historical injustices and histories of oppression (Brubaker 1996, p.9).  
The previous chapters have shown that the problematic relations between the two groups 
are rooted in the difficult historical relations between them; differing interpretations of 
historical events play a crucial role in interethnic relations. However, in both countries 
history and memory are but one aspect of the conflict. Decisively, language use and 
language policies have become the main markers of group belonging and conflict, and key 
terms in discussions of group 'loyalties'. Language policies are a crucial – often, the central 
– aspect of nationalising policies, because European state-building, and in particular the 
recent exercises in nation-state construction witnessed across Central and Eastern Europe, 
are based on an understanding of nations for which 'national languages have become the 
most important means of national cultural reproduction' (Csergo 2007, p.5). Moreover, in 
majority-minority relations across the region, language is the single most important marker 
of group difference, rather than racial, cultural and religious practices, which often 
constitute the lines of demarcation in other intergroup conflicts. Language policies have 
been identified as a central means for governments to integrate societies and establish 
cohesion amongst their members (Hogan-Brun 2005; Wright 2000). On the basis of the 
argument of integration, language policies in many countries across CEE were designed to 
evoke linguistic homogeneity. In many cases, this is phrased not only in terms of 
integration, but also refers to efforts to prevent disintegration and the potential break-up of 
a state resulting from minority demands for autonomy, independence, or 'their own' state 
(Hogan-Brun & Wolff 2003).  
At the same time, language is an aspect of social life that is inextricably linked to people's 
presentation of themselves to the social world as a means of accessing non-linguistic Part II - Chapter 6 
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resources. This is why it has been identified by a variety of social actors and 
institutions as a powerful tool in the control and interpretation of interpersonal as well as 
intergroup relationships and belonging (Järve 2003). Varying degrees of language control 
can be established through linguistic policies and supported through the education system. 
Where large-scale language shifts are intended by policy-makers, the visibility of minority 
languages in public and the availability of education in minority languages are both 
strongly linked with language policy (Hogan-Brun 2005, p.277). This is, of course, even 
more the case when policies are designed to influence individuals' access to social goods 
and their degree of participation in decision-making related to social and political issues.  
I argue in this chapter that language policies in Estonia and Slovakia can be analysed in 
terms of three simultaneous processes. Essentially, these are; i) continued state-building, ii) 
integration within the international system of nation-states and, importantly, iii) ambiguous 
nation-building strategies, which target titular and minority groups differently. I approach 
these aspects as follows: In section 6.2, I look at language policies in Slovakia and Estonia 
as nationalising policies, following the nationalist elites' strategies to ensure titular 
'ownership' of the state. These processes made use of regulations on the state language to 
promote societal integration. Section 6.3 assesses the relationship between the concept of 
minority rights and regulations of state language use in the context of Europeanisation. 
Section 6.4 investigates the role that policies addressing interethnic integration have played 
in the efforts to induce a language shift. I do this by looking at the education policies of the 
two states. I summarise the findings by indicating the main consequences of language 
policy planning: the solidifying of boundaries between the groups that works against the 
logic of society integration.  
6.2. Language policy planning in a nationalising state  
Language policies in Slovakia and Estonia attest to the centrality of ethno-national criteria 
for the formation and fortification of the political community. They are grounded in salient 
identities as well as political legacies from the earlier phases of nation-building that 
function as resources for nationalist political entrepreneurs. At the same time, efforts to 
create a unitary nation-state by means of nationalising policies also aim to bring into 
congruence a diverse population with the idea of the nation-state – that is, to integrate the Part II - Chapter 6 
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population around the titular language as a 'common core'.
1 As part of the nationalist 
elites' political strategies to manage linguistic diversity, language legislation in Estonia and 
Slovakia has been designed to alter the different forms of linguistic pluralism found in the 
two countries in the late 1980s. 
With respect to Estonia, in 1989 the Supreme Soviet promulgated laws to foster the 
processes of nation-building by adopting the Language Law of the Estonian Soviet 
Socialist Republic (ESSR 1989). This crucial step provided a symbolic point of reference 
on the road to national self-determination. The strong link to national sovereignty showed 
through when it came to issues of language use. Estonia was then among the first Soviet 
republics, together with Latvia (following Lithuania's lead), to declare the titular nation's 
language the 'state language' and thereby the (only) official language of the ESSR in 1989 
(Kionka 1992, p.165; Misiunas & Taagepera 1993, p.311). At the time, when more than a 
third of the population had Russian as their first or main language of interaction and most 
of this section of the population lacked competence in Estonian, many Estonians worried 
that Estonian would lose its role as the first language for Estonians, with potentially 
extinction threatening the language in the long-term. In response to this perception, the law 
was to enable the state to 'accord special attention and protection to the Estonian language' 
in all formal and public proceedings (preamble of ESSR 1989; see also Budryte 2005, 
p.73). These policies reversed the status Russian had under Soviet language legislation, 
when it functioned as the all-Union official language and was sometimes described as the 
'"second native tongue" of every Soviet citizen' (quoted in Taagepera 1971, p.216). As a 
result, the attribution of privileged status to the Estonian language constrained the role and 
use of Russian, as will be discussed later (Adrey 2005, p.458). This caused frustration and 
disappointment among the Russian-speaking members of the Supreme Soviet (Järve 2002).  
In Slovakia, until 1990 the concern with language policies had not been prominent in the 
VPN, whose activists focused on issues of general democratisation rather than 'national' 
interests (Harris 2002). Daftary and Gál claim that it was the Czechs' stronger and more 
visible role in leading the revolution that caused many Slovak intellectuals to submit to 
demands from nationalists to voice 'Slovak interests' (Daftary & Gál 2003, p.42). 
Increasingly, Slovak nationalists, with the SNS at their forefront, framed these interests in 
cultural-linguistic terms and placed these high on the Slovak political agenda. The original 
proposal for a language act was drafted by the SNS on the initiative of the Slovak cultural 
                                                 
1 The notion of a common core is particularly and explicitly emphasised in Estonia's integration strategy. 
However, Slovakia's language policies have repeatedly been justified with similar arguments, as I will 
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heritage organisation Matica Slovenská (Mother Slovakia), and was embedded in a 
campaign that aimed at restoring 'historical justice' in relation to the Hungarians (Innes 
2001, p.54; Bakker 1997, p.50). Hungarian representatives responded with their own 
version of a language law that envisaged far-reaching minority language rights (Csergo 
2007). Eventually, the moderate Slovak majority adopted a law that satisfied neither the 
nationalists nor the Hungarians, but effectively privileged Slovak over other languages 
spoken on Slovakia's territory and drew a clear line between Slovak and Czech/ 
'Czechoslovak'.  
As a result of the strength of the moderate majority actors in both countries, the early 
language laws recognised minority groups and included provisions that were aimed 
particularly at Russian-speakers and Hungarians respectively. The first Slovak language 
law allowed for minority language use in official administrative proceedings in the 
municipalities, where a minority group constituted 20% or more of the local population, a 
condition almost exclusively fulfilled by the Hungarians (ibid.). Thereby the law 
acknowledged practices on the ground and prevented the criminalisation of minority 
language use in public offices in minority-inhabited areas. At the same time, the law did 
not require municipal offices to be able to respond to written or oral enquires in a minority 
language (ibid.). This ensured that the law avoided the situation where an official was 
recognising minority languages, 'through the back-door', at the local level. In contrast, the 
ESSR law constituted a basis for the continued legal usage of Russian on Estonian 
territory. Although it introduced transition periods, outlining dates by which public offices 
should fully function in Estonian, the law guaranteed the continued use of Russian within 
and between local bodies of state authorities, as well as within institutions and 
organisations whose working language was Russian (ESSR 1989, §36). This provision did 
not include a deadline, but would be applicable even after other deadlines had been 
reached. In addition, the Supreme Soviet was given the right to postpone set deadlines for 
the transition to Estonian in areas where Estonian was not spoken by the majority of 
residents. While, with hindsight, it seems the codification of language use also laid the 
groundwork for the activity of Russian-speakers in public life on their own terms to be 
curtailed, the 1989 law did not exhibit the aggressive measures for promoting the Estonian 
language and restricting the use of Russian that would characterise later language 
legislation. Protests of Russian-speaking deputies in the Supreme Soviet attested to the fact 
that Russian-speakers hoped for the Russian language to obtain the status of second official 
language. As in Slovakia, the law satisfied neither the minority representatives nor the 
majority nationalists. However, both early language laws offered a vision for majority-Part II - Chapter 6 
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minority integration that, although based on majority preferences, acknowledged 
minority language practices and the importance of minority language use for minority 
group members.  
In both laws, the titular language was framed as a means to enable intergroup 
communication and understanding (Daftary & Gál 2003). The laws' capacities to integrate 
the populations could not really be tested, however, since majority nationalists pushed for 
further nationalising policies in the two countries, and minority activists continued to 
demand their unfulfilled claims for excluded minority language rights. Moreover, the laws 
failed to establish standards for language use in many spheres, most obviously in 
education, causing gaps in the legislation and leading to vague provisions that, under the 
circumstances of growing ethnic tensions on the ground as well as in politics, were 
interpreted very differently by the different groups.
2 The major importance of the laws 
therefore did not lie in their practical outcomes – which in any case would be limited by 
future political changes – but in the psychological effect that the new status of Estonian 
and Slovak had for the process of nation-cum-state building (Järve 2002; Raun 1995). 
Growing support for majority nationalism in subsequent years made it increasingly less 
acceptable to demand minority language rights or question the unique status of the state 
language.  
The role of the titular languages in the two states became even more pronounced with the 
adoption of the constitutions, which stipulate Estonian and Slovak respectively as the sole 
state languages. As mentioned earlier, the constitutions did, simultaneously, acknowledge 
minority language rights; still, particularly in Estonia, subsequent citizenship and 
naturalisation legislation made the knowledge of Estonian a sine qua non for participating 
in the newly developing society. In Slovakia, the provision of Slovak as the state language 
was interpreted by the second Mečiar government as an imperative for tightening or 
replacing legislation that regulated the public display of minority languages. Between 1992 
and 1995, both states adopted legislation that was increasingly restrictive with respect to 
minority language use. Laws targeted the visibility of minority languages on public 
signage and with regard to names in Slovakia; in Estonia, several legal acts regulated the 
working language of local and national parliaments and governments, as well as the 
                                                 
2 The confusion over the role minority languages may or may not play in the public, in particular on public 
signs and in geographical denominations, was used by Matica Slovenská activists who started taking down 
bilingual signs in parts of southern Slovakia. The Matica Slovenská responded to an earlier decision by the 
Ministry of Interior that bilingual street signs were prohibited, which they welcomed. They were, of course, 
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command of the state language required of candidates to stand for office.
3 This left 
Russian-speakers largely disenfranchised even at the local level where, since the adoption 
of the Aliens Act of 1993, permanent residents were entitled to vote. Estonian officials 
later admitted that the goal of the restrictive policies of the time was 'to turn the life of 
Russians into hell' (former general director of the Citizenship and Migration Board, Andres 
Kollist, in an interview with Peeter Ernits, published in Molodezh' Estonii 12/02/00).
4  
As mentioned earlier, 'historical justice' was one of the driving forces for the nationalist 
elites in both countries; however, this was not the only argument brought forward by the 
elites to establish the titular language as the only state language. In both countries, majority 
politicians also reacted to current challenges. In Estonia, the de facto status of Russian as 
the first language in the region of almost a third of Estonia's population was supported by 
Russia, where members of the political elite accused Estonia of 'ethnic cleansing'. 
Moreover, Estonia saw itself under pressure from the growing importance of English in 
particular, the role of which increased rapidly as part of Estonia's international integration. 
According to Ozolins, then, Estonia saw itself linguistically as well as politically 'between 
Russian and European hegemony' (Ozolins 2000). Because of this difficult relation, 
international organisations that attempted to advise the countries on their minority 
legislation had limited success; the international support for minority rights was seen as 
'acting for the Russians' (Mart Nutt, author of Estonia's citizenship legislation and member 
of the national-conservative Isamaaliit (Pro Patria Union) in an interview with Kelley 
2004, p.105). In a similar vein, Mečiar accused international organisations of double 
standards and discrimination against Slovakia in favour of Hungary, when minority rights 
were at stake (Goldman 1999, pp.159–160). In line with Slovak and Estonian nation-
building and even more so in response to such 'external kin-state nationalism' (Brubaker 
1996), the Estonian and Slovak national elites geared language policies towards the 
establishment of linguistic sovereignty over the states' territories.  
By 1995, the transition period to introduce Estonian to all public communications had 
ended. However, the language practices of large parts of the population had not changed 
sufficiently to enable the functioning of Estonian society in Estonian alone, as the 
restorationists had hoped it would: in 1995, only 37% of non-Estonians claimed to be able 
                                                 
3 Among others these were the Local Government Organisation Act 1993, the Riigikogu Election Act 1994 
and the Local Government Council Election Act 1996. 
4 This rather vague imperative was accompanied by explicit incentives for Russian-speakers who left for 
other Former Soviet Republics. The Migration Foundation (later Integration Foundation) granted up to 
100,000 EEK to non-Estonian émigrés (V. Pettai & Kallas 2009, p.108).  Part II - Chapter 6 
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to speak Estonian (Rannut 2004).
5 The hopes of some majority nationalists that many 
Russian-speakers would leave the country had also not been satisfied. As a result, many 
Estonians still considered the Estonian language to be under threat. Moreover, many 
politicians claimed the restorationist ideology was not sufficiently implemented, since the 
1989 language law still recognised Russian in spite of its illegitimate status in the eyes of 
Estonian nationalists (Budryte 2005, p.73). In Slovakia, majority nationalists had similar 
concerns as the Estonians. They claimed that the rights of Slovaks to use their language 
were violated in southern Slovakia due to the use of Hungarian. As a survey revealed in 
1993, according to 53% of Slovak respondents there was a 'danger of Hungarianization' 
(Harlig 1997, p.487).  
Drawing upon these sentiments, anxieties, and the mobilisation potential they generated, in 
1995 both parliaments introduced new state language laws.
6 Replacing the laws from 1989 
and 1990, they left little space for minority language use. The new Slovak law, which 
forms the basis for contemporary language policies, ruled that Slovak 'shall have priority 
over other languages used' in the country (SLL 1995, §1,2).
7 More precisely, it stipulated 
that the state language should be used in all public communications and introduced fines 
for the violation of the law (ibid. §10). The law tightened existing legislation and de facto 
revoked the changes made to language legislation under the short lived Moravčík 
government.
8 Particularly disappointing for minority representatives was the fact that none 
of the Slovak parliamentarians who were present during the vote on the law voted against 
it, leaving the Hungarian political representation even more politically isolated than before 
(Williams 1996, p.7).
9 This included those MPs who, a year earlier, had tacitly cooperated 
with the Hungarian MPs in the interim government and as a joint opposition against many 
decisions of the Mečiar-governments.  
The Slovak law envisaged the potential imposition of fines in cases of violation of the act's 
provisions, which caused particular anxiety among minority members. In subsequent years 
the government devised several laws and decrees gradually limiting the use of Hungarian 
                                                 
5 This was unsurprising, since the Estonian authorities had not introduced measures to improve minority 
competency in the state language. Existing programmes were largely prepared by international organisations 
(Budryte 2005).  
6 This was on the initiatives of Isamaaliit from the opposition and the SNS as a government partner, but with 
much support from other parties, including the more moderate ones. 
7 The amended version can be accessed at the website of the Ministry of Culture of the Slovak Republic (SLL 
2010).  
8 The moderate interim government (March-December 1994) annulled the laws on names and bilingual street 
signs, but it did not respond to the Hungarian parties' demands for further minority language legislation 
(Csergo 2007).  
9 The seventeen Hungarian MPs abstained from the vote, and several Slovak MPs were absent; all other MPs 
voted in favour of the government's proposal (Williams 1996, p.7).  Part II - Chapter 6 
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in public institutions, such as in the reports issued by Hungarian schools, in public 
displays of language, in ceremonies, and many other cases (Csergo 2007). The lack of 
direct minority language regulation in the law and of separate, minority language 
legislation left minority members unsure about their rights; minority representatives argued 
that the law was a direct attack on its cultural group reproduction and an attempt to 
undermine its group identity (Wolff 2001, p.24). This problem was addressed by the 
Dzurinda-government in 1999, which adopted a minority language law, as will be 
discussed in the next sub-chapter. The Dzurinda-government also did not actively pursue 
nationalising language policies. Overall it acted in the spirit of the more liberal language 
law of 1990.  
Similarly to the Slovak state language law, the Estonian language act of 1995 declared the 
'right to use Estonian' in all public interactions, including those with companies and non-
profit organisations (ELL 1995, §4). In line with this right, the law limited severely the 
opportunities for the use of Russian, the status of which changed from a 'widely spoken 
language' to a 'foreign language'. More importantly still, it introduced proficiency 
requirements for employees in a wide variety of occupations and for naturalisation. These 
language criteria had a strong negative impact on minority participation on the labour 
market (Hallik et al. 2002; Lauristin & Vetik 2000). The proficiency requirements were 
applied throughout Estonia, affecting Russian-speakers in areas that were inhabited largely 
by Estonians as well as in those that were almost exclusively Russian-speaking. The lack 
of sufficient and effective language courses for Russian-speakers to acquire this 
proficiency meant that citizenship became unattainable for many Soviet-era settlers who 
were of undefined or foreign citizenship. This was the case particularly for those Russian-
speakers living in the North-East of the country or in Tallinn itself, where in many areas 
communication took place almost exclusively in Russian.  
The proponents of the laws argued that these were necessary to ensure the rights of all 
citizens to speak Estonian or Slovak respectively everywhere on the states' territories. 
Moreover, they were proposed to enhance interethnic integration. The preamble to the 
1995 state language law declares the Slovak language the 
'most important attribute of the uniqueness of the Slovak nation and the most precious 
value of its cultural heritage, as well as an expression of sovereignty of the Slovak 
Republic and a general means of communication for all its citizens, securing their 
freedom and equality in dignity and rights on the territory of the Slovak Republic' (SLL 
1995). Part II - Chapter 6 
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The law's claim goes beyond the notion of 'nationalising' the state. It purports that the 
titular language is the tool to integrate Slovakia's diverse citizenry, by offering an 
instrument of communication between all citizens. At the same time, no measures to 
improve the generally good command of Slovak among Hungarian citizens were adopted, 
questioning the incentives for 'integration' (Csergo 2007; Lampl 24/09/2009).  
In Estonia, the question of communication between majority and minority members was 
indeed an issue; as mentioned above, the proportion of Russian-speakers who were 
proficient in Estonian was small. At the same time, when the law was adopted, the 
Estonian authorities did not show an inclination to support the acquisition of Estonian 
language knowledge by Russian-speakers. Language programmes were demanded by 
minority actors, but existing programmes were limited to the minority members they could 
easily reach, and entirely run by international organisations, aiming to accelerate the 
naturalisation of stateless persons and thereby increasing stability (Sarv 2002).  
In order to ensure the fulfilment of the Estonian state language law, in 1996 an act was 
adopted to assert the Order of Realisation of the Control over the Language Act Fulfilment 
(Order 1996). The law restructured the Language Board, which had existed since 1990 to 
supervise the standardisation of the Estonian language, into a Language Inspectorate 
charged with the 'control [of] the language act fulfilment' (Language Inspection 2011). 
Among other things, it is responsible for issuing penalties for the violation of language 
requirements in the use of Estonian in public administration, the media, the Defence 
Forces, and in relation to customers' and public signage, such as in cases where Estonian 
Literary Standards are violated in the transcription of names. The language inspectorate is 
a key institution to ensure the enforcement of Estonian as the state language. The Slovak 
Language Law also envisaged fines for the violation of the language act, which were 
central to any protests and criticism by domestic minority and international actors. As a 
consequence, the choice of language, not only in public institutions, but in all spheres of 
life, represents the acknowledgment or refusal of citizenship duties, as already implied by 
the state language law. Language use was directly equated with 'loyalty' to the state and to 
the Estonian and Slovak nations respectively (Budryte 2005; Langman 2002). This also 
served to delegitimise protest against the legislation, and further undermined minority 
members' political participation.  
In 1998, Estonian language requirements were further tightened when an amendment to the 
law was adopted that excluded individuals with insufficient knowledge of Estonian from Part II - Chapter 6 
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the right to be elected to local government (Local Government Council Election Act 
1996). Despite harsh international criticism and domestic outrage among non-Estonians, 
the amendment was reversed only in 2001. This reversal was triggered when the OSCE 
Mission to Estonia, which Estonian officials had long wanted closed in the light of the 
country's accession to the EU, conditioned its closure on the state's decision to annul the 
1998 amendment; additionally, NATO made Estonia's membership conditional upon 
changing the law (Järve 2003, p.98). However, the local elections of 1999 fell under the 
1998 regulations. In response to media outcries against the reversal in 2001, the decision 
was immediately 'compensated' for by the adoption of another restrictive amendment to the 
act requiring Estonian to be the language of local government sessions, even in bodies 
where the internal working language was Russian.
10 It was only with the introduction of 
the integration strategy that the Estonian state emphasised the need for an active approach 
to increasing minority members' proficiency in Estonian, though measures were still 
largely funded by international organisations (Government 2008; Government 2000).  
The 'second wave' of state language laws was central to the consequential development of 
majority-minority relations in Estonia and Slovakia. The laws continued the nationalising 
policies with regard to state institutions and participation therein; second, the elevation of 
the state languages was part and parcel of Estonian and Slovak nation-building which 
distinguished those with 'native' proficiency in the state language from those whose 
command of the state language was, in socio-economic and interactive terms, limited; 
third, it set the stage for further integration by conditioning social and political 
participation increasingly on state language use. As a result, speaking the state language 
amounted to a citizen's duty, and hence made the inability or reluctance of minority 
members to do exactly this an act of 'disloyalty' (Langman 2002; Feldman 2000).  
In February 2007, the Estonian language act was amended once more, with this revision 
entering into force in 2008. The act now relates the language proficiency in Estonian to a 
new 6-level scheme following the Common European Framework of Reference 
(Eksamikeskus 2011). Apparently introduced to clarify the language situation for 'public 
servants, employees and sole proprietors', the law requires new proficiency certificates 
from employees in a number of occupational spheres.
11 In addition, the 2007 amendments 
                                                 
10 This, as is widely known in Estonia, has led to the practice that unofficial sessions are held in Russian 
where debates take place, while a short follow-up session is held in Estonian where the decisions are made 
official (Agarin 2010; Järve 2002).  
11 The question of validity of language certificates was a bone of contention already in 2002/2003, when the 
Pro Patria Union claimed that earlier certificates acquired to certify an individual's level of language 
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changed the language inspectorate's legal status, which led to its strengthening, despite 
ongoing international criticism of the strong role of the inspectorate (Council of Europe 
2005a). As part of the law's enforcement since 2008, the language inspectorate checks the 
employees' proficiency in Estonian, both in cases where no former certificate exists and in 
those where it does (Language Inspection 2011; LICHR 2010). This has increased the 
pressure on Russian-speaking employees and contradicted international and domestic 
criticism of both the adequacy of the established requirements and the practices of ensuring 
compliance with these requirements (Poleshchuk 2009, pp.99–102). In 2007, the 
parliament also reconfirmed the normative centrality of the Estonian language for the state, 
by including the protection of the Estonian language into the preamble of the constitution. 
In Slovakia, language legislation was more minority-friendly between 1998 and 2006, and 
resulted among other things in the adoption of a minority language law in 1999, which will 
be discussed in section 6.3. With its return to government in 2006, however, the SNS 
resumed its anti-minority policies, increasingly pushing the language issue. Since the 
Dzurinda government, under the impact of European organisation, had introduced a 
minority language law, the Fico government reasoned that a new state language law was 
needed which would be linked to the responsibility of the Slovak state to safeguard the 
rights of every Slovak who lives among a minority, even if the latter constituted a local 
majority (Bocian & Groszkowski 2009). The 2009 language law did not differ significantly 
from the 1995 version in its direction and general regulation of the state language; 
however, the law did tighten existing state language provisions and extended their 
applicability.
12 The law saw one important change with the potential to directly affect 
minority language use. Fines were reintroduced and tightened, which had been nullified in 
the original law by a clause in the minority language law in 1999; ranging from 100 to 
5,000 Euros, these applied to organisations as well as individuals (SLL 1995, amendment 
318/2009, §9a). Although the law reiterates that minority language legislation was not to 
be rescinded by any of the state language law regulations, this did little to safeguard 
minority language use outside of contacts with municipal authorities (i.e. the area covered 
by the minority language law).  
                                                                                                                                                    
validation (USEFR 2011). Mainly for practical reasons, i.e. acknowledging that the language inspectorate 
would not be able to conduct all validations of existing certificate within the originally given timeframe, the 
revocation of the validity of 'old' certificates was postponed until the introduction of new certificates and 
proficiency criteria in 2007.  
12 It regulated not only public affairs, but also interactions in e.g. transport, telecommunications and postal 
services, requiring all workers in these sectors to master the state language (318/2009, §1,5). It required 
cultural performances and programmes that were presented in a minority language to be dubbed or 
accompanied by another form of translation.  Part II - Chapter 6 
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The Slovak government's renewed attempts to bring the majority's claim for linguistic 
sovereignty into congruence not only in state institutions but also, potentially, in everyday 
interaction processes shocked minority members. Hungarians saw their situation 
deteriorate, and in the eyes of many it became worse than it had been in the 1990s 
(Domsitz 16/09/2009).  
The law was interpreted by representatives of the Hungarian group as well as the 
Hungarian state as an anti-minority and specifically anti-Hungarian move. Domestic and 
bilateral relations deteriorated at such a pace that the OSCE High Commissioner for 
National Minorities (HCNM), Knut Vollebaek, became increasingly involved over a period 
of several months. His diplomatic statements explicitly pointed to the Slovak government's 
responsibility to alleviate the potential impact of the law on minority rights:  
'I expect the Slovak authorities to closely monitor and evaluate the implementation of 
the State Language Law, particularly with regard to the imposition of fines in order to 
avoid undue limitations to the use of minority languages. I intend to remain engaged 
with this and other matters until the balance between strengthening the State language 
and protecting minority rights is achieved' (HCNM Press release 2010).  
It was the new democratic government coalition under Iveta Radičová in 2010 – including 
the new minority party Most-Híd – that responded to the HCNM's demands and enabled 
the amendment of the state language law in March 2011. Several aspects of the law were 
revoked, thereby limiting the cases in which fines could be imposed for violations of the 
act (SLL 2010). However, essentially the state language law remained intact.  
Conclusion 
The legacy of past relations between the titular nation and minorities on the territory was 
central to the majority nationalist elites' efforts to nationalise the institutional structures. 
Still, having the upper hand in politics, moderate majority elite members in both countries 
did not initially follow the demands from nationalists, who opposed any formal status for 
minority languages (Daftary & Gál 2003; Järve 2002). The moderate majority parties' 
stances on language legislation attest to the openness of the situation during the early 
phases of democratisation (Csergo 2007; Budryte 2005). However, moderate politicians 
increasingly gave in to nationalist pressure, while in opposition. In government, liberals 
did not pursue policies of explicit state-cum-nation-building on the basis of language. 
Although Hungarian and Russian had not been granted official status, the laws did 
elaborate on the use of these languages. Although the language acts of 1989 and 1990 did Part II - Chapter 6 
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not respond to minority demands, they entailed the possibility of moderate nation-
building under the conditions of minority consensus and inclusion. Later policies 
increasingly restricted minority language use in the public sphere and its public visibility, 
essentially nationalising, by means of language use, the territory and institutions of the 
state.  
Language policies in Estonia and Slovakia are problematic from a democratic perspective. 
They reflect the marginalisation of minority perspectives in the decision-making regarding 
the relations between majority and minority groups. Moreover, the enforcement of the state 
language across political, social and economic institutions correlates with group-related 
disadvantages not only in political, but also in socio-economic participation. For labour 
market participation in Estonia the level of command of the state language has an 
important, even decisive impact on employability, occupational attainment and wages of 
Russian-speakers. It is a sine qua non for the vast majority of white-collar jobs (Lauristin 
et al. 2008; Leping & Toomet 2007; Hallik et al. 2002; Lauristin & Vetik 2000). Although 
the situation of Hungarians in Slovakia is different, and although the command of Slovak 
is generally good among Hungarians, researchers have argued that the generally low level 
of social mobility of Hungarian inhabitants in southern Slovakia can be traced back, among 
other factors such as education and the rural character of the region, to an individual's first 
language (Adrian Smith 2000). These unintended consequences of language integration 
contribute to feelings of discrimination among minority members (Bara 21/09/2009).  
As a result of these language policies, proficiency in the titular language acquired 
importance as a tool for social advancement, access to economic opportunities and 
participation in political process, because from a state institutional perspective and policy 
regulations alike, linguistic skills were seen as a token of identification with the state at 
large.  
6.3. International involvement in minority protection 
The interethnic dimension of language policies in Slovakia and Estonia is not limited to the 
regulation of the state language. This section looks at the development of policies on 
minority language use in the two countries in the context of European integration. Already 
prior to Estonia's and Slovakia's independence in 1991 and 1993 respectively, both states 
had sought their countries' international integration. Central to their efforts were the 
memberships in NATO and EU to which these states formally applied in 1994 and 1995; Part II - Chapter 6 
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with independence, both states were immediately admitted to the Conference for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE; later known as the Organisation for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe: OSCE), and joined the Council of Europe in early summer 
1993. It was on this basis that both states became subject to increasing international 
scrutiny, and with regard to NATO and EU also to conditionality politics in order to ensure 
the states' fulfilment of membership criteria. Between the mid-1990s and 2004, these 
international structures significantly constrained domestic decision-making in the area of 
minority policies.
13  
In contrast to the 'first wave' of language laws, the 1995 laws brought significant change 
for minority language rights, now entirely under the imperative of the notion of state 
language. Although very similar in their regulation of the state language, the states' 
approaches to the regulation of minority language use differed. The Slovak language law 
does not explicitly regulate minority language use at all, creating a heavily criticised legal 
vacuum (Daftary & Gál 2003).
14 Since the state language law replaced the earlier language 
law of 1990, and no minority language legislation was adopted in parallel to the State 
language law, the potential constraints on minority language use were enormous precisely 
because of the wide use of Hungarian in practice. As demonstrated in the previous section, 
the wide use of Hungarian was the pretext for the Mečiar-government to restrict minority 
language use in a range of institutional contexts. The Mečiar-government also did not 
respond to the institutional tension created by the law, which therefore contradicted 
constitutional law, as well as a bilateral treaty recently signed with Hungary (Basic Treaty 
1995). In contrast, the Estonian law does reflect the need for legislation as a response to the 
presence of a large and embedded non-titular population. Besides the state language, the 
law regulates the use of 'foreign languages', which now also include Russian (ELL 1995, § 
21,1). The law does not make any explicit reference to Russian, changing the role of the 
formerly 'second largest native language' in the country to that of any other foreign 
language (ibid., §10). While the language law allows for the use of minority languages in 
contact with local level authorities, this provision is limited to towns where at least 50% of 
                                                 
13 Among the fundamental documents determining the criteria for assessing the two states' progress in 
questions of minority policies were the EU's 'Copenhagen Criteria', the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities (FCNM), signed by both states in 1995, and the European Charter for 
Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML).  
14 The 1995 Slovak State Language Law refers to regulations of minority language use as regulated in legal 
acts on criminal court proceedings, Civil Court Order, periodical print and other mass information media, the 
system of primary and secondary schools, Slovak Television, Slovak Radio and the denomination of 
communities in the language of national minorities (SLL 1995). In several cases, however, these laws still 
had to be drafted and minority language use was de facto unregulated.  Part II - Chapter 6 
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the 'permanent residents belong to a national minority'. Since there is no requirement 
that civil servants speak Russian, ample space is left for practical arbitrariness.  
The law further provides for the use of the minority languages as an internal working 
language alongside Estonian in local governments 'where the majority of permanent 
residents are non-Estonian speakers'; however, this provision is dependent on the 
respective local government applying for such status to the national government, and the 
government's consent to such practice (ELL 1995, §11). These provisions fulfilled the 
requirements of constitutional law. However, Tallinn is excluded from this provision by 
law: interviews suggested that the possibility of the Estonian capital being a bilingual city 
was irreconcilable with the dominant understandings of statehood and sovereignty. Several 
municipalities in Ida-Virumaa and Harjumaa (the county that includes Tallinn), Narva, 
Sillamäe and Maardu, have applied repeatedly to the national government, yet no such 
permission has been granted (Agarin 2010, p.110; Poleshchuk 2009, p.19). The 
government denied the requests on the basis of what it saw as unfulfilled obligations 
concerning the full implementation of the right to use Estonian in all municipal 
communications, which was the precondition to allow Russian to be used alongside the 
state language (Tomusk 2004, quoted in V. Pettai & Kallas 2009, p.109). 
The CoE was critical of the minority provisions in the constitution and the state language 
law, both of which it considered were in peril of failing to fully protect minority language 
rights due to the broad scope and intensity of state-language protection. The CoE's 
Advisory Committee on the Implementation of the FCNM is particularly critical of the rise 
in the imposition of fines issued on the basis of the violation of the state language act 
(Council of Europe 2001). It further criticises the lack of clarity with respect to the 
applicability of the constitutional minority rights due to the use of the term 'national 
minority', which elsewhere is restricted to Estonian citizens and thus could not be applied 
in Estonia due to the large number of foreign citizens and stateless persons among Russian-
speakers in combination with the high threshold (50%) (CAA 1993).  
However, apart from the CoE, international organisations only started criticising Estonia's 
language legislation in earnest after the 1998 changes. They focused largely on language 
requirements for political participation rather than minority rights as such, following the 
overall interest in conflict prevention and political integration rather than minority rights 
advocacy (Kelley 2004; Sarv 2002; Birckenbach 2000). Consequently, international 
organisations concentrated on pushing the Estonian authorities to lower the Estonian Part II - Chapter 6 
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language proficiency requirements for naturalisation. In 2001, the OSCE fact finding 
mission was first to exert direct and strong pressures on Estonia to revoke the 1998 
restrictions introduced with the amendments to the language act. The OSCE mission had 
been stationed in Estonia upon the state's invitation following allegations from the Russian 
Federation that Estonia pursued 'ethnic cleansing' in 1993, but it was hoped the mission 
would end quickly (Sarv 2002). Under pressure, keen to have the mission leave, the 
authorities adopted an amendment to the language law that 'foreign languages' might be 
used in oral communications between members of the public and state agencies as on the 
basis of agreement between the two parties, which entered into force in 2002. In contrast to 
earlier versions of the language act, this article of the law does provide for the legal basis 
of a common practice in many areas, particularly in Ida-Virumaa and parts of Tallinn, 
eventually ruling out the absurd situation that Russian-speaking public servants and 
residents were legally obliged to speak Estonian with each other. Acknowledging these 
changes, in 2002 the European Commission only criticised minor shortcomings with 
respect to the use of minority languages in private signs visible to the public, and in its 
final report of 2003, minority issues were off the table entirely (European Commission 
2003; European Commission 2002).  
With accession to EU and NATO in 2004, the instruments by which some pressure was 
exerted on Estonia had ceased to be applicable. In contrast to the 1990s and early 2000s, 
when the prospective accession had an impact on domestic policy-making, today the 
situation of minority language related legislation depends on domestic political power 
relations alone. Yet, the CoE did not discontinue its criticism. In 2005, for example, its 
Advisory Committee again problematised the  
'overly large margin of discretion to the individual officials concerned as to whether 
persons belonging to national minorities may use their language in contacts with 
authorities' (Council of Europe 2005a, p.7).  
When Estonia amended the language law again in 2011, the Advisory Committee of the 
CoE on the implementation of the FCNM repeated this criticism, arguing that the law was 
adopted entirely  
'without comprehensive consultations with minority representatives and without 
attention to international recommendations for a more balanced approach' (Council of 
Europe 2011).  
The problem international organisations faced with regard to the adoption of their 
recommendations in Estonia have been not only the lack of tools to sanction non-Part II - Chapter 6 
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compliance, but also the question of a legitimate right to speak on the Estonian 
situation. Especially during the 1990s, it was the Estonian position that the Estonian 
government's alignment of its policies with international demands amounted to 'giving in 
to Russia' (Budryte 2005, p.81; similarly Kelley 2004, p.105).
15 As a result, the Estonian 
policies of state language primacy have resisted many of the international 
recommendations for intergroup conflict resolution. Instead, the Estonian nation-state 
building project led to a rapid decline in opportunities to use Russian in public. Although 
the sheer number of Russian-speakers in certain towns and regions provides for many 
social situations that can and do take place in Russian, it has been argued that Russian-
speakers increasingly, especially the younger cohorts, use Estonian also between 
themselves (Council of Europe 2011). Overall, though towns such as Narva, where around 
95% of the population are Russian-speakers, will not become the 'festival for Estonians' 
envisaged by nationalists during the 1990s (Reinvelt 2002), in the medium term we can 
expect the use of Russian to decrease significantly not only in public offices and official 
communication, but also that minority-minority interaction across Estonia will increasingly 
resemble that of migrant communities in other European countries. Developments in 
societal level interactions support this assumption (Vallimäe et al. 2010). This would 
contribute in turn to the further differentiation of the Russian-speaking group according to 
Estonian language proficiency (Vetik 17/04/2009).  
The Slovak state language law of 1995 was perceived more critically by the international 
organisations, which saw it as part of a range of anti-democratic measures which had 
alarmed international organisations since the second Mečiar government (Fisher 2006). 
The EU had already issued its first démarche to the Slovak Republic, demanding against 
the background of worrying developments in the democratisation process, economic 
reforms, and regional cooperation with neighbouring countries, that the tensions in relation 
to the Hungarian minority in the country were removed (Henderson 2002, p.92). Earlier 
still, the OSCE had criticised the situation of minority rights protection in Slovakia, but 
were responded to only by the short-lived Moravčík-government in 1994. Although the 
                                                 
15 These allegations were unfounded. Despite the critical tone the organisations adopted towards aspects of 
Estonia's language policies, they have always been concerned with the improvement of the situation on the 
basis of the status quo. As such, they never interfered so much as to suggest a language regime change, i.e. 
official bilingualism. Such a suggestion was made by Jørn Donner, then rapporteur for the European 
Parliament, in 1997. He proposed a similar model to that of the Swedish minority in Finland to be introduced 
in Estonia to foster integration (Budryte 2005, pp.79–80). As Budryte notes, Donner's remarks led to further 
polarisation in the debates on language and integration. Moreover, they were not only perceived by Estonians 
as opposed to their own declared approach to integration around the Estonian language rather than linguistic 
segregation, but also provided the Russian Federation with an excellent point of attack, which was 
immediately used by Russia in the ongoing border dispute (ibid.). Russia's foreign minister at the time, 
Sergey Primakov, tried to condition Russia's signature under the border agreement on Estonia's extension of 
minority rights, among others in the field of languages (ibid.).  Part II - Chapter 6 
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Mečiar-governments did seem to signal compliance with some of the international 
demands, this was by no means satisfactory from the international organisations' 
perspective and did not follow a comprehensive logic.
16 At least partly this can be 
attributed to the ambivalent relationship the Mečiar-governments had concerning 
international integration; there was significant support among parts of the Slovak political 
elite for Slovakia's integration with Russia rather than the 'West' (Fisher 2006; Goldman 
1999).  
The controversial language law was one of the reasons for Slovakia's initial rejection from 
the first round of applicant countries considered by the EU as candidates (Harris 2007). It 
played an important part in the Europeanisation process as it impacted Slovakia, as the 
regular demands for a minority language law demonstrated. Europeanisation in Slovakia 
set in with the change in government in 1998. The European institutions made it very clear 
that Slovakia had to improve its minority policies if it wanted to become a member of the 
European Union. The 1999 Minority Language Law was the new government's direct 
response to this international pressure; however it was equally clear that the status quo 
would not have been acceptable within the coalition (MLL 1999). Both in opposition and 
in coalition talks, the Hungarian parties had emphasised the importance of a minority 
(language) law (Csergo 2007).  
The MKP had elaborated their demands for comprehensive minority legislation during the 
1990s. With regard to the minority language situation, the party insisted that a minority 
language law was necessary that responded to all the problems raised by the State language 
law and would therefore regulate minority language use in official contacts, in formal 
proceedings in schools, as well as in instruction and textbooks, in press and broadcasting, 
in minority cultural activities and information thereof, and in social services.
17 The 
international organisations were involved throughout the whole process of drafting the law. 
Already on his first visit after the 1998 elections, OSCE High Commissioner for National 
Minorities, Max van der Stoel, had declared:  
                                                 
16 Among the steps perceived as compliance with international demands was the adoption of a bilateral treaty 
with Hungary, which had been demanded by NATO in particular (Schimmelfennig 2000; Basic Treaty 
1995).  
17 These demands were developed as part of the Hungarian parties' reaction to the 1995 State language law 
and were adjusted several times during the discussion process, also in 1999. Eventually it envisaged not only 
the right of minorities to use their language in official proceedings at the local level, as the 1990 Official 
language law had done, but also required that local authorities were responsible for guaranteeing that 
minority members would also be replied to in their language, that minority languages could be chosen as 
languages of interaction in local office and local council meetings and that official forms and seals could be 
bilingual (HHRF 11/06/1999).  Part II - Chapter 6 
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'If law regulates the use of state-language then law must regulate the use of native-
languages in public administration as well' (HHRF 15/12/1998).  
He also expressed support for many, but not all of the aspects included into a first draft of a 
minority language law, as elaborated by the MKP in government. Thereby the HCNM 
acknowledged that this was only the start of the cabinet's and parliament's negotiations. 
After the meeting with the High Commissioner, the MKP started redrafting the law, inter 
alia suggesting that a 10% threshold would be more adequate, and would enable many 
more or less sizable minorities to enjoy the benefits of an MLL. Hungarian representatives 
also demanded the inclusion of some of the minority provisions regulated by other laws or 
ministerial decrees (e.g. HHRF 21/01/1999). It became apparent that the minority party 
envisaged the MLL as a coherent minority law, dealing with all aspects of the minority 
language, in order to eradicate all vagueness and room for majority language superiority 
caused by the SLL. In early February 1999, the coalition started its debate on the MLL 
(HHRF 02/02/1999). 
The subsequent period of wrangling within the coalition over the aspects to be covered by 
the law lasted for more than six months. The nationalist opposition called for Slovaks to 
defend themselves against such a law, initiating protests and attempting to file a petition. 
The notorious president of the SNS, Ján Slota, declared that,  
'[i]f Slovaks are forced to learn Hungarian in southern Slovakia, we will resort to 
extreme measures to defend the country's inviolability' (HHRF 09/03/1999).  
However, no 'extreme measures' were taken and the coalition resumed its debates on the 
minority language law. With the deliberations not progressing at a satisfying pace, pressure 
of the international community on the Slovak government was increased to adopt the MLL 
in time. A key date was the meeting with the European Commission set for July 1999, to 
discuss the country's prospects for EU accession. Several EU, CoE and OSCE officials 
visited the country prior to this, and these visits were accompanied by anticipated as well 
as unanticipated visits of the HCNM, whose recommendations even included advice on the 
specific wording of the law (HHRF 16/03/1999; HHRF 29/04/1999). Eventually an 
alternative proposal to the MKP's draft was presented to parliament, which was approved 
by the international monitoring organisations after some recommendations were included 
into the draft law – the MKP's proposals to amend the draft were not taken into account 
(HHRF 20/04/1999). Part II - Chapter 6 
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The minority language law was then adopted against the will and the votes of the 
minority party; still, the international organisations generally welcomed the decision. 
However, the international organisations also acknowledged that this did not fully resolve 
some of the key problems of interethnic relations and indicated future support with 
additional legislation in the field of minority rights to compensate for the MKP's 
dissatisfaction (HHRF 27/07/1999). The adopted minority language law stipulates the right 
of all citizens of Slovakia belonging to a minority to use their language in official contacts 
with their municipality, when their minority constitutes at least 20% of this municipality's 
population (MLL 1999, §2).
18 Minority members can expect to receive a reply both in the 
state and the minority language to requests brought forward in a minority language. 
However, as most provisions are discretionary, the law's wording allows room for 
interpretation. Crucially, the law states that '[l]ocal administration bodies and their 
employees are not employed to speak a minority language' (ibid., §7 (1)), which appears to 
be in direct contradiction to the minority rights the law regulates in the first place. Similar 
qualifications were made for the MLL's provisions for using a minority language as an 
internal working language and a language of proceedings in local councils, if all 
individuals present agree. Even though the law regulates minority language usage, no 
concrete measures are outlined in the law that would facilitate law enforcement.  
The adoption of the law was decisive for Slovakia's accession to the EU. As far as the 
European Union is concerned, the situation was settled to an acceptable degree. More 
specifically, the MLL corresponded with criteria outlined at the Copenhagen summit in 
1993, opened up the route to sign the European Charter for Minority and Regional 
Languages (ECMRL) and overall satisfied the standards expected by the European 
Commission as detailed in the Commission's Regular Report of 1999.
19 At the same time, 
the Commission does state that  
'[t]he Government has given a commitment that the law will be interpreted and applied 
so that its provisions prevail (as a matter of subsequent and specific law), over the 
provisions of the Law on the State Language. It [the MLL] may also need to be 
complemented in the future with other legislation on the use of minority languages in 
other areas, notably education and culture' (European Commission 1999, p.17).  
                                                 
18 The basis of the 20% margin should always be the latest census. 
19 Also allowed for the adoption of the ECRML. Although the MLL formally complies with the Charter, 
Harris points out that three limitations of the law imply that the Charter guarantee full minority protection 
which are said to be protected by the Charter (this includes the Bulgarian, Czech, Croat, German, Polish, 
Romani , Rusyn, Ukrainian and Hungarian minorities, to different degrees). These limitations are caused by 
the 20% threshold, which excludes all but the last three groups almost entirely, as the former do not normally 
constitute 20% of the municipal population in given municipal boundaries; the conflation of minority 
language use and claimed nationality status; and the fact that the MLL does not complement the SLL in all 
areas, but only protects minority language use – to an extent – at the local level (Harris 2004, pp.9–10). Part II - Chapter 6 
 
142
The dependence of the law's enforcement on the goodwill of a specific government 
leaves the law weak at the foundations. The return to restrictive language legislation under 
the Fico government attested to this. Given the mix of approval and criticism from 
international organisations, it appears that the law has been rushed through before 
Slovakia's talks with the European Commission, rather than actually satisfying 
international requirements. In an attempt to reconcile the law with the requirements of the 
FCNM, the CoE has proposed to apply a flexible approach where percentages constitute 
the basis of minority rights, such as the 20% threshold, rather than relying on current 
census data. The Advisory Committee to the Implementation of the FCNM reminds the 
Slovak government that this  
'refers also to areas which have been "traditionally" inhabited by persons belonging to a 
national minority, [so that] the demographic structure of the area in question could be 
considered over a longer period of time in order to ascertain the existence of sustainable 
demographic trends. This is particularly relevant when it comes to withdrawing existing 
linguistic facilities in certain municipalities, a measure that should be taken with 
extreme caution only' (Council of Europe 2005b, p.23).  
The 1999 Minority language law constitutes the only law that regulates minority language 
use and is limited to the practices of local level authorities. Neither the Dzurinda- nor the 
Fico-government pursued the issue of a more coherent minority language law.  
It was only after the elections of 2010 that the Radičová-government amended the state 
language law and improved the minority language law (MLL 2011; Most-Híd Draft 2011). 
The revised laws now explicitly provide for the right to use minority languages in a 
broader range of institutional contexts; particularly at the local level, such as in relation to 
the language of municipal chronicles in largely Hungarian towns, documentation in 
schools, information materials, catalogues and so on of minority organisations, it is no 
longer necessary to seek ministerial permission to install a plaque or sign in a minority 
language in a public place, and importantly, sanctions of violations of the state language 
law were reduced to cases where health, safety or property rights might be at risk.
20 
Moreover, with the revised MLL, the threshold for municipalities to be eligible for 
minority language rights was lowered to 15%, solving some of the problems emerging 
from demographic changes of the Hungarian community and allowing other minority 
groups to enjoy this right as well (Gyurgyik 2002).  
                                                 
20 Also since 2011, these do not have to provide a full translation of written materials into the state language, 
but a general summary of the contents in Slovak suffices.  Part II - Chapter 6 
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Thus – all disputes and the temporary deterioration of the minority language situation 
during the four years of the SMER-SNS government aside – under the Radičová-
government the minority language situation has improved not only in relation to the Fico 
government, but can be considered at its all time best. In contrast to 1999, the Hungarian 
representatives in government cannot be overruled as easily as in the Dzurinda-government 
due to Most-Híd's stronger position in comparison to the MKP's.
21 Still, the adopted law 
represents a 'watered down' version of the original proposal of Deputy Prime Minister for 
Minorities Rudolf Chmel', and was criticised for this by the MKP (MKP 26/05/2011; 
Slovak Spectator 30/05/2011). Nonetheless, head of Most-Híd Bugár described the law a 
'reasonable compromise that helps stabilise the legal system of Slovakia as directed 
towards minorities, and thus contributes to the stability of the democratic system in the 
country' (Bugár, quoted in Slovak Spectator 30/05/2011).  
Still, this law again failed to regulate minority language use outside of public offices. 
Essentially it responded to some of the Hungarian minority's oft-raised demands without 
the involvement of international organisations. Although some majority parties again 
attempted to play the 'ethnic card', the Minority language law was de facto improved from 
a minority perspective. This indicates the relaxation of interethnic relations on the basis of 
a minor step away from the majority's claim for complete linguistic sovereignty.  
As a result of minority language legislation, minority language provisions failed to regulate 
most areas of de facto minority language use. In particular, they left the areas of minority 
education, minority language media and broadcasting and public display of minority 
languages unregulated. These aspects became the subject of language legislation in the 
early/mid-1990s and later came under repeated attack. Essentially, in both countries, 
minority language laws have failed to respond to minority demands. At the same time, 
despite the priority of the state languages in all fields, minority languages are often heard 
in practice, not least in the media.  
The use of minority languages in public is not entirely determined by the state and 
minority language legislation. An important role for the visibility of minority languages 
and their continued relevance for maintaining a minority community is played by the 
media. In Estonia, several (privately funded) newspapers are issued in Estonian and 
Russian languages in parallel; these are important institutions for Russian-speakers in 
Estonia, since alternative Russian-speaking media from Russia rarely reflects on the 
                                                 
21 Whilst in 1999, the Slovak coalition partners did not depend on the minority party's support for the 
minority law; in 2011, without Most-Híd the three coalition partners hold only 65 seats out of 150.  Part II - Chapter 6 
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situation in Estonia and Estonian newspapers often do not take into account concerns 
and standpoints of Russian-speakers. But also the bilingual newspapers publish different 
articles in the Estonian and Russian versions. Because of this bias, newspapers in Estonia 
cannot fulfil the role that Russian-speakers and Estonians concerned with intergroup 
integration would like them to, namely constitute a platform for exchange and dialogue 
between the groups and the development of common discourses (Government 2008; 
Government 2000; Astrov 17/05/2010; Poleshchuk 18/012/2009; Korts 24/04/2009). This 
is reflected also by continuous stereotyping in the media, in particular when referencing 
minority group members (Jakobson 17/04/2009).  
The limited role the Russian-language print media is able to play in the integration process 
is even more constrained by the problems encountered by larger publishing companies in 
recent years. Two Russian-speaking newspapers founded in the 1940s and 1950s in 
Estonia had to close down in 2009 due to financial problems. Since, according to the state 
policy, no subsidies can be acquired for print media, the CoE Advisory Committee on the 
Implementation of the FCNM argued that minority language media are structurally 
disadvantaged (Council of Europe 2011). Essentially, there are no structures that can 
support the Russian-language press. In contrast to the decline of Russian-language print 
media, in recent years – and to large extent thanks to the integration strategy – the Estonian 
authorities have supported the development of Russian-language audio and visual 
broadcasting. Since 2007, efforts of Estonian broadcasting organisations have increasingly 
targeted minority members as an audience. Television programmes in Russian have 
increased in budget and broadcasting hours in 2009, though they are still acknowledged to 
be insufficient for meeting the high demand for such programmes. In comparison to press 
and television, the Russian-language radio station Raadio 4 must be regarded a success. 
The channel has existed since 1993 and produces programmes in Russian, but also in 
Ukrainian, Belarusian, Armenian, Georgian, Polish, Azeri and Chuvash languages. It is 
listened to nation-wide and an important community institutions; however its impact on 
majority society is again marginal (Astrov 17/05/2010; Poleshchuk 18/12/2009).  
The minority language media situation in Slovakia is very different. The existence of 
several daily newspapers covering Slovakia in general and local news from southern 
Slovakia has not caused much political debate. As in Estonia, these media's influence on 
the general debate in Slovakia is small, but they constitute important community 
institutions (Lampl 24/09/2009). Minority language broadcasting is regulated by the 
Slovak acts on television and radio since 1991 which proffer that minority language Part II - Chapter 6 
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broadcasting 'contributes […] to promoting national culture and cultures of minorities 
living in the Slovak Republic, and to mediating cultural values of other nations' (TV Act 
1991; Radio Act 1991). The provisions in the laws are vague, however, and there are no 
guarantees as to the share in public radio or TV stations or a weekly amount of 
broadcasting hours. These have always been subject to the policies of the Ministries of 
Culture and therefore vulnerable, especially under the nationalist governments (see for 
example Dostál 2007; Dostál 2006; Dostál 2000; Dostál 1998). Under the Fico-government 
2006-2010 the radio station Rádio Pátria which broadcasts in minority languages – besides 
Hungarian also in Rusyn, Ukrainian, Romanes, Czech, German and Polish – faced the 
threat of closure, which caused protests among the minority groups (Petőcz 23/09/2009). 
Minority representatives therefore continue to demand institutionalised guarantees for the 
state support of minority language broadcasting.  
Minority language use was regulated in both states even before factual independence. The 
Estonian and Slovak constitutions proffer minority rights in the realm of language use. 
Despite the gradual fortification of legislation on language use over the 1990s, in practice 
there has been some leeway for flexible implementation on the ground, largely in regimes 
where minority members field the plurality of residents. This was guaranteed first and 
foremost due to the involvement of international organisations. As we see here, 
international, and particularly European organisations, took some interest in ensuring some 
form of minority language protection in these two states. Both the policy steps and the 
rhetoric of political elites surrounding the legislation were framed by the institutional 
provisions already in place, which privileged the titular community over the minorities. 
Domestically, although benchmarks were erected to provide for minority language 
communities with opportunities for language use, the actions of the majority remained 
constrained by the characteristics of the institutions in place. The international involvement 
in crafting minority policies was sometimes strong in its opinions, but remained vague and 
cautiously avoided recommendations that would be interpreted in a way of granting 
minority languages the de facto status of second official or state language.  
 The majority-devised attribution of 'national minority' to some groups but not to others has 
had a limiting effect for the question of rights of Russian-speakers in Estonia, but were an 
important resource for Hungarians in Slovakia (Bara 24/09/2009; Petőcz 23/09/2009). As a 
result, the development in both countries has differed. In Estonia the grounds on which 
minorities could negotiate their positions on legislation were becoming increasingly shaky: 
neither institutions, nor policies were devised to accommodate minorities; all the same, the Part II - Chapter 6 
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tokenistic concessions were presented to the publics as 'minority-friendly' legislation. 
This effectively undermined the very basis on which society integration could be built 
upon at a later stage. In Slovakia, the codex of policies reflecting on the moderate majority 
positions allowed some support for the minority language communities. In both cases, 
linguistic practices on the ground allow for some leeway in the application of legislation, 
helping ease tensions and at times satisfy (moderate) minority politicians. This in turn 
speaks of the difficulty of policy implementation and perpetuates the arbitrariness of legal 
insecurity among both majority and minority members. Yet the institutional framework 
within which these policies were to be monitored offered only strong support to the notion 
of state language. This wider perspective indicates that regardless of political actors' own 
positions and policy choices available, the institutional context – both at the national and 
the European level – constrained domestic decision making on further integration.  
6.4. Language policy enforcement: domestic versus international 
factors 
In both countries state languages were attributed the role of an 'integrating factor' between 
the citizenry and the state. Slovak politicians, like their Estonian counter-parts, regularly 
refer to the integrating role of the state language, yet only in Estonia has the government 
adopted measures to promote the use of majority language among the minority. There, 
language policies were to be supported by enhancing teaching of the state language, with 
the view that the minority members would increasingly speak the state language and 
enhance their political, social and human capital. In Slovakia, in the mid-1990s, education 
became the sphere of 'integration' in support of a language shift towards the state language. 
This section looks at the developments of induced language shift in the two countries.  
In both countries, there were reasons to support the knowledge of the state language among 
minority members – support and improved methods for state language teaching were 
demanded also by minority representatives (Csergo 2007; Sarv 2002).
22 However, while 
                                                 
22 Interestingly, and very much in contrast to the situation in Estonia in the 1990s, studies show that those 
Magyars who do not know any or only little Slovak constitute less than 2% of the group (Lampl 2008); 
according to minority representatives, this affects those elderly cohorts among the Magyars who did not 
receive Czechoslovak education, and perhaps few cases of individuals who in reaction to the post War 
policies refuse to speak Slovak (Petőcz 23/09/2009). At the same time, more than 98% of the Magyar 
population report that they not only know the Slovak language but use it in part or in most of their daily 
interactions, at work, in school or, particularly in 'mixed' families, even at home (Lampl 2008). Despite the 
fact that Slovak is widely spoken among the minority community, individuals who have a somewhat limited 
command of Slovak are potentially faced with difficulties when they are required to interact outside the 
Hungarian dominated areas. In my interviews, some respondents reported cases where members of the Part II - Chapter 6 
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minority members envisaged assistance in the learning of the state language in order to 
enable their better participation in society, the states pursued policies of titular language 
education as part of the continued nation-state-building. In line with the imperative of the 
Slovak State language law, a shift from Hungarian to Slovak was phased in by the Mečiar-
government with the introduction of 'alternative education' in the school year of 1995/96 
(Dostál 1998). The concept entails the introduction of Slovak as a language of instruction 
in certain subjects in schools and classes with Hungarian as the main language of 
instruction.
23 The alleged aims of this initiative were to foster the functioning of Slovak 
society and to improve the knowledge of the state language among minority members. 
Furthermore, it was promoted as a modern form of education in an attempt to raise its 
appeal with the attribute 'alternative' (Langman 2002). Moreover, the government argued 
that a good command of Slovak was essential for, and the only way to, success in Slovak 
society (Langman 2002, p.53). 
As demonstrated earlier, the State language law in Slovakia was promoted as a tool for 
integration. Moderate majority politicians and minority politicians alike supported the 
improvement of Slovak language knowledge and teaching to minority members, and the 
latter repeatedly made suggestions as to the development of teaching materials and 
didactics with respect to the teaching of Slovak as a second language to Hungarian-
speakers (Csergo 2007). The nationalist elite showed no interest in these suggestions. 
Rather, neither the state language law itself nor accompanying policies envisaged further 
integrative measures, such as in the economic and social spheres or in relation to increased 
intergroup contact and cooperation. It became very clear that it was not intended to foster 
interethnic integration; nor did it have the potential to do so. Even without taking into 
account the xenophobic and anti-minority/anti-Hungarian rhetoric that accompanied the 
introduction of the law, the lack of minority language regulation and de facto curtailing of 
minority language rights in comparison with the 1990 law – as well as the potential 
criminalisation of minority language use – set a divisive tone in the relations of majority 
and minority members (ibid.). Moreover, the government did not introduce any integrative 
measures that would enable minority members with difficulties in the Slovak language to 
improve their state language command.
  
                                                                                                                                                    
Hungarian minority were faced with hostility because they spoke Slovak with an accent 
(Golha/Hajdok/Havran 18/06/2009).  
23 To be sure, all students attending Hungarian schools and classes studied Slovak as a second language 
compulsorily, i.e. as a subject. The new project envisaged a change in proportion of teaching in Hungarian 
towards an increase in Slovak language teaching (Langman 2002). Part II - Chapter 6 
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According to the Minister for Foreign Affairs Juraj Schenk, in a letter to the HCNM 
Max van der Stoel on 20 October 1995, via the project of alternative schooling the 
government intended 'to release the members of Hungarian minority from the monolingual 
grip'; the Minister goes on to quote from the supporting documents of the ECRML and 
argues that, in so doing, the reform would contribute to achieving the aims valued by the 
ECRML, fostering  
'closer relations between peoples and a better understanding between different 
population groups within the state in an intercultural basis' (Schenk 20/10/1995).  
These arguments were an attempt to convince Hungarian parents to accept 'bilingualism' as 
the form of teaching they would want for their children, as the government had long 
claimed that its introduction would depend on the parents' will and only be introduced 
where there was sufficient demand (Schenk 20/10/1995; Csergo 2007). These arguments 
did not convince the Hungarian parents. The 'monolingual grip' was largely imagined by 
the nationalists: the majority of Hungarians lived bilingually on a daily basis (Lampl 
2008). Moreover, when 'alternative education' was introduced as a pilot project, in contrast 
to what the government had announced, parents were not consulted (Langman, 2002; 
Csergo 2007).
24 The government's policies were embedded into a range of policies trying 
to gain full decision-making authority over all proceedings in Hungarian schools. This was 
furthered by the decision that certain subjects could only be taught in Slovak and by 
Slovak teachers, such as Slovak language and literature, geography and history (Csergo 
2007). Here, the state language was used as a direct tool to exert control over the minority 
group as well as its individual members. On the one hand, it affected individual 
opportunities to teach these subjects; on the other hand, by implication it suggested that 
minority members could not be trusted, per se, in the pursuit of conveying the teaching 
canon to students as intended by the government. However, the parliament rejected said 
bill in July 1998 (European Commission 1998, p.12). It is telling that such policies were 
pursued by the governments which included the SNS, and yet were of limited concern to 
the moderate governments.
25  
                                                 
24 With the beginning of the school year 1995/96, according to the Minister, bilingual education was to be 
introduced at 3 secondary schools (out of 21) comprising 363 students and one elementary school with 6 
pupils (out of 298). In addition, 29 kindergartens (out of 392) were chosen to have 'bilingualism' introduced 
(Schenk 20/10/1995; Langman 2002, p.54). 
25 Under the Dzurinda government, the Ministry of Education was assigned a unit responsible for minority 
education, and relations in this area relatively quickly relaxed and the previous approach to 'integration' in 
schooling disappeared. The government did not pursue any forms of exerting control and restricting minority 
schooling. At the same time, the Dzurinda government also did not show much interest in an active approach 
to the improvement of interethnic relations either, activities in policies to promote multiculturalism and fight Part II - Chapter 6 
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The introduction of 'alternative education' in selected schools and nurseries was met 
with fierce protest by the Hungarian community. Minority members saw these policies as 
the first step in a strategy to dismantle Hungarian schooling altogether, and so a serious 
threat to their group reproduction and identity (Bakker 1997). Already prior to the school 
year of 1995/96, the Association of Hungarian Teachers in Slovakia and the cultural mass 
organisation CSEMADOK had organised a petition which was signed by 45,000 people 
(Langman 2002). In the first days of the 1995/96 school year, parents and more than two 
thirds of all students engaged in 'strikes', refusing to go to school, and joined large scale 
demonstrations, partly in reaction to the disciplinary measures against those head teachers 
who had participated in the petition (Dostál 1998).  
The international community was alarmed by this outbreak of protest. Shortly before the 
school year started, the OSCE's High Commissioner van der Stoel visited the country with 
respect to the interethnic conflicts linked to the language law, the education bill and the 
government's general approach to minority culture (HCNM 1995). The High 
Commissioner expressed his concern about the non-voluntary shift at selected schools and 
the government's apparent disregard for the protests. He also made recommendations for 
an impartial study of the 'quality of teaching of the Slovak language in Hungarian schools 
and the ways to ensure its improvement where necessary' (ibid.). As the letter of the 
Foreign Minister quoted earlier shows, these recommendations were bluntly rejected by the 
Slovak government.  
Essentially, however, the attempt to introduce 'alternative schooling' was a failed reform. 
Although the control mechanisms over school proceedings remained in place until the 
Dzurinda government loosened the governmental grip on minority schools and changed 
language related decrees, 'alternative education' was not continued. The question of 
improving Slovak language learning at minority schools is still not solved (Mézes 
18/06/2009). The Dzurinda government introduced special sections on minority education 
in the Ministry of Education, but it did not pursue visible activities between 2002-2006. 
However, the Dzurinda-government achieved one of its election goals and established a 
state-funded Hungarian university in southern Slovakia in 2003. While this did nothing to 
improve the Hungarians' competence in Slovak, it responded to minority demands for 
                                                                                                                                                    
ethnic stereotyping were limited. Such activities were however demanded by international actors (Council of 
Europe 2000). Despite its official statements in the support of multiculturalism, the Dzurinda government 
took only few steps in this area. Again, multicultural education has almost entirely focused on the integration 
of Romani children and in recent years to some extent on the tolerance towards 'new minorities', i.e. migrants 
who have come to Slovakia recently (Vašečka 20/08/2008). Part II - Chapter 6 
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extended opportunities to receive higher education in Hungarian in the Slovak 
Republic, to avoid the education migration of young Hungarians to Hungary or elsewhere.  
Overall, education policies in Slovakia have been not so much concerned with the 
improvement of the teaching of Slovak for said reasons of cohesion and labour market 
success of minority members. Essentially, in Slovakia language policies were never social 
policies, but were used as a means for the consolidation of the nation-state. This is despite 
the fact that there is some correlation between group belonging/mother tongue and success 
on the labour market, as well as with university education (Lampl 24/09/2009). The 
limitation of 'bilingual education' to a nationalist project has also limited the preparedness 
of minority members to develop actual bilingual alternatives for minority children. 
Resistance within the community against bilingual concepts is often backed up with 
references to the demographic situation and the 'decline' of the Hungarian community. At 
the same time, in the present situation, parents have to chose between Slovak and 
Hungarian education for their children, and increasingly make the decision for Slovak 
schools (Szarka 2008). Although some argue that this is a problem of the Hungarian 
community itself, and a question of whether they want to maintain their 'identity' or not 
(Domsitz 16/09/2009), it can be argued that the choices to do so are limited.  
In Estonia, the language shift and linguistic integration through educational policies set in 
even earlier than in Slovakia, and have remained central to policies regulating interethnic 
relations ever since. In 1993, shortly after the Law on Aliens had begun to stir the emotions 
in the country, the Riigikogu adopted the Law on Basic Schools and Upper Secondary 
Schools. Predictably, this added to the outrage and intensified anxieties among Russian-
speakers (Jurado 2003, p.399). The law stipulated the requirements for institutions of upper 
secondary education (grades 10-12) in state-funded schools that operated in a minority 
language to move to full education in Estonian by the year 2000; for grades 1-9, it was left 
to municipalities to decide on the language of instruction in their schools (MEIS 2011). 
The aim of the law was to enable diglossia reversing policies in a situation where many 
minority members did not speak Estonian, and in order to complete Estonian nation-state 
building. Russian-speakers on the other hand interpreted the law in the context of 
restrictive citizenship and language policies, and as an attack on the minority community 
as such (Budryte 2005).  
The general tone of the debate resembled the government's arguments for the need to 
guarantee the 'survival of the Estonian language and culture' and to increase Estonia's Part II - Chapter 6 
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security against Russia (Jurado 2003, p.413). It transpires from the early debates on the 
law that the proponents of the change of language of instruction in secondary education 
were driven by the aim to 'titularise education' (Agarin 2010; similarly Jurado 2003), and 
this demonstrates that, in this early phase, advice from international actors including the 
OSCE, CoE and the HCNM (who raised concerns as to domestic stability in light of the 
recent protests against the law on aliens and to the compliance with international minority 
rights standards) were not taken into account (Jurado 2003). Even though the members of 
the Riigikogu largely supported the move, the adoption of the law did go not entirely 
smoothly; moreover, once it was accepted by parliament and signed by the president the 
then Minister of Culture of the Reform Party (Reformierakond), Paul-Eerik Rummo, 
unsuccessfully attempted to delay the deadline, which already in 1993 appeared 
unattainable (Galbreath 2005, p.171).  
Rummo raised his concerns as part of the very limited opposition against the original 1993 
law. At the time, the Riigikogu did not include any representatives of the Russian-speaking 
group due to the impact of citizenship regulations, and the parliament was dominated by 
the right-to-centre parties which formed its governments. Rummo's concerns were 
pragmatic rather than a question of genuine opposition to the cause of the law (Jurado 
2003, p.413). Similarly, other opponents of the law argued that the pace of the envisaged 
reform was not feasible, mainly due to the lack of appropriate teaching material and even 
more importantly because of the shortage of teachers at Russian-language schools who 
spoke Estonian at a sufficient level that suited teaching purposes (Adrey 2005, p.461). 
Concerns of Russian-speakers were voiced only outside the parliament and, to some extent, 
by international organisations.  
Despite the rather unrealistic aim stated in the 1993 law, initially the Estonian state did 
little to address the problems of Russian schools. No coherent measures were taken or 
strategies developed before the 1997 Development Plan for Russian Language Schools in 
Estonia to achieve this goal (Asser, Pedastsaar, et al. 2002). The combination of ambitious 
aims and no strategy led to numerous practical and strategic problems. In light of the lack 
of adequate teaching personnel and outdated textbooks Estonian experts on education 
argued that the 'attitude of "wait and see"' was not encouraging to the people involved to 
'search for, and implement[…] new models of education' (Asser, Pedastsaar, et al. 2002, 
p.239). Considerations at the time did not touch upon questions of what was realistically 
achievable in municipalities where 95% of the population interacted in Russian in all areas 
of life. In these areas Estonian language practice would largely be limited to school, which Part II - Chapter 6 
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would negatively impact the chances of minority members to participate in the political 
and socio-economic structures.  
While the state was reluctant to introduce a coherent strategy, in the mid-1990s financial 
assistance through the EU's PHARE programme
26 helped set up several initiatives which 
facilitated Estonian language learning for Russian-speaking school children and assisted 
the process of writing Estonian language textbooks. It was not until 1998 that the work of 
these 'Language Centres' addressed the problems Russian schools encountered during the 
education reform (Jurado 2003, p.414). During that time the state also began with its 
efforts to create financial incentives for Estonian teachers to teach specifically in schools in 
Estonia's North-East (Korts 24/04/2009).
27 Only in 1998 did the state fill 18 posts of 'State 
language teachers', charged with the task of facilitating the process of Estonian language 
learning in minority schools (Education Act 1992).  
With the Education Act Amendment of 1997, the Riigikogu eventually accepted changes 
to the Basic and Secondary School law and postponed the date by which Estonian should 
be the language of instruction in 60% of education at all state-funded secondary schools to 
2007. The 1997 specification of the target of the reform, the 60:40 ratio of Estonian 
language tuition, which permits bilingual education rather than mono-lingual instruction, 
alleviated concerns of the international actors, who nevertheless remained cautious in their 
appraisal of an amendment that left it to the municipality or school to decide on the 
provisions for minority language instructions. These revisions were already embedded in 
the country's close interaction with international organisations on minority issues. The 
growing demands for coherent integration policies brought some momentum into the 
question of minority education.  
In this context, an increase in the international financial support available for minority 
members to learn Estonian was well-received in Estonia, where economic strains started to 
hit the population and the state hard, and where simultaneously the chance to increase its 
level of compliance with international requirements regarding minority politics constituted 
                                                 
26 Originally introduced by the European Union as pre-accession financial support programme for Poland and 
Hungary to assist the restructuring of the countries' economies (thus the name PHARE) in 1989, since the 
adoption of the Copenhagen Criteria in 1993 the programme's aim was redirected to assist CEE candidate 
countries in their implementation of the aquis communautaire and to ensure social and economic cohesion.  
27 This in turn increased the anxiety of Russian teachers with little or no proficiency in Estonian, a situation 
that was exacerbated by a climate in which using non-state languages had begun to be interpreted as 
disloyalty to the Estonian state, and limited knowledge of Estonian started impacting minority members' 
chances on the Estonian labour market. Part II - Chapter 6 
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a bonus the Estonian government did not want to let pass (Jurado 2003).
28 Moreover, as 
part of its integration strategy, the Estonian government framed Russian-speakers' 
linguistic integration as a necessary means to overcome social division that, according to 
researchers, had already contributed to the deterioration of both internal and international 
relations (Lauristin & Heidmets 2002). Education became one of the main focuses of the 
integration programme (Government 2008; Government 2000).  
The Integration Foundation, a semi-governmental organisation, is charged with the 
implementation of the states' integration strategy. Teaching of the Estonian language is 
among the Foundation's central tasks. The Foundation takes a particularly important role in 
the development of teaching materials, the training of teachers, and in developing the 
various education programmes in cooperation with international advisors. The Integration 
Foundation operates in several areas itself, among other things coordinating the activities 
of corporate tenders or calls for the complete outsourcing of training or other projects. The 
foundation's own activities concentrate on the development of teaching materials for the 
language immersion programme, the training of teachers of Estonian as a second language, 
the support for Russian-speaking teachers in their transition to teaching in Estonian, and 
the coordination in relation to youth work and other projects; it also co-operates with 
organisations and projects in the realm of language teaching, such as special and technical 
language learning for vocational schools (Mätlik 04/12/2009).
29  
In 2008, the Education Act was again amended, putting into legislation the programmatic 
changes and policy aims of the integration programmes. As a result, two options of partial 
education in Russian are currently at work in Estonia. First, basic schools (grades 1-9) may 
instruct in Russian, though Estonian language tuition is part of the curriculum, and ensures 
also that graduates from Russian basic schools do not have to pass additional language 
exams in order to be granted Estonian citizenship (Government 2000, p.22-23). Upper-
secondary education goes through a process of transition with the final aim of a relation of 
a 60:40 share of Estonian to other languages of instruction. The decision on the primary 
language of instruction of a school lies with the local government. Second, the so-called 
language immersion was introduced in two forms: on the one hand, it is a system where 
Estonian is gradually introduced as the language of instruction in a number of subjects one 
at a time from sixth grade onwards (late immersion). On the other hand, a second form of 
                                                 
28 In 1998 the Estonian government launched another PHARE programme, generously supported by 
Scandinavian governments and EU and UNDP and several millions of foreign aid from them to enable the 
language shift in schools (Government 2000).  
29 Cf. also the project kutsekeel.ee (Kutsekeel 2011), which is a support pool for Estonian language learning 
in vocational education.  Part II - Chapter 6 
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immersion is currently practiced, starting with full Estonian education in first grade and 
gradually increasing the share of Russian language education to 50%. The decision for a 
gradual shift is partly based on the opposition towards a similar reform in Latvia 
(Poleshchuk 2009), partly due to the practical problems of the education reform mentioned 
earlier.  
Besides attending 'Russian' schools, children have the option to go to an Estonian school. 
While this happens increasingly, the process is complicated by the reluctance of Estonian 
school teachers to accept non-native speakers in their class, as it would 'slow down the 
teaching process' (Mätlik 04/12/2009). Such reactions show that the ideological and 
practical problems of the integration strategy are not limited to policy problems. In reaction 
to such attitudes, the Integration Foundation organises training sessions on 
multiculturalism and multicultural education for Estonian and Russian-speaking teachers. 
The success of such programmes has so far been limited, however (Mätlik 04/12/2009; 
Council of Europe 2001). Still, the initiatives show that the Integration Foundation has, at 
least on paper, understood the importance of including Estonians in this process and work 
on and with them as well, a point also emphasised in the current integration strategy EIS 
(Government 2008). Monitoring suggests that these programmes are not implemented well 
(Lauristin et al. 2008).  
The comprehensive teaching of Estonian to Russian-speaking students in schools across 
Estonia has significantly increased the number of Russian-speakers who report they have a 
good command of Estonian (Schulze 2008; Hallik et al. 2002; Lauristin & Vetik 2000). 
Surveys suggest that substantially more young Russian-speakers born after 1978 speak and 
write well in Estonian than Estonians of the same age group speak or write in Russian, 
based on self-evaluation (Kirss & Vihalemm 2008, p.50). The same surveys also show that 
Russian-speakers are continuously faced with negative attitudes towards the Russian 
language, including the reluctance of Estonian students to learn the language (ibid.). This 
has the potential to positively impact the naturalisation rate and to improve young people's 
chances on the labour market (Vetik 17/04/2009). However, the relative success of 
Estonian language teaching to these young people stands in contrast to the limited efforts 
taken in support of other age groups. In particular for Russian-speakers who are in 
employment, there are few formal or structured opportunities to improve their command of 
the state language, and those provided for the unemployed have only limited success 
(Solovev/Dul'neva 31/07/2009). This supports the understanding that the main aim of the 
Estonian education reform is a long-term language shift, while the integration and Part II - Chapter 6 
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cohesiveness of society around the state language – even if emphasised in the rhetoric – 
is a subordinated goal of these policies.  
Perhaps most important with respect to the educational reform – and decisive for the 
question of 'integration though participation' – is the fact that the reform has been 
elaborated without the inclusion of those affected. In recent years, an opposition movement 
against the reform has picked up the long-standing critiques offered by Russian-speakers' 
organisations, which have demanded both the improvement of Estonian tuition for 
Russian-speakers and the continued existence of Russian schooling (see chapter 9 for a 
more detailed discussion of this point). However, the opposition to the reform is not as 
fundamental as it may seem. Russian parents have indeed called for a reform in Russian 
schooling and increasingly, they are warming to specific goals of the current reform 
(LICHR 2010). Essentially, they have debated questions of the role of minority language 
instruction in Estonia, the Russian-speakers' linguistic identity institutions, the quality of 
teaching to Russian-speaking children in both languages, and the chances in the labour 
market depending on the form and quality of education received. However, these 
contributions have not been taken into account by the Ansip-governments 2007-2011 and 
ongoing (ibid.). So far, the government has dismissed the concerns of Russian-speaking 
parents by arguing that Russian language education will always be possible, as envisaged 
in the integration programme. However, the role and support minority languages shall 
receive according to the integration programme does not respond to the demands for 
comprehensive Russian language education mentioned above, since it is limited to leisure-
time activities, such as in hobby groups or so-called 'Sunday schools' (Government 2008; 
Government 2000).  
As a result both of the domestic policy dynamics and European involvement in minority 
rights protection, communities of non-state language speakers were facing national 
institutions that were not designed to serve equality, but to sponsor what was framed as 
national cohesion. In both countries, these policies have impacted the choices minority 
members make when choosing the language of instruction for themselves or their children. 
Poleshchuk claims that the share of pupils learning at Russian schools has dropped from 
37% in 1990 to 27.2% in 2000 as a direct result of these policies (Poleshchuk 2009, p.82). 
In Slovakia, there has been a decline between the school years 1990/1991 and 2002/2003 
in the proportion of Hungarian language secondary schools (14.29% to 11.36%), of 
Hungarian classes at Slovak schools (8.19% to 6.86%), and in total the proportion of 
children of Hungarian background who study in Hungarian (6.93% to 5.84%) (László Part II - Chapter 6 
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2008, p.234). Minority members have perceived these developments as discrimination 
of their communities. More importantly, they have felt left out of the decision-making 
process on questions of education. Instead, policies of increased pressure on Russian-
speakers continue to dominate in Estonia. In Slovakia, following the acceptance of 
minorities as historical minorities, moderates and international involvement helped stop 
similar projects; however, minority members cannot expect much help in the area of social 
inclusion as a result of their choices (e.g. in language learning). The Hungarian University 
was one step to somewhat allay the negative results of linguistic diversity under the 
conditions of continued policies that privileged the state language. Overall, while clearly 
central to the question of integration, education policies in Estonia and Slovakia have 
failed to address the issue in a way that would allow this field to play the crucial role in 
integrating majority and minority groups.  
Conclusions 
Nation-building in Slovakia and Estonia demonstrates the dynamics emerging from 
institutional arrangements that favour one national – in this case, linguistic – community, 
while simultaneously attempting to serve the citizens of the state which speak multiple 
languages. In order to ensure the leading role of one ethnic community in these two states, 
language policies were put into place to benchmark group boundaries and at times to 
regulate access of different linguistic communities to processes of decision making. As I 
have discussed in this chapter, both states have implemented elaborate legislation to 
regulate the visibility and use of non-titular and therefore non-state languages.  
These regulations need be seen in the specific institutional context of state building where 
nation building projects were finding it difficult to reconcile linguistically diverse 
segments of the public. Institutions supporting state building have thus prompted sets of 
policies which conflict with social realities on the ground and have thus produced 
unintended consequences. One of these lay in hampering efforts to promote societal 
cohesion through the means of national language. Scholarship has distinguished policies 
that aim at assimilation from those that assume a fundamental difference between language 
groups, and which therefore have no intention to assimilate or integrate, but instead to 
'dissimilate' (Brubaker 1996). In Estonia and Slovakia we find that the nationalising 
policies – which centred around, but were not limited to the regulation of linguistic 
practices – had an ambiguous twofold effect. On the one hand, the resulting 'nationalising 
policies of dissimilation' (ibid., p.88) produce the containment of non-titular groups outside Part II - Chapter 6 
 
157
the political space and by no means aim to foster minorities' adaptation to the 
environment that functions in the titular-language. As I have discussed above, the language 
policies implemented in the two states fall in line with objectives of state building because 
they aim at societal cohesion. Yet, the individual actors who are particularly affected by 
these policies perceive language policies as tools for disrupting the relations between the 
minority and the majority. Ultimately, language policies in both states sponsored minority 
marginalisation from social and cultural processes in the countries.  
This underlines the second, unintended outcome of language policy planning in a state-
building process that is set in the wider context of European integration. The international 
organisations' involvement was initially based on pragmatic policies of language 
management in order to avoid conflict escalation, while the question of institutionalising 
minority rights was not central to the international monitoring process (Rechel 2009). 
Overall supporting the accommodation of minority communities in the context of state 
building under the stewardship of an ethnonation, it is questionable whether the 
improvement of intergroup relations in accession states was on the agenda of European 
organisations at all (Hughes & Sasse 2003). Within the context of Europeanisation, 
minority language institutions became a contested field, where language communities were 
increasingly identified in terms of the linguistic resources available to them, fostering the 
segregation of communities. Given the breadth and depth of the European impact on 
domestic policies, it seems that state-building projects in Estonia and Slovakia, much as in 
other CEE states, focused on minority language communities as a complementary issue in 
enhancing the institutional capacity of the state. In the nexus of nationalism, language 
practices and identity, language policies can have unintended effects on aspects such as the 
linguistic identities of speakers, their capacities to participate in social and political 
processes, or their strategies to adapt to or circumvent the consequence of linguistic 
policies. For example, Laitin distinguishes a variety of adaptation strategies, essentially 
claiming that by far not all of these strategies lead to the assimilation of minority members 
to state norms (David D. Laitin 2003; D. D Laitin 1995). As we will see in the following 
chapters, the states' institutional design and domestic policy dynamics – geared in both 
cases toward enhancing the link between the nation and the state – further invited political 
actors to play the 'ethnic card' for the sake of success in national politics.  
This chapter analysed how the particular paths of state-building discussed in the previous 
chapter became a crucial resource for, as well as was reinforced by, majority nation-
building in the two countries. Majority political actors enacted the normative structures of Part II - Chapter 6 
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state-ownership to expand their political and social dominance and thereby increase 
their agency. At the same time, this process was embedded into the structures of 
Europeanisation. While the latter did constrain majority agency to an extent, what they 
supported was not a change in the structures of majority dominance, but minority 
adaptation on the one hand, and minority particularity on the other. Essentially, nation-
building in Slovakia and Estonia created structures of majority-minority dissimilation and 
limited assimilation of minorities to the majorities, undermining claims for equal 
participation in the political, social, economic and cultural spheres. Whereas the normative 
structures of national self-determination had resurfaced in the late 1980s/early 1990s, and 
at the time appeared to be open to change, post-independence nation-building and 
Europeanisation have reinforced and stabilised these structures, making them less 
susceptible to change and mitigating the contradictions with the cultural structures of 
democratisation. At the same time they provided alternative structures for minority 
participation, if not on an equal footing with majority members, as the following chapters 
demonstrate.  Part III - Chapter 7 
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Chapter 7: Russian-speakers' political activism 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter analyses the heterogeneous formations of Russian-speaking political actors 
and alternative forms of Russian-speakers' political representation. Section 7.2 looks at 
those political actors that formed political organisations explicitly aimed at Russian-
speakers in order to establish alternative political structures. Section 7.3 examines the 
structures proffered by the state in order to foster (limited) minority inclusion into the 
political process. Section 7.4 analyses the continuities and shifts in the political agendas of 
the Russian-speaking political actors. Finally, section 7.5 discusses the problems of group-
based political representation of Russian-speakers in Estonia.  
7.2 Formation of Russian-speakers' political representation 
Russian-speakers' group-based political organisations 
Although Estonians and Russian-speakers cooperated in the Popular Front, many of the 
political parties and organisations that emerged in 1990 and 1991 did not address all ethnic 
groups in Estonia equally. Keskerakond (Centre Party), the party that claims to be the 
successor of the Popular Front, has had the most inclusive approach to political 
representation of the Estonian population; other 'Estonian' political parties of the early 
1990s pursued moderate to radical nationalist political agendas, unwilling as well as 
unlikely to represent Russian-speakers. The developments already foreshadowed the 
looming policies of restorationism. In response to this situation a variety of Russian-
speakers' parties formed which developed from the mainly Russian-speaking counter-
movements to Estonia's path to independence. With the adoption of Estonia's citizenship 
legislation, the structural and institutional basis of the Russian-speakers' parties 
disappeared, since the vast majority of Russian-speakers were neither eligible to vote nor 
to stand as a candidate in elections (Thiele 1999).  
In order to participate in early state- and nation-building, and despite their formal exclusion 
from political membership, Russian-speakers aimed to form alternative political structures 
to represent their interests and preferences in the political processes. Initially, trade unions 
were among those organisations with the largest Russian-speaking membership, who also Part III - Chapter 7 
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engaged in the political process directly.
1 They were particularly strong in the towns of 
Ida-Virumaa, and for some time constituted the most important civic-political 
representation of Russian-speakers, both in terms of membership they represented and the 
impact they could exert on general political processes (Park 1994; Smith 2002).
2 
Facilitating naturalisation was just one of a number of demands raised by trade unions in 
order to achieve equality for Soviet-era migrants with inter-War citizens of Estonia and 
their descendents. In the first years after independence, the specificities of the Estonian 
labour market and its ethnic segmentation between Estonian agrarian and Russian-speaking 
industrial workers even increased the significance the unions played for the Russian-
speaking population. The role of trade unions to represent Russian-speakers waned when 
from 1993 a number of Russian-speaking candidates became eligible for candidacy in local 
elections, opening up a channel for Russian-speakers' interest representation at a local 
level. Since the mid-1990s, unions have witnessed a decline in membership and their role 
as a social partner in Estonian politics is limited, both because of the general restructuring 
of the labour market and the radically liberal economic policies of the state. Moreover, the 
unions have begun to focus on their members' work-related economic demands. Because of 
these developments, the unions' potential to represent minority interests in more general 
terms has been negligible (Lagerspetz 2005).  
In an attempt to address the lack of any genuine nation-wide political representation, the 
Representative Assembly (Predstavitel'noe sobranie, RA) was formed in 1993. It became 
the most influential and renowned Russian-speaking organisation of the early 1990s. 
Founded as a non-elected body to represent the population that was not included into the 
citizenry, its members insisted that the organisation did not mobilise on ethnic criteria 
(Laitin 1998, p.277). The RA was acknowledged as the representative forum of Russian-
speakers by Estonian political actors.
3 Furthermore, the RA was the only form of Russian-
speakers' representation that was regularly included in talks with international 
organisations, who invited its members to voice the Russian-speaking minority's discontent 
                                                 
1 In the early 1990s, the trade unions EAKL (Eesti Ametiühingute Keskliit, Estonian Trade Union 
Confederation) and TALO (Teenistujate Ametiliitude Keskorganisatsioon, Estonian Employees' Unions' 
Confederation) replaced the former Soviet All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions, which was, however, 
significantly reorganised. For the first half of the 1990s, trade Unions provided the most important civic 
structures for Russian-speakers (Lagerspetz 2005).  
2 For example, trade union branches in Narva and Sillamäe demanded to be represented in the Estonian 
delegation that negotiated the withdrawal of Russian troops (Park 1994); with a 'political strike' and 
demonstrations the local Trade Union Centre of Narva mobilised against the 1992 citizenship law (Smith 
2002b).  
3 For example, recognised as representative of the minorities the RA was an invited member at the 
Presidential Roundtable on National Minorities and perceived, while a Russian-speakers' organisation, as the 
'integrationist' political representation of Soviet-time migrants (Melvin 1995, p.49).  Part III - Chapter 7 
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at consultations with the HCNM, the OSCE, the CoE, the EU and American actors who 
engaged in conflict prevention in the country.  
Lacking direct political power, however, the RA's role was limited to contributions to the 
public debate and minority advocacy, raising awareness of the conflict potential inherent to 
the state's approach to integration in domestic and international debates and making 
minority perspectives heard. The organisation supported integration, yet in contrast to the 
Estonian authorities the RA advocated integration 'through participation, not for 
participation' (Aleksej Semjonov 2002). The organisation expressed concern that the 
regulations put in place for naturalisation and minority protection were likely to alienate 
minority members from the Estonian state. Arguing that integration required the inclusion 
of minority members' perspectives in the design of political institutions and the state's 
approach to integration from the start, rather than permitting participation only after certain 
conditions (including those of citizenship and language knowledge) were fulfilled, was 
essential for the democratic and peaceful transformation of the Estonian society. In so 
doing, the Representative Assembly expressed the most important demands of the Russian-
speaking community for political change in Estonia, which have since shaped the agendas 
of minority political representatives. 
Given its dependence on the majority political elite's preparedness for dialogue, however, 
the Representative Assembly remained politically weak. Although the RA was accepted to 
some extent as a discussion partner by the Estonian authorities, and some of its concerns 
were mirrored in the recommendations provided by international organisations to the 
Estonian government, the RA's concerns about minority inclusion and social stability were 
not taken into account in the elaboration of the state's approach to minority policies. The 
RA's members proved unable to raise majority political actors' awareness of minority 
members' feelings of humiliation caused by their exclusion from shaping intergroup 
integration. Therefore, the organisation's biggest successes lay in that it established a 
representative organisation that was accepted as a speaker for the minority group, and in its 
mediating role in the heated situation of the early 1990s, when many Russian-speakers still 
feared expulsion from Estonia and their legal situation left them very vulnerable (Laitin 
1998). 
The RA was not the only Russian-speakers' organisation active at the time. Some 'pro-
Moscow' groups remained active at the local level until the mid-1990s. One of the few 
organisations with strong affiliations with the Russian Federation engaging and operating Part III - Chapter 7 
 
162
at the national level was the Russkii Sobor (Russian Council, sometimes translated as 
Russian Assembly, see for example Smith 2002a, p.85)), which, for some time, was the 
minority organisation that constituted the main alternative to the Representative Assembly 
(Smith 2002a, p.85). Unlike the Representative Assembly, however, the Russian Council 
was not invited to cooperate with the Estonian authorities. It mobilised on ethnic criteria 
and sought the alignment with politics of the Russian Federation, openly championing a 
close relationship of the Russian community with its kin-state (J. Chinn & Kaiser 1996, 
p.108). In the Russian elections of 1994, the Council called for Russian citizens in Estonia 
to support the Russian nationalists of Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democratic Party in the 
Russian parliamentary elections of 1993 (ibid.; Laitin 1998, p.278). The visibility and 
influence of the Russian Council as well as of local pro-Moscow groups waned in the mid-
1990s, indicating the reluctance of many Russian-speakers to engage in the political games 
in the Russian Federation, while their own situation depended so much more on Estonian 
politics (J. Chinn & Kaiser 1996, pp.107-108).  
Whereas the RA aimed to establish itself as representative of all Soviet-era migrants and 
Russian-speakers in relation to the Estonian authorities, the E'stonskii respublikanskii 
Soyuz grazhdan Rossii (Estonian Republican Union of Russian Citizens, ERSGR), has 
pursued the social protection and promotion of rights of Russian citizens in Estonia. Beside 
this, the organisation's stated main aim is the 'normalisation of Estonian-Russian relations', 
'normalisation' meaning primarily the compliance with bilateral agreements and the 
adoption of a more pragmatic and friendly approach to the relations between the two 
countries (International Council of Russian Compatriots 2011). Founded in 1992 (under 
the name of the Union of Russian Citizens of Narva), the ERSGR is now an umbrella 
organisation, with member organisations being local Unions of Russian Citizens in 
Haapsalu, Kohtla-Järve, Narva, Pärnu, Sillamäe, Tallinn, Tartu and Viljandi (though those 
outside Ida-Virumaa do not appear to be currently very active, ibid.). The organisation has 
repeatedly mobilised Russian-speakers to take to the streets in support of their demands. In 
1997, the Union organised demonstrations of several hundred people in the streets of 
Narva, seeking social rights and measures especially to fight the high unemployment rate 
of the region (Reinvelt 2002). Ten years on, the Union still was demanding changes to the 
Estonian-Russian agreement on pensions for Russian permanent residents in Estonia, an 
issue complicated by the reluctance of both states to find a solution not to the detriment of 
pensioners, who are among the population groups worst off socio-economically and who 
depend on both states' cooperation with regard to social provisions for their subsistence 
(DELFI 18/08/2008; Narvskaya Gazeta 28/02/2008). In recent years, therefore, the Part III - Chapter 7 
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ERSGR has focused on the difficulties Russian pensioners in Estonia face, being, as 
the organisation claims, neglected by both states which both attempt to shift the 
responsibility for the group to the authorities on the other side of the border. While during 
the 1990s leading figures of the organisation attempted to represent Russian citizens 
permanently residing in Estonia in the Russian Duma in order to directly impact Russia's 
policies on compatriots permanently living abroad, these attempts remained largely 
unsuccessful (Russkaya Obshchina 2011). Recently, the ERSGR's chair Jurii Mishin 
adopted Estonian citizenship in order to have access to institutionalised politics and 
represent the interests of Russian citizens in Estonia. 
Russian-speakers' group-based political parties 
Until 1995, Soviet-era migrants were excluded from participating in national elections due 
to citizenship and election legislation. Induced by the first round of naturalisation in 1993-
1995, minority party politics gained momentum in the run-up to the national elections of 
1995. Naturalisation had brought about a change in the composition of the electorate. The 
hopes of Russian-speakers increased that political change would be possible on democratic 
grounds, guaranteed by their formal representation in the political bodies of the new state. 
In 1994, the Representative Assembly merged with other political organisations to form 
the Eesti Ühendatud Rahvapartei (United People's Party of Estonia, EÜP).
4 The Vene 
Erakond Eestis (Russian Party of Estonia, VEE) was officially founded in the same year. 
In the 1995 elections, both parties stood candidates in an electoral coalition under the name 
of Meie kodu on Eestimaa (My home is Estonia). The alliance of both parties could claim 
to represent about 62% of the Russian-speaking electorate, gaining 6 out of 101 seats in 
parliament (Khrychikov & Miall 2002, p.203). In 1999, the EÜP in a new electoral 
coalition even increased their share of the vote, if not the number of voters, to 6.13%, again 
winning 6 seats for the coalition in the Riigikogu, while the VEE did not pass the threshold 
to the 9
th Riigikogu.
5 However, the minority parties did not succeed in sending any of their 
                                                 
4 These included the Estonian-Russian Democratic Movement, the Estonian-Russian Business Chamber, the 
Estonian Chernobyl Committee. The information on Russian-speakers' parties in Estonia described in this 
paragraph is based on the data provided by the Eesti Erakondage Ajalugu Instituut. Although so-called 
'Russian parties' or 'minority parties' had claimed to represent the Russian-speaking population of Estonia 
since 1988, they had been politically insignificant components of Estonian party politics. It was only with the 
foundation of EÜP in 1994, renamed Konstitutioonierakond (Constitution Party) in 2006, by members of the 
Russian-speaking socio-political elite that minority party politics in Estonia gained some momentum. 
5 In 2000, some members left the EÜR to form their own, Vene Balti Erakond Eestis (Russian-Baltic Party of 
Estonia), which however never took part in national elections, and eventually in 2002 joined the Russian 
Party of Estonia. Around the same time, the EÜR was joined by several small parties most of which had 
existed for only a few years previously. Members of the Constitution Party are observed by the Estonian Part III - Chapter 7 
 
164
candidates to parliament after the 2003 elections. Despite other parties and initiatives 
being formed by members of minority groups, arguably attempting to appeal to the ethnic 
voting potential,
6 none were politically successful at the national level.  
The EÜP's and VEE's success in the 1990s can be related partly to the dynamics of 
Estonian politics, the structures of which had not yet been consolidated, potentially 
allowing some space for Russian-speakers in the political arena. Also, after the shocks of 
Estonian post-Soviet minority legislation, particularly regarding the Aliens law of 1993 
and the Language Act of February 1995, passed shortly before national elections, the 
March 1995 elections also promised at least a slight possibility for change, mobilising 
Russian-speaking citizens to vote for EÜP or VEE.  
Clearly, parties aiming at an ethnic minority electorate are at a disadvantaged position, as 
their potential electorate is diminished due to the condition of citizenship. While ongoing 
naturalisation processes increased the number of members of the minority groups eligible 
to vote in national elections, in 2007, 16.3 % of the population, i.e. approximately half of 
the minority population were citizens of another state or had undetermined citizenship 
status, limiting the number of possible voters of 'Russian' or other minority-oriented parties 
(Needs & Feasibility, 2009: 9). However, evidently, ethnically-based minority parties after 
their election to the eighth and ninth Riigikogu lost their appeal to the voters per se. 
Khrychikov and Miall estimate that the share of Russian-speakers voting for 'Russian' 
parties had already dropped from 78 % to 55 % between the Riigikogu elections of 1995 
and 1999 (2002, p.203).  
During their period of representation in parliament, both parties were able to set new 
emphases in parliamentary debates, expressing minority perceptions and preferences for 
political institution building, particularly with respect to citizenship and language 
legislation and minority education (Jurado 2003). In so doing, for the two election periods, 
Meie kodu on Eestimaa and the EÜP could indeed claim to represent a large proportion of 
the Russian-speaking citizens of Estonia, giving a voice to minority demands in the 
legislative body of the young republic. The political initiatives in the Riigikogu aimed at 
the political inclusion of minority members in Estonia have focused on the formal political 
inclusion of those members of society who are citizens of another state or do not hold any 
                                                                                                                                                    
internal secret police, the Kaitsepolitsei (Security Police, KAPO), and are regularly accused of having been 
'sponsored by the Kremlin' and of 'propaganda work in Estonia' (see for example KAPO 2007, p.8).  
6 According to Berg however most of these parties, initiatives or organisations would reject the label 'ethnic 
party' (Berg 2001, p.20).  Part III - Chapter 7 
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citizenship at all, and on the legislation regulating the criteria for acquiring citizenship 
status. The two Russian-speakers' factions in the eighth and ninth Riigikogu (1995-1999, 
1999-2003) also called for the radical amending of citizenship regulations.  
However the Russian-speakers' parties failed to sustain the trust of the Russian-speaking 
electorate. This was due partly to the internal heterogeneity of the electorate, which was 
concerned with a range of political, social and economic problems among which the 
nationalising policies of the Estonian state were just one (Aleksej Semjonov 2002). At the 
same time, due to differences in ideological orientation, the Russian-speakers' parties were 
not able to form a strong coherent and sustainable minority representation in parliament 
(Jakobson 17/04/2009). These difficulties were combined with problems in the leadership 
and the political strategies applied by the parties, which pursued a confrontational strategy 
in relation to even moderate Estonian parties (ibid.). This impeded the cooperation with 
those Estonian political actors who were more open to discuss the terms of integration than 
the nationalists, or with those who supported similar agendas in educational reform (Jurado 
2003). Eventually, the minority parties failed to manage the balancing act between 
guaranteeing minority representation on the basis of specific minority demands and 
fostering integration in alliance and cooperation with the Estonian political forces. In 
addition to the self-inflicted political weakness of the Russian-speakers' parties, fierce anti-
Russian and anti-Soviet rhetoric that was aimed directly at the Russian-speaking political 
representation undermined their legitimacy to influence policy-making in Estonia.
7  
Since 2003, the Russian-speakers' parties have made several attempts to join forces,
8 
although since then both Russian-speakers' parties have been politically insignificant, 
failing to achieve election results of more than 2% maximum. A merger of the Russian-
speakers' parties and activists in the national elections of 2011 received only around 5,000 
votes, or less than 1% of the vote. Overall, these parties' political successes have been 
negligible since 2003. This includes their campaigns to build a successful representation of 
                                                 
7 Throughout my interviews with Russian-speakers many alluded to direct activities of the Estonian 
authorities to undermine the group's political representation. According to the respondents, in several election 
periods Estonian authorities sponsored some Russian-speakers' parties in order to split the electorate 
(Poleshchuk 14/04/2009; Astrov 17/05/2010; Grigoryan 18/05/2010). It was beyond the scope of this thesis 
to establish on what evidence these accusations are based.  
8 In 2007 the former EÜP, which had reconfigured under the name Konstitutsioonierakond (Constitution 
Party) and the VEE started negotiation talks, which almost led to the merging of both parties. However when 
the congress of the Constitution Party decided that the overall direction of the party's policies should go 
towards the left, this simultaneously ruled out the option to cooperate with the more conservative VEE. 
Rather, in 2008, Constitution Party merged with the Eesti Vasakpartei (Estonian Left Party) to form the 
Eestimaa Ühendatud Vasakpartei (Estonian United Left Party, EÜVP). For the national elections of 2011, 
members of the VEE, EÜVP and prominent individuals of the Russian-speaking community made another 
attempt to unite under the VEE's roof in order to achieve inclusion into political bodies and decision making. Part III - Chapter 7 
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Russian-speakers at the European level. Although the elections to the European 
parliament were debated among the Russian-speakers' politicians as a route to increase the 
political influence of the group, even at that level the support for representatives with an 
agenda strongly aimed at Russian-speakers has gained only around 2% of the vote.  
That does not mean that the parties have left the political scene altogether though. They 
continue to make headlines largely with contributions to the public debate that increasingly 
appeal to proponents of minority nationalistic views, while issues that concern daily 
problems faced by non-citizens or non-Estonians generally are increasingly lost from 
sight.
9 Overall, the main role of the Russian-speakers' parties was with the representation 
of demands which had been almost completely ignored by the Estonian parties. Therefore, 
Berg (2001) argues with some justification that while not being ethnic parties in the narrow 
sense, at least for the 1990s they resembled part of what he calls the 'Russian communal 
defence' (p.23). Importantly, and another reason for the parties' decline, is that they based 
their approach on segregationist grounds, in contrast to the Russian-speaking population's 
preferences for a solution to interethnic problems on the basis of integration with Estonian 
society and in cooperation with them. The increasingly populist approach of the more 
prominent political actors of the Russian-speaking minority is also a sign for the crisis of 
Russian-speakers' political representation and the lack of any sustainable structures. As a 
long-term observer of political developments in Estonia put it, minority political 
representation in Estonia 'is in ruins, completely. […] There are no structures' (Poleshchuk 
18/12/2009). This is at least the case with respect to parties that promote as their main 
political goals the improvement of the situation of Russian-speakers.  
The crisis and decline of the Russian-speakers' parties do not mean that Russian-speaking 
voters are excluded from the political process altogether. Keskerakond (the Centre Party) 
has been the main alternative for Russian-speaking voters in national as well as local 
elections. Although the party's political agenda has never been nearly as explicit with 
regard to citizenship and language policies as the EÜP and VEE, Keskerakond has 
continuously promoted the alleviation of the naturalisation procedure and initiated several 
of the improvements on citizenship legislation that were discussed in parliament. 
Moreover, although Keskerakond also responds to a nationalistic electorate, it has openly 
supported a more flexible approach to Russian language use in public (Sõtnik 04/08/2009; 
Rosenfeld 07/10/2009). At the same time, Keskerakond's more accommodationist take on 
                                                 
9 Among the initiatives the Constitution Party has strongly supported is for example the plan to erect a 
monument for Peter I in the town of Narva (Megatrons 05/06/2009).  Part III - Chapter 7 
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non-citizens and permanent residents of foreign nationality compared to other Estonian 
parties is not reflected in its political programme and policies, which do not account for 
these groups' range of very diverse, but pressing problems caused by their political status 
and social situation (Poleshchuk 18/12/2009).  
Essentially, Keskerakond's success with Russian-speaking voters relies on the fact that 
overall the party has not engaged in policies that have caused particular outrage among 
Russian-speakers; that it stands for a centre-left approach which covers a broad range of 
political and social problems faced by minority members specifically; and that it practices 
the inclusion of Russian-speakers into the party. Although Keskerakond has been generally 
open to Russian-speakers' interests, the representation of minority demands within the 
party at the national level and the responsibility to develop legal initiatives on the matter 
have remained with minority members of the party (Sõtnik interview). Nevertheless, in 
each election period since 1995, Keskerakond has been represented in parliament by 6-7 
Russian-speaking deputies, and in 2002/2003 the party sent the first, and so far only 
minority politician into the cabinet, when Eldar Efendijev accepted the post of Minister for 
Population Affairs.  
Estonian parties representing minority interests 
The Russian-speaking electorate is, of course, much more heterogeneous than a single 
party could account for, as already the diversity of the Russian-speaking parties 
demonstrated. Other Estonian parties have increased their efforts to attract Russian-
speaking voters. Still, the political programmes rarely address citizenship and language 
issues from a non-nationalistic point of view. An exception was in the late 1990s when the 
party Res Publica (RP), which actively tried to attract Russian-speaking voters, promised 
alleviations in the naturalisation process. However, it turned out that this was simply pre-
election games.
10 Russian-speakers have been very disappointed by RP's performance in 
minority issues generally (Poleshchuk 18/12/2009). Other parties have hoped to attract 
Russian-speaking voters by placing Russian-speaking candidates on their election list. In 
recent years, this strategy has helped Reformierakond (Reform Party, RE) to increase its 
share of the Russian-speaking electorate (Poleshchuk 18/12/2009).  
As a result, for several legislative periods, normally two of RE's deputies in the national 
parliament have been Russian-speakers. However, they have been largely inactive in 
                                                 
10 Res Publica later turned out to have been a project of Isamaaliit (Pro Patria Union), which was designed to 
attract also the less nationalistic parts of the electorate; the two parties later merged (Poleshchuk 18/12/2009).  Part III - Chapter 7 
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relation to minority issues or, when they have spoken out against RE's minority 
politics, such as in the case of the removal of the Bronze Soldier monument in Tallinn, 
they were entirely marginalised in their own party (Astrov 17/05/2010, referring to Sergei 
Ivanov and Tatjana Muravjova specifically). Other minority representatives of RE do not 
show any interest in questions of integration, citizenship or the role of Russian language 
use in Estonia (e.g. Andrei Korobeinik, member of the XII Riigikogu for RE, Korobeinik 
2011). The Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond, (Social Democratic Party, SDE) is a supporter 
of integration policies, but its agenda has not attracted many Russian-speakers so far.
11 
This demonstrates that neither the inclusion of minority members into majority parties nor 
the inclusion of Russian-speakers' concerns in the party programmes or rhetoric of 
politicians has allowed for changes in the interethnic power division and responsiveness of 
policies towards minorities' demands. Although this development has enabled some 
heterogeneisation of the voting behaviour of Russian-speakers, Keskerakond remains the 
party most voted for by Russian-speakers at the national level as well as the one that has 
the clearest one-party support base (Hallik et al. 2002, p.21). 
The situation of minority politics is somewhat different at the local level, buttressing the 
assumptions of those hopeful that Keskerakond could be conducive in changing interethnic 
relations and politics in Estonia. Keskerakond functions as a minority party at the local 
level in highly minority populated areas. Here, minority members have equally reduced 
their support for minority political parties and used Keskerakond's channels in order to 
integrate with the Estonian political structures. Although minority parties have 
occasionally shown some strength at the local level, and at times formed municipal 
coalitions, minority voters' preferences overall seem to lie with Keskerakond. In recent 
years, Keskerakond has become known for the support it offers young talented Russian-
speaking politicians to have a party career, and it has generally played a crucial role at the 
local level (Novikov 18/05/2010; Rosenfeld 07/12/2009; Sõtnik 04/08/2009). As the ruling 
party in the Tallinn municipality, the party has introduced some accommodating policies to 
respond to the Russian-speaking part of Tallinn's population. By staffing local offices with 
minority members, there is some representation and practical inclusion guaranteed at the 
local level, enabling minority members to decide on many aspects that concern their 
everyday lives in their proximity. These opportunities have been crucial over the past 20 
years in providing minority members with some say in the political-decision making and 
                                                 
11 Since the 2011 elections the SDE is represented in parliament by a Russian-speaking deputy also, who in 
contrast does have Russian-speakers' issues on his agenda whose statements aim to evoke a change in the 
discourse on Russian-speakers; Jevgeni Ossinovski's website features an interview that the daily Postimees 
did with him, in which he explains his position on integration and Russian-speakers' politics under the title 'I 
am an Estonian of Russian descent' (Ossinovski 2011).  Part III - Chapter 7 
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choice of their political representatives. All this has however taken place without 
having any impact on the party's minority policies at the national level.  
The local level has also offered alternative strategies for integration as, for example, the 
implementation of local integration programmes shows. Tallinn's 'Civic Peace' programme 
takes a more accommodationist position on interethnic relations than the national 
integration strategy (LICHR 2008b).
12 It emphasises the need for practical political 
integration of Russian-speakers through participation. In this context the municipality has 
conducted a series of forums to discuss the current state of the integration process, its aims 
and the obstacles (Vaus 18/05/2009). Unfortunately, although the initiative should be 
appreciated in general, the debates at these forums have not increased the awareness with 
regard to the situation of Russian-speakers, since the group's situation has not significantly 
changed (Grigorjan 18/05/2009). Minority representatives and participants argue that the 
increased 'dialogue' has not led to policy changes (Kõlvart 19/05/2009). The most 
important issues concerning integration – citizenship and minority language use in public 
and in education – need to be solved at the national level.
13  
As a result of the limited structures for Russian-speakers' political representation, many 
Russian-speaking political activists and civic organisations set their hopes on directly 
cooperating with state institutions that were designed to foster the practical inclusion of 
minority members' preferences into the political decision-making. The discussion of 
institutions for minority inclusion in the next chapter investigates to what extent these 
institutions were able to channel minority interests and allow them to influence policy 
making and institution building.  
7.3 Minority inclusion and majority-minority cooperation in the political 
institutions 
The Roundtable for National Minorities 
The first institution that was established with the aim to integrate Russian-speakers into the 
development and critical evaluation of policy-making in Estonia is the Presidential 
Roundtable for National Minorities, established in 1993. The Roundtable has gained the 
                                                 
12 After the riots in 2007, Tallinn has elaborated its own integration strategy 'Civic Peace' (Kodurahu, 
Grazhdanskij Mir) for May 2007 until September 2009, on the basis of which the municipality continues to 
work (Tallinn City 2011).  
13 Another example, Kohtla-Järve's integration programme focuses on the support for Estonian language 
learning for Russian-speaking adults (Solovev/Dul'neva 31/07/2009). While this can facilitate national and 
socio-economic participation, it remains in line with the state's integration strategy.  Part III - Chapter 7 
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trust of Russian-speakers, and has allowed to bring Russian-speakers' views from the 
periphery of the debate closer to its centre. The Roundtable was initially convened by the 
Estonian President in 1993 in reaction to great tensions in Estonian society and imminent 
destabilisation of the country following the 'Aliens crisis'. With this step President Lennart 
Meri (1992-2001) reacted both to pressure from 'below'
14 and to recommendations from 
international actors, namely the OSCE Mission to Estonia and the HCNM (Sarv 2002, 
p.40; Pettai 1999; Barabaner et al. 1999). The Roundtable functioned almost continuously 
between 1993 and 2006; in 2010, current President Toomas Hendrik Ilves (2006-present) 
introduced a restructured Roundtable of Nationalities (Rahvuste Ümarlaud) under the roof 
of the Estonian Cooperation Assembly (Eesti Koostöö Kogu) (Mätlik 04/12/2009; Pettai 
05/12/2009).
15 By and large appreciated by Russian-speaking political actors, the 
Roundtable is designed as a 'standing conference of representatives of ethnic minorities 
and stateless persons residing in Estonia and of political parties' with advisory capacities 
(Statutes 1998). In contrast to the understanding of national minorities deployed in other 
Estonian legal documents, the Roundtable explicitly claims to represent 'non-citizens', 
thereby acknowledging that this group also needed political representation.
16 This is one of 
the main reasons why the Roundtable had something to offer to Russian-speakers. 
Moreover, up until 1995, when the first Russian-speakers entered parliament, the 
Roundtable was the only institution that provided for any representation of Russian-
speakers in national-level political institutions.  
According to its statutes, the Roundtable's main objectives encompass contributing to the 
building of a stable democracy in Estonia and to work on the 'integration into Estonian 
society of all people who have linked their lives to Estonia or wish to do so' (Statutes 1998, 
III.7). It aims to achieve this by resolving problems related to socio-economic, legal 
(citizenship), and cultural (language) issues, while simultaneously preserving the identity 
of ethnic and cultural minorities (ibid.). It is unsurprising, therefore, that the convention of 
the Roundtable helped mitigate the conflictual situation in 1993 and was seen initially as 
an institution that helps improve the representation of minorities (Semjonov 2002). The 
Roundtable aims to enable direct participation of minority groups in devising 
recommendations on political processes and policies. Its design thereby constitutes the 
                                                 
14 Four days before the passage of the law in parliament, 10,000 people had demonstrated in the city of 
Narva, threatening among other things to cut off electricity supply for the rest of Estonia provided by Narva's 
Baltic Power Plant (Sarv 2002); moreover, the establishment of a Roundtable had been called for by the 
Representative Assembly (Kolstø 2002, p.147).  
15 The Estonian Cooperation Assembly is a newly established umbrella organisation that aims to coordinate 
organisations and activities aimed at improving Estonia's 'human capital', in particular the activities are based 
on the annual UN Human Development Reports on Estonia.  
16 Citizens of other states cannot be members of the Roundtable, cf. Statutes 1998, II. 6.  Part III - Chapter 7 
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most direct form of institutionalised involvement of minorities in the decision-making 
process (Council of Europe 2004, p.22).  
The structure of the Roundtable has been changed several times. In 1993, the Roundtable 
consisted of an expert committee, equally representing the parliament, the Russian-
speakers' Representative Assembly and the Estonian Union of National Minorities, which 
represented non-Russian minorities. In 2002/2003, the Roundtable was restructured in 
order to include far more minorities than before and to overcome the exclusivity against 
most minority organisations and groups in Estonia that lay in the expert character of the 
Roundtable. Therefore in 2003, the Roundtable was replaced by an expert committee, 
comprised of political actors, academics and heads of cultural organisations of various 
groups in Estonia, and is complemented by a Chamber of Representatives, which from 
September 2003 onwards comprised of around 140 representatives of cultural and 
educational societies (President 2003). 
The Roundtable is formally represented by its Plenipotentiary, who is appointed by the 
Estonian President, as are the other members of the Roundtable's expert committee. The 
members of the assembly of cultural organisations are in turn appointed by the expert 
committee. As a result, no member of the Roundtable is elected or delegated by the 
minority communities directly; thus the character of the Roundtable as represented in its 
structures is, in the first place, a consultative institution to the President, not a genuine 
representation of the minority groups. The Plenipotentiary represents the president at the 
Roundtable meetings and advocates the results of the Roundtable's work with ministries, 
members of parliament and institutions working on the issues of integration. There are no 
regulations determining the work of the Plenipotentiary, she or he is free in shaping her/his 
tasks and schedule. The expert commission is designed as the more active board and has 
the opportunity to form workgroups and to invite external experts for consultation and 
debate. During the 1990s and early 2000s, the Roundtable met regularly, and organised 
conferences and other public events designed to provide space for public debate and, 
potentially, dialogue (President 1992-2006). Moreover, when active under Meri and 
President Arnold Rüütel,
17 the Roundtable regularly invited members of the major political 
parties to attend meetings of the Roundtable and offered consultation. The assembly has 
the right to develop recommendations for the expert board, which may pass resolutions and 
recommendations that are then forwarded to the President of the Republic, the Riigikogu, 
                                                 
17 Rüütel was President of the Estonian Republic from 2001 until 2006.  Part III - Chapter 7 
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respective commissions at the Riigikogu working on the issues raised, and the 
government (Statutes 1998, IV).  
The Roundtable provides for a body autonomous from the government, which, while 
appointed by the President, 'shall be independent in [its] activities' (Statutes 1998, II.5), 
also from the legislative. Essentially, however, it does not have any decision-making 
authority. This limitation has been reflected in the Roundtable's influence on state policies. 
In its work, especially during the 1990s, the Roundtable concentrated on problems of 
citizenship and naturalisation policies. Furthermore, in workgroups it developed 
recommendations for political actors and draft laws on individual aspects of minority 
integration. For example, it worked on the preparation of a National Minority Law, 
engaged in debates on the future of minority (language) schooling, the financial support for 
minority associations and their cultural activities and continued the discussions on the 
status of non-citizens (Šein 1999). From 1998 onwards, the Roundtable particularly 
focused on the development of a more inclusive approach to integration in general. The 
fact that the authorities remained largely 'ignorant' in relation to the Roundtable caused 
frustration among its members. After all, the Roundtable was the only state organ that 
could claim some representativeness for minorities during the early stage of the integration 
strategy. In February 1999, the frustration even resulted in the resignation from their 
function at the Roundtable of four prominent members (Barabaner et al. 1999). In their 
critical statement on the receptiveness of the Roundtable's recommendations by members 
of parliament and government, the four members who resigned questioned the relevance 
and impact of a consultative institution if its views were not taken into account or were 
even contradicted by the legislative and executive forces and their policies (ibid.). 
However, members of the Roundtable became part of the expert commission that 
developed the strategy and programme for the 'Integration of non-Estonians into Estonian 
society, 2000-2007' (Government 2000, p.4). The suspension of the Roundtable 2006-2010 
was noticeable for minority members, despite the already limited influence of the 
institution prior to this. Especially after 2007, when Estonia was desperate for answers to 
the many questions the outbreak of violent protests of Russian-speakers had caused, the 
absence of an official body that included Russian-speakers, and particularly non-citizens, 
was a missed opportunity of institutionalising an open debate on the problems of 
integration.  
In sum, while the Roundtable proved to be an important tool for mediation in times of 
imminent tension or crisis in relation to minority issues in the 1990s, its overall importance Part III - Chapter 7 
 
173
as a body providing for minority representation at a high political-institutional level 
should not be overestimated.
18 Structural limitations make it dependent on the interest of 
policy-makers in the contributions and recommendations by the Roundtable. So far, there 
has not been sufficient interest in prioritising the situation of minorities in Estonia in the 
political process and in taking the minority position seriously on side of the government 
and MPs. Despite its potential to form a forum for dialogue and practiced integration, the 
Roundtable was able to develop this only inwardly.
19 Essentially, it is too dependent on 
cooperating partners in the executive and legislative bodies to exhibit sufficient authority 
for its recommendations to be heard under current Estonian political conditions. Despite 
the mediating role the Roundtable was able to play in 1993, during the 2007 crisis around 
the removal of the Bronze-soldier monument Ilves did not revive the institution. On the 
occasion of the official re-formation of the Roundtable in 2010, President Ilves presented 
his view about the role the institution can and should play in Estonian politics. He traced 
the problems of integration back to the 'different knowledge of history' and argues that the 
Roundtable's remits were to help change this, in order to allow for all Estonia's human 
capital value to thrive. This approach represents a substantial change away from the 
Roundtable's earlier role. Between 1993 and 2006, legal and structural problems of 
Russian-speakers were seen as the main obstacles to integration by Roundtable members, 
and were even emphasised by the Presidents Meri and Rüütel (see for example Meri 1995). 
The 'neoliberal turn' in the President's approach to integration reflects the state's approach 
to integration that underlies the integration strategy.
20 A statement of the members of the 
new Roundtable mirrors this approach; moreover, it appeals to the public to 'ensure that 
Estonia has enough citizens and denizens who work and contribute to our society in order 
to maintain our statehood and its functioning society' (Ümarlaud 2010, author's emphasis). 
It remains to be seen whether the acceptance of statelessness not only as a fact, but as a 
part of the aspired integrated society will allow the institution to help increase the Russian-
speakers' active participation in state- and society-building.  
The Minister without portfolio for Population Affairs and the Council for Ethnic Minorities 
                                                 
18 The consistent reluctance of the Estonian-language media to report the activities and contributions by the 
Roundtable underlines its insignificance for much of the public debate. Meanwhile, the Russian-language 
media in Estonia was far more eager to publish on the work of the Roundtable (Šein 1999; Lauristin & Vetik 
2000, p.101).  
19 Semjonov emphasises this in his accompanying note to the Statement of the four members who 
temporarily resigned from their activity with the Roundtable: 'Indeed, the quality and competence of internal 
discussions and subsequent recommendations of the Roundtable considerably improved in the course of 
recent years. The body essentially turned out to be able to create a real mechanism for a dialogue' (Barabaner 
et al., Statement 1999).  
20 The SIP and EIS emphasise the need to enact all of Estonia's human resources to build Estonia.  Part III - Chapter 7 
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The intergroup tensions between Estonians and Soviet-era settlers were very clear to 
the members of the Popular Front and the first Estonian government during the early phase 
of 'restoration'. The interim government under Tiit Vähi (1995-1997) introduced the post of 
Minister without portfolio for Nationalities, de facto dealing with interethnic relations.
21 
The role of the post however only gained importance in the second half of the 1990s under 
Siimann's coalition government (1997-1999), formed by the Coalition Party 
(Koonderakond) and the later People's Union of Estonia (Eestimaa Rahvaliit). In the 
context of Estonia's international integration the government adopted the integration of 
Soviet-era migrants into its programme. Since the 1997 European Commission's report on 
Estonia's progress for EU accession had demanded the acceleration of the integration 
process of Estonia's large non-citizen population, the position of Minister without portfolio 
for Ethnic and Population Affairs was re-installed (Poleshchuk 2001). The international 
pressure to reduce the number of non-citizens and citizens of other states in Estonia was 
essential for this decision. The Minister of Population Affairs played a particularly crucial 
role in the development of the State Integration Strategies from 1998 onwards (see below). 
The Minister could set some emphases in the debates on integration, especially during the 
first half of the 2000s, thanks to the centrality of the issue to Estonia's EU integration. 
After 2004, however, the post lost much of its political force and primarily provided an 
institution for minority representatives to present their concerns to a government official.  
In 2009, the post was abolished when the Social Democrats, who at the time held the post, 
left the coalition. The responsibilities of the position were shared among the Ministry of 
Culture, the Ministry of Social Affairs and the Ministry of the Interior. The government 
argued that in this way it was easier to link integration tasks directly to those ministries, 
whose responsibilities the different aspects of integration effectively are (Council of 
Europe 2010). The last Minister to hold the post belonged to the smallest coalition partner 
(SDE); being a young woman with a relatively short political career and no portfolio, this 
                                                 
21 The post was initially occupied by Klara Hallik, a historian and social scientist, who is from an Estonian-
Russian background and has since accompanied the integration process as an expert in many positions, such 
as a member of the Roundtable and as a researcher. The post of Minister for Nationalities was installed at a 
time, when there was a very strong opposition across the political elite to institutionalise politically the 
question of minority issues. Hallik served as a Minister from April until October 1992. When the 
conservative-nationalist coalition under Mart Laar came to power in October, interethnic relations became 
part of the responsibilities of Jüri Luik, who was head of the Delegation for negotiations between Estonia and 
Russia (Eesti ja Venemaa vaheliste läbirääkimiste delegatsiooni juht) and later became Foreign Affairs 
Minister. His responsibilities for interethnic relations were transferred to Peeter Olesk, who later became 
Minister of Culture and Education. Olesk's post was again that of Minister of Population Affairs, and as 
before not endowed with a portfolio. During the mid-1990s, under the Andres Tarand and second and third 
Tiit Vähi governments the responsibilities of the Minister of Population Affairs did not have a pronounced 
position in the cabinet, but were covered by the Ministries of Culture. This data is taken from a website on 
the history of the Estonian parliament, provided by the National Library of Estonia (Meie parlament ja aeg 
2011).  Part III - Chapter 7 
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meant that she had a difficult standing in the cabinet. As a result of the politically weak 
position of the Minister, her capacities lay mainly in the communication with minority 
members on the one hand and the government on the other (Korts 24/04/2009).  
The Ministry of Culture is often perceived as the successor institution of the Minister of 
Population Affairs, because it has established a body that consults with representatives of 
minority organisations on a regular basis. Already in 2008, the Ministry of Culture had re-
launched the Council for Ethnic Minorities under the Ministry of Culture and it has acted 
as the official contact body for minority issues since then. The Council regained its 
responsibilities after the government eventually discontinued the post of Minister without 
portfolio for Ethnic and Population Affairs in 2009. According to the information on the 
Ministry's website, the Council has three-monthly meetings with the heads of 17 
organisations representing primarily traditional-cultural societies of people with minority 
background to engage in talks with the Minister on the minorities' current (cultural) 
situation, needs and projects for the future (Estonian Ministry of Culture 2008). These 
meetings provide opportunity to 'discuss problems […] and exchange opinions' on 
Estonian cultural policy (ibid.). The Council, which had existed as a consultation body to 
the Ministry of Culture between 1997 and 2003, takes an advisory function for issues of 
minority culture, minority language use and questions of sponsoring of minority cultural 
and organisational life (Agarin 2010). 
The Council 'tries to copy' the Presidential Roundtable, by consulting with minority 
representatives on issues that concern them (Dusman 16/12/2009). Despite the opportunity 
for including the demands of minority representatives, again, no direct results are visible in 
terms of (draft) legislation or provisions so far, and minority representatives are very 
sceptical regarding the practical use of the Council from the perspective of integration in 
general (Grigoryan 18/05/2009). It is particularly problematic that the remits of the 
Council are de facto limited to questions of cultural events, Sunday schools and support for 
minorities' cultural and educational organisations; that is, the Council deals with minority 
issues in line with the understanding of Estonian multiculturalism, but does not cover 
crucial issues of political and socio-economic inclusion. Moreover, the Council particularly 
focuses on issues of smaller minorities, that is not the Russians, thereby significantly 
narrowing the scope of debate. Decisively, 'it doesn't discuss other […] integration 
policies, like citizenship' (Mätlik 04/12/2009). At the same time, institutionalising certain 
routes for minority representatives to communicate with policy-makers, and particularly by 
including the idea of the minorities' right to the protection and development of their Part III - Chapter 7 
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cultural identity into the state integration strategy, the Estonian state has responded to 
the minority's demands for cultural self-realisation in civic organisations and established 
the current framework for the support of minority cultures. 
The social and citizenship issues related to integration are now part of the responsibilities 
of the Ministries for Social Affairs and for the Interior; moreover, the much disputed 
aspect of integration in the field of education and in particular the role of Russian 
schooling in Estonia has always been the responsibility of the Ministry of Education. 
Unlike the Ministry of Culture, these ministries do not feature advisory bodies that would 
guarantee the consultation of minority members with regard to questions of citizenship, 
civil society integration, Russian language education or labour market integration. This is a 
clear setback from the situation when minority concerns that were discussed with state 
institutions still included all aspects of integration.  
The stronger focus on integration pressured for in particular by Western regional 
organisations allowed the Minister of Population Affairs to voice the need for integration 
and coordinate ongoing integration efforts as well as, to an extent, channel minority 
concerns. In this sense, it was a resource and a tool for the moderate political forces, who 
emphasised the importance of improved interethnic relations and social stability, such as 
the Social Democrats (former People's Party Moderates, or Rahvaerakond Mõõdukad) 
(Astrov 17/05/2010). The Minister regularly met with minority organisations of different 
background (Poleshchuk 18/12/2009; Dusman 16/12/2009). Moreover, the Minister 
emphasised that integration in Estonia was a complex process that entailed problems of 
legal status, political participation, cultural diversity, practical questions of language use, 
social implications and exclusion from access to welfare and societal progress and many 
more.  
'[T]his office worked like a coordination office between different ministries, and they 
tried to be involved in different work [at] the state level and tried to support institut[ions 
at] the local level, including NGOs. But now we have the Minister of Culture only, 
[and] it's not easy to be as active as […] in integration issues, [the focus is] more on 
culture events' (Dusman 16/12/2009).  
This clearly assigned point of communication and contact for minorities was abolished, 
which is what minority members regret, even though they did not have great hopes in the 
fundamental improvement of their situation through the Minister of Population Affairs. Part III - Chapter 7 
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Tanel Mätlik, head of the Integration Foundation and former member of the 
Presidential Roundtable, partly disagrees:  
 '[The abolition of the Minister of Population Affairs] doesn't change very much, 
because it has been always the same. I don't say it's positive that it's always been the 
same, [but since 1990] with every change of the office the Minister disappeared and a 
new office was re-established. […] Which is a very stupid system […]. And now again: 
when the Ministry of Culture took over [the responsibilities of the Minister for Ethnic 
Affairs] again they had [to] start from zero. In a way our [Integration] Foundation has 
been the element of continuity – our role has been always to transfer the knowledge to 
the new people' (Mätlik 04/12/09).  
Despite these practical problems related to the post of Minister in general, the decision of 
the government in 2009 to abolish post of Minister was read as a negative sign by minority 
members as well as Estonians involved in integration policies. The importance of the post 
lay in its existence per se and in the attention it drew to the need for continued integration 
efforts by the state, as well as for the visibility it gave to minority members and to 
Estonia's ethno-cultural diversity. The Council's work is less appreciated, both for reasons 
of the symbolic downgrading of communication with minority members (from the position 
of a Minister to just a council inside the Ministry of Cultures) and because of its less 
comprehensive approach. The Council's task envisages an 'exchange [of] opinions', but 
does not transfer any decision-making competencies to the Council (Estonian Ministry of 
Culture 2008).  
At the same time, some minority members point to the extension of base-line funding for 
organisations that cooperate with the state through the Council and a generally positive 
trend in the state's support for organisations which are dedicated to maintain minority 
culture (Lyagu 19/05/2010). Other activists argue that the Council has not played a 
significant role for the situation and life of minorities in general, and is not likely to do so 
under current political power relations (Grigoryan 18/05/2010; Poleshchuk 18/12/2009; 
Rosenfeld 07/12/2009). Thus, despite the support it provides to some organisations, the 
Council has not engaged visibly in any form of improving the legal framework for 
minority members' impact on the social or political decision-making. It has also not 
included the Council's representatives in the agenda-setting of the government's further 
development of integration strategies, nor helped the minority cultural landscape 
heterogenise or increase minority organisations' funding situation generally. Overall, the 
representation of interests of ethnic minorities at government level has been limited, if it 
existed at all. Decisively, there is no consultation sought by the government with regard to 




In 1998 the government founded the Integration Foundation, which since then has 
supported the integration process and functions as a separate actor, though it is not 
independent of the government.
22 The Integration Foundation is primarily a coordinating 
and implementing body but is also in charge of the development of strategies in the 
integration strategies' sub-programmes, especially education. In this capacity it cooperates 
with the Ministry of Education in the fields of Language Immersion as well as minority 
language education (MEIS 2011). It is also the Integration Foundation, rather than the 
Ministry of Culture, which coordinates and provides actual support for most minority 
cultural organisations. Project-based funding is the major form of support for non-
governmental and civic organisations, including minority cultural organisations. It is 
granted to organisations which apply for support both in response to calls for applications 
and based on the organisations' own initiatives. The foundation also helps maintain the 
existence of a smaller number of organisations through base-line funding (Lyagu 
19/05/2010; Mätlik 04/12/2009). This is rare however; Mätlik, head of the Estonian 
Integration Foundation, describes the funding situation:  
'We, as a foundation, which gets reallocations from the state budget, we can't have 
contracts with NGOs for 5 years or 7 years, because we receive money from the EU for 
one year only. [Right now, i.e. December 2009] we cannot be sure what will happen in 
2011 – the moment of truth will come when the financial agreement between us and the 
ministry will be signed at some point in January [2011], and then we will know how 
much we will actually get. That is why we cannot make long-term commitments with 
initiatives' (Mätlik 04/12/2009).  
The situation is made even more difficult by the fact that the Foundation's resources are 
limited. Given that its task is the integration of a third of the population and the 
organisation is praised for the fact that it has supported more than 400 organisations and 
projects between 1998 and 2007, the budget of around 6 million Euros (492,554,000 EEK) 
for the Integration Foundation's activities in the years 2008-2010 appears small (Estonia.eu 
2011). Moreover, the Integration Foundation does not have budget stability, which 
impedes its ability to act coherently and efficiently. As a result, even a rapid increase in the 
budget, while staff numbers remain stable, can cause difficulties (Mätlik 04/12/2009).  
                                                 
22 Since 2010, the Integration Foundation merged with the Estonian Migration Foundation and now forms the 
Integration and Migration Foundation Our People (Integratsiooni ja Migratsiooni Sihtasutus Meie Inimesed, 
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The Integration Foundation passes on the problems with its own budgetary planning to 
the organisations it supports. The difficult situation and lack of planning possibilities is not 
exclusive to the sphere of integration but shared by Estonian civil society and citizens' self-
organisation in general (Lagerspetz 17/04/2009; Jakobson 17/04/2009). However, Russian-
speakers' organisations have already limited access to funding and less developed civil 
society structures to draw upon in order to sustain their activities compared to most 
Estonian-speakers' organisations (Lagerspetz 17/04/2009); to increase the base-line 
funding could improve the situation for some organisations, but the institution does not 
plan to do so in the near future (Lyagu 19/05/2010; Mätlik 04/12/2009). 
Overall the focus of the Integration Foundation's activities has remained the same over the 
past thirteen years; however Mätlik emphasises that in recent years projects that focus on 
increasing the opportunities for both majority and minority members to meet members of 
the other group (Mätlik 04/12/2009). He suggests that  
'it's not that important that they will speak there about integration, maybe it's not even 
good; it's good if they are doing something together. For example in the field of 
environment protection, if they do some joint campaign, 'cause it might be an important 
issue for all people, no matter what their ethnic background is. It's not to avoid this issue 
of ethnic background and ethnic relations, but rather to promote joint activities, through 
which they might discover that their ethnic group is maybe not that different, and we 
see that through these contacts actually the attitudes change' (Mätlik 04/12/2009).  
Although the Integration Foundation has increased its activities in this field, this does not 
mean that questions for example of naturalisation or the support for bilingual media are 
neglected. Rather, it reflects the somewhat broader approach to integration and the 
realisation that 'obtaining Estonian citizenship in itself does not solve all integration-related 
problems' (Government 2008, p.11), which characterises the Estonian Integration Strategy.  
The Integration Foundation is the only institution besides the government's cabinet that has 
a responsibility for the pressing issues of citizenship, minority language use and, 
importantly, the future of education in both Estonian and minority mother tongues for 
minority members. Mätlik acknowledges this also:  
'With help from the EU programmes, this year we launched a call for proposals for 
different activities [in relation to citizenship issues] and we estimate that five projects 
will be financed. And maybe this will help to fill this gap. But this is project-based, it's 
not institutional' (Mätlik 04/12/2009).  Part III - Chapter 7 
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The constraints imposed on the Integration Foundation's activities because of its 
executive function for the State's integration strategy, do not envisage the inclusion of 
minority recommendations and critique into the development of sub-programmes. The 
institution is designed as a facilitator of integration and dialogue, not as an institution for 
dialogue itself. Yet, the Foundation cooperates with minority organisations on specific 
projects in several thematic and training areas (Mätlik 04/12/2009). Some minority cultural 
and educational organisations closely cooperate with the Integration Foundation in the 
production of information material on national minorities and receive training for 
successful project application and other activities within the range of tasks of the 
integration strategy (Dusman 16/12/2009; Mätlik 04/12/2009). Particularly schemes which 
are supported as part of the integration strategy, such as Sunday schools, allow for the 
professionalisation and further institutionalisation of minority cultural organisation, if 
under the problematic conditions of lack of possibilities for long-term planning (Lyagu 
19/05/2010).  
Reviewing the developments of the Estonian state's institutions for minority inclusion it 
can be stated that from the beginning of Estonia's independent statehood in 1991 the state 
recognised that the interethnic situation, and the specific aspect of statelessness, required 
particular attention. When Russian-speakers eventually achieved limited opportunities to 
channel their interests to the government and state authorities as a result of their protests in 
the crisis of 1993, this was down largely to international pressure. Similarly, the emphasis 
on integration in the second half of the 1990s cannot be examined without regarding the 
considerable influence EU integration had on these policy developments. Despite the 
limited opportunities these institutions offered to Russian-speakers, minority 
representatives appreciated the Roundtable and the Minister of Population Affairs as rare 
channels to communicate minority concerns and demands. Although the institutions 
discussed in this chapter did not meet the expectations about integration Russian-speakers 
had towards the state, they had helped to stabilise the tense situation. However, the ruling 
parties were not interested in making these institutions permanent. The numerous changes 
to the post of Minister of Nationalities/Population Affairs illustrates this most clearly – it 
was established due to the 'pragmatic recognition that something has to be done' (Astrov 
17/05/2009); it was then revived as a post with a qualified remit for the period of EU 
accession. The abolishment of the Ministry in 2009 followed logically from the alleged 
'mainstreaming' of the integration policies throughout government policies, which made an 
'Integration Ministry' appear superfluous. The renewed Roundtable and the Council for 
National Minorities are unfit to provide for sufficient discussion and, crucially, political Part III - Chapter 7 
 
181
power to shape the debates on integration. The remaining institution, the Integration 
Foundation, is not mandated to engage in dialogue, lacks decision-making authority, and 
also the political will to channel Russian-speakers' interests. As a result, the executive as 
well as the state authorities provide no suitable institution to include the views of the 
Russian-speaking group.  
At the level of parliament, a number of so called parliamentary groups, committees and 
Deputies' associations and unions exist whose work touches, potentially, upon minority 
related issues. These include, but are not restricted to, the Cultural Affairs Committee, the 
Social Affairs Committee and the Legal Affairs Committee. Moreover, the Ida-Virumaa 
Association, National Minorities Support Group and Orthodox Association explicitly 
tackle minority issues. However, despite their existence, most of these groups are very 
silent on minority issues or overall inactive (Sõtnik 04/08/2009). No considerable 
contributions on minority politics came from these groups, and also their members do not 
exhibit an interest in them (Poleshchuk 18/12/2009). Again, most Russian-speaking elites 
interviewed on this question suggest that this is partly due to the understanding among 
Russian-speaking politicians that there is little hope to achieve their political goals via this 
way.  
7.4 Political agendas of Russian-speakers' representatives 
Russian-speakers' political actors were fractioned almost from the beginning with regard to 
their political demands. During the 1990s, so called 'integrationists', or sometimes called 
'loyalists', such as the Representative Assembly, centred their demands around minority 
rights by attempting to modify or reinterpret existing political institutions. The RA 
supported the inclusion of minority representatives into decision-making on issues that 
affected the status and self-realisation of minority members, as well as the state's 
responsiveness to minority contributions to democratisation generally, without 
conditioning participation on formal membership and language knowledge. Factions 
sometimes described by Estonian sources as 'hardliners' or even 'extremists' (KAPO 2009, 
p.9) such as the ERSGR, were more uncompromising in their demands, championing 
among other things unconditional citizenship for all Soviet migrants and particularly 
outraging Estonians by claiming second official language status for Russian. Besides the 
issue of pensions, the general political demands of the ERSGR include  
'the right to simplified procedures to gain citizenship for all permanent residents, the use 
of Russian language as a second official language [in Estonia], proportional Part III - Chapter 7 
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representation of all ethnic groups in government and administrative bodies, 
expansion of rights for permanently residing non-citizens in elections to the bodies of 
local self-government, stipulation of the right of national minorities to public education 
in the languages of national minorities at all levels of education, as well as the 
realisation of the inalienable and recognised human rights and rights of national 
minorities' (Mishin 2002).
23  
At no time, however, has this led to the formation of regionally separatist movements. 
Clear-cut distinctions are hard to draw, though. It can even be argued that from a 
perspective based on current interpretations of Estonian political institutions, virtually all 
parties or political activities rallying for Russian-speakers' rights are considered 'hardliners' 
in the sense that all Russian-speakers' parties have the elimination of statelessness in their 
programme, such as the VEE calling for its elimination  
'as soon as possible within the framework of the European Union, ensuring that all 
residents of Estonia have equal rights' (VEE 2011). 
Similarly, virtually all Russian-speakers' political actors call for the continued use of 
Russian in public under certain conditions as well as the guarantee of Russian schooling. 
Although the Estonian authorities have been reluctant to accept any minority demands, 
differences between Russian-speakers' organisations exist in the framing of these demands 
and the degree and form of regulation of the minority provisions claimed. The two main 
political parties of the 1990s/early 2000s have accentuated different aspects of integration 
and interethnic relations, which are mirrored in their self-representation. The VEE claims 
to represent the Russian-speaking minority, although on the basis of Russians' and 
Russian-speakers' century-long presence on Estonian territory. It portrays the group's 
interests as those of the 'historical' Russian minority of Estonia, hence claims to defend the 
Estonian Russians' interests in their homeland, while acknowledging that Estonians have a 
specific relationship to their historic nation-state (VEE 2011). Following this concept, 
demands for far-reaching rights for the usage of Russian and the facilitation of 
naturalisation are argued for on the basis of an 'ancestral' right, which however stretches to 
comprise Russian-speaking Soviet time settlers.  
In contrast to the neo-conservative approach of the VEE,
24 the EÜP represented a less 
traditional approach to minority policies. More strongly than the VEE, the EÜP and its 
successor parties (Konstitutsioonierakond, Eestimaa Ühendatud Vasakpartei) have 
                                                 
23 Juri Mishin, then head of the Union of Russian citizens of Narva, in an open letter to the European 
parliament, the Council of Europe, NATO and other organisations involved in the democratisation and 
international integration of Estonia, 2002.  
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highlighted the socio-economic status of minority members and their formal political 
inclusion, thus facing the double challenge of political opposition by being a 'leftist' and a 
minority party (Galbreath 2003, p.39). Moreover, as (self-styled) 'left' party, that is to say 
emphasising social security and state regulation over the free market and calling for the 
redistribution of social wealth, the EÜP has focused more on the discrimination against 
Russian-speakers in Estonia with respect to citizenship and language legislation, and has 
also attempted to capitalise on demanding more space for the specific 'Soviet' 
commemoration that has played an important role for Russian-speakers. Overall, all parties 
agree that Russian and Soviet history are convoluted in a complex manner, and the 
Russian-speaking group cannot be detached from either.  
In order to attain a comprehensive solution for the regulation of the status and situation of 
Russian-speakers in Estonia and respond to the complicated overlap of problems related to 
group belonging, citizenship and language competency minority members face, the 
political representatives in parliament have pursued two legal initiatives that have been 
discussed more widely among minority activists.  
The most systematic legal initiative to provide a coherent approach to minorities' status and 
position in the Estonian state is the draft law on National Minorities, submitted by two 
Russian-speaking members of the Keskerakond parliamentary faction, Vladimir Vel'man 
and Mikhail Stalnukhin (Stalnukhin & Vel'man Draft 2003). Prior to the preparation of the 
draft law, the Presidential Roundtable, of which Stalnukhin was a member, had discussed a 
potential law on minorities; the Roundtable did not publicly support the initiative at later 
stages though. One of the main aims of the draft was to streamline Estonian minority 
legislation with the requirements of the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities. The Convention had entered into force in Estonia in 1998, but 
minority activists did not see it fulfilled in the country's policies. Crucial in the context of 
legal and institutional provisions for minority members is the definition of national 
minorities, which is fundamental for asserting many minority rights, provided for by the 
constitution and ordinary legislation. A change of the definition of national minorities 
would therefore make it possible to prevent or at least mitigate many of the problems that 
minority members face under existing legislation, and to influence the political structures 
that determine the situation for minority members' participation in political and social 
processes. The draft law aimed at such a change, among other things.  Part III - Chapter 7 
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Generally, the draft bill was focussed on the social and cultural participation of 
minority members irrespective of their citizenship status, thus it aimed to eliminate most of 
the restrictions non-citizens of Estonia face, and to replace the Cultural Autonomy Scheme, 
which is widely held to have been ineffective (and has also not been made accessible for 
Russians). The law did not exhibit any concrete amounts of funding or mechanisms for the 
support of minority culture though. Moreover, the draft bill had a merely declarative 
character whereby it copied provisions of the FCNM rather than adjusting these to the legal 
framework of the Estonian Republic, and was potentially ill-suited to address the Russian-
speaking minority's complex problems in relation to Estonia's minority legislation. The 
draft bill contained a number of mechanisms to substantially simplify the status and 
opportunities of minority members, irrespective of citizenship, and to increase minority 
participation in society, practice their culture and language on the basis of individual rights 
(Poleshchuk 2003). Crucially, in its reformulation of the rights of national minorities, the 
draft law omitted the current official requirement for individuals to be citizens of Estonia 
in order to be considered a member of a national minority. This appeared to be in line with 
the understanding represented in the CoE's resolutions on the implementation of the 
FCNM in Estonia; in the resolutions the CoE repeatedly criticised the discrepancy between 
the minority protection mechanisms implemented in Estonia and the actual situation of 
minority members, in particular of those with no or foreign states' citizenship. However, it 
was unclear whether it was reconcilable with Estonian law (Council of Europe 2006; 
Council of Europe 2002).  
The draft law was not discussed in parliament, and no similar attempt has been made by 
Russian-speaking parliamentarians since then. Three reasons were decisive for the failure 
of the initiative for the draft law. The law itself featured numerous shortcomings, 
particularly in relation to other Estonian legislation. The problem was, on the one hand, the 
contradiction with Estonian law in general, as the Estonian understanding that only citizens 
could be recognised as members of national minorities has entered the state's application of 
the FCNM and, while criticised, was nonetheless accepted by the CoE and other 
international organisations. Moreover, the authors failed to embed the draft bill in the 
Estonian legislative framework, specifically to relate it to other laws on minority rights and 
protection (Cultural Autonomy Act, State Language Law, Law on Basic and Secondary 
Schooling), as well as Estonia's adoption of the anti-discrimination law which was to be 
approved soon after the draft minority law had been presented to parliament (Poleshchuk 
2003). Besides the legal reasons, the authors' political strategy for the presentation of their 
draft bill was also flawed. Vel'man and Stalnukhin had initiated and presented the draft law Part III - Chapter 7 
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to the public and parliament without first securing the full support of their party 
Keskerakond. When the draft bill was presented to the legal committee of the Riigikogu 
with the aim to overcome the contradictions with Estonian laws, it was again left 
unsupported even by the initiators' own party. Observers of the process argue that 'there 
was no interest in improving the law' among any of the political parties in the Riigikogu 
(Grigoryan 18/05/2010).  
In a similar attempt to realise constitutional and legal provisions, representatives of the 
Russian Party of Estonia (VEE) have initiated an application for Russian cultural 
autonomy within the framework of the Cultural Autonomy Act (CAA) of 1993. The 
initiative, although originating in and represented by the VEE, is officially pursued by a 
registered non-profit organisation 'Russian Cultural Autonomy' (RCA). This constitutes the 
only substantial attempt to achieve a power division agreement, if only in the form of 
functional autonomy, with the Estonian state. The objective is explicitly embedded into the 
Estonian legal framework, while simultaneously demanding the extension of the law to 
cover all permanent residents who wish to practice cultural autonomy. Moreover, the 
proposal by the RCA envisages changes to the existing CAA in order to include guarantees 
and expanded opportunities for Russian language usage as a 'language of the Russian 
minority', particularly in municipalities with a Russian population; expanded opportunities 
for Russian education as part of Russian cultural autonomy while maintaining state 
provisions for Russian education at all levels of education; and particularly financial 
allocations at national and municipal levels proportionally to the Russian population living 
in the country or municipality (RCA 2011). It is apparent that the RCA's proposal is meant 
to avoid the pitfalls that many Russian-speakers fear are linked to the cultural autonomy 
scheme in Estonia, in particular concerning the institutionalisation of mediating bodies to 
moderate between the Russian-speaking community and the state, and with respect to the 
peril that the state might withdraw other forms of minority support were cultural autonomy 
to be established (Grigoryan 18/05/2010; Astrov 17/05/2010; Poleshchuk 18/12/2009).  
In their proposal, the RCA argues that Russian cultural autonomy in the envisaged form 
would allow solving numerous problems minority members are facing today in practicing 
their language and culture. Among these, the RCA suggests, are the opportunity to 
establish genuine Estonian-Russian representation in the institutional framework of the 
state, but at the same time autonomous of the state, even in political bodies and concerning 
social security. Cultural autonomy is portrayed as a possible form of establishing Part III - Chapter 7 
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interethnic cooperation rather than confrontation. Despite the 'integrationist' wording, 
the RCA's proposal went further than Vel'man's and Stalnukhin's draft law.  
In a first step to establish Russian cultural autonomy, the RCA submitted both an 
application and a proposal on required changes to the existing cultural autonomy act to the 
Ministry of Culture. As a letter by the then Chancellor of Justice documents, the Minister 
repeatedly failed to reply to the application while dealing with other applications for 
cultural autonomy in a much shorter time period (Ingrian Finns and Swedes) (Jõks 2007). 
The Chancellor of Justice argued that he could not take a decision on Russian cultural 
autonomy with the decision being incumbent upon the Minister. He urged the Minister to 
deal with the initiative, which was seen as a (small) success by the initiators of the move 
for Russian cultural autonomy. In the emerging exchange between the initiators and the 
Ministry, which involved litigation over several years, and a later discussion in parliament 
on the issue it transpired that the government was strongly opposed to Russian cultural 
autonomy. Initially, arguments against the RCA included formal criteria, which the RCA 
were said not to have fulfilled. Government officials later had to admit though that this was 
not the case.  
Alexander Astrov, a lecturer at the Central European University, who has closely observed 
the process of application for Russian cultural autonomy, argues formal reasons did not 
necessarily play the most important role in the decisions against Russian cultural 
autonomy:  
'So with cultural autonomy it was again the Minister of Culture in the end, who 
explicitly said that there are no formal reasons for the rejection of the application, but 
[that] at the moment it [i.e. Russian cultural autonomy] was politically undesirable. 
Because, I think she said that openly, that if this cultural autonomy is created, it can 
potentially be used by "anti-state forces"' (Astrov 17/05/2010).  
It is remarkable how openly Estonian authorities have expressed their deep mistrust 
towards institutional structures of representation of the Russian community in Estonia, 
even against Estonian constitutional guarantees and legislation, which includes Russian 
cultural autonomy as one of the 'historical' cultures of Estonia. According to Astrov, what 
happened with regard to Russian cultural autonomy is that  
'the issue is deliberately taken out of the liberal field and it is presented as kind of an 
emergency political issue, and the moment this is done, [the topic] is out of discussion' 
(Astrov 17/05/2010).  Part III - Chapter 7 
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By means of securitising even those demands from Russian-speaking activists that are 
founded on fundamental institutions of the Estonian state, the latter has repeatedly 
legitimised the lack of implementation of several minority rights provisions.  
Russian Cultural Autonomy and especially its leading activist Stanislav Cherepanov have 
not ceased their activities though. In the election campaign for the 2011 national elections 
the issue was again among the priorities of the VEE (VEE 2011). This is interesting, as the 
application for Russian cultural autonomy stands in stark contrast to the widely held view 
among Russian-speakers that the Cultural Autonomy scheme is neither practicable nor 
desirable from the Russian and Russian-speaking minorities' perspective. While the RCA's 
proposal for necessary legal changes which accompany the application for Russian cultural 
autonomy addresses most of the concerns, including the problem that the CAA does not 
include guarantees for specific amounts of financial support that it currently grants to 
Estonian citizens only, and that it constitutes a 'trap' for the Russian minority. It is a widely 
held belief among Russian-speakers that institutionalised cultural autonomy could be used 
by the state to transfer all minority related responsibilities to the cultural autonomy bodies, 
which alone would not be provided with the means to sustain all minority institutions 
(Lyagu 19/05/2010; Grigorjan 18/05/2010; Astrov 17/05/2010). The RCA's proposal also 
does not address the minority members' concern that has grown out of their experience 
with minority parties in parliament 1995-2003; many are convinced that the 
institutionalisation of 'mediating institutions' to communicate between minority members 
and the state would be prone to malpractice and manipulation (Lyagu 19/05/2010; Kõrvalt 
19/05/2010; Astrov 17/05/2010). It is also important to remember that many minority 
members support integration that is based on all members' inclusion into the political and 
social community rather than group representation that fosters segregation (Lyagu 
19/05/2010; Grigorjan 18/05/2010).  
Given the disputes around cultural autonomy in the Russian-speaking community, 
observers argue that the motivation for the RCA's move was to find out 'how far [they] 
would get with this' (Astrov 17/05/2010; similarly Grigorjan 18/05/2010), and to 
demonstrate, domestically and potentially internationally, that Russians in Estonia would 
not be allowed to practice their constitutional right to Cultural Autonomy. At the same 
time, the two initiatives represent the attempts of Russian-speaking politicians to 
circumvent the negative consequences of the Estonian citizenship policies without 
targeting these directly.  Part III - Chapter 7 
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Since the early 1990s, even moderate Estonians, especially in Keskerakond, have 
discussed the immediate and unconditional naturalisation of all permanent residents (the so 
called 'zero option' for citizenship). Chapter 5 showed that these debates were to no avail. 
Even very specific demands regarding individual aspects of the citizenship legislation or 
measures to change the linguistic requirements for naturalisation, which could effectively 
reduce mass statelessness, were discussed. An example is Keskerakond's draft bill to 
abrogate the possibility of revocation of citizenship from naturalised persons who were 
born in Estonia after 26 February 1992. Under current law, citizenship can be revoked 
from anybody in case of 'violent action against the Republic of Estonia' (Amendment 
2009). In the aftermath of the 2007 Bronze Soldier events, which were framed as anti-state 
activities by majority politicians, this was a serious concern of many young people.
25 The 
draft law failed due to the different ideological preferences of the ruling coalition (Sõtnik 
04/08/2009). This draft, however, was one of the rare attempts of minority politicians to 
come forward with minority-related legal initiatives in parliament. 
Essentially, all such changes to citizenship or related legislation are perceived as direct 
challenges to the ideological consensus of the Estonian elite, and therefore of the Estonian 
state. Despite the categorical rejection of any changes to Estonia's citizenship regime, some 
political actors still openly demand such changes, as mentioned above.  
Because of the demands for an end to statelessness and for official status for the Russian 
language, organisations such as the ERSGR are seen by the Estonian authorities as 
challenging the foundations of Estonian independent statehood. Although the organisation 
has continuously raised social concerns with respect to vulnerable groups in Estonia, it is 
viewed by the authorities through the lens of the discourse on the 'Russian' threat. It is 
apparent that the demands raised by the ERSGR differ from demands for inclusion or 
responsiveness raised by other minority representatives only in degree, if at all. However, 
the outspokenness of Mishin and other activists representing Russian citizens permanently 
residing in Estonia has made them the subject also of criminal investigations (Poleshchuk 
14/04/2009). 
The legitimacy of claims for social security for Russian citizens, as well as stateless 
permanent residents in Estonia is undermined by the political discourse that portrays these 
demands as unjustified, and in some cases as 'projects' of the Russian special services 
                                                 
25 Although the courts did not charge anyone with 'anti-state activism' in relation to the riots, the situation is a 
far cry from giving legal security to naturalised persons.  Part III - Chapter 7 
 
189
rather than based on the needs of Russian-speakers in Estonia.
26 The dismal prospects 
for activists calling for some form of institutionalisation of Russian beyond the existing 
level or even 'bi-nationalism' of the Estonian state, and the potential initiation of criminal 
prosecution, lead other minority activists to keep away from making such claims in public. 
One of my respondents, whose identity I decided not to disclose in relation to this 
statement, directly referred to the argument of the Estonian security police in its annual 
report:  
'If you read the security police report [from 2007], it clearly states that the "zero" 
variant for citizenship, official bilingualism and equal rights are projects of the Russian 
special services in Estonia. And I think, I'm afraid, that it's not only the opinion of our 
security forces, but that this is a kind of consensus of our establishment. So that's why 
I'm not to propagate these ideas in public too loudly. […] Of course, 99% of our [work 
is] related to equal rights […], but I think citizenship is the key issue'. 
The assertion of the Estonian state that all demands for equal rights, improvements in 
relation to citizenship, language and education legislation were steered by Russia's 
propaganda has undermined almost all attempts of those Russian-speaking activists who 
worked on an 'integrationist' agenda; attempts to establish dialogue with Estonian political 
actors, to generate an understanding among them that the current situation is detrimental to 
social stability and contradicts Estonia's claims and promises of the integration strategy, as 
well as specific policy recommendations have been rejected by the Estonian authorities. 
The demands raised by Russian-speaking activists and politicians over the past two 
decades were elaborated in direct response to Estonian nationalising legislation as well as 
rooted in the ideas of common statehood of Estonians and Soviet-era migrants that were 
developed within the Popular Front. The official stance that such demands were based on 
Russian propaganda dismisses the crucial role of Estonian domestic policies for the 
generation of these demands; it also neglects that Russian-speakers have their own reasons 
to organise politically. This neglect makes a solution of the problems unlikely for the near 
future.  
The assumption that boundaries between Estonia's Russian-speaking population and the 
Russian state are being blurred by virtually all organisational contacts or cooperation is 
therefore an impediment to much of the political work of Russian-speakers in Estonia. This 
is even more problematic and becoming increasingly difficult as the withdrawal or denial 
                                                 
26 See the KAPO annual report of 2007: '"Projects" that Russian special services have, so-to-say, put on 
standby – the claiming official bilingualism in Estonia, the zero-level citizenship, the so-called equal rights 
(that basically means the right to work on any position and in any public institution). These claims have, in 
one form or another, been made already earlier, most recently at the meetings in Narva during the April 
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of resources for many Russian-speaking organisations increases their dependence on 
kin-state support. The Russkiy Mir Foundation, the International Council of Russian 
Compatriots and the Russian Embassy to Estonia, are among the sponsors of some 
Russian-speakers' organisations' activities.
27 As a result, the accusations have undermined 
Russian-speakers' organisations directly by making the funding situation difficult for them. 
Even the acceptance of support from sponsors who are based in Russia is often portrayed 
as suspicious (KAPO 2009, p.12). Since Estonia's support for Russian-speaking political 
and civic organisations is marginal, several of the organisations whose representatives I 
interviewed did not receive any funding from the state.  
Another problem for Russian-speaking activists, the development of a clear political 
agenda, is also exacerbated by the particular dynamics of the Estonian minority policies. It 
has been particularly difficult for minority activists to react coherently to policy 
developments which have changed over time, if only insignificantly and not in character. 
Initially, Russian-speakers' hopes were high that the negotiations with European 
institutions in the preparation for Estonia's accession to the EU would allay the hostile 
language and citizenship policies of the 1990s, and with some reason, as under 
international influence several amendments to the law on citizenship revised the language 
requirements for naturalisation as well as the law on local elections. At the same time, the 
'compensation' of such legal improvements for Russian-speakers led to the deterioration of 
rights in other areas. Later, Estonia's signals to further societal integration by implementing 
a national long-term strategy to alleviate Russian-speakers' disadvantaged position in 
society led many Russian-speakers to expect improvement of their situation. They also 
believed that Estonia would not be accepted to the EU while it exhibited outstanding 
domestic interethnic problems, in which language disputes were a major factor (Kõrvalt 
19/05/2010; Grigorjan/Ivanov 18/05/2010; Dusman 16/12/2009). By 2004, when Estonia 
became a member of the EU and external pressure lifted, the signals were still ambiguous. 
A second integration programme was in the pipeline, promising further improvements, 
while the legal situation as such was very much consolidated. In effect, integration and 
particularly language policies have constituted a 'moving target' for Russian-speaking 
activists, who have been unsure at what to aim in their campaigns and protests. As a result, 
hardly any group has engaged in tailored legal initiatives or protest campaigns to change 
language legislation in Estonia. 
                                                 
27 These institutions are Russia-based and primarily support activities and organisations that aim at the 
'consolidation of [the] Russian diaspora, coordination of activities of public associations and organizations 
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The lack of inclusion into the strategies to foster integration has caused frustration and 
anger among Russian-speakers. Some minority members reject learning and using 
Estonian altogether. Grigorjan observes that more and more people say that  
'we don't want to study the language anymore, language is for conversation! If we were 
equal, then we would try and learn the language, but if this [Estonian language learning] 
is happening by force, we don't want it' (Grigorjan 18/05/2010).  
Sociological studies confirm that there is a tendency among part of the Russian-speaking 
population that rejects the form and direction of the integration process altogether, and this 
group is consolidating, if not growing (Vetik 17/04/2009).  
In parallel to such sentiments, some Russian-speakers' representatives have resumed to 
mobilisation on the basis of ethnic identity rather than groupness due to structural 
problems. The constraints on minority participation are not only about the protection of the 
cultural nation of Estonians from mixing with others, but also about the defence against a 
potential aggressor. This all makes the construction of a 'Russian' identity attractive to 
some activists, and the most impressive resource Russian-speakers can currently draw 
upon, through actual contacts with and sponsoring from Russia or through emphasising the 
Russianness of the group in cultural terms. However, the minorities' support for this degree 
of segregation and deliberate self-marginalisation entailed in this approach is generally 
low. Particularly after the April events of 2007, some of the political actors whose agendas 
have already tended towards segregation have increased their rhetoric and activities aiming 
to establish a Russian-speakers' identity, rather than attempting to change the approach 
towards integration represented in the state's institutions. This development is interesting 
as it does not call for an alignment with the Russian Federation as activists did in the early 
1990s, but represents attempts to establish a local Russian-speakers' identity and political 
defence. Because of the heterogeneity of the Russian-speaking group and because ethnic 
and linguistic identities vary among Russian-speakers, these political activists play up the 
Soviet-era collective commemoration, which is an emotional instance that unites large 
parts of the Russian-speakers.  
Particularly during and since the Bronze Soldier crisis, Russian speaking politicians have 
attempted to ground a 'Russian-speaking identity' on the collective memory of World War 
II as a signifier and positive foundation of the Russian-speaking community as well as their 
political representation (Astrov 17/05/2010). Historical memory has crystallised as the 
central theme of the group-based political identity formation of Russian-speaking activists Part III - Chapter 7 
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since the mid- to late-2000s. While an uncoordinated social movement evolved around 
the controversy over the monument, some political activists have attempted to capitalise on 
the existing movement for their own political aims. The movement around the monument 
had started as a collective commemoration of selective historic memories deviating from 
the official Estonian state and majority's view. With political actors attempting to put 
themselves in front of the emerging movement, it was turned into a new form of collective 
action, characterised by the politicisation of commemoration during the debates 2002-04 
and the luridly called 'war of monuments' (LICHR 2008a). To be sure, there had been 
disagreements about Soviet and Estonian war monuments in the 1990s (ibid.). However, it 
was in the process of the debates among the Russian-speaking community, and with 
political entrepreneurs entering the stage, that the very process of commemorating became 
so politicised. With the demonstrations of commemorators growing with respect to the 
number of participants and not being met by any action or even attention on the side of the 
authorities, this was interpreted by Russian-speakers as ignorance towards their cause, 
adding to their frustration not only with respect to the question of commemoration, but the 
integration process in general (Astrov 17/05/2010).  
Groups that had formed in parallel to the weakly organised movement entered the stage 
and attempted to exploit the situation and put themselves at the head of the movement, 
such as Nochnoj dozor. Some of the activists involved are said to have been receiving 
financial support for their activities from Russia (Tydyakov/Dornemann 19/05/2010; 
Brüggemann & Kasekamp 2008). Much of the politicisation of the protest was in fact 
based on direct confrontation between Estonia and Russia, where for the first time in years 
the media reported widely on the situation of the 'Russian diaspora' in Estonia. Individual 
local actors in Estonia even stood in close contact with one of the notoriously nationalistic 
youth movements of the Russian Federation, 'Nashi' ('Ours'), and received substantial 
media attention in both countries. Unsurprisingly, minority political activists such as 
Dmitri Klenski, Dmitri Linter, or Maksim Reva, who have tried to benefit from the protests 
and the Russian support, have been accused by other activists of trying to impose their 
own, rent-seeking agenda on the majority of Russian-speaking activists (Tydyakov 
19/05/2010; also Astrov 17/05/2010).
28  
                                                 
28 Linter and Reva have become known in the context of the monument, when they attempted to unite and 
lead the loose movement into a coherent actor; other members of Nochnoj dozor however have argued that 
Linter and Reva were never really part of the movement (Tydyakov/Dornemann 19/05/2010). Klenski is a 
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It was in this context that activists who tried to position themselves as leaders of the 
movement or who were sympathetic to it argued that the 'Bronze soldier' monument in 
Tallinn, having symbolic importance for many but being placed increasingly under threat 
by Estonian nationalist attacks, needed a positive foundation to be defended, and attempted 
to use this foundation also as the basis of a new group identity for political action. In 2006, 
VEE and ERSGR initiated a discussion on the foundations of which to build the future of 
the already disputed monument of the 'Bronze Soldier' in the centre of Tallinn.
29 The 
original argument pursued by VEE and ERSGR was an attempt to frame the monument as 
a symbol which all people living in Estonia should be able to support, on the basis of anti-
fascism. The argument was of course too narrow and one-sided a perspective, unable to 
appeal to Estonians, who generally viewed the monument in relation to what in Estonian 
historical discourse is called Soviet 'occupation'. Similarly, earlier attempts to give new 
meaning to the monument by replacing a plaque dating from Soviet times, which devoted 
the statue to the 'liberation of Tallinn', with a less provocative meaning referring to 'the 
fallen of World War Two', had not helped make this a monument that Estonians valued 
(Burch & Smith 2007, p.919). With the sentiments of Estonians in this matter well-known, 
the sincerity of the attempt to make commemoration inclusive is therefore somewhat 
doubtful.  
Other activists suggested even less accommodating reasons for the monument to remain in 
place as a symbol for Russian victory, demanding the acknowledgement of their 'argument' 
that Estonia 'has always been Russian' (Tydyakov 19/05/2010). Proponents of this 
perspective even devised claims from their view, including, a year later, the demand for a 
Russian autonomous region in parts of Tallinn (Dornemann/Tydyakov 19/05/2010; 
Grigorjan 18/05/2010). Alarmed by these currents among the people demonstrating, 
Estonian authorities tightened their policies. When the monument central to the debates 
was removed in 2007, protests erupted in the centre of Tallinn. These, however, were soon 
suppressed successfully by the police, with follow-up activities, particularly involving the 
KAPO, helping keep many young people away from organising in any form (Ivanov 
20/04/2009). 
The debate around the monument itself waned when Russian-speakers, still very angry 
about their exclusion from the debate on the relocation of the monument, eventually 
                                                 
29 In a public statement, both organisations appealed to the Estonian authorities to work against the 'ethnic 
hatred' that had been incited around the monument and protect it as 'practically only remaining symbol for 
the victory over Hitler's Germany in the Second World War in Estonia. It is a unique place, where on Victory 
Day all of us – Russians, Estonians, Jews, Ukrainians, Belarusians – can bring flowers to our fathers and 
grandfathers, the liberators, who have died saving the world from fascism' (Delfi 13/06/2006).  Part III - Chapter 7 
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accepted the monument's new location in Tallinn's military cemetery outside of the city 
centre. However, after 2007, some minority activists attempted to mobilise political 
support based on the commemoration of the Soviet victory of the Second World War 
(Astrov 17/05/2010). Moreover, the same activists – most notably Dmitri Klenski, and 
various political organisations related to him, e.g. Spisok Klenskogo (List 'Klenski' on 
which he stood as a candidate for the Tallinn city council elections in 2009)– who 
attempted to mobilise on this basis have also worked towards the 'preservation of our 
national roots' or 'Russianness' ('russkost'') (IA Regnum 19/12/2010). In effect, these 
activists play on the overlap of Soviet and Russian (cultural) identity. Despite their 
visibility though, their impact on policy making is negligible, due to the lack of political 
structures through which they would be able to channel and bring forward their agendas.  
While of course commemoration is an important issue for many Russian-speakers, it is 
neither the most pressing nor the core issue for them. Similarly, the preservation of their 
cultural identity is also central for many Russian-speakers, however not necessarily by 
emphasising their Russianness, but by demanding institutions that allow them to practice 
and hand down their language and traditions which are not accounted for in the Estonian 
framework. 
The growing role of Russian-speaking political activists in the public debate who mobilise 
on the mix of ethnic and historical identity is observed with concern by those activists who 
still try to achieve policy improvements by debating these with representatives of the 
Estonian authorities. The increasing visibility of political actors who play up the 
boundaries between Estonians and Russian-speakers is a clear indicator for the weakening 
of other Russian-speaking political forces that characterised the past decade. It follows 
from these developments that Russian-speakers have to decide whether to pursue an 
'integrationist' agenda, which has been largely unsuccessful, especially after EU accession, 
or whether to follow a segregationist approach. The next section discusses Russian-
speakers' positions on this question and draws some preliminary conclusions about the 
development of the political representation of Russian-speakers in Estonia over the last 
twenty years.  
7.5 Panacea or predicament? Representation on the basis of ethnicity 
Russian-speaking activists in Estonia have engaged with how interethnic relations are 
shaped through policies, and in political activities and agendas communicated their 
preferences for the political institution-building in the country. When Russian-speaking Part III - Chapter 7 
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political actors initially cooperated with Estonians in the Popular Front, the questions 
of the future status of Soviet-era migrants and their language(s) in an independent Estonia 
were still being negotiated. At the time, most important concerns of Russian-speakers were 
not interethnic, but had to do with their unpreparedness for the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, and the 'political bankruptcy' of those groups who claimed to support and defend 
the rights of non-Estonians (Semenov 1995, p.239). With nationalising policies beginning 
to shape the role of Russian-speakers in clearly negative terms, minority activists began 
building political structures to represent their heterogeneous group.  
Although the adoption of the restorationist ideology and its implementation in the first 
legislative acts and constitution generated a very large group of those who were directly 
affected in their political rights in relation to others, many Russian-speakers assumed this 
was still a temporary decision and that Estonia would eventually adopt the 'zero option'. 
Similarly, the leeway for the Russian language in the first law led many Russian-speakers 
to believe in a continuity of Russian in Estonia. As a result of the Russian-speakers' 
preferences for a consensus with the Estonians, hardliner positions that sought an 
alignment with Russia soon declined, and Russian-speakers were politically represented 
largely by proponents of an 'integrationist' approach to the development of Estonian state 
and society. Overall, minority attempts to establish political and civic structures from 
outside party politics to represents their specific needs and interests have not been accepted 
by the Estonian governments and state officials, or where they used to be accepted, such 
structures and access points for dialogue have been abolished, reframed or undermined in 
the second half of the 2000s.  
Despite the changes in the development of Estonian policies and the structural changes 
among the Russian-speaking population with regard to citizenship statutes and Estonian 
language competence, the overall aims of Russian-speaking representatives have remained 
largely unchanged. Over the past twenty years, the social and political grievances of the 
group have not changed significantly. They concern primarily the lack of Estonian 
citizenship and criteria as well as procedures for naturalisation, the role of Russian-
speakers' representation in the representative bodies of the political system, the 
opportunities for speaking Russian in public and of Russian language education. Although 
the difficult relations between the Estonian and the Russian states hamper the establishing 
of a trusting and supportive relationship between Estonians and Russian-speakers, this has 
not been the primary concern of Russian-speakers in Estonia. Similarly, despite the 
significance of historical commemoration or 'historical justice' for the exclusion of Part III - Chapter 7 
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Russian-speakers from the political community and the ideology on which the state is 
founded, this did not use to be of primary importance for Russian-speakers as concern for 
their political representation. The importance for Russian-speakers of the latter grew only 
when the 'war of monuments' politicised their collective commemoration to the extent 
which eventually led to the removal of an important historical-symbolical site of Russian-
speaking community representation in Estonia.  
Throughout the two decades of Russian-speakers' political representation, the approaches 
to Estonian statehood in response to the grievances have differed among different actors. 
Since the 'hardliners' of the early 1990s have disappeared, 'integrationists' dominated the 
Russian-speakers' political scene. Certainly their understanding of 'integration' has always 
differed from the official concept. Still, some of these political actors engaged directly with 
the authorities, attempted to negotiate policies and communicate the group's problems in a 
non-confrontational way. Others, such as the parliamentary parties, opted for a more 
contentious way, hoping that they could build on their political strength. Integration was 
understood by all political actors, decisively, as equal political participation of minority 
members in building Estonia's state and society. Because of the restrictions of the Estonian 
elite's consensus on Estonian statehood, based on restorationism and permeating the 
Estonian political institutions, all attempts to safeguard Russian-speakers' political and 
social participation constituted a threat to this 'consensus'. They demanded more than 
Estonians were prepared to give. From the Estonian perspective, where the situation of a 
third of the population being stateless in the early 1990s and the current number of 8% of 
the population without any citizenship at all is perceived to be a 'natural' phenomenon 
rather than a decision made deliberately at a certain time on certain grounds by certain 
people, these Russian-speakers' demands go far beyond what Russian-speakers can expect, 
according to Estonians.  
Over time, the lack of political membership of a substantial part of the group and the 
heterogeneity of it not only affected the group's participation in issues related to the 
questions of citizenship and language use, but their potential contribution to the political 
process generally. By the late 2000s, the grievance has become much more general: 'Our 
voice is worth nothing to the government' (Grigorjan 18/05/2010). Certainly this holds 
even more where minority issues are at stake. The exclusion from decision-making led to 
the gradual deconstruction of Russian-speakers' group institutions, first of all in the realm 
of political life, where the political representation of Russian-speakers was effectively 
undermined until it ceased to provide for actual representation. Moreover, as seen by the Part III - Chapter 7 
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example of Russian schooling, although the naturalisation of increasing numbers of 
Russian-speakers, their formal political membership did not lead to an increase in their say 
on minority institutions and minority rights. As a result, not only in political terms, but also 
with regard to social interaction the Russian-speaking group remained excluded, and 
minority preferences were increasingly excluded from policy-making. This was despite 
alleviations in naturalisation legislation. The gradual loss of community institutions, 
including the right to use Russian in many public interactions, depending on where one 
lives, and Russian education, in combination with the Bronze Soldier events, increased the 
perceived threat of cultural assimilation and loss of linguistic and group identity. As a 
consequence, political actors aiming to represent Russian-speakers increasingly focused on 
utilising group identity institutions in their political activities. 
The benefits and detriments of an 'ethnic' representation are a point of discussion among 
Russian-speakers and particularly among political activists. They disagree over the 
question of how much ethnic mobilisation is acceptable. On the one hand there are those 
who argue that without demonstrating power as a group which is formed along lines that 
'Estonians understand', i.e. criteria that mirror the Estonian concept of group-based 
sovereignty, there will be no change. These political activists are convinced that 'saving the 
Russians is the Russian's business', as one newspaper article was entitled in 2010 (IA 
Regnum 19/12/2010), suggesting that no change is to be expected if minority members 
continue to wait until the majority is prepared to give up their privileges. Following this 
approach, the political programmes that mobilise on the basis of a Russian or Soviet 
identity, aim at establishing a different consensus with respect to the ownership of the state 
and the esteem of different groups in the state. Although their aims differ only in degree 
from the aims of political actors working on inclusion and responsiveness, it is the 
difference in degree that openly challenges some of the consequences of the definition of 
Estonian statehood: These more 'radical' groups demand the recognition of Russian-
speakers and, particularly difficult for Estonians, of Russians as part of the state-forming 
entity; claim language rights which would undermine the unique link between the Estonian 
'nation' and linguistic sovereignty on the territory of the country; and call into question the 
idea of continuity of Estonian statehood, by highlighting the Soviet times as part of 
Estonian and Estonia's population's history.  
Although many Russian-speakers do not agree with such a confrontational approach in 
general and they wish to achieve a compromise with Estonians, increasingly even those 
people argue that under current conditions, in order to achieve some change, such forms of Part III - Chapter 7 
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ethnic mobilisation are the only way for pushing majority-minority relations into a 
different direction:  
'No matter how I sometimes disagree with [people like] Klenski – but let's put it this 
way: I recognise their utility. Someone has to rock the boat; otherwise it's never 
changing' (Astrov 17/05/2010).  
The understanding behind this reasoning is that minority political activism is noticed by 
Estonian governments only in cases where the minority representatives appear strong. It is 
clear to many that the Russian-speakers are not strong politically, and therefore can easily 
be ignored by the Estonian authorities. As long as substantial parts of the Russian-speaking 
population are not eligible to vote in national elections, the group will not constitute a 
political force with which the Estonians must reckon. Therefore, their strength has to be 
generated out of the group, in the form of a convincing (political) identity.  
Many of my respondents expressed the difficulties they had in deciding, whether they 
supported, in principle, political representation on 'ethnic' grounds. On the one hand, some 
argue that, as institutionalised politics have not opened up to Russian-speakers 
significantly over the past two decades, it was hard or even impossible to challenge the 
established ethno constitutional system including its consequential policies devised in 
correspondence with the notion of nation-state from 'within', that is to initiate change 
towards the inclusion of minority members and minority interests into the general spectrum 
of interests represented in the political arena. Minority representatives even go so far to 
argue that 'this is how [the political institutions] are structured: not to let this [i.e. the 
inclusion of minority interests] happen' (Astrov 17/05/2010). A logical conclusion from 
this perspective is that any significant change would only be feasible if the structures of 
minority exclusion were to be challenged from outside of mainstream politics, by what 
would have to be powerful minority representation. The events of 2007 showed the degree 
of frustration among Russian-speakers. They made many Russian-speaking activists, who 
had formerly opposed ethnicity- or language-based parties, agree that some form of 
explicit minority representation is needed (Kõrvalt 19/05/2010). 
On the other hand, there are those activists who stress that any form of 'peaceful co-
existence' or even integration with Estonian society is possible only if the minorities and 
the majority engage in a dialogue at all stages of the integration process (Grigorjan 
18/05/2010; Dusman 16/12/2009). At the same time, many minority members do not 
consider it 'European' or 'modern' to make policies on the basis of salient identities, but Part III - Chapter 7 
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argue that ideological orientation should be decisive for a person's political choices 
(Lyagu 19/05/2010; Kõrvalt 19/05/2010; Rosenfeldt 07/12/2009; Sõtnik 04/08/2009). 
Sõtnik is convinced that 'the time of ethnic parties [in Estonia] is over' (Sõtnik 
04/08/2009). Interestingly, while most respondents who support this view, for ideological 
or strategic reasons, are close to Keskerakond, not all consider the party to offer the means 
necessary to overcome the minority's problems. Several respondents, including members 
of Keskerakond, declared that ideological orientation can only be the fundament of 
political choices under what they called 'normal' conditions, by which they meant a system 
that provides for a stable political representation of minority members. In contrast many 
expressed their opinion that Estonia's 'political system is absolutely abnormal from the 
point of view of minorities' (Poleshchuk 18/12/2009). Apart from general doubts about 
ethnic representation, however, critics of an ethnically defined political representation also 
directly refer to the experience with the Russian-speaking parties in the Riigikogu 1995-
2003:  
'Activists of the Russian parties then acted only for their own interests, but were not 
interested in pursuing an ethnic agenda, not to mention achieving any change. […] The 
Russians realised that they do not gain anything from the fact that Russians are 
represented in parliament – this does not give anything to the population' (Lyagu, 
19/05/2010).  
Kõrvalt even comes to the conclusion that  
'there is no future for a Russian political force, because all possibilities [were] used, and 
[they were not] used [in a] very good [way]' (19/05/2010).  
Overall, minority parties find themselves in a dilemma: on the one hand, their appeal to 
voters is based on these voters' perceptions of their own situation as being determined by 
their group belonging and the voters' conclusion that only a group-based party can help 
solve them. Importantly, although this group is not necessarily framed on the basis of 
ethnicity or another salient identity, the specific policies of the Estonian state make them 
de facto run along such lines. On the other hand, due to the very marginality of Russian-
speakers' voices in Estonian politics, support for a Russian-speakers' party does not offer 
good prospects. Essentially, minority politics are politics for those who are marginalised, 
and based on the resources of the marginalised, which is what voters know as well. In my 
interviews, Russian-speaking representatives frequently expressed the view that ethnicity- 
or language-based parties capitalise on society's divide, which makes them prone to benefit 
from the divide they allegedly oppose or try to overcome. So while there is a demand for a 
political representation of Russian-speakers in form of a minority party, seen by many as Part III - Chapter 7 
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currently the only possible force to bring up minority issues in the realm of politics, the 
existing parties and other actors are rejected by most Russian-speaking voters as 
ambivalent political actors, unable even to cooperate among each other and so far 
unsuccessful in achieving any improvement in the lives of Russian-speakers in the country.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, viewed from a minority position, the situation of minority politics and 
minority members' inclusion into political decision-making is complicated: the political 
system was set up and has since been developed one-sidedly to the advantage of the 
majority group and their interests. While during the 1990s, the structures of the political 
system were still in the process of defining the boundaries of the community, they now 
appear to be even less open to change than they had been during this time. The lack of 
sufficient space for minority members to participate in politics, the shortcomings among 
the minorities' political self-organisation and the ignorance of the state towards politically-
oriented civil society organisations as well as the experience of direct attacks against 
minority group structures has left the group unable to develop sustainable and powerful 
representation within the existing social and political framework. This situation has left 
little space for minority members to participate on equal grounds, or, in fact, on any 
grounds in the political sphere. This form of exclusion makes it hard, perhaps impossible, 
to initiate change without the help of majority allies who would be committed to improving 
interethnic relations as well as the situation of minority members and their democratic 
inclusion into politics. In their evaluations of the current situation and anticipation of 
developments in the near future, Russian-speakers by and large do not expect the 
consolidated Estonian political actors to be ready and willing to accept Russian-speakers as 
equal political agenda-setters or even decision-makers, particularly in the realm of minority 
issues.  
Minority agency has been expressed in an array of Russian-speakers' political activities in 
Estonia over the past two decades. The minority's political agendas reflect the deliberation 
of common grievances, a variety of projections for a future Estonian society and state, and 
changing and conflicting evaluations of the political opportunity structure. Overall, these 
attest to a very heterogeneous group, which has had difficulties, but nonetheless at times 
managed to form a collective actor. In their conduct, Russian-speakers have applied several 
strategies to impact the political structures which determine their status as a non-dominant 
group. In framing their agendas, some minority activists have aligned their demands with Part III - Chapter 7 
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the deep structures of national self-determination, demanding recognition, rights and 
participation on the basis of group belonging. Others have attempted to enforce the group's 
political participation by actualising the resources of democratisation and Europeanisation. 
In both cases, these have not supported minority participation in the integration process on 
minority terms. The intersecting and mutually consolidating structures of nation-state-
building analysed in chapters 5 and 6 mean that there are currently no viable opportunity 
structures for meaningful minority participation. Where minority political actors create 
such opportunities, these are altered by majority adjustments of the institutional 
frameworks that determine the norms, meaning and sanctioning of action, such as by 
'securitising' the minority issue. Minority political activists were unsuccessful in their 
attempts to build structures which would constitute an alternative for minority members to 
socially and politically assimilate with the majority or remain socially and politically 
marginalised. Their agency remains largely reproductive. Minority actors have so far been 
unable to sufficiently problematise majority-minority relations and therefore their agency 
lacks the transformative element of social change. Part III - Chapter 8 
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Chapter 8: The Hungarian minority as a political actor  
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter investigates the political initiatives and agendas of the Hungarian 
minority in Slovakia. As the discussions of chapters 4, 5 and 6 demonstrated, 
Hungarian minority members were formally included into the political community 
and even cooperated with majority parties for several years in government. This 
chapter examines the foundations of Hungarian political activism and sheds light on 
the obstacles that hampered the political cooperation with majority actors. 
Furthermore, the chapter briefly discusses the ambiguous relationship of the 
Hungarian minority's political representation and the Hungarian kin-state. The 
chapter concludes by arguing that under current conditions Hungarians do not render 
possible an alternative to ethnicity-based representation.  
The most direct strategy to represent the Hungarian minority in political decision 
making and agenda setting has been to participate in the legislative and in the 
executive bodies of the political system. Regional concentration allows minority 
members to send minority representatives to the national parliament. Even before 
Slovakia's independence, the Hungarians had organised into 'Hungarian' branches of 
the Verejnost' proti násiliu (Public Against Violence, VPN) revolutionary movement. 
To date, members of the Hungarian community are said to virtually exclusively 
support parties whose representatives and members are part of the Hungarian 
minority and who style themselves as Hungarian or minority parties.
1 Because of 
this, their participation in parliament has been relatively stable, although no 
affirmative means exist which would guarantee the Hungarians' participation in 
national (or local) politics. Based on the provisions of proportional representation, 
the Hungarian parties benefit from the community's high regional concentration as 
well as the strong group identification of Hungarians in Slovakia. However, as I 
                                                 
1 Although this claim cannot be substantiated fully by research, political scientists in Slovakia argue 
that the election results for Hungarian parties at national, regional and local level correspond with the 
proportion of Hungarians in respective electoral districts (Gyárfášová 17/06/2009; Mezešnikov 
14/04/2008).  Part III - Chapter 8 
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argue in this chapter, while this form of inclusion and representation gives 
Hungarians a good position to pursue their political agendas, their real struggle for 
political inclusion lies in the question of consensus formation between Slovaks and 
Hungarians, and the minority's inclusion in the political community.  
8.2 Formation and developments of Hungarian political parties in 
Slovakia 
Hungarians and Slovaks formed a caretaker government between the revolution and 
the first post-socialist elections (Innes 2001). These shared political activities 
allowed for inter-ethnic co-operation among the more liberal forces in Slovak 
politics. Initially, members of the joint VPN movement wanted to build on this 
cooperation in order to institutionalise the co-existence of the different groups. Many 
Slovak and Hungarian members of the VPN favoured the establishment of a twin-
party system, in order to build an (ethnically) integrated party system, while allowing 
both Slovaks and Hungarians to generate ideas and strategies on their respective 
communities' needs independently. The idea was to form a Christian-democratic, a 
liberal and a socio-democratic party with a Slovak and a Hungarian division each. 
This project failed, however, due to the refusal of the Slovak Christian Democrats to 
coalesce with their Hungarian equivalent, and because on the Hungarian side no 
socio-democratic party emerged. Instead, a 'Hungarian' party without a clear 
ideological standpoint aiming to represent the Hungarian community as a whole, on 
minority nationalistic grounds, was formed (Öllös 23/09/2009; Csergo 2007). As a 
result, Slovaks and Hungarians developed a party system that is divided along ethnic 
group lines up until today.  
Despite the formation of group-specific political representation, Hungarian political 
representation is not homogeneous, but has generated a number of different political 
parties over the course of the past two decades, which reflect different ideological 
orientations within the Hungarian community. Generally, however, all parties have 
the shared aim of ensuring the Hungarians' inclusion into the political community. 
Many individual movement groups emerged from the VPN movement. Among these 
were four Hungarian political groups: the liberal Független Magyar Kezdeményezés Part III - Chapter 8 
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(Independent Hungarian Initiative, FMK), which became the first party in 
independent Slovakia in 1992, i.e. the Magyar Polgári Párt (Hungarian Civic Party, 
MPP) – this party defined itself as liberal; the conservative Magyar 
Keresténydemokrata Mozgalom (Hungarian Christian Democrats Movement, 
MKDM); the movement Együttélés (Coexistence), which did not have a specific 
political ideology but aimed to represent the Hungarian minority as a national group, 
though it largely represented similar Christian and conservative positions; and the 
similarly conservative Magyar Néppárt (Hungarian People's Party, MNP), which 
subsequently merged with Együttélés in January 1992.
2  
For most of the 1990s, Hungarian political representation involved Együttélés, the 
MKDM, and the MPP. Until 1992, the MPP had been a member of the VPN 
government. However, with the rise of the nationalist strand of the VPN movement 
the MPP left, and neither the remaining liberal bloc of the VPN that did not support 
Mečiar, the Občianska demokratická únia (Civic Democratic Union, ODÚ), nor the 
MPP won seats in elections to the Slovak National Council in 1992, however the 
Hungarian minority was still represented by MKDM and Együttélés (Csergo 2007). 
In 1994 the MPP joined an electoral coalition with the other two Hungarian parties to 
form the Magyar Koalíció (Hungarian Coalition, MK). This electoral coalition 
formed the basis for increasing cooperation among the three Hungarian parties in 
parliament and functioned as an opposition force until 1998. With the change of the 
electoral law in 1998, which prohibited post-election party coalitions in an attempt to 
weaken the Mečiar opposition and prevent the Hungarian parties from entering 
parliament altogether, the MK member parties were forced to form a unitary party, 
the Magyar Koalíció Pártja (Hungarian Coalition Party, MKP). Even though the 
changes to the electoral system under Mečiar did not force the parties to merge at the 
local level, the MKP replaced the local branches of the Hungarian parties there also.  
The Hungarian parties of the 1990s maintained their idiosyncratic features within the 
MK and later the MKP by working on inner-party platforms. Programmatic 
disagreements, particularly concerning the overall approach to relations with the 
Slovak parties and the Slovak state were mainly fought about internally, 
                                                 
2 Encyclopaedia of terms and dates related to the Hungarian minority in (Czecho-)Slovakia since 1918 
can be accessed on the website of the Forum Institute (Lexikon 2011).  Part III - Chapter 8 
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guaranteeing a stable representation of the Hungarian minority in Slovak political 
institutions. The Hungarian electorate appreciated this by showing strong support for 
the Hungarian parties in all elections at the national, local and – after 2002 – also at 
the regional level. The representation by a largely unified political force cannot 
disguise that the Hungarian minority is ideologically and socially heterogeneous and 
envisages different scenarios for sharing the state and society with the Slovaks 
(Lampl 24/09/2009). Thus, the parties of the early 1990s and their successor 
platforms represented the three most widely supported approaches respectively.
3  
The civic-liberal strand envisaged a solution that involved the 'companionship' of the 
Slovak and the Hungarian parts of the democratisation movement, and the 
guaranteed participation of Hungarian representatives in the government of the 
emerging country. Essentially, the party envisaged a form of 'consociationalism', 
where certain institutions, among other things a proposed Ministry for Minorities, 
would be charged with the responsibility for minorities. Furthermore, certain aspects 
of minority community life were to be left out of general ideological and political 
disputes, namely the support for minority cultural and civic organisations, minority 
education, and minority media (Szarka 2004, p.92). At the same time, this was not 
envisaged as a form of minority autonomy scheme. Rather, the coexistence of 
Slovaks and Hungarians should be based on comprehensive minority legislation and 
the cooperation between Slovak and Hungarian political partners, as well as the 
common understanding that these minority rights were essential for the peaceful and 
stable development of Slovak democracy (Öllös 23/09/2009; Tóth 23/09/2009; 
Petőcz 23/09/2009).  
In contrast, Együttélés argued that, if anything, this scenario could only be a short-
term solution, while in the long run the protection of the minority community could 
only be guaranteed by the educational and cultural autonomy of the Hungarian group 
                                                 
3 The Hungarian community was never represented by a party that claimed to represent the political 
left. In 1995 a small party was founded by a former and excluded member of Együttélés and with the 
strong support of the then Prime Minister Mečiar, who stood as a – very unsuccessful – candidate in 
the 1998 elections under the name Hungarian People's Party for Reconciliation and Prosperity. In 
2001, the party reorganised as Party of Hungarian Socialists in Slovakia (Szarka 2004, p.96). The 
claim that Mečiar had been involved in setting up one or both of these parties suggests that they were 
meant as a tool to undermine the success of the three more established Hungarian parties. Apart from 
this, political scientist and Hungarian activits László Öllös explains that the leftist section within the 
Hungarian community tended to support the Slovak Communist Party anyway, arguing that there was 
never a real demand for a new Hungarian leftist party (23/09/2009).  Part III - Chapter 8 
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(Szarka 2004). Együttélés became known for its concept of the 'partner nation' that 
aimed to establish far-reaching political self-government of the Hungarians (Csergo 
2007). The party based its argument for strong minority interest representation and 
against the cooperative model envisaged by the MPP at a time when nationalism was 
on the rise in the Slovak party landscape. It only saw feasible a concept of minority 
protection that relied on the strength of the minority, not one that depended on 
cooperative relations between Slovak and Hungarian political forces. When the MPP 
joined the electoral coalition, it essentially dropped its own political model, at least in 
the medium term. Szarka comes to the conclusion that Együttélés's concept for a 
stringent minority block has decisively influenced the power relations between the 
Slovak political forces and the Hungarian minority representation. On the one hand, 
it united the Hungarian parties into one strong political force; on the other hand, it 
circumvented a development that would have allowed the Mečiar-government to pull 
the rug from under the Hungarian political representation, turning it into a 'hopeless, 
defensive position' (Szarka 2004, p.94).  
The MKDM was the largest party of the three in terms of supporters and from the 
second half of the 1990s onwards also in terms of influence on the political line of 
the MK, and later MKP. Among others the last two leaders of the party came from 
the MDKM platform (Pál Csáky and Béla Bugár). The MKDM has a clear Christian 
centre-right profile, and unlike Együttélés, whose political goals lay almost 
exclusively in the representation of the minority as such, successfully established the 
MK/MKP as a political actor supporting the rule of law and market economy as part 
of Slovakia's democratisation (Szarka 2004). According to Szarka, it is the MKDM 
which presented the most coherent programme for minority self-government that has 
been elaborated by any of the Hungarian parties. It was based on general 
decentralisation and the establishing of comprehensive local and regional 
administrative and self-government structures, as well as a coherent minority law 
guaranteeing the minorities' status in Slovakia (Szarka 2004, p.95). Moreover, it 
emphasised the cooperation with the Slovak anti-Mečiar opposition and assumed a 
line of compromise with them. Essentially, the MKDM combined aspects of the 
MPP's and Együttélés's political programmes and developed into a strong minority 
representation, without resorting to provocative minority nationalism. Although 
other, one-off political groups among the Hungarians at times advocated more Part III - Chapter 8 
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radical aims, the majority of Hungarians supported parties and factions that aimed to 
increase local self-government and demanded guarantees for their community 
particularly under the conditions of increasing political pressure under the Mečiar 
government (ibid.; Domsitz 16/09/2009).  
From 1998 to 2009 the formerly three Hungarian parties formed the MKP. Merging 
into one party strengthened the Hungarian political representation during this period. 
In the 1998 elections, the Hungarian representation lost two seats, however at the 
same time it became the forth-strongest party in parliament. The coalition partners 
demanded that the MKP dropped its demands for autonomy in order to participate in 
government, to which the party agreed. Apart from this change, which was largely a 
change in the wording that so outraged many Slovaks, the MKP pursued the line 
formerly represented by the MKDM: Although it had dropped demands for minority 
autonomy, the MKP's legal initiatives and draft amendments still represented the 
claim for the institutionalisation of coherent minority rights.  
After the national elections of 2006, and back in opposition, the MKP faced a 
number of internal disagreements which eventually led to the split of the Coalition 
Party and to the formation of a new minority party. The new party under the double 
name Most-Híd (both words meaning 'bridge' in Slovak and Hungarian respectively) 
brought back some of the heterogeneity of the early 1990s' minority party landscape. 
Most-Híd successfully mobilised the Hungarian electorate in the national elections of 
2010, after having been registered as a party for only about one year. In its campaign 
to collect the necessary signatures of people supporting the formation of the new 
party, the party had already experienced considerable support. Although in the 'test-
run' during the 2009 regional elections the new party only gained two seats in 
Slovakia's regional councils, whereas the MKP won forty seats, in the national 
elections of 2010, Most-Híd gained 8.12% of the vote, and entered parliament while 
the MKP achieved only 4.33% and therefore has not been represented in parliament 
since June 2010 (Pink 2011, p.6). While Most-Híd was elected into the national 
parliament in 2010 and subsequently formed a government coalition with Slovak 
centre-right parties, the MKP remained the stronger minority party at the local and 
regional levels, as well as continuing to represent Hungarians in the European Part III - Chapter 8 
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parliament. The electoral success and the support for the new party suggest that the 
electorate was supportive of some form of change in minority party politics. 
Petőcz agrees with the view that the MKP was unable to represent the heterogeneity 
of the Hungarian population in Slovakia (2009). The heterogeneity meant here does 
not reflect ideological or socio-economic interests. Even though the MPP and the 
MKDH supported different political-ideological standpoints, the main differences 
between the Hungarian parties have always concerned their concepts of minority 
institutions. The new choice for Hungarian voters is not related to political stances 
though; this is illustrated not the least by the fact that the split reflected a division 
within the MKDM wing of the MKP. Internal power conflict grew within the MKP 
in the aftermath of the end of Béla Bugár's party presidency in 2007. A highly 
popular politician among Hungarians, and regarded as reasonable and trustworthy 
politician also by Slovaks (especially since he is a speaker of impeccable Slovak), 
Bugár's tone in politics is perceived more reconciliatory than that of other MKP 
representatives (Dostál 2003). Bugár's successor as the MKP's president Pál Csáky 
pursued a more confrontational approach, trying to move the MKP from a defensive 
opposition position to a strong minority party. His public appearances and the 
emphases he tried to set in the political debate, which was increasingly shaped by a 
triadic conflict among the Slovak political elite, the Hungarian minority and the 
Hungarian state, worsened the situation and increased the confusion and insecurity 
about the direction of Hungarian politics in Slovakia both among the MKP's 
membership, reinforcing inner-party disagreements, and among the moderate Slovak 
parties (Petőcz 2009). Overall, Csáky was unsuccessful in devising a clear strategy 
for the MKP in opposition.  
Most-Híd's founders declared that the MKP's style of leadership had become 
unacceptable; they accused former MKP rivals championing radical positions of 
minority nationalism, and argued that a 'party of cooperation' was needed in order to 
improve Slovak-Hungarian relations.
4 In turn, MKP leaders called Most-Híd the 
'party of assimilation' (Petőcz 2010, p.90). While the MKP continues to describe its 
main objective as 'to protect and preserve the national identity of the Hungarians 
                                                 
4 Az együttműködés pártja – strana spolupráce, the 'party of cooperation' is the party's slogan (Most-
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living in Slovakia' (MKP 2010, p.1), Most-Híd presents itself as party of 'cooperation 
between Hungarians and Hungarians, Hungarians and Slovaks and […] any other 
national minority' (Most-Híd 2011). 
 Many observers are still uncertain about actual 
internal and policy differences; however, currently the MKP's self-portrayal tends 
towards that of a minority (nationalist) party emphasising power sharing and, at 
times, segregation, while Most-Híd attempts to establish itself as 'integrationist' 
party, striving for cooperation with majority political actors.  
In interviews conducted shortly after Most-Híd was founded, Hungarian activists and 
intellectuals were very critical of the split in the political representation. They feared 
the weakening of the Hungarian political representation. Essentially, while the 
electorate was presented with a choice between a more and a less accommodationist 
strategy, the voters also had to make a very rational choice on the basis of their 
expectations as to how the other voters would decide in order not to lose the 
Hungarian representation in parliament altogether.
5 Because of this risk involved in 
the party formation, many members of the community also questioned the reasons 
behind the split (Öllös 23/09/2009; Petőcz 23/09/2009, Lampl 24/09/2009; Bara 
24/09/2009). Although the leaders of Most-Híd are known as less divisive in their 
public statements and political aims for the Hungarian minority than many of those 
now remaining in the MKP, many observers are convinced that the divide does not 
actually run along lines of political programmes and principles, but has more to do 
with economic interests of different groups of (former) MKP politicians or the 
'unfulfilled personal ambitions' of Most-Híd's founders (Petőcz 2009, p.90; Domsitz 
16/09/2009; Öllös 23/09/2009).  
The results of the 2010 national elections support to an extent the assumption that the 
heterogeneity of the Hungarian community played a role; Most-Híd's stance on 
minority politics opens more leeway for flexible solutions that can represent 
moderate Hungarian voters from different backgrounds. For some, the MKP under 
Csáky seemed to transform into a party that capitalised on the divide in society rather 
than mend it. The political opposition against the Fico-government had also 
increased the chances that the Hungarians could form a coalition with moderate 
                                                 
5 As discussed earlier, there is a 5%-threshold for individual parties, while the Hungarian electorate 
constitutes roughly 10% of all voters.  Part III - Chapter 8 
 
210
Slovak parties again, which however seemed less likely with the MKP than with 
Most-Híd. Thus, the Hungarian electorate preferred a political party which would be 
included in political decision-making, over a rhetorically strong Hungarian party, 
which was also based on compromising with coalition partners. Another possible 
explanation for Most-Híd's quick success is the party's leader and popular figurehead 
Béla Bugár. While the strategy of the party split might not have appealed to the 
Hungarian electorate at first, the experience with Bugár as head of MKP while it was 
in the coalition government suggested that government participation of the 
Hungarians would be more likely for a party under Bugár's rather than Csáky's 
leadership, especially since the latter had stood out with rather divisive messages 
towards the Slovaks. It will not have gone unnoticed by the electorate either that the 
MKP's internal problems have not entirely ceased since the party's split. After the 
party's major defeat in the parliamentary elections of 2010, the party leadership 
changed again. Recently elected head of the MKP, József Berényi declared that the 
party had focused too much on rivalries, internally and with Most-Híd, instead of 
presenting its own assets to the electorate (Minority Report 07-08/2010 2010, p.1).  
It is unclear whether Most-Híd has much room to experiment in the approach to 
minority politics, or many real incentives to do so (Petőcz 23/09/2009; similarly 
Lampl 24/09/2009). Its main asset lies in the accommodationist approach it supports. 
Although the heterogeneity of the Hungarian community became a resource for a 
(symbolic) change in Hungarian minority politics, for structural reasons of the party 
landscape Hungarian voters have so far not had the opportunity to vote on the basis 
of purely political-ideological or socio-economic preferences. As a result, 
constituting one major Hungarian party, Most-Híd will be equally unable to represent 
this heterogeneity of the Hungarian community, as were the MK and MKP. 
Hungarian voters are constricted in their political choices due to the ethnic division 
in the party system and the clear message from virtually all majority parties not to 
pursue politics that support the minority community. In contrast to the situation of 
Russian-speakers in Estonia, however, despite these restrictions the Hungarians in 
Slovakia have had the chance to directly participate in institution-building, thanks to 
the opportunities provided by cooperation with majority parties, which is discussed 
in the next section.  Part III - Chapter 8 
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8.3 Co-operation between majority and minority parties 
Already before the split of the VPN, most Slovak parties distrusted the Hungarian 
parties to the extent that they did not want to share political power with them, neither 
by means of the 'consociationalism' proposed by the MPP, nor at party level, as 
mentioned in the last section. Still, in 1993 the moderate opposition impeded the 
adoption of more and harsher anti-minority legislation that accompanied the Mečiar 
government's increasing rhetoric against internal and external enemies (Csergo 2007, 
pp.96-97; Deegan-Krause 2004). Despite the preparedness to stop some anti-minority 
initiatives of the government, the political opposition was divided, not the least over 
the potential future cooperation with the Hungarian parties should the opposition 
eventually oust the Mečiar government; the minority question was one of the reasons 
why the moderate opposition remained unable to unite and to offer the electorate an 
alternative to the Mečiar-governments for much of the 1990s.  
The political disarray and the opposition's paralysis were overcome temporarily with 
the successful vote of no-confidence against the Mečiar government in March 1994 
(Innes 2001, p.243). The moderate interim-government under HZDS defector Jozef 
Moravčík opted for a 'compromise' between proponents and opponents of 
cooperation with the Hungarian parties. Moravčík's government did not include the 
Hungarian parties, but instead relied on their support. Thanks to this dependency, in 
combination with the interim-coalition's pro-Europe orientation, the government 
implemented liberal-democratic policies also in the realm of minority rights. Reasons 
not to include the Hungarian parties in the coalition were down partly to the 
reluctance of sections within the interim-government to trust the Hungarians with 
political power, and partly to the hope of being re-elected in the early elections that 
had been scheduled for October 1994. Popular sentiment, fuelled by the Mečiar 
opposition's rhetoric, considered the Moravčík government too soft on minority 
issues.
6 However, the 'Hungarian card' shaped the election campaigns of 1994 
(Nedelsky 2009).  
                                                 
6 This was one, but of course not the only reason for the subsequent re-election of the HZDS into 
government in 1994, this time in coalition with the SNS: the failure to produce a strong and united 
political force and the unpopularity of the harsh economic reforms by which the economically liberal Part III - Chapter 8 
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The third Mečiar government (1994-1998) brought a change in the dynamics of 
Slovak politics compared to the first two Mečiar-governments. While before 1994, 
HZDS's politics could be described as ad hoc, the government began to attune the 
different policies on curtailing democratic rights as well as increasing 
authoritarianism (Innes 2001). The discussions of chapters 5 and 6 attest to the 
overall systematic approach to achieve majority (nationalists') dominance in the 
political process, particularly after 1996, by modifying the foundations of the 
political system. The Mečiar-governments' concentrated attacks on political 
opponents, their 'disrespect for the rule of law, favouritism, corruption, the 
intertwining of crime with politics, and a confrontational nationalist policy' (Bútora 
& Bútorová 1999, p.80) eventually helped the divided parliamentary opposition 
combine their forces and cooperate with the Hungarian parties against 'Mečiarism'. 
All major opposition parties showed an inclination to improve their relations, 
particularly with regard to interethnic cooperation; after all, the 1994 interim 
government had demonstrated that (silent) cooperation between Slovak moderates 
and Hungarian pluralists was possible without endangering Slovak sovereignty on 
the side of the Slovak parties or sacrificing all minority interests on the side of the 
MK/MKP. Trust between the opposition parties increased also thanks to cooperation 
in the opposition between 1996 and 1998, which in the eyes of the Slovak opposition 
demonstrated the Hungarian parties' strong, uncompromising support of Slovakia's 
integration with the West in general, the EU in particular (Henderson 2002).  
Eventually, with the defeat of the HZDS-SNS coalition at the 1998 elections, the 
MKP was invited into the next government coalition. Although not required for a 
simple majority in parliament, the MKP procured the government's two-third 
majority necessary for constitutional change, which was important to initiate several 
of the coalition partners' political programmes. More significantly still, the new 
government intended to send out a signal to the European Union that the country had 
left behind the anti-European course of the previous government. The importance of 
external incentives was the reason why most actors involved were very clear about 
the fact that the coalition of Slovak moderate parties with the MKP was not a 'love 
                                                                                                                                          
parties aimed to signal to Europe that Slovakia was oriented towards Western integration were crucial 
factors which led to the moderate political forces' loss of political power (Nedelsky 2009; Innes 2001; 
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match' to begin with. As Foreign Affairs Minister under the Dzurinda-government 
since 1998, Eduard Kukan said in 2000: 
'it was also deep in our minds that the inclusion of the [MKP] in the government 
would improve the standing of Slovakia, the image of Slovakia vis-à-vis our EU 
ambitions' (quoted in Pridham 2002, p.964).  
Disagreements and mistrust among the parties, as well as the Slovak parties' 
reluctance to leave powerful or symbolically important positions to the MKP,
7 
shaped coalition negotiations as well as the early phase of the coalition's governance. 
Despite these setbacks, however, the coalition was eventually formed and minority 
demands were included into the government's programme. 
The ideological point of departure for cooperation consisted of the Slovak moderates' 
and the Hungarian opposition parties' support for the liberal-democratic foundations 
of statehood, particularly as possible common ground to ease tense interethnic 
relations. The centre-right orientation of the SDK and MKP, not so however of the 
SDL', as well as the high importance all government parties gave to the goal of EU 
membership, made policymaking in most policy fields fairly straightforward and 
allowed disputes between the MKP and its government partners to be limited largely 
to minority-related issues. In fact, disagreements were much more common between, 
and crucially within the other coalition partners. As a result, the MKP was regarded 
as the most stable coalition partner which would reliably support the government's 
programmatic line; its public support grew even among the Slovak population 
(Mesežnikov 14/04/2008). The coalition was renewed for a second legislative period 
in 2002, allowing the minority representatives to continue to shape Slovak policies 
for another four years. This way, the MKP had a forum to develop and communicate 
their understanding of interethnic relations from a position that gave them more 
legitimacy than small opposition parties can usually expect. It is questionable, 
however, whether the MKP's formal inclusion into the coalition government had led 
to the group's inclusion into agenda-setting and decision-making, particularly with 
regard to matters of specific minority interests. Particularly during the second 
Dzurinda government, several initiatives petered out (see for this point the detailed 
                                                 
7 MKP leaders claimed a proportional right to one of the three post of Prime Minister, President of the 
National Council or President of the Republic (Hamberger 2004, p. 118).  Part III - Chapter 8 
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account to minority policies between 1996 and 2007 Dostál 1998-2007; Sáposová & 
Šutaj 2008).   
The MKP's de facto exclusion from governmental agenda-setting and particularly 
from decision-making was evident in relation to a number of proposals submitted by 
the MKP, including the Minority Language Law, the change of the constitutional 
preamble, regional reform, the reform of public administration, the plan to 
restructure existing opportunities for higher education in Hungarian, the Minority 
Law, the Law on Financing Minority Cultures and several others (ibid.; Regelmann 
2009). This illustrates the weak position of the Hungarian government actors. The 
process of drafting and debating a Minority Law was repeatedly postponed, 
responsibilities shifted among institutions, before it was finally dropped. Other 
initiatives were overthrown by 'Slovak coalitions' of government and opposition 
parties, which repeatedly mobilised the narrative of periled sovereignty against the 
MKP's proposals, such as in relation to the administrative reform of 2001. Although 
the government showed preparedness to fill the gaps left by the vague wording of the 
minority rights guaranteed by the constitution, it did not put much effort into the 
question of how to actually ensure minority participation in Slovak politics. No 
government strategy revealed signs of a coherent concept of integrating the political 
community normatively or regulatory, at any level of the political system. The 
rejection and disregard of the MKP's proposals for policy change do not show a clear 
pattern. Had all rebuffed initiatives been accepted they would have significantly 
changed the structural and institutional settings towards a more pluralist conception 
of statehood. Overall, the MKP's proposals promoted the inclusion of minorities into 
the political community by aiming at the identity consensus, organisational structure 
of the political community at different levels, and regulations for minority inclusion 
in various fields.  
The limitations of minority inclusion into the government's decision-making cannot 
hide the fact that the participation in the Dzurinda government helped substantially 
increase the minority's representation in political decision-making generally; 
moreover, and perhaps more importantly, it also set the stage for new interethnic 
relations both in Slovak politics and among the population. Many minority (and 
majority) members emphasise that the societal climate significantly improved under Part III - Chapter 8 
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a non-nationalistic government, and given the representation of Hungarians at this 
level. Eventually, it made Hungarian participation as political partners and members 
of government acceptable, challenging the frequent portrayals of minority members 
as 'renegade citizens', potentially threatening the Slovak nation-state (Gyárfášová 
17/06/2009). Its performance helped other parties to understand the coalition as a 
workable political partnership, which was an important precondition for the 
negotiations of 2010 running so smoothly. 
Despite the limitations of the various minority-related institutions at a governmental 
and parliamentary level, the inclusion of the MKP into government brought changes 
in the policies towards minorities. Among others, the new government revoked 
earlier discriminatory policies, issued several laws that de facto improved the legal 
situation of minorities, if only to an extent, and, importantly, changed the perceptions 
of interethnic relations and their representation in public discourse. Even the idea of 
a member of the Hungarian minority acting as president of the National Council 
became conceivable for moderate Slovak politicians, something previously 
unthinkable (Harris 2004, p.200); Öllös 23/09/2009). It is particularly for reasons of 
improved interethnic relations in general that many Hungarians praise the times with 
minority inclusion in the government. Hungarians were formally included into 
decision-making institutions, some political goals of the MKP were implemented 
and, as opinion polls of the two legislative periods show, the party was accepted as a 
legitimate decision-maker even by parts of the Slovak population. Therefore, it is fair 
to say that the two legislative periods of minority participation in government have 
temporarily changed the interethnic relations.  
The co-operation between Slovak and Hungarian parties was enabled primarily by 
the overlap with regard to attitudes to basic institutions of liberal democracies, which 
the moderates and the Hungarian parties shared. These include economic policies, 
but also certain forms of (limited) minority recognition and rights, and crucially in 
the Slovak case, the support for the country's membership in the EU. On this basis, 
Hungarian and moderate parties cooperated and evoked crucial changes in the power 
dynamics in the country in the early 1990s, in 1994, in 1998 and in 2010. Decisively, 
the Hungarians' inclusion into government coalitions did not help evoke substantial 
change where the Slovaks' upper hand in political and social processes was at stake. Part III - Chapter 8 
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However, the strength of Slovak nationalists is the real problem for the Hungarian 
parties, as the time of the Fico government demonstrated.  
Both the 1990s and the legislation period of 2006-2010 showed that the situation for 
minorities and interaction relations significantly deteriorates when no minority party 
is in government. Not only does minority inclusion increase minority participation in 
the decision making generally, it also provides for minority members to feel 
represented and part, if unequal, of the political community. Mirroring the 
ambivalent appraisal of the phases of inclusion and exclusion from the formal 
political process and actual decision making, and the alternating signals from the 
Slovak moderates, the elections of 2006 and 2010 showed that the Slovak population 
is still divided over questions of minority rights and minority inclusion into the 
political community. The change in government in 2006, which put the MKP back 
into opposition, meant a harsh turn in the rhetoric on minority issues. This did not 
come as a surprise to many actors involved, as minority organisations and minority 
representatives, as well as liberally-minded Slovaks had warned during the election 
campaign that a return to power of the 1990s' governing parties of HZDS and, in 
particular, SNS would lead to a deterioration of both domestic interethnic relations 
and bilateral relations with Hungary. While in opposition, the MKP's efforts to limit 
the negative effects of the Fico-government's minority policies and bilateral politics 
with Hungary at the European level increased.
8 However, its political impact as an 
opposition party was again marginal (Berényi 30/09/2009).  
When in 2010 the government changed again, the inclusion of Most-Híd, a splinter of 
the MKP established in 2009, into Iveta Radičová's government (2010-2012), the EU 
was not needed in order to facilitate the interaction between majority and minority 
parties. It can therefore be read as a long-term consequence of the earlier 
participation of Hungarian parties in the Dzurinda-government. However, the co-
operation 1998-2006 provided a mode for the government under Radičová to 
continue cooperation between the groups, rather than having to start from scratch.  
                                                 
8 The MKP repeatedly held talks with the political groups of the European Parliament, particularly the 
European Socialists, not to accept the strongest party in government, Smer-SD, as member of the 
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For the last twenty years, Hungarians have organised politically around the question 
of minority rights and minority participation in the political decision-making rather 
than divided socio-politically. This has allowed the minority community to maintain 
a coherent political representation for the group. At the same time, this has hampered 
the representation of minority members' socio-political interests. The ethnic divide of 
the political system has also enabled majority parties to neglect the representation of 
Slovakia's minority population in their own programmes. However, socio-political 
agendas have not been completely irrelevant in the context of majority-minority 
political interaction. Essentially, majority and minority parties have co-operated on 
the basis of a shared liberal-democratic agenda. Participation of minority parties in 
government has improved interethnic relations and reduced tension between the 
groups, despite the lack of institutionalising minority rights that were demanded by 
the minority parties.  
8.4 Institutions of minority inclusion 
The previous section demonstrated that the minority parties' participation in 
government has not led to significant extension of the minority rights framework of 
the Slovak state. Co-operation in government has, nonetheless, contributed to the 
improvement of relations between majority and minority groups. One important 
reason for this lies in the increase of representative bodies dealing with minority 
issues at government level under the Dzurinda-government and again under the 
Radičová-government. This section discusses the changes to the institutions of 
minority representation at government level, primarily between 1998 and 2006.  
During most of the 1990s, political participation of the Hungarian minority and 
representation of their policy demands was extremely limited. Practical inclusion into 
the political processes was given mainly through the election of Hungarian parties 
into parliament, where they constituted an often marginalised part of an already weak 
opposition. The political system does not provide quotas or other affirmative action 
for the inclusion of minorities into decision-making. Moreover, no bodies are 
institutionalised that would ensure the meaningful political inclusion of minorities in 
'all matters that concern them', as the constitution demands (Ústava 1992, §34,2(3)). 
However, since the early 1990s, some formal inclusion is provided by the Part III - Chapter 8 
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Government Council of the Slovak Republic for National Minorities (Úrad vlády SR 
Sekcia národnostných menšín, further Government Council), which was designed to 
fulfil advisory functions and to guarantee that minority perspectives on draft 
legislation as well as the concerns of minorities are included into the government's 
decision-making (Kukan 1994). 
During the 1990s, the Government Council failed to ensure minority representation, 
partly due to its advisory function, lacking powers of veto or sanctioning, should 
government's policies contradict the needs or demands of minorities, and partly due 
to its composition. Under the third Mečiar government, only 10 out of the 24 
members of the Government Council were members of national minorities, three of 
these members being Hungarian. Two seats on the Government Council were 
allocated to members of the Slovak cultural heritage organisation Matica Slovenská, 
while half of the 24 members were government representatives who also had a right 
to vote on council decisions (Minorities at Risk 2004). Therefore, not only at a time 
when Hungarian parties were out of government, their national minorities' 
representatives (along with those of other national minorities) found themselves 
outnumbered by Slovak cultural and governmental representatives on the very 
advisory body set up to represent their concerns. Frustrated with the situation, two 
Hungarian members resigned from the Government Council in 1996, after they had 
demanded a change in the membership and voting rights proportions of the body for 
the third time (ibid.). The refusal to establish a body to advise the government on 
minority issues that could claim to speak for minorities once more demonstrated that 
the Mečiar government did not accept the minorities' claim that nationalising policies 
and majority claims for ownership of the state represented an illegitimate curtailing 
of minority participation in society.  
The Dzurinda-government gave momentum to the institutionalising of minority 
inclusion by setting up further governmental bodies and modifying the existing 
Government Council. The MKP specifically supported minority inclusion by 
increasing the number of formal bodies assigned with responsibility for minority 
issues. The government introduced a Governmental Committee and a Cabinet Office 
for Human Rights and Minorities; in 2002 the Ombudsman for the Protection of 
Human and Civil rights took up his position, which although cannot take a pro-active Part III - Chapter 8 
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role in minority protection.
9 Furthermore, the Ministry of Education formed the 
Department for Education on Nationally Mixed Territory and the Ministry of Culture 
formed a Department of Minority Cultures. Moreover, the State Pedagogical Institute 
as well as the Ministries of Labour, Social Affairs and Family as well as of Foreign 
Affairs introduced sections dealing specifically with question of human and minority 
rights as well as social integration with regard to Roma (Open Society Institute 
2002). The inclusion of departments dealing with questions of interethnic integration 
in several crucial ministries, rather than creating only one specialised position 
dealing with minority questions, allowed for 'mainstreaming' minority issues and 
interrelation across policy fields. However, similar to the role of the Government 
Council and the Deputy Prime Minister, the activities of these other governmental 
institutions targeting minority inclusion declined also (Dostál 2005). These 
institutions were criticised with regard to their limited efforts to promote 
multiculturalism, tolerance and interethnic group interaction.   
Although the MKP did not receive the position of Prime Minister or President of the 
National Council, it was assigned with the newly created position of Deputy Prime 
Minister for Human Rights, Minorities and Regional Development (1998-2002), 
latterly for European Integration, Human Rights and Minorities (2002-2006), which 
was accepted by then head of the MKP, Pál Csáky. This gave the MKP a powerful 
role in the political agenda-setting. Even though the position was not endowed with a 
portfolio, Csáky immediately launched several initiatives to try and improve the 
situation of minorities, as discussed earlier. Through political activities as well as 
symbolically, the Office of the Deputy Prime Minister seemed to emphasise the vital 
role of minority policies for the new government (Open Society Institute 2002, 
pp.477–478); the evaluation of policies initiated by the Deputy Prime Minister earlier 
in this chapter shows only meagre results though.  
Nevertheless, these steps for an institutionalisation of minority protection at the 
highest state level had an important symbolical meaning. They allowed for more 
opportunities for minority actors to voice their concerns and appeal to these specific 
minority institutions, and to both political and civil society actors, who were invited 
                                                 
9 The MKP had long lobbied to provide for protection from direct minority discrimination (Harris 
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to present their causes to the respective institutions. In this way, the organisations 
themselves provided for an increase in feedback opportunities and greater openness 
with respect to society's concerns and citizens' participation. As a result the 
perception of accessibility and accountability for minority issues of the state also 
increased, as virtually all my interviews in Slovakia testify. Moreover, as holders of 
prestigious positions, minority representatives were able to make a difference in the 
tone and the attitude the state showed toward its minority citizens. The work of the 
Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights and National Minorities illustrates the 
significance of governmental and state institutions explicitly mandated with the 
active inclusion of civic and political representatives of minority groups for setting 
the tone of interethnic relations, and also shows what a difference a minority party 
representative can make in shaping social and political relations from such a position.  
The first holder, Pál Csáky, used this position to initiate draft legislation and 
intervene in political debates and policy making to defend minority rights in his role 
as Deputy Prime Minister. His successor Dušan Čaplovič, member of the 2006-2010 
ruling party Smer-SD, was known for his divisive comments on interethnic relations, 
rarely representing a conciliatory approach to group relations, and overall appearing 
as a defender against minority rights rather than of their rights (Slovak Spectator 
30/03/2009). Minority representatives are convinced that Čaplovič's statements and 
reluctance to respond to minority demands or complaints have contributed to the 
deterioration of intergroup relations between 2006 and 2010 (Berényi 30/06/2009; 
Golha/Hajdok/Havran 18/09/2009). In contrast to his predecessor, recently elected 
Deputy Prime Minister Rudolf Chmel has emphasised the danger that lies in neo-
nationalism across Central Eastern Europe, calling state actors to accommodate their 
diversity rather than dividing their populations (Chmel 2010). This again attests to 
the different societal atmosphere, intergroup perception and accommodation the 
inclusion of moderating political actors can potentially bring. Although this does not 
guarantee the direct improvement of interethnic relations or the minority's position in 
social and political life, it makes a noticeable difference in the daily life of minority 
members as well as in politics. 
In addition to the introduction of these posts and bodies by the Dzurinda government, 
a governmental decree reorganised the Government Council (292/1999 of 04 April Part III - Chapter 8 
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1999); although the Council remained an advisory body with no executive or 
sanctioning powers, the composition was changed, increasing the number of minority 
representatives in total and in proportion to government representatives (Open 
Society Institute 2002, p.478). From 1999 onwards, the new Government Council 
consisted of fourteen representatives of eleven minorities.
10 It is interesting to note 
that under the Radičová-government, the Government Council was again expanded.
11 
Moreover, since 1999 only the minority representatives have the right to vote on the 
decisions of the Government Council.
12 The changes to the statutes of the 
Government Council demonstrated the government's preparedness to ground state-
building on a new consensus, which included the participation of minorities in the 
decision-making. In this vein, between 1998 and 2002 the Government Council 
actively provided for minority representation at government level. However, Dostál 
comes to the conclusion that after 2003, the Government Council 'showed very few 
signs of life and did not pursue any noteworthy activities' (Dostál 2005, p.169).  
The legislature has its own minorities-focused institution, the National Council's 
Committee on Human Rights and Minorities (Výboru Národnej rady Slovenskej 
republiky pre ľudské práva a národnostné menšiny, further: Committee). As an 
institution formed by parliament and representing parliamentary proportions of 
political power, the Committee's specific impact on minority policies is dependent on 
changing power relations (Berényi 30/06/2009). However, in contrast to the times 
when a nationalist majority existed in the National Council, the moderate parties' 
majority in parliament between 1998 and 2006 as well as since 2010 has 
strengthened the position of minority representation in the Committee. The 
Committee is entitled to invite social, political and cultural activists, researchers or 
other individuals or organisations involved with minority advocacy or self-help to 
present their concerns to the Committee, and can initiate debates in parliament. 
                                                 
10 These included three Hungarian, two Roma and one representative each of the Czech, Rusyn, 
Ukrainian, German, Jewish, Polish, Croatian, Moravian and Bulgarian minorities; in 2003 a 
representative of the Russian minority was included (Dostál 2005; Dostál 2000).  
11 It now includes four representatives from both the Hungarian and Roma minorities, two members 
each of the Czech, Rusyn and Ukrainian minorities, and one from each of the Jewish (vice-president), 
German, Polish, Bulgarian, Russian, Croat and Serbian minorities (Vlada 2011).  
12 The government was represented on the one hand by the Deputy Prime Minister for Human Rights, 
Minorities and Regional Development and the Minister of Culture, who acted as chair and vice-chair 
of the Government Council, and on the other hand by other government officials who regularly 
participated in meetings of the Government Council; neither the chairs nor the invited government 
representatives had the right to vote in the decision-taking of the Government Council (Dostál 2000). Part III - Chapter 8 
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Naturally, it does not have any executive or sanctioning powers. While it provides 
for some openness to minority demands, autonomous influence on decision-making 
processes is limited by the composition and remits of the Committee. 
Despite the limitations of the bodies for minority inclusion, they overall helped 
increase the debates in minority issues between representatives of majority and 
minority parties. The improvement of relations at the elite level also impacted the 
relations of the majority and minority groups at the level of everyday interaction. 
Károly Domsitz, mayor of Šamorin, a town with a Hungarian majority, emphasised 
this:  
'We had 8 years of […] government [with MKP participation], where these 
problems or these questions [i.e. of interethnic tensions] were not on a daily 
[basis]; I wouldn't say that we [reached] consensus, but we always found a kind of 
compromise, so we were able to cooperate' (Domsitz 16/09/2009). 
This should be considered an achievement given the fact that no affirmative 
measures exist, which provide for the inclusion of minority parties into government, 
and practical inclusion of Hungarians into political decision-making has been 
limited.  
8.5 Variations in the political agendas of Hungarian parties in 
Slovakia 
One of the main problems of the Hungarian political representation, both in 
opposition and in government, has been that the majority parties were prepared 
frequently to play the 'ethnic card' in decisions that were related to the relation 
between the state and the Hungarian minority specifically. This section investigates 
how Hungarian politicians have framed their political agendas in order to improve 
the situation of the Hungarian community. Ultimately, all efforts made by the 
Hungarian parties aimed at changing the fundamental consensus on state-ownership, 
either by institutionalising forms of power-division or by increasing the 
responsibility of the state for its minority population. This section supports the 
argument that the congruence of political and ethnic divisions has hampered the 
long-term reduction of tensions, such as by institutionalising minority rights.  Part III - Chapter 8 
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From the beginning of Slovakia's independence in 1993, Hungarian political parties 
have worked on alternatives to the logic of the Slovak nation state which established 
a direct and absolute linkage between the state, the Slovak nation and the Slovak 
language. Besides working on the Hungarian representatives' inclusion in political 
decision-making and the responsiveness of policies, during the 1990s the Hungarian 
political forces had initiated concepts to establish forms of power-sharing to change 
the foundations of statehood. Together with Slovak opposition parties, the Hungarian 
parties were excluded from drafting the 1992 Slovak constitution, which paved the 
way for establishing Slovakia as a single nation-state. In the debates of 1992 prior to 
independence, Hungarian representatives in the republican National Council 
expressed their preferences for the future of the Slovak state in a joint proposal to 
change the draft constitution suggested by all Hungarian parties together, and also by 
themselves proposing alternative concepts to the Slovak nation-state. As Csergo 
(2007) elaborates in her detailed study of the political participation of the Hungarian 
minorities in Slovakia and Romania, the Hungarian parties responded to the Mečiar 
government's moves with a 'unanimous rejection of the homogeneous nation-state 
strategy' (ibid., pp.33–34). Unsurprisingly, the proposal by the Hungarian parties was 
rejected and the Hungarian representatives walked out when the parliament made its 
final decision on the constitution and its preamble on September 1, 1992, in a 
demonstration of their discontent with the 'anti-democratic process', as all four 
Hungarian parties later declared in a statement (ibid., p.33). However, the Hungarian 
parties differed with respect to their ideas about what should replace the nation-state 
idea.  
Particularly in the early years of Slovakia's democratisation, MKDM and Együttélés 
strongly supported the establishing of a pluralist state which would feature some 
form of inter-ethnic power sharing. In parallel, all the Hungarian parties, but 
foremostly the MPP, supported alternative agendas for the political inclusion of 
Hungarians without necessarily challenging the foundations of Slovak statehood as 
such, aiming instead at the group's acceptance by the dominant group as equal 
members of society, and crucially in the political process (Szarka 2004). 
Irrespective of the ideological division within the Hungarian political representation, 
towards the outside it has, for the past 20 years, formed a largely unified and Part III - Chapter 8 
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comparatively successful political force. The common goal of all Hungarian minority 
parties has been to guarantee equal opportunities in cultural and social matters, 
particularly education both as a form of cultural group reproduction and as a resource 
for securing non-discrimination and social advancement of minority members, as 
well as political participation. The inclusion of the minority's voice(s) into political 
agenda-setting and decision-making bodies, hence the political community, is central 
to all parties' agendas, even though some strands favour an even more rigid change to 
the fundaments of the political system. Öllös, a political scientist and former member 
of the Hungarian Independent Initiative during the so-called 'Velvet' revolution, 
emphasises that it is important for the Hungarians 
'[t]o be an equal part of the political community, not [an] unequal part. That 
means that [Hungarians] are respected with all [their] special features, and also 
[that] they are or could be a normal part of constitutional democracy. And we 
aren't respected as an equal part of the political community as Hungarians. So it 
would be impossible to elect, for example, a Hungarian president in this country 
[or] a Hungarian head of the government' (Öllös 23/09/2009).  
The minority parties have strived for their inclusion into the political community as 
an 'equal part' with different strategies. These cannot be assigned to the individual 
political parties, since for most of the time the different ideological lines were forced 
to unite under the MK and MKP, which meant that they had to align their ideologies 
also. For reasons that are related to this specific development, it makes sense to look 
at the Hungarian political representation – at least after 1998 – as a single political 
actor whose political agendas have exhibited shifting emphases. In what follows I 
discuss four main strategies of the Hungarian representation to establish a system of 
political pluralism: first, the parties proposed the change of the symbolic consensus 
on state-ownership; second, a territorial-based solution was sought to establish a 
functional division of responsibilities by increasing minority autonomy in the fields 
of education and culture, as well as facilitating the implementation of minority 
language rights in the public sphere; third, the Hungarian parties drafted proposals to 
institutionalise guarantees of minority protection; fourth, Hungarian parties have 
promoted minority protection through the introduction of functional autonomies in 
various policy fields. These initiatives have shaped the Hungarian parties' political 
programmes at different times, rather than follow chronologically.  Part III - Chapter 8 
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Symbolic inclusion into the state-bearing nation 
The most fundamental initiative of the Hungarian political representation focused on 
the change of the ideological consensus on the state-bearing nation. As discussed in 
chapter 5, the Slovak political community consensus excludes all minorities from the 
'state-bearing nation'. When the constitution was adopted, the Hungarian parties 
suggested replacing the wording 'we, the Slovak nation' of the constitutional 
preamble by the more inclusive 'we, citizens of the Slovak Republic', a formulation 
that would allow all citizens irrespective of group membership to be a constituent 
part of the Slovak civic nation (Nedelsky 2009). The minority parties' attempts to 
reformulate the understanding of the state-forming nation and to broaden the concept 
of state-ownership and sovereignty failed, thanks to the Slovak majority's reluctance 
to share 'their' state. During a constitutional debate in 2000/2001, the MKP seized 
another chance to discuss the very foundations of the state and challenge the nation-
state model, by again proposing a change to the preamble of the constitution. Unlike 
demands of Együttélés in particular, the proposal did not support the inclusion of 
Hungarians as a 'partner-nation' into the community consensus, but demanded a 
symbolical turn away from the nation-state model.  
The Hungarian parties' proposals did not involve the recognition of minorities as 
'owners' of the state, but the change to a civic concept of nation- and statehood in the 
constitution would require significant changes in the institutional setting, threatening 
the Slovaks' upper hand in the political community. The MKP's proposal was not 
accepted in parliament, and apart from the MKP only received the support of the 
Demokratická strana (Democratic Party, DS)
13 therefore failed (Dostál 2002). 
Despite the preparedness of Slovak moderates to cooperate with the MKP in 
government, their willingness did not include the acceptance of Hungarians and other 
minorities as equally constituting part of a Slovak political community. From the 
perspective of almost all Slovak political forces, the concept of sovereignty, it seems, 
is 'absolute' and cannot be shared (Öllös 23/09/2009). Politicians representing 
                                                 
13 For the history of the DS see the statutes of the Slovenská demokratická a kresťanská únia – 
Demokratická strana (Slovak Democratic and Christian Union – Democratic Party, SDKÚ-DS), the 
DS had formed the SDKÚ coalition party in 1998 together with other centre-right parties of the anti-
Mečiar-opposition and merged with the SDKÚ officially in 2006. It was originally formed by the 
remnants of the non-nationalist wing of the VPN, (SDKÚ 2011).  Part III - Chapter 8 
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Hungarians, in contrast, demanded that the political community consensus be made 
conditional on the approval of minority fellow citizens and that it represent an 
inclusive consensus that can claim legitimacy and accountability for minorities also. 
Territory-based minority rights and division of responsibility for their 
implementation 
In parallel to initiatives that aimed to establish a form of power sharing, the 
Hungarian parties developed a second pluralist argument of 'community sovereignty' 
qua self-government of the Hungarian minority (Csergo 2007, p.35). The concept 
encompassed the aims to  
'maintain […] substate territorial districts in southern Slovakia where Hungarians 
could use their language in government, territory markings, and public education' 
(ibid., p.47).  
Even though these aims do not question the exceptional role of the Slovak nation in 
Slovakia as such, they do challenge the Slovaks' linguistic sovereignty over the 
whole of Slovakia's territory. Few Slovaks did not feel alarmed by this concept of 
'territorial autonomy' as it was perceived, and few Slovaks put it into perspective by 
understanding it as a reaction to the Slovak concept of nation-state sovereignty (ibid., 
p. 52). It is important to note that the concept of community sovereignty did not 
entail the region's secession to Hungary, as many Slovaks fear. Zoltán Bara, at the 
time of interview international secretary of the MKP, now a member of Most-Híd, 
speaks for the vast majority of Hungarians in Slovakia when he says:  
'I'm a citizen of Slovakia, my mother tongue is Hungarian. I have a lot in common 
with Hungarians, but I don't want the Hungarian state here. There are people who 
want it, but practically everybody knows – and every politician knows – that [in 
order] to have 'Kosovo' here, you would need 10,000 dead people. Nobody wants 
that here in Central Europe; it's not an issue' (Bara 21/09/2009).  
The concept of community sovereignty also does not strive for the territorial-
political autonomy of the Hungarian minority over parts of southern Slovakia. Apart 
from the fact that this would be impractical, since most districts where Hungarians 
live are ethnically mixed, it would also contradict the political line at least of the Part III - Chapter 8 
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liberal or moderate Hungarian political actors, who support a cooperative relation to 
the Slovaks, politically and socially.  
During the debate on administrative reform in 2000, the MKP demanded the 
establishing of an administrative region that allowed for the special status of the 
Hungarian minority, namely in the Komárňanská župa in the South-West of the 
country.
14 This was not related to political dominance, but aimed at the facilitation 
and increase of minority rights throughout 'minority regions' (ibid.). The idea to 
establish such a region was disputed even among the Hungarian community, as it 
could have institutionalised unequal relations also between Hungarians who 
happened to live in this region and those who did not (ibid.). After all, Hungarians 
constituted a local majority in many municipalities which were located in the East of 
the country and would thus not have been included into a potential 'Hungarian 
region'. As a result of the rejection of the Hungarian proposal for administrative 
reform in 2001, minority actors started re-framing their goal of community 
sovereignty in less provocative terms, demanding the strengthening of local level 
self-government, as discussed in section 5.6. The devolution of competences to the 
local level benefitted minority members also in communities where they did not 
constitute the majority; however, it did not regulate 'minority interests' directly.  
Institutionalisation and extension of minority rights at the national level 
In order find a solution to the reoccurring problems of the Hungarians with regard to 
the right and opportunities to use their mother tongue in public, maintain community 
institutions and safeguard support for their cultural and civic activities, minority 
politicians attempted to promote a comprehensive minority law. In 1998, the demand 
for such a law entered the government's programme (Dostál 2000). In 1999, Deputy 
Prime Minister Csáky's drafts for a minority language law envisaged a 
comprehensive solution, regulating not just minority language use, but also minority 
education (Dostál 2005). The minority language law which was eventually adopted 
did not have the potential, and was not designed, to redefine and specify the 
relationship between the state and minorities as such. Still, the Dzurinda government 
                                                 
14 Already in the early 1990s, the FMK had discussed an alternative scheme for re-structuring 
Slovakia's districts into smaller units which would allow for several administrative units where the 
Hungarian minority would (nearly) constitute the majority (Šutaj & Šutajová 2006, pp.20–24). Part III - Chapter 8 
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had included the minority law into both government programmes in 1998 and 2002. 
Over the two legislative periods the responsibility for coherent minority legislation 
was transferred from the Ministry of Culture to the Deputy Prime Minister and it 
even became a government priority of the second Dzurinda government. Parallel 
plans for legislation on the financing of minority cultural activities and minority 
language broadcasting were incorporated into the minority law proposal rather than 
regulated separately. This provided for more coherent legislation in this realm and 
would have established a legal environment that would have fostered the 
development of the Hungarians' ethnic identity and at the same time improve their 
status. However, the deadline for a comprehensive minority law was repeatedly 
postponed, reflecting frictions among political actors regarding the general breadth of 
the law as well as the specific provisions; in 2005/2006, a plan for such a law was 
not included into the annual government's programme anymore.  
To avoid a situation where no minority law would regulate even the cultural support 
for minorities, a bill on financing minority culture was prepared by Csáky in 2004 
(Dostál 2006). The principal objective of this draft law, according to its supporters, 
was the introduction of a certain degree of independence in the decision-making 
process on minority cultural activities. Csáky's proposal, presented to parliament in 
2005, however, envisaged the creation of a new central administrative body that 
would have been tasked with managing the financing of minority cultural activities. 
While the alleged aim was to make planning in the field of minority culture possible, 
and to grant more security to the minority groups by increasing the independence 
from changing governments and their preferences, critics point out that the idea of 
the introduction of a central body was in conflict with the idea of independence 
(Dostál 2005). The conflicting logics of the demand for autonomy from the state as 
well as for accountability of an overseeing administrative body indeed causes a 
dilemma for the Hungarian demand for functional autonomies, which has not been 
solved. The second problem with the law was the significant increase in the funding 
for minority culture that it envisaged. Whereas the budget for minority cultural 
activities had totalled in around 80 Million Slovak crowns in 2003, Csáky's proposal 
suggested, without further justification for the massive increase in financial means, 
that 0.15% of the state budget to be at the minorities' disposal, which in 2004 would 
have added to approximately 350 million SKK or more than four times as much as Part III - Chapter 8 
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the previous year's amount (Dostál 2005). Bara argues that this constituted only a 
very small amount of the budget of the Ministry of Culture, which amounted to about 
5 billion SKK (Bara 21/09/2009). Eventually, the proposal was rejected by 
parliament, including the coalition partners of the MKP, and no new attempt to 
devise a law on the status or the financing of minority culture has been made so far.  
The proposal did not have very good prospects for being accepted by the Slovak 
coalition partners or parliamentary opposition. The motives behind the move at that 
time are therefore not entirely clear. It can be speculated that the law was aimed at 
responding to the Hungarian minority audience rather than realistic policy making, 
particularly in the face of the lack of success in this matter during seven years in 
government. This would have been in line also with the MKP's programme for the 
second Dzurinda government, which focused on symbolical moves, particularly 
emphasising questions of historical memory, such as the debate on the 'Beneš 
decrees' and Hungarians' 'collective guilt', as well as the debate on Hungary's 
campaign for dual citizenship for members of Hungarian minorities, rather than 
policies aimed at improving the actual situation of minority members (Dostál, 2006). 
On the other hand, the draft does reflect the demands of the Hungarian community's 
political representation that aimed at compensation for the disadvantaged position of 
minority culture in comparison to the titular nation's culture. Most-Híd included both 
a comprehensive law on national minorities, which should secure their status and 
prohibit the 'majorisation' of minorities, and a law on the financing of national 
minority cultures into their election programme for the national elections of 2010;
15 
moreover, it demanded that the government establish a Government Office to 
Promote the Culture of National Minorities (Úrad na podporu kultúry národnostných 
menšín) (Most-Híd 2010, pp.24–26).   
Even without the substantial increase of funding for minority culture the implications 
of a comprehensive minority law go beyond mere symbolic minority recognition. 
The salience of cultural self-expression for ethnic minorities in the country would 
solidify demands for a new, multicultural consensus rather than merely express 
acceptance of the multicultural reality, as current minority legislation does. It is all 
                                                 
15 The Government Council for National Minorities has resumed the debate on these initiatives in 
2011 (Government Council 2011).  Part III - Chapter 8 
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the more important to acknowledge this, since the majority parties were prepared to 
include the plan for this law into the government programme, signalling their 
readiness to discuss Slovakia's multicultural foundations. Essentially, the framing of 
minority legislation that is based on the right to cultural self-realisation, in contrast to 
demands based on territorial concentration has been the more promising route for the 
Hungarian political representation.  
Functional autonomies 
The development of the attempts to establish a minority law and related draft 
legislation also reflect a change in the strategy of the Hungarian political 
representation away from forms of national level power sharing towards 'functional 
autonomies' that regulate selective areas of minority interests (Bara 21/09/2009). 
Similar to the MPP's vision, functional autonomies would establish certain areas, in 
particular education and cultural activities, as outside of the daily political debate and 
allocate a guaranteed sum to this area. Bara refers to the policies of the Fico-
government when he explains which problems the Hungarian parties hope to solve 
with cultural as well as educational self-administration:  
'There's a huge amount of EU funds, and if three hundred schools are supported 
[with these funds] and no Hungarian school is supported, then of course this 
created problems. [With functional autonomy in minority schooling the 
minorities] could quarrel between themselves, but that would not be a national 
issue, so the Ministry […] could not create a political problem out of that' (Bara 
21/09/2009).  
Such a solution would then represent the state's wish to safeguard and sustain 
minority culture and minority education irrespective of changing governing parties' 
political preferences. Functional autonomies would also allow for some decision 
making authority over minority issues for the minority community, even when no 
minority party is in government. The University of Komárno that was established by 
the Dzurinda government was seen by many Hungarian politicians as an example for 
issue-specific self-administration (Slovak Spectator 09/08/2004).  
Even though minority representatives have focused on the advocacy of minority 
rights and inclusion of Hungarians and other minorities into the Slovak political Part III - Chapter 8 
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community, when demanding the introduction of functional autonomies, these are 
also linked to the solution of socio-economic problems the Hungarians face 
specifically (Bara 24/09/2009). The latter are related to the regional development of 
Slovakia's southern periphery, the continuously lower percentage of Hungarian 
university students compared to Slovaks, a 'brain drain' of well-educated Hungarians 
from southern Slovakia to Bratislava, Hungary, the Czech Republic or elsewhere in 
Europe, and problems related to the employment structures of Hungarians (Lampl 
24/09/2009). It is for this reason that the devolution of competences to the local level 
in the administrative reform under the Dzurinda-government was so much 
appreciated by Hungarians.  
Interviews demonstrated that there is a widely held fear of the rapid decline of the 
Hungarian minority in Slovakia (Bara 24/09/2009; Petőcz 23/09/2009; Tokar 
17/09/2009; Golha/Hajdok/Havran 18/06/2009). Demographics demonstrate a 
constant decline in the number of people who identify as Hungarian in national 
censuses since the 1960s (Lampl 24/09/2009; Gyurgyik 24/06/2009). While in 1991 
10.76% of Slovakia's populations declared Hungarian nationality, in 2001 the 
proportion was 9.66% and in 2009 9.47% (RegStats 2011; Gyurgyik 2002). The 
demographic data alone does not identify the reasons for the decline, and the 
question of identification in censuses has been a controversial issue for minority 
members since the post-war years, if not earlier (Petőcz 23/09/2009). Minority 
representatives claim that some minority members were afraid of revealing their 
group belonging, due to the experience in the immediate post-war years and under 
Communism (ibid., Gyurgyik 16/04/2008). Between 7-10% more people declare 
Hungarian as their mother tongue than as their nationality, which is taken by some in 
support of the argument that fear of disclosing ones group belonging plays a role 
(Gyurgyik 2008, p.198; Gyurgyik 2002). However, the idea dating from Communist 
times that 'to be successful you have to go to a Slovak school' (Bara 24/09/2009), and 
put more generally, that to be successful one has to adapt to the majority society, 
enjoys increasing popularity among minority members (Lampl 24/09/2009). The 
Hungarian parties have acted in response to this fear. In order to maintain group 
institutions, as well as to 'protect and preserve the national identity of the Hungarians 
living in Slovakia' (MKP 2010), most initiatives of the Hungarian parties have 
directly focused on the maintenance and elaboration of the institutional structures Part III - Chapter 8 
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that support minority language and culture. For the same reason large parts of the 
Hungarian community and also the Hungarian parties strongly oppose any changes to 
the Hungarian educational institutions in particular because of the understanding that 
this will accelerate the decrease in people declaring Hungarian identity (Mézes 
18/06/2009).  
Not all minority activists are entirely contented with the strong position the 
Hungarian parties have taken in the field of minority schooling, as well as in other 
policy fields, though:  
'The various groups within the Hungarian community have different needs, 
different desires; from [the] point of view [of the language of instruction] for 
example, the Hungarians who live among Slovaks, in mixed marriages etc – they 
would appreciate bilingual schools' (Petőcz 23/09/2009).  
Petőcz argues further that bilingual schooling is rejected downright by all Hungarian 
political actors, including parties and civic organisation, because of the fears that this 
would mean the end of Hungarian education, and potentially of the Hungarian 
community in Slovakia. Taking into account the aims of the introduction of bilingual 
schooling during the 1990s, these fears cannot be cast aside entirely. Moreover, there 
is a strong part among the Hungarian community that supports a narrative that 
suggests that the Hungarian community in Slovakia is 'in danger' (MKP 2010) of 
becoming extinct (Gyúrgyík 24/06/2009). The Hungarian parties' strong support for 
Hungarian language education in particular has perpetuated the situation for 
Hungarian or 'mixed' families, who have to decide whether to send their children to 
schools with either Hungarian or Slovak as main language of instruction. 
Increasingly, parents opt for Slovak schools (Szarka 2004). The sociologist Zsuzsana 
Lampl argues that this is not necessarily a reaction to the decrease in opportunities 
for minority instruction, but follows parents' wishes that their children learn Slovak 
well (Lampl, 24/09/2009).  
The example of minority language instruction illustrates the dilemma of the 
Hungarian community and their political representation: On the one hand, the 
political strength of the Hungarian parties is conditional on strong positions on 
minority issues, such as language use, education, culture, political participation; on 
the other hand, strong positions cannot account for the community's heterogeneity Part III - Chapter 8 
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with respect to the members' different realities and also their different ideas about the 
'coexistence' with Slovaks in the country and in their local communities.  
Overall, the constant ethnicisation of issues related to (southern) Slovakia or the 
Hungarian minority hampers the work of many who try to develop practicable 
solutions for the improvement and sustainability of good interethnic relations as well 
as regional development (Öllös 23/09/2009). Indeed, a range of problems have 
hardly been discussed publicly or between Hungarian political and civic actors 
thanks to the focus on defending existing rights under the nationalist governments of 
the 1990s and 2006-2010. Among these are questions that shape the situation of the 
Hungarian minority and their relation to the future of southern Slovakia's regional 
development, Slovak-Hungarian bilateral inter-state relations and the difficult and 
conflicting historical memories of Hungarian and Slovak citizens of Slovakia. The 
debates on these issues happen almost exclusively in research institutes, and small 
initiatives such as the Slovak-Hungarian history commission, aiming to initiate 
dialogue on the common history of Slovaks and Hungarians (Šutaj 23/06/2009). The 
diplomatic escalation of interstate relations with Hungary under the Fico-
government, which were often embedded in or triggered by disputes about collective 
and official commemoration, did not contribute to the two countries' rapprochement. 
The election programmes of most major parties during the elections of 2010 either 
neglect interstate relations as well as minority politics entirely, or refer to these in 
purely negative terms (Mesežnikov 2010). Even the minority parties' programmes for 
the development of Slovak-Hungarian relations do not elaborate on questions of 
reconciliation or reduction of tensions as such.
16 On this basis it will be hard to 
pursue politics of rapprochement or reconciliation, in order to overcome the deeply 
ingrained antagonisms between majority and minority, as well as between the two 
states, which have had a negative impact on the situation of Hungarian minority 
members in Slovakia.  
                                                 
16 The former government parties Smer-SD, L'S-HZDS and SNS merely refer to the need to tackle 
'pan-Hungarian chauvinism and extremism' (Smer-SD), and political revisionism. This is also the 
approach of the KDH. The SDKÚ-DS simply refers to 'friendly relations with Slovakia's neighbouring 
countries', but does not pick up the deteriorated relations between Slovakia and Hungary specifically. 
The SaS is the only 'Slovak' party that outlines in more detail the need for reconciliation. Most-Híd 
and its partner OKS focus on the development of interstate relations within the framework of the 
Visegrád Four, that is together with the Czech Republic and Poland. The MKP emphasises the 
cooperation with Hungary in relation to the minority as well as Hungarian-Hungarian relations, that is 
the relations between other Hungarian minority groups in Romania, Ukraine, Slovenia, Serbia in 
particular (Mesežnikov 2010).  Part III - Chapter 8 
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Nevertheless, much in contrast to the Russian-speakers' parties in Estonia, Hungarian 
politicians were able to use the opportunities offered more effectively and adjusted 
their demands to what was deemed an acceptable agenda for the moderate majority 
parties. Simultaneously, throughout their political initiatives all parties have 
maintained a clear line that challenged Slovakia's unitary nation-state model. As a 
result of the Hungarian parties' initiatives, if often essentially thanks to the pressure 
from the EU, Slovakia established central institutions that demonstrate the state's 
responsibility for its national minorities, and decentralised the responsibility for 
selected policy areas to the local level. The ability to frame these policy steps as in 
line with Slovakia's liberal-democratic foundations allowed their adoption. However, 
in the long run the Hungarian political representation has continued to support a 
change in state ideology. Because this is unattainable given the persistent interethnic 
tensions, pragmatic political strategies focus on the cooperation with Slovak 
moderate political actors and gradual policy change on the basis of anti-
discrimination policies as well as institutions of limited affirmative action. At the 
same time, the existing, hard-fought institutions of minority protection and self-
administration, such as the Minority Language Law and the Hungarian University in 
Komárno, constitute achievements, which form the basis of future negotiations, as 
was demonstrated by the amendments to the Minority Language Law under the 
Radičová government. This suggests that a gradual ease in tensions and support of 
the stepwise introduction of minority institutions can also be expected in the future, 
if minority parties are able to participate – even if only to limited extent – in political 
agenda-setting and decision-making.  
8.6 Minority - kin-state relations 
The dilemma of the coherent and strong political representation of Hungarians is 
made even more complicated by the difficult triadic relationship between Slovakia, 
the Hungarian minority and the Hungarian state. In contrast to the Russian 
Federation, Hungary's interest in the situation of the Hungarian minorities in 
Hungary's neighbouring countries has been an enduring aspect of Hungary's foreign 
policies after 1920, when Hungarian irredentism flourished and was eventually 
satisfied with the border revisions of 1940, following the Second Vienna Award Part III - Chapter 8 
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(Zeidler 2002). During Communism, the Kádár regime did not pay much attention to 
the issue though, adhering to the 'façade of socialist brotherhood' (Waterbury 2006, 
p.487) and believing in the 'automatic resolution of the issue based on the principle 
of internationalism' (Bárdi 2004, p.62).
17 With the beginning of post-Communist 
state- and nation-building, Hungary declared 'responsibility' for the (cultural) well-
being of the Hungarian minorities living outside Hungary. The first post-Communist 
prime minister József Antall often referred to the '15 million Hungarians' who live 
within Hungary and 'beyond the border' that his government worked for, rather than 
to just the 10 million Hungarians who make up Hungary's population proper (Ieda 
2004).
18 Over the past two decades, this fundamental claim was translated into 
several legislative initiatives, which were highly disputed in the homelands to the 
Hungarian minorities, both by the minority and the majority. Moreover, there are 
close relations between Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia due to the 
financial and organisational support Hungary provides to the kin abroad on the basis 
of the Slovak-Hungarian Treaty on Good neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-
operation between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic ('Basic treaty') 
and the Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the 
Government of the Hungarian Republic on the Mutual Support of Ethnic Minorities 
in the Field of Education and Culture in December 2003 (Dostál 2005), as well as the 
'Status Law', which caused a lot of controversy.
19  
                                                 
17 Although the government remained largely passive in relation to this issue towards the countries of 
residence of the Hungarian minorities, from the 1960s onwards, increasingly specialised committees 
such as of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the Hungarian Association of Writers began 
working systematically on the situation of the Hungarians abroad. Several documents acknowledged 
the deterioration of the situation for the minorities in neighbouring countries and indicated that, while 
a domestic issue of the respective states, it was also a matter of Hungary's foreign policy (Bárdi 2004, 
p.65).  
18 The Hungarian phrase that is used for denoting the external minorities is 'határon túli magyarok', 
which translates 'Hungarians beyond the border' and represents how the minorities are framed in the 
Hungarian discourse (Waterbury 2006, p.485).  
19 The so-called Status Law of 2001 envisaged a range of (financial) benefits and free movement as 
well as temporary labour permits and 'ethnic Hungarian cards' to persons 'declaring themselves to be 
of Hungarian nationality' while being citizens of one of Hungary's neighbours (Status law, status law 
book. pp.508-528). As such, the law directly affects the status of citizens of neighbouring states. 
Hungary did not consult with these states before the adoption of the law, causing protest and outrage 
in the affected countries (Kovács 2005). These policies were seen by neighbouring states as efforts to 
effectively modify Europe's approach to states and nations (Fowler 2004). Indeed, it seemed to 
confirm the fears of Slovak nationalists that Hungarian irredentist claims were not a matter of the past. 
In their support for the status law, the Hungarian party Fidesz asserted that '[w]e couldn't choose the 
borders, but we can rise up and transcend this division' (Zsolt Németh of Fidesz, quoted in Waterbury 
2006, p.498) and even argued that members of the Hungarian minorities in neighbouring countries 
should not leave their places of residence, as this 'would diminish the reach and breadth of the Part III - Chapter 8 
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The controversy on the Status law was followed two years later by a half-hearted 
referendum in Hungary about issuing dual citizenship to the Hungarian minorities 
abroad. The referendum was initiated by the World Federation of Hungarians, a US-
based non-governmental organisation that is not well integrated with domestic 
politics in Hungary, but attempts to establish itself as a representative of all 
Hungarians around the globe (Kovács 2005). The initiative collided with the interests 
of both the Socialist government and the Conservative opposition. The opposition 
party Fidesz, a right-wing conservative party which has increasingly mobilised on a 
nationalist agenda (Rajacic 2007), however, decided to jump on the bandwagon and 
support the initiative against the government. The Hungarian debate was very much 
shaped by the government's position that Hungary could not cope with an anticipated 
'influx' of Hungarians from neighbouring countries or the availment of benefits to 
minority members abroad on the basis of citizenship.
20 As a result, the referendum 
did not get much support, when only 37.49% of the entitled population took part 
(Rajacic 2007, p.649). From the outside, this result was read by some as a message to 
Europe that Hungary had decided to follow the path of Europeanisation (Kovács & 
Tóth 2009; Kovács & Tóth 2007), to its neighbours that Hungary did not want to 
continue playing with the fears of irredentism and to the minorities abroad that they 
were seen by Hungary as citizens of their states of residence (Fox 2007).  
When Fidesz regained political power in Hungary in 2010, the citizenship issue soon 
resurfaced in government policies. Again without consulting neighbouring states' 
governments, and this time without a referendum, the government introduced dual 
citizenship for members of Hungarian minorities abroad (Kovács & Tóth 2009). 
Observers have argued that the law has very few real consequences, because most 
entitlements and right to free movement are regulated by the Status law as well as by 
common EU membership of Hungary as well as Slovakia, Romania and Slovenia.
21 
Still, the move was met by particularly harsh criticism from the Slovak government, 
                                                                                                                                          
Hungarian nation' (Waterbury 2006, p.498). In so doing, the Hungarian government enacted the 
Hungarian 'sense of mission' that had shaped the irredentism of the inter-war period (Zeidler 2002) 
and simultaneously supported their concept of a Europe of nations rather than states (Navracsics 
1997), which could again be seen as subtle attempt to temper with the borders by Slovakia. 
20 The Status law was designed to hold the balance so that those who, for example, claim benefits 
under the rules of the status law would be 'more than tourists, less than citizens' (Waterbury 2008, 
p.223)  
21 Even for Ukrainian citizens of Hungarian 'nationality', three quarters of whom are holders of the 
'ethnic Hungarian card' on the basis of the Status law, the law does not change much (Shevel 2010).  Part III - Chapter 8 
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who quickly threatened that members of the Hungarian minority who were citizens 
of Slovakia were to lose their Slovak citizenship should they decide to assume 
Hungarian citizenship (EurActiv 27/05/2010). In 2011, a number of Slovak citizens 
who applied for dual citizenship are reported to have lost Slovak citizenship as a 
result of the modified Slovak citizenship act, which is due to be reviewed again 
(Slovak Spectator, 27/09/2011; Slovak Spectator, 15/08/2011; Sme, 27/05/2010).  
The citizenship debates were observed with mixed feelings by Hungarians in 
Slovakia. In interviews, members of the minority insisted that since 2004 – that is, 
since both Hungary's and Slovakia's accession to the EU – dual citizenship is not 
necessary. While some still appreciated the idea of a formal expression of what they 
described as their Hungarian identity, they argued that this was not about a 
connection to the Hungarian state, but to the Hungarian 'nation' 
(Golha/Hajdok/Havran 18/06/2009; Bara 21/09/2009). In this context, minority 
members in Slovakia criticise Hungarians in Hungary for the lack of understanding 
and historical knowledge about neighbouring countries and the situation of 
Hungarians who live there. The failed referendum in 2003 then became a turning 
point in the attitudes of many Hungarians in Slovakia towards Hungary. For 
example, Bara argues that the referendum was ill-advised from the start, as it 
demonstrated the ignorance of the proponents of the referendum concerning the 
offence it caused in relation to the Slovaks. Moreover, the Hungarian minority 
members in Slovakia took offence by the domestic debates in Hungary about the 
allegedly 'millions of Hungarians [from abroad who] will come and abuse the social 
security system' (Bara 21/09/2009). Perceived by the Hungarian minority in Slovakia 
as domestic political games and a clear signal of rejection from their kin, these events 
have led many members of the minority community say that 'they are still 
Hungarians, but they do not expect too much from the Hungarian government 
[anymore]' (Bara 21/09/2009).  
The developments around the 2003 referendum were in contrast to one of the 
Hungarian state's foreign policy doctrines. Since 1990, Hungary's controversial 
foreign policy towards its neighbours and in particular towards the Hungarian 
minorities in these countries was officially guided by the idea to preserve a 
Hungarian nation and its identity beyond the borders of Hungary. The Hungarian Part III - Chapter 8 
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government also declared the so-called 'Antall doctrine', which stipulates that all 
decisions regarding Hungarian minorities should be taken only upon their 
consultation and their inclusion into the decision making process (Bárdi 2004). 
While this resulted in Hungarian minority representatives from, for example, 
Slovakia to be present at many events organised by political actors in Hungary, this 
doctrine was not always adhered to. At the same time, incidents of close relations 
between Hungary and the Hungarian minority in Slovakia caused outrage among 
domestic majority actors.  
Since 1998 at least, the main strategy of the MKP and particularly Most-Híd has been 
to increase the representation and inclusion of minority members into 
institutionalised policies and seek common grounds with the moderates within 
Slovakia, rather than seek the alignment with the Hungarian state. However, 
mobilising a strong external ally can also bear important assets in intergroup power 
relations. In the context of minority politicians' efforts to improve the legal grounds 
for minority language usage in public and official proceedings, Hungary has 
repeatedly supported the minority at the international level to pressure Slovakia into 
adopting minority policies. Moreover, the support from Hungary particularly for 
educational and cultural institutions and organisations has been indispensible for 
Hungarians. Öllös, a political scientist at the Fórum Kissebségkutató Intézet/Fórum 
Inštitút pre výskum menšín (Forum Minority Research Institute, FKI) in Šamorín, is 
convinced that  
'Without the help of Hungary this [i.e. the Hungarian minority's] culture would 
not exist here. It's very difficult to [demand from the] Hungarian minority parties 
to criticise Hungarian politics. They know very well that without the help of 
Hungary it's over. They will cooperate with any Hungarian government – no other 
way' (Öllös 23/09/2009).  
Hungarians in Slovakia are aware of the balance they need to strike with regard to 
their relations to Hungary. Majority nationalists have continuously claimed that 
minority political activities have aimed to undermine Slovak statehood and gain 
sovereignty for the Hungarian group instead. Öllös argues that  
'That's our main problem: here's a constant fear of changing the border. This fear 
is strengthening [even among] politicians who know very well that there is no real 
danger of changing the border in this country. Hungary and Slovakia are members Part III - Chapter 8 
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of NATO, European Union, so it's absolutely impossible […]. But it is very 
important in Slovakia […] and the majority of the political elite cannot imagine a 
different Hungarian strategy because they cannot imagine it about themselves. 
[…] They cannot imagine a country in which citizens of different nationality live 
– and the country is functioning' (Öllös 23/09/2009).  
As a result of this difficult situation most efforts of the minority's political 
representation to alter the legal situation of Hungarians in (southern) Slovakia have 
been portrayed by Slovak nationalist politicians as attempts to alter territorial 
sovereignty. In response to the antagonistic situation in Slovakia and the fear of the 
Hungarian minority of their community's rapid decrease, minority political 
representatives have maintained a balanced relationship to the Hungarian state. They 
agree that it would be foolish to disassociate themselves from the kin-state, as this is 
expected to politically weaken the minority; moreover, the support for minority 
education and culture that comes from the Slovak state has proved to be unreliable, 
particularly under a nationalist government. Essentially, however, it is unlikely that 
the Slovak nationalists would discontinue playing the 'ethnic card' – after all, much 
of their political success is based on the antagonism with the Hungarian minority and 
Hungary as a strong 'enemy' (Mesežnikov 14/04/2008). Hence, while it has made the 
situation of Hungarians in Slovakia difficult at times, these cannot be changed 
without decisive reconciliation at the bilateral level. The crucial resources Hungary 
provides for its kin abroad cannot be discarded off by minority members, and the 
latter do not want to disassociate from Hungary either.  
8.7 Discussion 
Given the relative success of the Hungarian political parties, there has never really 
been a question whether an alternative to ethnicity-based political representation is 
feasible for Slovakia's largest minority. The Hungarian electorate has supported this 
view since 1992. The main reason for this lies in the absence of a political strategy 
for minority support and minority recognition in the agendas of Slovak political 
actors. Károly Domsitz, the mayor of Šamorín, argues that 'there will be never a 
Slovak government the aim of which would be to strengthen the identity of the 
Hungarians living in Slovakia' (Domsitz 16/09/2009). However, interviews have 
shown that there are parts among the Hungarian minority who regret this and would Part III - Chapter 8 
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wish for a situation where politics were not 'ethnicised'. Especially the students who 
were interviewed in the fieldwork conducted for this study argued that they did not 
want to be monopolised by an ethnic political representation, or by nationalist 
governments in Hungary for that matter (Zachar 22/09/2009; Tokar 17/09/2009; 
Golha/Hajdok/Havran 18/06/2009). These young people expressed their regret for a 
situation in which they see themselves forced to vote on the basis of their ethnic 
belonging, but also did not see a feasible alternative under current conditions.  
In general, the minority representatives who were interviewed for this study – 
without exception – are convinced that only a strong group-based representation can 
ensure that minority issues are not entirely dismissed by the dominant political 
forces. Kálmán Petőcz, politician of the MPP between 1992 and 1994, former 
ambassador to Switzerland for Slovakia and researcher at the FKI in Šamorín, insists 
that  
'I think that the Hungarians cannot achieve anything without demonstrating 
power. Slovaks wouldn't take them seriously until they really show that they are 
strong' (Petőcz 23/09/2009).  
Petőcz's argument suggests that the formation of a single Hungarian party in 1998 
was a necessity for the minority on its own accord in order to be able to constitute a 
strong political opponent to Slovak nationalism. The argument is understandable 
from a perspective that focuses on the Slovak nationalists. As József Berényi, former 
head of the National Council's Committee for National Minorities and now MKP-
leader, argued,  
'The situation is the following: […] the international organisations see that there is 
a need to increase the minority rights, but the government proposed a decrease. 
Then we are opposing; then there is a debate; then somebody [suggests] a 
"compromise", which [effectively means] some decrease, but not everything [the 
government had initially suggested will be abolished]; and then the media is 
pushing us to accept, because this is a "compromise". And we are saying that no, 
this is a decrease, we want to have the same as it was before – so not even an 
increase but just to keep it – and then we are labelled radicals and extremists 
because we are not ready to accept compromise' (Berényi 30/06/2009).  
Confronted with the nationalists' strategies to undermine existing minority rights, it is 
essential for the minority's political representation to have a clear standpoint on the Part III - Chapter 8 
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minority rights situation it advocates. The situation is less clear with respect to 
majority moderates.  
Over the past twenty years, the Hungarian parties have oscillated between conceding 
to their own and their electorate's heterogeneity and the consolidation of one party as 
the strong representative of the community. The Hungarians' continuous attempts to 
achieve a comprehensive solution of the problematic interethnic situation by 
establishing various forms of functional autonomies were exploited by Slovak 
nationalist politicians to further fuel fears among Slovak of a border change or the 
Slovaks' loss of sovereignty over southern Slovakia. At the same time, the strong 
position of the MKP was moderated in the negotiations of 1998, and it was the more 
moderate Most-Híd that was supported by the electorate to enter a coalition with the 
Slovak centre-right parties. The strong position of minority party actors during the 
election periods of 1997/98 and 2009/10 offered a starting point for negotiations and 
to develop more acceptable agendas, without demanding that the minority parties 
sacrifice too many of their central political aims. In relation to the Slovak parties, it 
can therefore be argued, the political strength of the Hungarian parties was crucial to 
allow the Hungarian representatives the degree of participation in agenda-setting and 
decision-making that it has maintained since 1998. 
Conclusion 
Overall I argue that the strength of the Hungarian political representation under the 
conditions of Slovak nation-state-building can be attributed to a large extent to the 
continuity in the political agendas of the Hungarian political parties and the 
persistency of their representatives, who at the same time maintained enough 
flexibility to adjust to changing contexts. The clear agenda for the protection of the 
Hungarians as a historical minority allowed for overlapping understandings of 
statehood promoted by majority moderates, thereby fostering cooperation. 
Furthermore, minority representatives have successfully used their far-reaching 
political positions as a starting point for negotiations with majority parties when this 
seemed feasible. The lack of alternatives for the Hungarian minority members at the 
ballot box and the certainty that the Slovak parties are not interested in minority 
issues has allowed the minority parties to maintain a political representation for the Part III - Chapter 8 
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majority of Hungarians in Slovakia. At the same time, the strength of the minority 
parties has also meant that there is no need for majority parties to develop their own 
minority policy concept.  
In order to increase their own group agency, Hungarians in Slovakia have 
successfully fallen back on the normative, socio-structural and socio-psychological 
resources and schemas that shape intergroup relations in Slovakia. The majority of 
Hungarian political actors frame their activities in accordance with the norms and 
regulations of national self-determination and 'cultural identity' that both resonates 
with and reinforces majority structures of meaning. This is enabled by the specific 
context, which allows the regional concentration and strong networks of minority 
members to grant access to the political structures. The experience and legacies of 
intergroup conflict on the side of majority and minorities has undermined minority 
political activities that go beyond reinforcing segregation though. Minority actors are 
aware of the lack of feasible scenarios of interethnic integration among the majority 
group. As a result, alternative scenarios for group agency and intergroup relations 
have to take a back seat, while worries over future developments weigh heavily in 
the generation of minority political agendas. Also in the context of democratisation 
and Europeanisation, Hungarians are much better equipped to actualise these 
resources, than Russian-speakers in Estonia.  Part III - Chapter 9 
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Chapter 9: Societal level activism of Russian-speakers 
in Estonia and Hungarians in Slovakia  
9.1 Introduction  
This chapter analyses the developments in Russian-speakers' and Hungarians' 
societal-level activism. The discussion focuses on those organisations that are 
directly engaged in the field of inter-ethnic relations or working towards the 
improvement of the minority groups' situation in relation with the state and the 
majority population. Section 9.1 provides a brief outline of the problems of research 
and available studies on the topic of minority organisations outside the political 
sphere, and it indicates related characteristics and problems of societal level 
organisation and co-operation across group boundaries. Sections 9.2 and 9.3 analyse 
the Estonian structures for minority support and the way minority members have 
organised in order to use these structures to channel minority interests to the state 
authorities. Section 9.4 looks at recent developments in Estonia, which have led to 
the frail, but nevertheless real stirrings of social movements, triggered by specific 
developments in Estonian politics, but supporting a more general agenda of 
increasing minority participation in socio-political processes. Section 9.5 discusses 
the situation in Slovakia, which differs from that in Estonia in many respects. 
Hungarians have successfully established sustainable structures for societal level 
minority organisations, which provide structures for the minority to act as an interest 
group. At the same time, efforts to engage in co-operation across majority-minority 
group boundaries have not brought about significant results. The chapter concludes 
with a discussion of the differences and similarities in the problems the groups in 
both countries face.  
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9.2 Societal level organisation of the Russian-speaking and 
Hungarian minorities in Estonia and Slovakia 
For the Hungarian and Russian-speaking minorities' formation as political actors and 
groups in both countries, the late 1980s/early 1990s was a phase that was decisive for 
the emergence of group structures and organisation in both political and social 
processes. The end of the old political-institutional order in each country, including 
the respective minority rights schemes in each, and the simultaneous attempts of 
increasing sections of the majority groups to institutionalise majority preference in 
the political and societal system, helped strengthen minority demands for the 
protection of their cultural identity and a place and support for minority interest 
representation. Similar to the lack of political structures to represent their minority 
interests, in the early 1990s minority activists had hardly any structures for civic, 
cultural or other forms of minority organisation in which to engage. The Soviet and 
Czechoslovak authorities had successfully undermined mass civic activism, and had 
pushed activities that can be counted under the broad, 'civic' label into the 
underground, or otherwise keep them limited to activities within the party and 
communist organisational structures. Minority cultural activities were not prohibited, 
but were limited to activities within the realm of 'nationalities policies' (Evans 2006; 
Baker 2002).  
Consequently, in the early 1990s there was a need in both countries to establish 
structures of societal level minority organisation. In both countries, minority activists 
soon saw themselves forced to engage in the defence of their membership in society, 
contradicting many of the goals supported by majority cultural organisations. As 
Károly Tóth, activist in the democratisation movement and currently director of the 
Hungarian Forum Minority Research Institute in Šamorín (FKI), recalls, politics and 
the development of societal level organisation were coterminous at the time (Tóth 
23/09/2009). When the HZDS and SNS were in government, and under the Dzurinda 
government also, relations between the state and society level organisations were 
often antagonistic. The Mečiar administration went to great lengths to hamper 
organisations that took a critical stance towards the government (Demeš 2001). Some 
authors have even argued that it was '"thanks" to the Mečiar era [that] the NGO Part III - Chapter 9 
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institutional system was (and is) more organised with much more co-operation 
among NGOs' (Mészáros-Lampl & Tóth 2003, p.3). Lagerspetz, Rikmann and 
Ruutsoo have argued that in Estonian democratisation, the concept of civil society 
has played an important role: not so much in terms of society's bottom-up 
organisation, but rather in the relation between state and societal organisations. Here 
there was a 'division of labour' in which social welfare functions were transferred to 
non-government organisations. In this process,  
'the desétatization scenario gives political decision makers the upper hand, as they 
will be able to define the "state orders" to be carried out by NGOs. In this, the 
question of the civil society's potential in counteracting the widening alienation 
from democratic process has been left aside' (Lagerspetz et al. 2002, p.75).   
These different backgrounds have impacted the development of society level 
organisation differently; in particular, the developments of civic, social, cultural and 
interest representation and organisation have shaped the interethnic integration of 
society differently in each case.  
Despite a common interest among both majority and minority activists, the 
'ethnicisation' of political processes in the early 1990s also affected the 
institutionalisation of society level democratisation and channels for society's interest 
communication. The increasing political and social divide between majority and 
minority members in both countries was soon mirrored in the segregation of 
emerging civil societies, not only with respect to the representation of culturally 
defined, salient group interests, but also with regard to organisations aiming to 
provide correctives to state politics, bottom-up activities of the minority groups, and 
the establishment of a sphere for organisation largely independent from state 
institutions. Although minority members do participate in or cooperate with majority 
organisations in general, such as in social organisations or with regard to leisure time 
activities, this happens much less in the other direction (Tóth 23/09/2009; Mézes 
18/06/2009; Mesežnikov 14/04/2008; similarly for the Estonian case Lagerspetz 
17/04/2009; Poleshchuk 14/04/2009). Generally, although there are no studies 
available that research the interaction between majority and minority groups at the 
societal level, sociologists researching civil society developments in Estonia and 
Slovakia estimate that few connections exist between majority and minority elements Part III - Chapter 9 
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of society level organisation (Lampl 24/09/2009; Tóth 23/09/2009; Lagerspetz 
17/04/2009). This situation is illustrated, for example, by an official 'comprehensive' 
study on Slovakia's civil society, which did not take into account a single Hungarian 
organisation (Tóth 23/09/2009).
1  
With respect to interethnic interaction, the situation is similar in Estonia: The Centre 
for Civil Society Study and Development at Tallinn University confirmed in 2009 
that there were no comprehensive studies of the co-operation between Russian-
speaking and Estonian societal organisations (Lagerspetz 17/04/2009; Tanel 
Vallimäe 17/04/2009).
2 Existing co-operation between majority and minority 
organisations, according to the activists interviewed during my fieldwork, is limited 
largely to research and policy organisations working on interethnic problems, and 
more often than not they are initiated from the outside, such as through incentives 
provided by EU project schemes (Ivanov 18/05/2010; Grigorjan 18/05/2010; Tóth 
23/09/2009; Lagerspetz 17/04/2009; Mesežnikov 14/04/2008).  
Unsurprisingly, given the status of Soviet-era migrants in Estonia after 1991, 
scholarship has emphasised the marginal role Russian-speakers played in the 
generation of Estonian civil society (Lagerspetz 2005). Recent studies, however, 
have challenged this view, arguing that Russian-speakers have indeed contributed to 
democratisation (Agarin 2010). Outside of trade unions, however, co-operation in 
civil society between majority and minority members has been very limited, and has 
                                                 
1 The contributions in the annual review of Slovakia's democratisation processes edited by the 
research institute and think tank Inštitút pre verejné otázky (Institute for Public Affairs, IVO) in 
Bratislava do not feature Slovak-Hungarian co-operations between societal organisations either; the 
contributions mention specific activities with respect to other, more socially excluded minorities, such 
as specific initiatives that target or are organised by members of the Romany communities in 
Slovakia, as well as anti-racist  initiatives (Demeš 2001). Initiatives that aim to reduce tensions 
between Slovakia and Hungary, as well as domestic problems between Hungarians and Slovaks are 
referred to merely as spontaneous reactions of individual public figures to rising tensions and 
'situations […] threatening to undermine civil society in Slovakia, such as the unsolved assault on 
ethnic Hungarian student Hedviga Malinová' (Strečanský et al. 2007, p.558) 
2 The researchers at the Centre indicated that such a study was envisaged for the future; indeed a study 
under the title of Survey report: Russian-speakers' civic organisations and Estonian civil society: 
Parallel worlds or quiet integration? was published in 2010 (Vallimäe et al. 2010). The authors of the 
study come to a generally more positive conclusion for the prospects of Estonian 'civil society' as a 
sphere of integration rather than 'parallel worlds'; however, this evaluation is based primarily on the 
increased use of Estonian language in Russian-speakers' organisations and the impact on promoting 
and teaching 'tolerance' (see especially the conclusions on ibid., p.33); overall the study demonstrates 
that the issue of integration is of upmost importance for the majority of Russian-speaking 
organisations and thereby contradicts dominant public perceptions of the Russian-speakers (ibid., 
pp.36-37).  Part III - Chapter 9 
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not been much encouraged by existing civil society development strategies, as 
discussed earlier in the thesis (Lagerspetz 2005). Those initiatives that bring 
individuals from the majority and minority groups together are commented upon 
very positively by the participants; however, such initiatives – often carried out in 
co-operation with the Integration Foundation – only reach a very small proportion of 
the population (Mätlik 04/09/2009; Solovev/Dulneva 31/07/2009).  
The limited interest of actors in cooperation across ethnic boundaries is mutual, 
despite the affirmations by majority and minority members of their preparedness for 
dialogue (Gyárfášová 17/06/2009; Dornemann 19/05/2009). This poses a continuous 
challenge to interethnic dialogue, even though many minority activists find alarming 
the ethnicisation of social and political processes that precipitated the disintegration 
of common efforts of majority and minority activists of democratisation. This 
chapter shows, among other things, that the lack of interaction further constrains the 
already limited opportunities for society level dialogue on issues of interethnic 
integration, as well as the strategies deployed in society level minority organisation. 
9.3 Umbrella organisations as channels for minority participation 
in Estonia? 
In the absence of more immediate solutions to the problems of the provision of 
general minority interest representation, minority members interested in practicing 
their cultures made efforts to establish suitable structures to enable them to 
sustainably finance and engage in minority activities at the societal level, primarily in 
the form of unity under umbrella organisations. Since the early 1990s, the state 
supported minority cultural activities as part of its approach to Estonian multi-
culturalism, of which the traditional minority cultures were a constituent part. The 
limited notion of multiculturalism, however, entails that the more general demands of 
minorities generated in minority social and cultural organisations were systematically 
undermined. Sections 9.3 and 9.4 look at the resources available to minority 
organisations and the constraints these mean for all activities that attempt to modify 
the dominant multiculturalist 'consensus'.  Part III - Chapter 9 
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In the early 1990s, Russian-speakers were confronted with the hostility of the 
political elite and the open declaration of plans to make life in Estonia undesirable 
for Russians/Russian-speakers expecting them (de facto) to leave. Based on this 
expectation, the political situation in the early 1990s did not make minority members 
expect much accommodation for cultural interest representation from the political 
elite of the time. Across Estonia, and in parallel to equivalent organisations set up by 
the Estonians, minority members gathered in local clubs to engage in traditional 
cultural activities, celebrate these, and set up structures to teach traditional cultural 
practices to other members of the respective communities (particularly the children). 
From the early 1990s onwards, local clubs started organising in umbrella asso-
ciations, facilitating the interaction between, as well as joint projects of, the different 
clubs/communities. One of the first umbrella organisations of this kind is the Rahvus-
vaheline Rahvuskultuuride Ühenduste Liit (Union of National (Ethnic) Cultural 
Communities, LÜÜRA). Founded in 1993, the organisation includes 53 member 
organisations, engaging in cultural activities from at least 19 national backgrounds.
3  
In the following years, minority members have established many more such 
individual and umbrella organisations and associations, including the MTÜ Russki 
Dom – Estonia (Russian House – Estonia); the Eestimaa Rahvuste Ühendus 
(Estonian Nationalities Association); the MTÜ Eesti Mitmekultuuriline 
Assotsiatsioon (Estonian Intercultural Association); the MTÜ Ukraina 
Organisatsioonide Assotsiatsioon Eestis (Association of Ukrainian Organisations in 
Estonia); the Ida-Virumaa Integratsioonikeskus (Ida-Virumaa Integration Centre); 
MTÜ Vene rahvuskultuuriliste organisatsioonide ühendus Sadko Eestis (Union of 
Russian Ethno-Cultural Organisations in Estonia 'Sadko'); Vene Haridus- ja 
Heategevusühingute Liit Eestis (Union of Russian Educational and Charitable 
Societies in Estonia). These umbrella organisations unite between 13-35 member 
organisations. Moreover, there are a range of smaller umbrella organisations within 
which smaller minority groups such as the Dagestani, Belarusian or Georgian 
cultural and educational organisations cooperate, or unite (for example) Russian-
speaking educational organisations that operate as 'Sunday schools' within the state's 
                                                 
3 These include Russians, Ukrainians, Mordvins, Belarusians, Armenians, Georgians, Ossetians, 
Kabardins, Tatars, Turkmen people, Koreans, Setos, Uzbeks, Chinese people, people from Angola, 
Kazakhs, Lezgian people, Talyshi, Buryats, cf.  (LÜÜRA 2011).  Part III - Chapter 9 
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integration framework (Vene Kultuuriseltside Assotsiatsioon Ruthenia or Association 
of Russian Cultural Societies 'Ruthenia') (Etnoweb 2011).  
To date there are 265 national cultural organisations and 19 umbrella organisations 
registered with the Estonia state, according to the website of the Integration 
Foundation (MEIS 2011).
4 They engage in the fields of general cultural activities, 
folklore, literature, music and the arts as well as language-based activities, proffering 
classes on subjects to improve the participants' knowledge of their mother tongue. 
Larger organisations, such as LÜÜRA, regularly carry out festivals of traditional and 
more modern forms of national culture, fostering the exchange between minority 
groups, whose lingua franca is, in most cases, Russian, despite the various group 
allegiances of the members (Agarin 2010; Grigorjan 18/05/2009). Increasingly, 
minority organisations use Estonian as their working language (Vallimäe et al. 
2010); websites and the information materials of the minority organisations are in 
most cases available in Estonian, and in some cases information in Estonian is now 
more detailed than in Russian, e.g. on the websites of organisations such as LÜÜRA 
or Eestimaa Rahvuste Ühendus (ERÜ 2011).  
The overall aim of these organisations' activities is to provide minority groups with 
the space for practices which are not considered part of the 'common (cultural) core' 
of Estonian society and thus is not made a priority in the state's responsibility to 
provide support for cultural activities. Some of the organisations claim to stand in the 
tradition of Russian-speakers' organisations from the 1920s and 1930s (for example 
Vene Haridus- ja Heategevusühingute Liit Eestis). While the cultural minority 
organisations' focus is on generating opportunities for minority practices, these 
organisations also try to impact the overall representation of minority culture in 
Estonia, by lobbying for this at the state level, and by establishing spaces and 
opportunities to discuss current issues of interest or concern for minorities. In this 
                                                 
4 Currently, 204 national cultural organisations are listed on the Ministry of Culture's website today, 
together with 21 umbrella organisation and a range of associations not members in an umbrella 
organisation, as well as related associations, organisations and Sunday schools working in the field of 
national cultures (Ethnoweb 2011). Information on the number of these organisations as well as the 
organisations themselves is not easy to acquire, as many exist as small clubs without any publicly 
accessible representation, and not all of them are officially registered or receive funding on a regular 
basis, which would enable to trace the number of organisations, as well as more general information 
on them through these activities (Lagerspetz 17/04/2009). No additional or updated information could 
be received by the author through email enquiries to the MEIS and Ministry of Culture; therefore the 
information on the website, despite potentially being inaccurate, has to suffice here.  Part III - Chapter 9 
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way they communicate difficulties and constraints of the current minority rights and 
protection framework to the authorities, as well as build structures of exchange, 
organisation and support for the minority groups in the country (Lyagu 19/05/2010; 
Grigorjan 18/05/2010). The organisations are funded in part by the Ministry of 
Culture, the Integration Foundation and local municipalities.  
Many activists work to the idea of preserving, deepening and handing down the 
knowledge of their culture, celebrating particularly ethnicity-/cultural group-based, 
traditional forms of cultural self-expression as ways to promote integration. 
Aleksander Dusman, chairman of the Ida-Virumaa Integration Roundtable and head 
of the Ida-Virumaa Jewish Community, argues that the strengthening of minority 
national identities is a crucial aspect of the integration process. He is convinced that 
the restoration and development of a minority cultural identity helps members of a 
former majority (Russian-speakers) to learn to understand the 'perspective of the 
Estonians' during Soviet times (Dusman 16/12/2009). At the same time, the 
promotion and information about minority cultural activities among Estonians would 
enable majority members to understand that the minorities' aims in practicing their 
cultures are not so different from their own interests after all (ibid.). These 
organisations therefore welcome policies that promote diversity and multiculturalism 
and actively participate in the political actors' initiatives in this field, particularly in 
Estonia, where ethnic diversity is promoted along the lines of traditional national 
cultures (such as the state integration strategy). In turn, these organisations' 
representatives do not generally perceive integration and accommodation with 
majority society as detrimental or threatening to minority members and their 
collective interest in preserving a cultural minority identity. Rather, integration is 
considered a problem for Estonian society generally, which can only be solved on the 
basis of the minority's co-operation with the majority. The simultaneous provision 
for and support of cultural diversity in society, which minority representatives 
demand, should be enabled by the state to help each group follow its own priorities 
(Lyagu 19/05/2010; Dusman 16/12/2009).  
On this basis, proponents of this approach seek to cooperate with state institutions 
and drive inroads into policy-making through minority cultural interest 
representation at state level, such as in the Ministry of Culture's Council for National Part III - Chapter 9 
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Minorities. Selected minority organisations are supported by the state through 
cooperative structures in several thematic and training areas, as indicated in section 
7.2, for example with the Integration Foundation (Mätlik 04/12/2009). Minority 
cultural and educational organisations closely cooperate with the Integration 
Foundation in the production of information material on national minorities, and 
receive training for successful project applications and other activities within the 
range of tasks of the integration strategy (Dusman 16/12/2009). Particularly, schemes 
that are supported as part of the integration strategy, such as Sunday schools, allow 
for the professionalisation and further institutionalisation of minority cultural 
organisation (Lyagu 19/05/2010).  
Refraining from supporting demands concerning the status and inclusion of minority 
members into political or social life beyond the thematic field of minority national 
cultural activities gives them more leeway in cooperating with the state than 
organisations with an explicitly political agenda (Kõrvalt 19/05/2010). Hence, 
cooperation between minority umbrella organisations and the state has not helped 
channel minority demands in fields outside of (a limited notion of) minority cultures 
into the political agenda-setting and decision-making.  
Aware of this situation, 201 minority organisations – some of which are regularly 
included in the Ministry of Culture's Council talks, some of which are not – have 
joined forces and formed the Eestimaa Vähemusrahvuste Esindajate Koda (House of 
Representatives of the National Minorities of Estonia, EVEK). The organisation was 
formed in response to the Bronze night events in 2007, brought on by the lack of 
political structures for Russian-speakers to express their discontent with policies and 
the demand to be included in political processes.  The organisation aims at the  
'protection of the rights of national minorities in Estonia and their representation 
in all structures of the state and municipal levels of government and in the judicial 
system of the republic as well as in various public organisations' (EVEK 2007).  
EVEK claims to be authorised to represent the Russian-speaking community at 
various levels of government, officially convening around 200 minority interest and 
umbrella organisations, including some of the large cultural umbrella organisations 
such as LÜÜRA (EVEK 2011). Based on the support of those organisations, EVEK Part III - Chapter 9 
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aims to form a political representative body following the example of the 
Representative Assembly in the early 1990s. EVEK unites a certain spectrum of 
Russian-speaking activists and organisations, which coordinate their political 
position and work under the umbrella organisation. Many members of EVEK have 
been involved in earlier political representation bodies, such as the Popular Front, the 
Representative Assembly and cultural organisations, favouring the 'integrationist' 
approach to minority policies. Many of them are prominent figures of the Russian-
speaking community; some of them have for years participated, in various functions, 
in the Presentation Roundtable talks or the Ministry of Culture's Council of Ethnic 
Minorities and taken part in numerous initiatives, organised either by the state or by 
minority organisations.  
While it has successfully organised conferences to unite minority activities, 
repeatedly appealed to the authorities, and engaged in informal talks with state 
representatives, Rafik Grigorjan, head of the organisation, regrets that the Estonian 
authorities do not acknowledge EVEK as a formal contact body on the grounds that 
the organisation was not formally elected by 'all' minority members, which of course 
is – not only under current conditions – impractical (Grigorjan 18/05/2010). This is a 
popular argument of the Estonian government, in effect serving to disregard most 
political initiatives by Russian-speakers as unauthorised.
5 With regard to EVEK, it is 
striking that EVEK unites many of those organisations and individuals who have, for 
years, been invited by the state bodies to 'discuss' minority integration; at the same 
time, these bodies refuse to acknowledge EVEK as a legitimate representative body 
of Russian-speakers in Estonia (Grigorjan 18/05/2010). Thus, although EVEK is not 
recognised by the authorities as the Representative Assembly was – at least for some 
time – a number of its board members participate de facto in the institutional 
structures for minority inclusion. Essentially, the lack of recognition of EVEK by the 
authorities means that the main representatives consult with state and government 
bodies on the basis of an invitation from the bodies to participate, not on the basis of 
                                                 
5 To be sure, this view is to some extent by Russian-speakers' organisations, which are critical of the 
approach EVEK pursues and who argue that many organisations have asserted themselves as the 
Russian-speakers' representation (Dornemann 19/05/2010). Similar to the Russian-speakers' political 
parties, the civic organisations engaging in political activities have indeed in many cases competed for 
acknowledgement by the authorities as the contact and representation of the group rather than 
cooperate with each other; other organisations have rejected the co-operation with the state altogether 
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a claim for legitimacy as the representative organisation of a (large) part of the 
Russian-speaking population acting on its own accord. In this way, the state 
maintains control over the process and avoids situations in which it would have to 
accept EVEK (or any other minority organisation) as a partner in dialogue.  
Despite its powerless role in the consultations, EVEK continues to meet and discuss 
with state and local government institutions in order to voice minority interests and 
views in the sparse forums offered. In contrast to the state, Tallinn's local initiative 
for integration has been more open towards EVEK as an organisation. Despite a 
number of meetings and conferences, the Civic Peace strategy (Tallinn City 2011), 
which was initiated after the events of April 2007, has not so far resulted in 
significant improvements of majority-minority relations in Tallinn. As part of the 
strategy, regular forums that have been held since 2007 about three times per year to 
analyse the problems and develop strategies how to improve the situation of 
interethnic relations. According to minority participants at the forums, no new 
strategies have been developed and analysts as well as political actors have mainly 
repeated the results of earlier studies and not developed any strategies for action 
(Kõlvart 19/05/2010; Grigorjan 18/05/2010; Ivanov 18/05/2010; Vaus 18/05/2010).  
The deadlock of the integration strategy with regards to institutional change is one of 
the reasons why EVEK's main efforts currently concentrate on its consolidation as 
part of the civil society structure and as the central organisation of Russian-speakers' 
civil and political activities. Currently EVEK still lacks the structures and 
organisational support that would enable the organisation to form a more powerful 
representation of Russian-speakers generally. Meanwhile, no other organisation is 
able to fulfil the role of civic or political representative of the Russian-speaking 
community, which could potentially be included into decision-making processes by 
the authorities.  
9.4 Problems of dependency – Minority organisations and the 
state Part III - Chapter 9 
 
254
The interaction between minority organisations and the state is important because of 
the participatory function it carries – however limited this may be. It also serves to 
ensure the financial and organisational support that societal level minority 
organisation is dependent upon. Minority activists aiming to optimise the status quo 
situation of their organisations therefore primarily focus on improving their support 
base and demanding more guarantees in the current framework for the support of 
minority interest representation. In other words, activists advocate the increase and 
improvement of the distribution of funding as well as organisational support for 
minority cultural activities. This section discusses the problems that result from the 
dependency on this form of state support by focusing on the examples of selected 
minority organisations.  
In order to increase their representational legitimacy and organisational power, 
minority organisations have united their forces in umbrella organisations, which 
fulfil a double function in the institutionalisation of minority cultural support. On the 
one hand, they enable minority organisations to channel and potentially strengthen 
the bottom-up communication of problems, needs and demands from minority 
organisations towards the state and coordinate their work for autonomous minority 
organisation (Grigorjan 18/05/2010). On the other hand, the Estonian state 
appreciates such organisations because they facilitate the granting and distribution of 
funding by the state in so far as they reduce the number of contact persons and so 
optimise communication and top-down channelling of regulations and provisions for 
minority support (Mätlik 04/12/2009). As a result, ministries and other state 
institutions in both countries cooperate primarily with umbrella organisations. This 
means, in turn, that organisations not yet under the wing of an umbrella organisation 
have more difficulties sustaining their activities (Jakobson 17/04/2009).  
While the distribution of funding is organised mainly through the umbrella 
organisations, the state still monitors the activities of individual projects funded by 
national or EU funds. Since 2006, all funding granted as part of EU project schemes 
are part of the state's budget for public funding. Tanel Mätlik, head of the Integration 
Foundation, explains, that 'That means […] all sources of finance will be agreed 
between the government and us' (04/12/2009). Umbrella organisations do not have 
the rights of bodies of functional cultural autonomy, even though they have the Part III - Chapter 9 
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responsibility for distributing resources and coordinating the co-operation of member 
organisations. The extended and growing role umbrella organisations play in the 
funding of minority activities has caused some problems for the group's ability to 
establish structures for their cultural activities due to political reasons. While some 
activists expect umbrella organisations to allow some autonomy for individual 
organisations, in practice umbrella organisations do not necessarily solve the 
problem of the activists' lack of control over the type of activities that are being 
funded by the state. Rather, they tend to shift the question of distribution and 
compliance from the expectations of state institutions to those of umbrella 
organisations, acting now as a first controlling body that accepts member 
organisations and individual projects on the basis of their experience with the 
requirements state institutions impose on minority cultural initiatives. Many Russian-
speakers believe that organisations, which have leanings to political organisations or 
engage publicly in political criticism or protest, have difficulties sustaining their 
cooperative relationship with the state institutions (Kõrvalt 19/05/2010; Grigorjan 
18/05/2010). Viewed from this perspective, appeals by umbrella organisations to 
their member organisations to comply with the non-confrontational approach towards 
state institutions the former promote can be read as forms of discipline and control 
over member organisations (Lyagu 19/05/2010).  
Due to the Integration Foundations vulnerable position in relation to the government 
(see section 7.2), minority organisations have had continuous problems with the 
long-term planning of their activities. Many minority activists in Estonia nonetheless 
appreciate the funding that is provided through the channels of the Integration 
Foundation thanks to the existence of the integration programme (Lyagu 19/05/2010; 
Dusman 16/12/2009). At the same time, they are also worried that funding for 
minority activities is linked to the existence of the integration programme (the 
current programme will end in 2013). Some activists claim, therefore, that the 
importance of the programme lies in its existence rather than in its content (Lyagu 
19/05/2010). This view is telling in that it appears to confirm not only minority 
members' different, sometimes contradictory reasons for criticising or advocating the 
integration programme's aims and implementation, but also that, without the 
integration programme in place, there would be hardly any structures for the support 
of minority members' cultural self-realisation and participation.  Part III - Chapter 9 
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The lack of legal guarantees regulating the financing of minority cultural activities is 
generally detrimental to the organisations' autonomy from the state. Some autonomy 
from state supervision is given in the form of funding provided by alternative 
sources, in particular kin-state funding, through foundations or in form of direct 
support. International initiatives, such as the Open Society Foundation and its local 
Open Estonian Foundation (Avatud Eesti Fond, AEF), have provided funding for 
organisations that focus on the social inclusion of minority members rather than their 
cultural minority interests. The AEF has provided project-based funding for a range 
of initiatives, also in the area of interethnic integration and specific problems of the 
country's North-East (for example, the AEF sponsored projects in relation to social 
exclusion and HIV/AIDS, which is a serious problem of the deprived areas of the 
Eastern periphery). Other AEF projects include the mentoring programme for 
teachers at Russian-language schools, which helps Russian-speaking teachers who 
are learning Estonian to acquire the language competence necessary for their specific 
needs and interests (AEF 2011). Besides assisting the integration process in this way, 
the AEF regularly holds competitions for project funding. Again, this does not allow 
minority organisations to plan effectively any long-term strategies.  
The practical relevance of external funding for minority activities is high but 
incalculable; as minority citizens have no decision-making power in their kin-state or 
in other states that provide funding, funding cannot be enforced. Minority 
representatives in Estonia and Slovakia also emphasise the importance of support 
from the minority's home state both to fulfil its democratic responsibility to represent 
all citizens' interests, including cultural ones, and to increase the minority members' 
feelings of belonging to their home country. In the absence of an alternative structure 
for minority funding, representatives have – so far, unsuccessfully – advocated the 
development of more sustainable institutions that would guarantee the maintenance 
of organisations working in the realm of minority culture as well as minorities' 
broader, socio-cultural interests. The extension of base-line funding for minority 
organisations is at the core of the negotiations of many minority organisations with 
the Ministry of Culture's Minorities Council (Lyagu 19/05/2010).  
An illuminating example of the problems that the dependency on project based state 
funding cause is provided by the Tallinn-based Taekwondo-Union (Eesti Taekwon-Part III - Chapter 9 
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do Liit) and Youth Association Generation (Pokolenie/Põlvkond) operating under the 
sport union's roof (Taekwondo Union 2011; KOOS 2011). The Taekwondo-Union is 
a young people's umbrella organisation which coordinates internationally successful 
Taekwondo Clubs in ten Estonian towns, and is the Estonian representation at 
international championships. In parallel to traditional martial arts, the Taekwondo-
Union has also organised celebrations of minority national culture, including national 
dances, music and theatre. Today, the umbrella organisation coordinates the work of 
a number of national minority culture clubs, and has more recently expanded in yet 
another direction: among other things, in the Generation club young people engage in 
charity clubs working with the poor and needy in parts of Tallinn, also organising 
lecture series for other young people on topics of their choice. A member of 
LÜÜRA, the Taekwondo-Union has organised large projects where its different 
member organisations cooperate, such as combined young people's martial-arts- and 
national-minority-festivals, hosting several thousands of guests from around the 
globe (Kõlvart 19/05/2010; LÜÜRA 2011).   
Mikhail Kõlvart, (former) president of the umbrella organisation, emphasises that the 
members of the various initiatives under the Taekwondo Union's roof have always 
understood their clubs to be 'Estonian', not 'Russian,' organisations.  The Taekwondo 
clubs in particular have always attracted Estonian youngsters as well thanks to 
Kõlvart's active support for an inclusive approach in his work. Still, Kõlvart says, he 
is often confronted with the authorities' 'accusations' of leading a Russian 
organisation:  
'I thought of having an Estonian organisation, because we participate in the World 
championship, we have Estonian flags, the Estonian anthem, sometimes [we win 
a] gold medal for Estonia, so for our country. They say we are Russian' (Kõlvart 
19/05/2010).  
Being assigned the 'Russian' label complicates attempts to secure funding, despite the 
member organisations' visible and popular activities. While the organisations' 
cultural, sporting and social activities have received project-based state funding, the 
club that organises lectures and discusses current themes is excluded from funding. 
In this context, Kõlvart recalls that Part III - Chapter 9 
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'One high-level [person] from the Ministry of Culture [said to me], of course not 
in the official talks, but in private: "What support do you [expect], if you have [a] 
Russian organisation?"' (Kõlvart 19/05/2010).  
Kõlvart attributes his organisation's difficulties with funding partly to the fact that he 
is publishing articles criticising the state's minority policies in the Estonian media 
and has always been outspoken in his views on integration. Moreover, he suspects 
that his election as a member of Tallinn city council on Keskerakond's list, marking 
him as an opponent of the current government, might also have played a role. 
Interviews with representatives of other Russian-speaking organisations revealed 
that, particularly after April 2007, the labelling of 'Russian' organisations was applied 
to organisations and individuals already outspoken on politically disputed issues, 
particularly in the realm of integration policies (Poleshchuk 18/12/2009; Rosenfeld 
07/12/2009; Ivanov 20/04/2009).  
An organisation that became subject to the investigations of state services - on 
similar grounds as the accusations against Kõlvart's organisation - is the Youth 
Association SiiN/Zdes' ('Here'), a Russian-speakers' youth organisation which 
portrays itself as anti-fascist (SiiN 2011). The organisation SiiN both directly 
addresses Russian-speaking young people and explicitly aims to work on integration, 
albeit with an understanding different to the dominant, Estonian approach. SiiN is a 
follow up to the 'Creative Youth Union' that existed in Mustamäe between 1995-
1998 (Mustamäe is a district of Tallinn with a Russian-speaking majority) and the 
subsequent struggles to set up a Youth Centre in the capital  (Ivanov 20/04/2009). 
SiiN was founded in 2001 as a project explicitly focusing on Russian-speaking young 
people, with a membership in 2009 of around 500 young people who regularly or 
occasionally participate in the organisation's activities (Ivanov 20/04/2009). Ivanov 
explains that, when he founded the organisation, he was convinced that  
'if nothing will be done for Russian youth in Estonia, soon [we'll have a] very 
dangerous situation. […] I knew: other Russians in Estonia know even less than 
me [i.e. about their own situation and the state's integration policies] – [there was 
a] need for an information centre for Human and Children's rights' (Ivanov 
20/04/2011). 
While starting off with the idea of empowering Russian-speaking young people, 
enabling them to stand up for their own interests and make their own demands, the Part III - Chapter 9 
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organisation now offers a broad range of activities, primarily in teaching debating 
and writing skills and working to foster more democratic and tolerant attitudes. SiiN's 
goals go beyond creating space for Russian-speaking young people to develop their 
own projects; many projects initiated by the young people aim to increase minority 
visibility as well as participation and access in the public sphere, for example by 
organising flash mobs to draw attention to their concerns; other projects directly aim 
at achieving recognition of and tolerance for diversity – for example, SiiN is a 
member of the Council of Europe's 'All Different – All Equal' initiative. Despite a 
lack of attention or a positive reception by the Estonian state, the organisation has 
received funding from the state in the past, and is still to some extent supported by 
the municipality of Tallinn as well as foundations and donors in other countries and 
the EU (Ivanov 20/04/2009).  
However, after April 2007, when riots broke out in the centre of Tallinn involving 
around 1,000 young people (Brüggemann & Kasekamp 2008, p.436), SiiN faced 
serious problems with its funding situation (Rosenfeld 07/12/2009). After the April 
events, Mark Siryk, a young man who was the local representative of 'Nashi' (Ours) - 
the nationalist youth organisations in Russia,- was identified as a member also of 
SiiN; the Estonian security police suspected also the organisation SiiN to have 
relations to Russian nationalistic forces (KAPO 2007, p.20; LICHR 2008, p.21). 
After the April events, several young people's organisations, as well as their 
individual members, were subject to Estonian Security Police investigations 
(Kaitsepolitsei, KAPO), which involved KAPO inquiries with teachers on the 
membership of schoolchildren in Russian-speakers' youth clubs and their potential 
involvement in the riots of April 2007 (Kõlvart 19/05/2010; Ivanov 20/04/2009; 
Poleshchuk 14/04/2009). While this has happened mostly under the pretext of the 
involvement of individual members of such organisations in the demonstrations or on 
accusations of holding contacts to organisations in Russia, it has affected large 
numbers of people who have not been involved in any of this, causing insecurity 
among many of them and deterring Russian-speakers from engaging in activities that 
are not solely focused on 'singing and dancing', and therefore accepted as innocuous 
'minority interests' by the state (Astrov 17/05/2010; Poleshchuk 14/04/2009). Part III - Chapter 9 
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As a result of the allegations and investigations, SiiN lost its financial support from 
state institutions (Postimees 01/08/2007). The organisation also lost its funding from 
international or foreign state organisations in Europe. This was a consequence of the 
Estonian state insisting, in relation to other states' funding, that SiiN was involved in 
anti-state activities (Glaß 09/06/2010). This was despite the fact that even the four 
prominent individuals charged with inciting the protests and riots, including Siryk, 
were cleared of all charges by court (LICHR 2008). To date, SiiN has not recovered 
from the cuts in funding and the withdrawal of sponsors due to the accusations, 
despite the fact that no member of SiiN was found responsible for the riots or events 
around these (Postimees 01/08/2007). Moreover, the allegations of involvement had 
momentous effects for SiiN in and of themselves. Russian-speaking activists claim 
that these accusations deterred minority members from participating in SiiN's 
activities specifically, and Russian-speaking young people's organisations that 
engage in activities aimed explicitly at Russian-speakers generally (Ivanov 
20/04/2009). Many young people have stayed away from the organisation, fearing 
that by participating they might become subject to state authorities' accusations as 
well (Ivanov 20/04/2009). While the details of SiiN's or some of its members' 
involvement into the riots of 2007 cannot be established here, it can be said that SiiN 
is well integrated into the existing structures of Russian-speakers who support an 
overall integrationist approach (Kõlvart 19/05/2010; Grigorjan 18/05/2010; 
Rosenfeld 07/12/2009). The organisation also participates in local-level integration 
activities, such as Tallinn's integration strategy Civic Peace.  
Crucially, it is difficult for minority activists to identify what is considered by the 
authorities to be 'political activity' or 'protest', and what requirements an organisation 
needs to comply with in order to receive state funding without encountering the 
problems Kõlvart's and Ivanov's organisations currently face. Several of my 
interview partners have claimed that Russian-speakers in general have been very 
cautious and reluctant to engage in any activities in the aftermath of the April events. 
Policy changes that facilitated the revocation of citizenship status from the 
naturalised, the formerly stateless, or from citizens of Russia have made the potential 
consequences of activities that are perceived as 'anti-state' by the Estonian authorities 
tangible. The control of minority civic and political organisations increased after 
2004, and did so again after April 2007. This development was paralleled by a Part III - Chapter 9 
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decrease in the preparedness for dialogue with minority organisations on the side of 
the government and state authorities.  
The situation was different during Estonia's run-up to EU accession, when the 
requirements for compliance with international expectations regarding the formal 
inclusion of minority perspectives into policy making and international organisations' 
efforts to facilitate the reduction of intergroup tensions had allowed for more 
consultations between state and Russian-speakers. In this process, thanks to its 
embeddedness in international networks, one organisation, the Inimõiguste 
Teabekeskus (Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, LICHR), was able to 
position itself – at least temporarily – as an organisation that the Estonian authorities 
could not ignore. The LICHR is among the most important and most renowned civic 
organisations in Estonia working on the facilitation of political change, even though 
it is not an organisation that aims at directly political representation. Since 1994, the 
LICHR has provided minority advocacy and has been the leading minority institution 
independently monitoring Estonian legislation and policy implementation from a 
human rights and international-legal perspective. It has a wide international network 
and cooperates, among others, with the European Union Agency for Fundamental 
Rights, the OSCE, the CoE, and the United Nations Human Rights Committee 
(LICHR 2011). While it has successfully drawn the attention of scholars and 
minority rights protection institutions across Europe to the situation of Russian-
speaking non-citizens in Estonia, the organisation's advocacy activities towards the 
state have remained without direct legal response. National political actors have 
repeatedly taken up invitations of the LICHR to engage in the exchange of opinions, 
particularly on the integration process during EU accession; occasionally, the LICHR 
has cooperated with the former Minister of Ethnic and Population Affairs, Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Culture and others after 2004.  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the LICHR gained both national and international 
recognition as a major institution supporting the integration process in Estonia, when 
the centre organised roundtable meetings, inviting representatives of the Estonian 
government, minority representatives and members of European institutions to 
discuss and potentially negotiate further steps in the recently initiated integration 
strategy. The LICHR attempted to establish a continuous dialogue and achieve Part III - Chapter 9 
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inclusion of Russian-speakers into the discussion of the aims and steps of the 
integration strategy, as well as in a long-term perspective to make the Estonian 
political elite sympathetic to the argument for the importance of Russian-speakers' 
inclusion  into agenda-setting and decision making (Poleshchuk 2002; Poleshchuk 
2001b; Poleshchuk 2001a). It seized the opportunity in the years preceding Estonia's 
accession to the EU, which linked to the increased attention European organisations 
then paid to interethnic stability and compliance with human and minority rights 
criteria of the accession countries. However, these efforts did not induce genuine 
dialogue. Poleshchuk, author of the LICHR roundtable reports, recalls that 'by the 
third roundtable meeting, participants were merely repeating their earlier statements', 
and no party was prepared to accommodate the other (14/04/2009). This experience 
is shared by many activists from other politically-oriented groups, who claim to have 
attempted to initiate dialogue with the authorities; the state's refusal to change its 
approach to citizenship and language legislation left minority members feeling 
unable to change their own position, which in their view already constituted a 
sensible solution to ongoing problems (Grigorjan 18/05/2010).  
The LICHR stands out among the NGOs in that its work is shaped by the synergy of 
the legal support for minority members, the expertise from monitoring policies and 
the co-operation with ministries and other political actors. The organisation's main 
focus is on legal activities. In its capacity as a legal advisory organisation it has, for 
example, defended many of the persons charged during the riots in Tallinn in 2007; it 
has also been leading constitutional court cases related to linguistic discrimination of 
Russian-speaking inmates in Estonian prisons and cases of arbitrariness of the 
Estonian legal framework with respect to minority members' equality with majority 
members. The organisations' publications engage with the individual, that is human 
rights perspective on Estonia's minority-related legislation and has been cautious not 
to touch upon the issue of group-based rights.  
Although the results of the LICHR's work are of political significance, it is not a 
political organisation per se. In contrast to the organisation's self-portrayal and the 
foci of its work, the Estonian national authorities have repeatedly argued that LICHR 
is a political organisation in an attempt to undermine its reputation as an observer 
and analyst, particularly after 2004 (Poleshchuk 18/12/2009; 14/04/2009; KAPO Part III - Chapter 9 
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2009). The LICHR's director, Alexei Semjonov was a founding member of the 
Representative Assembly and a member of the Presidential Roundtable for National 
Minorities between 1993 and 2006. The Estonian authorities have made serious 
allegations against Semjonov, claiming that he and his organisation were acting 'for 
Russia'. In the Security Service's (KAPO) Annual Report of 2009 this is highlighted 
again. Referring to a visit of the head of the Department of Foreign Relations of the 
Moscow City Government, Georgiy Muradov, to the Russian embassy in Tallinn, the 
KAPO report asserts that the (secret) aim of the visit was to consult with local 
Russian-speakers how to form a political list, with Semjonov as the leader. The 
report then claims that Semjonov was an 'understandable' choice,  
'as he is a person dealing with the subject of human rights from the position of 
Russia and his activity is being financed from Moscow. According to the annual 
report of the Legal Information Centre for Human Rights, financial support from 
the Embassy of Russian Federation formed nearly half of the total support to their 
projects in 2008' (KAPO 2009, p.12).  
No such list was created and therefore (the KAPO report claims) a promised 
'motivational package of over 10 million EEK' was never transferred (ibid.). As with 
earlier allegations against Russian-speakers, it would go beyond the purpose of this 
thesis to investigate the details of the events that are referred to here. At least two 
aspects are striking, however: first, the fact that no such political organisation was 
created was not explained by the authorities by the simple argument that Semjonov 
has always emphasised that he was not interested in a political career (Poleshchuk 
14/04/2009). Second, the problematic situation of receiving funding from the 
Estonian state for organisations that have maintained a critical attitude towards 
aspects of Estonia's democratisation is not taken into account by KAPO (LICHR 
2011). These two aspects once again demonstrate the vulnerable position of Russian-
speakers' organisations in relation to the Estonian state.  
Conclusions 
The dominant approach of minority organisations to state-society relations in the 
sphere of voluntary activism mirrors the general 'desétatisation' that Lagerspetz, 
Rikmann and Ruutsoo (2002) identified with respect to societal level organisation in 
Estonia in general: Many societal level actors welcome the funding that supports Part III - Chapter 9 
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their work and aim to increase these in order to optimise their situation. At the same 
time, this situation 'depoliticises' the relations between societal actors and the state, 
by making minority organisations fulfillers of the state's strategy for Estonian 
multiculturalism while leaving aside those society level activities that have the 
potential to develop alternative scenarios for interethnic relations – and state-society 
relations more generally (Agarin 2010). As a consequence of the de-politicisation of 
state-society relations, political organisation in turn becomes an undesirable aspect of 
societal level organisation. This is reflected in the funding situation of as well as in 
the co-operation of state institutions with those Russian-speakers' organisations that 
have attempted to change the situation of minority members by helping the state 
understand the group's problems and overcome alienation from the integration and 
democratisation process.  
9.5 Stirrings of a social movement of Russian-speakers in 
Estonia? 
In recent years, in the absence of political and civic structures to channel minority 
discontent, two grassroots movements were generated by Russian-speakers in 
Estonia. This section analyses their backgrounds and the reasons for their failure or 
political weakness.  
In recent years, Russian-speakers' activism has been most visible in relation to the 
widely debated events around and in the aftermath of the so-called 'Bronze Soldier 
Crisis', or the 'April events' of 2007. Said crisis unfolded around the relocation of a 
Soviet-era monument and small cemetery of war victims in the centre of Tallinn, 
which had become a 'locus of identification' for Russian-speakers, who used the 
monument as the site to commemorate the 9 May, or 'Victory Day', following this 
tradition from the Soviet period (Burch & Smith 2007, p.914). The demonstrations of 
commemoration had grown over the early 2000s, after the luridly-named 'war of 
monuments' increased. Disputes over the commemoration of various groups who 
fought in the Second World War had developed over the 1990s, and grew in 
significance when small groups of Estonian radical nationalists set up a monument of 
an Estonian soldier from the second World War depicting Nazi symbols, and a Part III - Chapter 9 
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plaque commemorating the attempted fight 'against Bolshevism and for the 
restoration of Estonian independence' and similar monuments (ibid., 913). The statue 
was removed by the Estonian government, then concerned about its international 
reputation, in turn causing outrage among the Estonian radical nationalists. 
Following a widely supported argument against 'totalitarianism', the government 
came under pressure from other, less radical strands of the nationalist spectrum of 
society, which demanded that if symbols of Nazism were removed, those of 
Communism would have to be removed too (ibid.). This sentiment was picked up 
during the election campaign of 2007, when Prime Minister Andrus Ansip of 
Reformierakond acted against both the coalition partner Keskerakond and the Tallinn 
city government, under whose jurisdiction the monument stood, by issuing 
legislation that entitled the government to remove the Bronze Soldier from the centre 
of Tallinn (Brüggemann & Kasekamp 2008, p.435). Ansip's strong stance on the 
monument issue, and his eventual decision to remove it, are held as main reasons for 
the victory of Reformierakond (ibid.).  
By April 2007, Russian-speakers had become active, but largely in an unorganised 
way and without any clearly defined agenda or strategies. However, they appeared in 
the streets and voiced their protest and discontent with the government's plans to 
remove the monument in an unprecedented manner. Young people organised a 24-
hour vigil to protect the monument, which had also been spattered with red paint by 
anti-communists (Burch & Smith 2007). In an unannounced move, the government 
fenced off the site on 26 April 2007, started with the excavations of the corpses. It 
was in this context that even larger crowds of people gathered around the monument, 
estimations suggest around 1,000 people (Brüggemann & Kasekamp 2008, p.436; 
LICHR 2008). In the evening, the crowd of mostly young people moved to the old 
town of Tallinn, which is in walking distance to the monument site, and began 
destroying car and shop windows and looting shops. The next morning the 
government decided to immediately relocate the monument, which led to further 
protests. These included many Russian-speakers using 15-minute car-honking as a 
form of civic disobedience, co-ordinated by word of mouth; riots occurred in Tallinn 
for two more nights, and were eventually suppressed by the police (ibid., Ivanov 
20/04/2009). The events came as a shock to many people living in Estonia, especially Part III - Chapter 9 
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since the country is considered to be a 'peaceful' one; the non-violent path to 
independence in 1991 is referred to in this context.  
While some organisations had existed and mobilised in parallel to the events, and a 
number of activists and political entrepreneurs attempted to exploit the large scale 
mobilisation for their own political benefit, most protesters were in the streets due to 
informal mobilisation of private social networks, not because of overtly political 
mobilisation through organisations. The unwonted way of mobilising collective 
action, however short-lived in the shape it took at its peak in April 2007, makes it 
particularly interesting to observers of Russian-speakers' activism in Estonia. In the 
aftermath of the Bronze night, the idea of an emerging social movement could be 
heard frequently (Sõtnik 04/08/2009). While the collective action of Russian-
speakers around the events does carry characteristics of movements, a common 
agenda is hard to identify. Moreover, those predicting a more sustainable minority 
rights movement have, so far, been proved wrong.  
In subsequent years, demonstrations to commemorate the fallen of the Second World 
War have taken place, but so far no new riots erupted in connection with them. While 
some attribute this to the suppression of protest at state level, processes among the 
minority groups also need to be taken into account (Lauristin et al. 2008). 
Unsurprisingly, the 'minority nationalist' views promoted by some put off many 
moderates among the supporters. While many also distance themselves from the 
riots, seeing them as indecent behaviour or fearing that the rioting of some mislead 
youngsters could have negative repercussions for all Russian-speakers, large parts 
among the Russian-speaking group still feel that, as soon as their former 'silent' and 
tolerated form of claiming public space became politicised, the public space was 
taken away from them. Moderate views also regarding the question of 
commemoration are still expressed by some activists in the civic sphere; however, 
many protesters have so far withdrawn completely, or continue their commemoration 
practices without expressing contention (Grigorjan 18/05/2010; Astrov 17/05/2010).  
This does not mean that contention has disappeared. And although sociological 
studies argue that many Russian-speakers' 'anti-Estonian (state)' attitudes are very 
much protest attitudes, these could turn into more lasting politics of contention in Part III - Chapter 9 
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times of renewed direct action against highly valued institutions of Russian-speakers 
(Lauristin et al. 2008). With the second integration programme in place for a few 
years already, promising a number of improvements with regards to funding minority 
activities, it remains to be seen to what extend they will have been realised at the end 
of the implementation period 2013. Crucially, the disappointment with minority 
policies is represented not only among 'minority nationalists'; also the moderates' 
expectations towards the Estonian state have not been met, leaving large parts of the 
Russian-speaking community neither satisfied in their demands regarding social 
access, political participation and cultural rights, nor provided with any structures to 
support their cause. Alexander Dusman of the Ida-Virumaa Integration Roundtable is 
convinced that in case of ongoing separation of majority and minority in all fields, 
'the "Bronze night" will repeat again and again', with uncertain outcomes 
(16/12/2009).  
Concern about possible, future riots is what leads politicians and experts to engage in 
discussions on how to avert the expression of minority discontent in this form 
(Dusman 16/12/2009; Korts 24/04/2009; Vetik 17/04/2009). Public debate during 
and in the aftermath of the events has emphasised the Estonian-Russian conflict and 
has given much attention to the organisations and political activists who claimed to 
represent the movement and appalled many Estonians with their views. A small 
number of academics and experts made the effort to study these events more 
thoroughly, portraying the events from other perspectives. Some scholars tend to 
view the 'Bronze Soldier Crisis' in connection with the study of commemoration and 
the politics of memory, seeing these as being of primary importance to Russian-
speakers, as many observers do (Sõtnik 04/08/2009). One group of authors thus 
embeds the events in larger, non-minority related debates on the 'crimes of 
communism' or 'new states coming to terms with their pasts' (Brüggemann & 
Kasekamp 2008); others focus, more narrowly, on the Estonian debate on the 
representation of history and memory in the public arena (Ehala 2009). Yet other 
scholars explain the events by recurring to the international and/or domestic political 
situation, i.e. the tensions between Estonia and the Russian Federation, or the 
relations between Estonia and its minorities (LICHR 2008). Part III - Chapter 9 
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While memory and collective commemoration, as well as the political tensions 
between Estonian and Russia, undeniably play an important role in the course of the 
debates and events, some authors also draw attention to the counter-intuitive fact that 
the largest part of protesters in the demonstrations of 2006 and 2007 were young 
people, not veterans or the direct descendents of those who fought in the war, nor 
those born in Russia (ibid.). In most Estonian sources this is explained by reference 
to 'Russian influence and propaganda' through the Russian media or the infiltration of 
Russian-speakers' organisations (KAPO 2007, p.8); I argue, however, that this 
explanation disregards domestic reasons for the eruption of conflict among young 
people in particular, and fails to provide a comprehensive understanding of minority 
activism.  
The same can be said, ultimately, about perspectives that interpret minority-majority 
relations as largely unproblematic. Ehala, for example, terms the late 1990s as 
'honeymoon' of Russian-speakers and Estonian-speakers, and the years 2000-2004 as 
years of 'integration' (Ehala 2009). This view, I suggest, is in danger of 
underestimating the discontent of Russian-speakers with their situation and with their 
role in Estonian society, even in times when surveys indicated a significant 
accommodation of Estonians and Russian-speakers with regard to their values.
6 For 
some parts of the Russian-speaking population, the situation as well as their chances 
in society improved as a result of the softening of minority policies, particularly 
under international leverage and in the economic boom which also positively 
affected the group. However, this could be called an improvement only in 
comparison to an earlier, less satisfactory condition: this in no way indicates that the 
present condition is wholly 'satisfactory.'  
The 'years of integration' were characterised by policies and rhetoric of integration, 
which entailed the promise of significant improvement of the social situation for the 
minority population. However, this promise was not kept. In the late 1990s and early 
2000s, many Russian-speakers expected that the process of EU accession would 
significantly improve the situation for Russian-speakers (Kõlvart 19/05/2009; Ivanov 
18/05/2009; Sõtnik 04/08/2009; Jershov/Bogdanova 23/04/2009). Yet, they were 
                                                 
6 Ehala speaks of identity rather than values, the understanding of which he, however, leaves 
undefined (Ehala 2009).  Part III - Chapter 9 
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disappointed (Grigorjan 18/05/2010). Finding that Russian-speakers were still not 
included in decision-making processes or accepted as equals with Estonians in 
society, and that group belonging continued to determine their chances in society, 
EU accession came as a setback to the group. When in 2007 the first integration 
programme was coming to an end, and its implementation had not been satisfying 
from a minority perspective, a sea-change in minority politics was not to be expected 
from the new integration programme that was being worked on at the time.  
What had become clear in the eyes of many Russian-speakers was that, irrespective 
of their accommodation with the majority society or their activities as a group, they 
were not heard or responded to by the government. This only appeared to be 
confirmed when the authorities continued to ignore the increasing mobilisation. To 
be sure, collective commemoration as part of a 'traditional' practice among Russian-
speakers had been performed without attention by the authorities for years, but also 
without policies undermining or prohibiting the demonstrations. Brüggemann and 
Kasekamp (2008) suggest that this can be seen as part of a process of 'democratising 
history'. But, although a tolerated form of expressing group-based values in the 
public sphere, these demonstrations were also never more than tolerated. Decisively, 
when since 2006 a political agenda was tied to the collective action around 
commemoration and memory, the authorities no longer 'tolerated' the 
demonstrations.  
The politicisation of the movement did not (only) take place in the form of minority 
political entrepreneurs attempting to shape the mobilised individuals into a more 
coherent political force. Instead, I argue that, over the course of events, a shift took 
place transforming a loose and unorganised form of collective commemoration into a 
politicised form of collective contention. The collective commemoration had turned 
into the expression of the clear statement of Russian-speakers that 'we are here' 
(Astrov 17/05/2010). It was the ignorance with which the authorities reacted to this 
statement that caused outrage among Russian-speakers, eventually leading to their 
escalation. It is crucial to understand that the government's decision to move the 
monument, which had become the focal point of the early stirrings of Russian-
speakers self-empowerment, without consulting any minority representatives did not Part III - Chapter 9 
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take place in a state of 'honeymoon' of state-minority relations.
7 On the contrary, it 
fell on top of the experience of unchanged minority policies, almost two decades of 
exclusion from decision-making, and newly disappointed hopes; the direct rejection 
of Russian-speakers' collective expression of the importance of the monument to 
their group thus added humiliation to exclusion.  
This is not to argue that the politicisation of the monument is the result of the 
government's decisions alone. Instead, politicisation was very much a process taking 
place within the minority group itself. With minority party politics in ruins, civic-
political activities undermined and unacknowledged, and forms of cultural practice  
being limited to those matching the Estonian concept of the minority, these 
demonstrations became a place to express the subsurface discomfort with precisely 
the alleged accommodation, and be present as a group with values and interests not 
represented in politics and society.  
'It [i.e. the monument] was a place where they [i.e. the Russian-speakers] could 
come, show off, what you do at state events actually, and the Estonians do that in 
the Opera hall and televised and all the rest, and the Russians did it this way, 
because what was important to them was that they did it themselves, no one was 
telling them […], and in this way it kind of grew in significance' (Astrov 
07/05/2010).  
In other words, Russian-speakers viewed the treatment of the monument as symbolic 
of the treatment of their group in Estonian society: Though in the centre of the 
capital, the monument was only tolerated, never accepted, by the dominant group. Its 
removal therefore expressed symbolically, and ultimately practically, the wider 
containment of minority self-empowerment. At the same time, the protesters have 
not been able to frame their demands with regard to this desire for their inclusion into 
the decision-making based on their belonging to the place and to society. Instead, 
they were viewed as mobilising on the basis of anti-Estonian politics of memory, and 
some of the most visible political activists tried to exploit exactly this divide.  
                                                 
7 It is widely agreed that most Russian-speakers were open to discussing the relocation of the 
monument in general, but demanded there be a dialogue between the authorities and Russian-speakers' 
representatives on the circumstances of such relocation. The acceptance of the monument being in its 
new place, expressed in the annual events of commemoration there in recent years, supports this. Part III - Chapter 9 
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The frail stirrings of what could have become a social movement thus faded without 
being able to develop, both as a result of suppression and the lack of sustainable 
action frames. It remains unclear exactly how the discontent that has remained 
unanswered will be channelled and expressed in the future, as these protesters 
continue not to have access to institutional proceedings and cannot draw upon 
functioning minority political structures to represent their interests. On the other 
hand, observers agree that it was the 2007 events that made Estonian-speaking 
experts and politicians working on integration realise that 'something had gone 
wrong' (Dusman 16/12/2009; Korts 24/04/2009). Recent years, however, have not 
witnessed a significant change in the approach to integration, but rather in the 
rhetoric of those responsible for integration policies and implementation. While 
many of my respondents agree that the integration strategy in place may have the 
potential to include a part of the Russian-speaking population, and there are signs 
that this is an ongoing process for certain segments of the group (Lauristin et al. 
2008), they also fear that if no genuine shift in integration policies is taken in the 
near future, large segments will continue to be 'left out'. This, they argue, makes it 
likely that more riots will take place.   
The weakness of the political representation of Russian-speakers has again become 
clear in relation to the development of a visible, but relatively small and politically 
weak movement that opposes the form and specific content of the reform of Russian-
language schools. Over the past five years, the future of Russian-language education 
in Estonia has become one of the issues most discussed among the Russian-speaking 
community. Responding to the ongoing exclusion of parents, teachers and students 
from the decision-making on the Minority School Reform (LICHR 2010), a small but 
active movement has evolved. The movement is relatively heterogeneous, supported 
by grassroots and local parents' initiatives, established minority representative 
bodies, as well as Russian-speakers' parties and the Russian-speaking members of 
mainstream parties. Besides these local and individual supporters, the movement has 
also generated an organisation aiming to channel and represent the Russian-speakers' 
perspectives in the process. The organisation Russkaya Shkola v E'stonii (Russian 
School in Estonia, RUSHKE) was formed in Tartu in reaction to the (later realised) 
plans to close Tartu's Russian-language secondary school, and has since been 
transformed into a nation-wide association, working from Tallinn.  Part III - Chapter 9 
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Although the fear of linguistic assimilation and loss of mother tongue is an important 
reason for some people to oppose the reform, the general idea of the reform is 
received increasingly well by the Russian-speaking population (LICHR 2010). 
Criticism and protest focus primarily on the form of implementation of the reform. 
RUSHKE and other organisations and individuals of this small movement tend to 
criticise the fact that most decisions concerning the fate of Russian schooling in 
Estonia are made without consulting and accommodating the concerns of parents, or 
the population in general (Ossinovski 2011). Moreover, in the state's refusal to 
engage in building a compromise between the demands of Russian-speakers and the 
state's programmatic direction, activists see the constitutional rights of minority 
members violated. They argue that, although the parliament had made changes to the 
original law on basic and upper secondary schooling (Schools Act 1993), allowing 
for the schools to choose their primary language of tuition, this was circumvented by 
Tartu City authorities and led to the closure of the oldest Russian-language 
secondary school in Estonia, causing insecurity among parents, pupils, teachers and 
employees (Postimees 09/09/2006). Thus, while identity issues play a role for many, 
minority activists and politicians frame their argument against the changes in the 
educational system. They make these arguments not on ethnic grounds, but instead 
on the basis that they are excluded from decision-making on issues that directly 
concern them, in many cases from being citizens of Estonia, e.g. by an appeal to 
'democratic values'.   
While the protests and initiatives are still ongoing, judging from previous interaction 
of minority representatives with the authorities, prospects for their inclusion in 
decision-making are limited. The negative signals the ill-prepared reform sent to 
minority members and the rigidity with which Former Education Minister Tõnis 
Lukas for Isamaaliit (Pro Patria Union) (2007-2011) has pushed through the reform's 
implementation have left minority members very vulnerable. Minority activists feel 
their fears of assimilation have been confirmed, and that the reform is aimed to 
abolish Russian schooling altogether, especially since the only Russian-language 
schools in Loksa and Rakvere were closed in 2009 and 2010 respectively (LICHR 
2010).  Part III - Chapter 9 
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It is still too early to tell whether the movement around the school reform will be 
able to consolidate itself, become a strong actor, and develop a mobilising appeal to 
the Russian-speaking community. Experience with earlier attempts to achieve change 
has left minority members frustrated and disillusioned; this is reflected in many 
Russian-speakers' perceptions of RUSHKE and their assumptions about the 
movement's prospects. Moreover, as the government has already begun 
implementing the dismantling of Russian schooling, the minority demands assume an 
ever weaker position.  
The government's reactions to the expressions of general protest around the Bronze 
soldier event, as well as the movement around the school reform, are characterised 
by the ignorance of Russian-speakers' concerns. In a similar vein as the efforts to 
build political representation for Russian-speakers, these movements are declared 
illegitimate and even criminal.
8 In effect, societal level organisation of Russian-
speakers has been acceptable for the Estonian state only as part of the 'division of 
labour' with regard to Estonia's strategy for multiculturalism. As discussed in earlier 
chapters, the latter does not entail a comprehensive strategy to increase interaction 
and co-operation between the groups. Rather, it depoliticises societal level activities. 
As a result, group interaction is depoliticised also, which impedes the debate on and 
the overcoming of intergroup antagonisms. It is a consequence of this Estonian 
approach to integration and multiculturalism that neither the strategy to form 
umbrella organisations in order to enhance group representatives' legitimacy and 
pursue a coherent minority agenda nor the formation of a collective minority actor on 
a single issue has succeeded in establishing a societal level representation for the 
Russian-speaking minority. Despite the failure of all such attempts to date, minority 
organisations continue to cooperate with state institutions in the fields where they 
can, that is minority culture. While this in effect stabilises the system, many minority 
activists do not see an alternative to co-operating with the state in this realm, since it 
is the only support they get from the state. In light of the amount and complexity of 
the problems of interethnic integration in Estonia, this is not much.  
 
                                                 
8 Public opinion polls suggest that the majority of Estonians saw the riots in Tallinn in 2007 as 
criminal acts, while most Russian-speakers interpreted them – even if many did not agree with the 
means – as acts of protest against government policy (Lauristin et al. 2008). Part III - Chapter 9 
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9.6 Parallel structures of societal activism? Minority organisations 
in Slovakia 
This section examines the developments in the organisation of Hungarian cultural 
activities in Slovakia and the emergence of structures that exist largely separate from 
or in parallel to other Slovak societal level organisations. The chapter does not cover 
the interaction of Slovaks and Hungarians within organisations; it only alludes to 
questions of interaction between majority and minority organisations outside the 
realm of minority-related issues.
9  
The development of societal level organisation in Slovakia only really set in after 
1989. Initially on the basis of Czechoslovak law from 1960, which was replaced by a 
new law in 1990, the first foundations were formed in order to support the generation 
of societies and associations, charity and grassroots organisations. This was also the 
case for Hungarian organisations. One of the first Hungarian foundations was the 
Márai Sándor Alapítvány (Sándor Márai Foundation) set up in Dunajská Streda in 
1990.
10 The foundation has focused on conflict resolution, human rights and 
interethnic relations in the Carpathian Basin. As part of its activities, the Foundation 
has led research projects on these issues and organised conferences as well as 
trainings to promote and facilitate interethnic dialogue (Lexikon 2011). In 1993, 
Hungarian activists set up the Fórum Alapítvány (Forum Foundation), aiming to 
promote and strengthen the civic sector in Slovakia (Lexikon 2011). The Fórum 
Alapítvány facilitated the establishment of a large number of regional branches of the 
Foundation, which co-ordinate the local projects of Hungarian minority members. It 
also acted as a programme initiator and co-ordinator; for example, it organised 
regional meetings of representatives of majority and minority groups as part of a 
Slovak-Hungarian Dialogue programme 1993 and initiated 'multicultural weekend 
programmes for families' in the capital Bratislava and in Košice, a large town in the 
east of the country, between 1993 and 1995 (ibid.). The Fórum Alapítvány also 
                                                 
9 Interaction within organisations that do not focus on ethno-cultural activities or on questions related 
to minority policies is normal for many minority and majority members, especially where minority 
members are also a local minority and live largely 'integrated' with Slovaks on the basis of common 
interests that are not related to minority policies, while co-operation functions on the basis of the 
common, Slovak language (Lampl 24/09/2009; Golha/Hajdok/Havran 18/06/2009).  
10 For a list of the foundation's activities between 1990-2000, see (Hunčík 2001).  Part III - Chapter 9 
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initiated the establishing of the Fórum Kissebségkutató Intézet/Fórum inštitút pre 
výskum menšín (Forum Minority Research Institut, FKI) in Šamorín in 1996, whose 
activities will be discussed in more detail below. Said foundations were established 
largely by activists within or close to the Independent Hungarian Initiative (FMK) 
(Tóth 23/09/2009; Öllös 23/09/2009). The task of these organisations was to 
research, strengthen and support Hungarian minority organisations with an interest in 
Slovakia's social and democratic development, the regional development of southern 
Slovakia, and the community formation of the Hungarian minority as a group. As 
Károly Tóth, current director of the FKI, puts it,  
'They wanted to create a local civil society, to generate local community 
[formation] and [organise] civil society' (Tóth 23/09/2009).  
This is still the remit of the Fórum Intézet (Forum Institute) in Šamorín (Fórum 
Intézet 2011). The Forum Institute unites the FKI (founded in 2002), the Fórum 
Információs Központ/Fórum informačné centrum (Forum Information Centre, FIK) 
and the Fórum Régiófejlesztési Központ/Fórum centrum pre regionálny rozvoj 
(Forum Regional Development Centre, FRK) (both established in 1999, FIK 2011; 
FRK 2011). It functions as a 'hub' for Hungarian society-level organisation and co-
operation, and provides the most important interface between the Hungarian minority 
community and the state.  
The Information Centre FIK informs about processes related to society level 
organisation and provides services, training and connecting activists and organisation 
primarily in southern Slovakia. It co-operates with other minority institutions, for 
example, to provide training in project management and related skills required for 
work in non-governmental organisations, thereby aiming to make Hungarian civic 
and social activism sustainable for the future (Tóth 23/09/2009; organisation's 
website). The work of the FIK has led, among other initiatives, to the formation of a 
new Občianske fórum (Civil Forum) in 2007. The aim of the association is to identify 
problems faced by Hungarian organisations in Slovakia, increase the networking 
between individual organisations and inform about funding opportunities and so on 
(Občianske fórum 2008). The Regional Development Centre FRK engages mainly in 
research and think-tank activities in the support of southern Slovakia's regional 
development. In its capacity as the leading institution on the issue, it has co-operated Part III - Chapter 9 
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with the Ministry of Regional Development, and has also worked closely with the 
Hungarian parties (Öllös 23/09/3009). The FRK is also involved in cross-border co-
operation and develops and implements projects within the Euroregion framework 
(FRK 2011). These activities entail close co-operation with partners in Hungary, but 
also in Romania, Ukraine and other countries in the region.  
The work of the Minority Research Institute FKI is particularly important, as it 
works in three directions, making it the single most important civic institution for the 
development of interethnic relations in Slovakia. First, the FKI supports the 
development of local initiatives and the growth of Hungarian civil society in 
Slovakia by producing original research and research output on the Hungarian 
minority, providing structural and organisational support in the setting up of 
initiatives and constituting a meeting point for activists through conferences. Second, 
the FKI is one of the very few minority organisations in Slovakia cooperating with 
and recognised as a partner on interethnic issues by Slovak civil society 
organisations and state institutions; it also aims to contribute to the development of 
Slovak civil society generally. Third, the FKI's political and sociological research 
and co-operation with actors in Slovakia, Hungary and other countries with a sizable 
Hungarian minority is designed to feed into its function as a minority think tank for 
the active development of Hungarian civil society and the Hungarian community 
(Öllös 23/09/3009; Tóth 23/09/2009).  
The FKI's own research focuses on questions of conflict resolution, multiculturalism 
and nationalism, but it also engages in the documentation, historiography and 
cultural anthropology of the Hungarian population in (southern) Slovakia 
specifically, and in the Carpathian basin more generally (Fórum Intézet 2011). In its 
capacity as a facilitator and centre for interethnic dialogue and co-operation, the FKI 
regularly holds conferences to debate issues of Slovak-Hungarian domestic and 
bilateral relations or questions of multiculturalism. In this context, there is a close 
connection to the members of the Slovak-Hungarian historical commission that aims 
to develop  between the two communities a dialogue on history in order to facilitate 
long-term reconciliation (Šutaj/Homišinová 23/06/2009). Moreover, many 
Hungarian and non-Hungarian researchers at universities in Bratislava, Nitra, and 
Komárno co-operate closely with the FKI to support the academic debate on Part III - Chapter 9 
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minority issues and provide analyses of current social and political developments 
(Lampl 24/09/2009; Öllös 23/09/2009; Gyurgyik 24/06/2009; 16/04/2008). 
Furthermore, there is some limited co-operation with Slovak think-tanks such as the 
IVO Institute for Public Affairs, the Open Society Foundation in Slovakia (Nadácia 
otvorenej spoločnosti) and the Centrum pre výskum etnicity a kultúry (Centre for the 
Research of Ethnicity and Culture, CVEK) in Bratislava, to name just a few, though 
such co-operation is project-based or even limited to one-off conferences and 
workshops (Petőcz 23/09/2009; Vašečka 20/08/2008).  
The FKI also functions as a 'minority think-tank' (Öllös 23/09/2009). In this context, 
researchers at the FKI have authored the programme of the MKP (Hungarian 
Coalition Party) in 1998, and have continuously co-operated with Hungarian parties 
on political aims and strategies to improve the minority situation in Slovakia (ibid.). 
The FKI has been cautious to remain an independent, non-partisan organisation, even 
though individual members have, at times, been active in local politics. Moreover, a 
long-term researcher at the FKI, Kálmán Petőcz, accepted a diplomatic position 
under the Dzurinda-government and the position of Director General of the 
Government Office of the Slovak Republic for Human Rights and Equal Treatment 
(Úrad vlády Slovenskej republiky – Sekcia l'udských práv a rovnakého 
zaobchádzania) under the Radičová-government. Overall, the FKI has made an effort 
to remain outside of the political process, but individual co-operation partners have 
also sought more direct routes into the political system of the Slovak Republic (Öllös 
23/09/2009; Tóth 23/09/2009).  
In 2009, the FKI has become directly involved with civic mobilisation when it 
initiated the formation of the Roundtable of the Hungarian Civil Society in Slovakia. 
This was a response to the limitations of the formal political representation of the 
Hungarians after mid-2006 and the weakness of the Hungarian political opposition in 
face of the increasingly nationalist policies of the Fico government. Based on the 
good organisational structure and internal co-operation of Hungarian societal level 
organisation, in January 2009 about 50 organisations representing civic activists and 
various segments and interest groups from the Hungarian population formed the 
Roundtable of Hungarians in Slovakia (Okrúhly stôl Mad'arov na Slovensku). 
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aim to function as the political representation of the Hungarian community proper, 
independent of fluctuations in political power relations, and to critically support the 
Hungarian parties (Kálmán Petőcz 23/09/2009).  
Petőcz, one of the main initiators of the Roundtable, explains why he is convinced a 
civil society representation in the political sphere is necessary: 
 '[The Roundtable] was created exactly because there was a need to articulate the 
views, the opinions and the interests of the Hungarian minority as such, the 
Hungarian minority as a societal community in Slovakia. […] In the time of the 
creation of the Roundtable, there was only one party and we needed […] a forum 
that should represent or just voice the opinions of the Hungarian civil society in 
Slovakia' (ibid.). 
The immediate trigger for the formation of the Roundtable was the Fico-
government's plan to amend the Slovak State Language Law. However, it has also 
acted in relation to other policy changes, such as the regulation that a Slovak citizen 
who accepts the citizenship of another state will lose their Slovak citizenship (see 
aktuálne.sk 31/05/2010). Although the roundtable's main objective is to 'increase co-
operation and dialogue on the future of the Hungarian community', and to oppose the 
'process of assimilation' (Tóth 2009), the organisers particularly felt the need to 
respond politically to political developments under the Fico government (Petőcz 
23/09/2009). The government's decision to amend the State Language Act from 1995 
and (re-)introduce further constraints to minority language usage and penalise this in 
certain cases was met with petitions condemning the effect the law would allegedly 
have on minority members as well as on interethnic relations in the country, and a 
direct address to the President of the Republic not to sign the amendment to the law. 
In response to the amendment to the Citizenship the Roundtable planned to take the 
regulation to the Constitutional Court.  
Articulation of the Hungarian community's opinions aims to establish a dialogue 
with the Slovak community, and particularly its political elite. It is meant as a step 
towards increasing and easing interaction between Slovaks and Hungarians, which at 
all levels of social and political life is relatively rare. Moreover, the Roundtable has 
only partly followed an agenda that has focused less on the outside and the 
channelling of the Hungarian community's perceptions, opinions and demands to the Part III - Chapter 9 
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outside; at the same time it aims to develop further the Hungarian community in 
order to strengthen it. The initiators of the Roundtable argue that discussion within 
the community was limited, and although there had been some debate on community 
issues within the MKP, there was a lack of engagement with the topics of 
assimilation, regional development, and education in the community itself (Petőcz 
23/09/2009). Whereas other organisations exist that function as an umbrella platform 
for Hungarian civic organisations working on more specific matters of NGOs, such 
as the Civil Forum mentioned above, the Roundtable is intended to encourage a 
debate about the future of the Hungarian community among the whole Hungarian 
group (Petőcz 23/09/2009).  
Apart from its regular activities, the roundtable has organised protests that received 
the active support of large parts of the Hungarian community. Most visibly, it was 
involved in the organisation and support of a rally against the Language Act in 
Dunajská Streda in September 2009, which was attended by around 10,000 protesters 
(BBC News 02/09/2009). While majority parties criticised the protests as minority-
nationalistic, the Roundtable representatives are eager to frame their protest in 
democratic terms:  
'[…] it's simply in a democratic country […] quite natural […] that if you feel that 
your rights are taken away, […] you have to defend your rights. That's a basic rule 
of a democratic society: that you simply have to stand up for your rights, because 
if you don't do that, then you cannot expect any kind of positive change' (Petőcz 
23/09/2009).  
The Roundtable was recognised as the representation of the Hungarian community 
and a serious civic-political actor by the Fico government, and its representatives 
repeatedly met with the Minister of Culture and other government officials to discuss 
planned legislative changes. The Roundtable representatives also consulted with 
representatives of international organisations such as the CoE and the OSCE, who 
have accepted the Roundtable as a contact partner for issues concerning the minority 
situation in Slovakia (Petőcz 23/09/2009; Tóth 23/09/2009; Öllös 23/09/2009). The 
Roundtable is actively supported by the work of other NGOs and by professional and 
cultural organisations. Although these other organisations also engage in the public 
debate on political issues, they normally do not engage in direct action for political 
change, but communicate preferences for political change to the political Part III - Chapter 9 
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representation of the minority community (CSEMADOK 2006). The Roundtable is 
the only Hungarian organisation in Slovakia that functions as a political 
representative and aims to foster the inclusion of Hungarians in the decision-making 
on matters that concern them specifically (cf. aktuálne.sk 31/05/2010). Overall, the 
roundtable has been successful in that it established an efficient and well-organised 
representation, and was able to quickly build channels to communicate their concerns 
and demands to governmental representatives, even under adverse conditions (i.e. 
with the SNS in government). In its work the Roundtable has successfully mobilised 
already well-developed structures of Hungarian civil society and coordinated existing 
links and contacts with the authorities. Despite its mobilisation potential, the 
Roundtable has been less successful in evoking policy change during the time of the 
Fico government. 
The relative success of the Roundtable and the many activities of the individual 
organisations at the Fórum Intézet, in particular in comparison to the developments 
of societal level organisation of Russian-speakers in Estonia, must be seen in the 
context of the development and funding situation of Hungarian organisations in 
general. During most of the 1990s, these foundations (both Slovak and 'Hungarian') 
depended largely on foreign and domestic donors, and their situation became 
increasingly difficult under the Mečiar-governments. A law of 1996 limited the use 
of financial means in an attempt to weaken the potential of the foundations (Green 
2002, p.460). The efforts by the Mečiar-government to undermine its political 
opponents, however, even led to a strengthening of non-governmental organisational 
development. Foundations, associations, societies and individual organisations that 
supported a broad liberal-democratic agenda constituted an important factor enabling 
political change in 1998 (Bútora & Bútorová 1999). Hungarian organisations were 
part of the 'Civic Campaign – O.K.'98', a broad, non-partisan association that 
promoted democratic change in Slovakia, by which they meant, among other things, 
the electorate's increased awareness of political processes and the importance of 
participation therein, and the aim of increasing 'civil society's' impact on public 
debate (WMD 1998). However, although Hungarians and Slovaks shared many goals 
in 1998, the co-operation within the network was also limited to these goals and did 
not result in the long-term integration of civic initiatives (Tóth 23/09/2009; 
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The situation for civic engagement and societal level organisation improved when 
the democratic Dzurinda-government entered government (Demeš 2001). The 
Hungarian community also benefited from this development. Moreover, a number of 
policy decisions allowed for the extension of funding opportunities for minority 
educational and cultural activities. The most important development here was the 
adoption of a follow-up agreement between the Hungarian state and Slovakia to the 
Basic Treaty of 1995, which was adopted after the disputes on the Hungarian 'Status 
Law'. A bilateral Treaty Between the Government of the Slovak Republic and the 
Government of the Hungarian Republic on the Mutual Support for National 
Minorities in the Areas of Education and Culture (Dohoda medzi vládou Slovenskej 
republiky a vládou Mad'arskej republiky o vzájomnej podpore národnostných menšín 
v oblasti vzdelávania a kultúry) was adopted in 2003 (Dohoda 2003). Most of the 
funding from the Hungarian state is channelled through the Pázmány Péter 
Alapítvány (Péter Pázmány Foundation, PPA), which constitutes the largest 
foundation in Slovakia. In 2005 it allocated grants in the realm of 183,930,000 SKK 
(over 6 million Euros) and convened own projects whose costs amounted to around 
8,646,000 SKK, or a total budget of 192,576,000 SKK (almost 6,4 million Euros) 
(Strečanský et al. 2007, p.548). In 2009, the foundation received around 3,694,000 € 
from the Hungarian state (PPA 2009). The main activities of the PPA lie in the 
support of institutions and schools that provide education in Hungarian. As part of 
this work, it supports additional training for teachers, provides scholarship for 
students at Hungarian schools, funds the development and purchase of teaching 
materials, and runs competitions, programmes for outstanding students, summer 
camps (Strečanský et al. 2007). Moreover, it allocates funds to initiatives that fall 
into the realm of minority education and culture (Golha/Hajdok/Havran 
18/06/2009).
11  
The Hungarian state is also the major patron of the Selye János Egyetemért 
Alapítvány (János Selye University Foundation), which supports activities of the 
Hungarian university in Komárno. It is also one of the largest foundations in 
                                                 
11 These smaller initiatives often aim to 'offer something of interest to Hungarians' in order to keep 
especially young Hungarians in Slovakia; this is a reaction to the tendency that many young 
Hungarians leave Slovakia and go to the Czech Republic, Hungary or western Europe in order to 
study, and often stay there. 'We don't want them to feel there is nothing for them here' explains Katalin 
Hajdok from the student organisation Vox Juventae, who organise competitions for projects that are 
related to the Hungarian minority in Slovakia, funded mainly by the Pázmány foundation.  Part III - Chapter 9 
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Slovakia, in 2005 with a budget of 83,846,000 SKK (around 2,8 million Euros) 
(Strečanský et al. 2007, p.548). The treaty between both states however ensures that 
education also of the Hungarian minority remains the responsibility of the Slovak 
state. Funding from Hungary therefore does not directly sponsor these institutions or 
regular education, but supports extracurricular activities and individuals – this 
applies to the PPA also (Tóth 23/09/2009; Golha/Hajdok/Havran 18/06/2009).  
The funding of minority activities was further facilitated - to an extent - by a Slovak 
law that enables individual and corporate tax-payers to designate 2% of their taxes to 
societal organisations or to a state fund acting in the support of non-governmental 
organisations.
12 Although the system has many flaws, such as lack of transparency 
and in 2003 was still not very well known among Slovak tax payers (Mészárosné-
Lampl & Tóth 2003), today non-governmental organisations of various types benefit 
from these funds. As a result of this situation, the cultural and civic organisations of 
the Hungarian community have become increasingly independent of the state, which 
enables them to extend community structures and support minority institutions, even 
under adverse conditions, such as under nationalist governments.  
This has not always been the case. During the 1990s, funding opportunities on the 
basis of the Hungarian state's kin-support were considerably fewer. The general 
constraints on non-governmental activities and foundations specifically during the 
1990s affected Hungarian organisations also. This affected Hungarian press, 
publishing and broadcasting; commemoration; live culture; and minority projects. 
Under the Dzurinda-government these cuts were immediately revoked, and the 
funding for minority culture in these areas amounted to approximately 80 million 
SKK per year; in 2006, this sum was doubled to reach 160 million SKK, but was 
immediately cut back to 80 million SKK by the Fico government Dostál 2007, 
pp.180-181). As discussed earlier in this thesis, the MKP had tried to introduce a 
funding system that guarantees reliable support for minority cultures, but failed with 
their legal initiative. As a result, minority funding from the state left the future of 
minority cultural activities conditional on government preferences. At the same time, 
this has not taken the shape of controlling minority activities as it has done in 
                                                 
12 The original law envisaged 1% of a donor's income tax, after an amendment to the legislation this 
was raised to 2% (Mészárosné-Lamp & Tóth 2003, p.2).  Part III - Chapter 9 
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Estonia. With the exception of the two years under the HZDS-SNS government, 
there has always been support for minority cultural activities from the state.  
The single most important and largest beneficiary of state funding for cultural 
activities is CSEMADOK. As mentioned earlier, CSEMADOK was founded as the 
Csehszlovákiai Magyar Dolgozók Kultúregyesülete/Kultúrny zväz maďarských 
pracujúcich v Československu (Hungarian Workers' Cultural Union of 
Czechoslovakia) by Communist Czechoslovakia as the Hungarian organisation in the 
National Front. Since then, the organisation saw several name changes, but has kept 
its abbreviation CSEMADOK. Since 1993, the organisation is formally called 
Szlovákiai Magyar Társadalmi és Közművelődési Szövetség/ Maďarský spoločenský 
a kultúrny zväz na Slovensku (Hungarian Social and Cultural Association in 
Slovakia) (CSEMADOK 2011). The organisation provides Hungarians with (limited) 
structures for their co-operation. Today, many national cultural organisations of the 
Hungarian minority organise within the structures of CSEMADOK, which functions 
as an umbrella organisation for local CSEMADOK clubs (ibid.). CSEMADOK lists 
419 such local member organisations on its website and claims that almost every 
Hungarian inhabited village in Southern Slovakia has their own CSEMADOK club 
(Mézes 18/06/2009). While the organisational structure of CSEMADOK has 
remained in place, and was reworked according to the demands of postcommunism, 
to date its relation to the state is unregulated. Local, regional and national level 
boards of CSEMADOK function as interest representation bodies towards the 
political actors, who in turn engage with the political framework for minority 
protection directly. Regional and national umbrella organisations also communicate 
with local, regional and national level policy-makers to secure funding for the 
preservation and development of minority cultural activities. In this sense, 
CSEMADOK has laid particular emphasis on the co-operation with the MKP in the 
past, to which it had good connections and relations; many leading individuals in 
CSEMADOK have at some point in their career been engaged in the Hungarian party 
politics or vice versa (ibid.; Öllös 23/09/2009; Berényi 30/06/2009; Mézes 
18/06/2009). 
Despite the links to the political structures of the minority, and also the state, 
CSEMADOK itself is not an organisation working directly to change political Part III - Chapter 9 
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settings; its main aim is the promotion and development of Hungarian culture among 
the Hungarian community in Slovakia, in co-operation with other (national) 
minorities in Slovakia and in the region associated with Hungarian culture, the 
Carpathian basin (CSEMADOK 2011). Similar to the situation in Estonia, the main 
purpose of the local CSEMADOK organisations is to provide structures in which 
minority members can follow their cultural interests, that is those interests that are 
not covered by Slovakia's general cultural politics, and provide space for 'non-core 
nationality' culture. The organisation attaches  
'utmost importance to maintaining and developing the national identity of 
Hungarians in Slovakia the preservation and cultivation of their national culture, 
traditions and mother tongue as well as providing the possibility of institutional 
education in their mother tongue from kindergarten to university education' 
(CSEMADOK 2006). 
Its activities are devised accordingly.   
CSEMADOK also provides for structures that encourage co-operation in other 
minority-culture related areas, such as minority education and the support for the 
Hungarian language in Slovakia. CSEMADOK has close ties with the organisations 
of Hungarian teachers and of Hungarian parents in Slovakia, and numerous events of 
CSEMADOK are co-organised with them (Mézes 18/06/2009). The Szlovákiai 
Magyar Pedagógusok Szövetsége/Zväz mad'arských pedagógov na Slovensku 
(Association of Hungarian Teachers in Slovakia) is primarily a professional 
organisation for teachers at Hungarian schools in Slovakia, which was founded in 
1990 (SzMPSz 2011). It provides support, including teaching materials, to Hungarian 
teachers. Its main aims are related to the promotion of a sustainable Hungarian 
language education in Slovakia. Moreover, it has been the co-ordinating body of 
activities that aim to improve the teaching of the Slovak language to Hungarian 
students. The organisation came under increasing pressure especially during the third 
Mečiar-governments 1994-1998, when several head teachers lost their jobs because 
they refused to comply with the implementation of the state language law in their 
schools, as discussed in chapter 6. In this context, the Szlovákiai Magyar Szülők 
Szövetsége/Združenie maďarských rodičov na Slovensku (Association of Hungarian 
Parents in Slovakia) was formed in 1996 in order to provide for a strong interest 
representation in support of Hungarian language education in Slovakia and is one of Part III - Chapter 9 
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the biggest minority organisations in Slovakia (Mézes 18/09/2009).
13 The SzMSzSz 
was the main organiser of the school strikes in 1996. The organisation benefits from 
its close relations with CSEMADOK (ibid.).  
The dominant position of CSEMADOK raises concerns among some minority 
activists. Their criticism is that the majority of minority activities are organised 
through or in co-operation with CSEMADOK which, in the eyes of these critics, 
undermines the diversification of Hungarian cultural organisations. Hence, while 
they do not criticise CSEMADOK's activities directly, they are interested in 
Hungarian minority culture not to be perceived as streamlined activities but 
acknowledged in their heterogeneity (Zachar 22/09/2009; Tokar 17/09/2009; 
Golha/Hajdok/Havran 18/06/2009). This critique reflects the similar situation with 
regard to the minority's political representation of community diversity. Tóth adds,  
'There are [a few] big organisations, like CSEMADOK, the parents organisation, 
the teachers organisation […] and the Fórum Intézet, and most of them are related 
to the party [i.e. MKP] – and not only on the personal level, but the are members 
of the MKP. […] Our goal [i.e. at the Fórum Intézet] was totally different, we 
wanted to create a local civil society that could generate a local community and 
get something started' (Tóth 23/09/2009).  
Even though the 'local civil society' that Tóth refers to has not yet evolved, overall, 
the Hungarian community has managed to create organisational structures for 
minority activities at the societal level. Support from the Hungarian state in 
particular, as well as the existence of several large foundations since the early 1990s, 
has enabled Hungarian activists to organise community structures that are at least 
partly autonomous from the state and its fluctuating minority policies. In this way, 
societal level organisations could absorb some of the effects of detrimental policies. 
The situation for minority activists is far from satisfactory though. Even though the 
Hungarian state's foreign policy goals include the support of the Hungarian 
minorities abroad, minority members have no means to enforce this support. The 
impact of the constraints of the support from outside Slovakia were felt in the context 
of the financial crisis after 2008, which hit Hungary hard and early, when the 
Pázmány Foundation provided significantly fewer funds for the minority (Bara 
                                                 
13 According to head of the organisation Rudolf Mézes the membership numbers cannot be 
determined; the vast majority of parents whose children attend Hungarian schools and classes, 
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286
24/09/2009; Domsitz 16/09/2009). Increased and/or guaranteed domestic support for 
minority activities could help improve the situation for societal level minority 
organisation and also help respond to minority members' demands that 'their' state – 
i.e. Slovakia – should take the responsibility for its minority population. Doing this, 
the state could also facilitate the diversification of minority activities and the 
integration of majority and minority organisational structures at the level of societal 
organisation.  
Conclusions 
This chapter discussed minority activities at the societal level that deal with 
questions related to the minorities' status and options to participate in society. It 
specifically looked at civic initiatives that aim to provide for channels of 
communication between society and state institutions. Developments in this sphere 
have been very different in the two countries. In Estonia, civic activities of Russian-
speakers have failed to establish functioning structures of co-operation at the societal 
level; many efforts have been deliberately undermined or rejected by the state 
authorities. Functioning structures are largely limited to the support of narrowly 
defined cultural activities that fit the Estonian model of multiculturalism. However, 
these structures are too dependent on the goodwill of policy-makers to be able to 
develop sustainable structures that would guarantee their development in the long-
term. The increase in base-line funding for some organisations is a positive 
development, however under current conditions it is still linked to means of control 
and 'co-optation' (Pettai & Hallik 2002). In contrast to this situation, structures that 
have existed already prior to Slovakia's independence, such as in CSEMADOK, and 
the active involvement of the Hungarian minority in the democratisation movement 
have allowed the minority to set up structures, which it has developed and expanded 
ever since. In neither state have the societal level structures been able to substitute 
the lacking or limited political inclusion. In Slovakia however, it has succeeded in 
providing support for and fill gaps in the resources available to minority institutions, 
and was able to offer alternatives to either the assimilation to Slovak majority society 
or the alienation from Slovak society altogether. However, the minorities' bottom-up 
organisations in both countries have not been able to reduce the relevance of group 
antagonism in both the state institutions and intergroup relations in general.  Part III - Chapter 9 
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In both countries, minority actors have aimed to improve their relation with the 
majority group by transposing the cultural schemas of 'national-cultural identity', 
which were institutionalised for the support of majority nation-state-building to 
enable their own group agency. The political institutions of diversity promotion in 
both countries provide structures, however limited, for minorities to foster intergroup 
co-existence on the basis of social segregation. The structuration of intergroup 
relations however has very different outcomes for the two minority groups.  
In Slovakia, the segregation of Hungarians is enabled by the array of normative and 
institutional resources by which both the Slovak home state and the Hungarian kin-
state support the maintenance of group boundaries. At the same time, increasingly, 
the social practices of group members question these group boundaries. It is in this 
context that the interlacing structures of segregation become a constraint for minority 
participation in Slovak society. Since the deliberation of alternative structures for 
integration has been neglected, segregation continues to be the most viable resource 
for Hungarians in Slovakia, while those group members, whose routines supersede 
the firm group boundaries, are currently caught between segregation and 
assimilation. The recent attempts of the minority roundtable to deliberate on the 
future of the Hungarian community in Slovakia, and majority-minority interaction 
more broadly, represents an attempt to again determine more strongly the group's 
agency.  
In Estonia, the normative structures of firm (cultural) group boundaries and the 
policies that support minority dissimilation could potentially serve to engender 
segregation. However, as this chapter showed clearly, the Russian-speaking minority 
lacks other structures that would help the development of strong ties between the 
group's members and increasing autonomy of these structures from majority 
dominance. The normative-cultural structures of restoration have undermined all 
attempts to reframe the Russian-speaking group as a legitimate participant in social 
and political processes. The limited availability of socio-structural resources for 
Russian-speakers that could foster sustainable community institutions, such as the 
Hungarians in Slovakia are able to maintain, has left the group without significant 
structures of group reproduction. The gradual opening of political processes and 
restrictive forms of inclusion into the Estonian political community discussed in Part III - Chapter 9 
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chapters 5 and 6 mean that individual assimilation became a viable option for some 
members, while all claims for segregation led to further marginalisation. Minority 
actors in Estonia who oppose both assimilation and segregation have, more strongly 
than Hungarian in Slovakia, promoted integration as an alternative to the two on the 
basis of the provisions of the liberal-democratic state. The agency of the Estonian 
majority however enabled alteration of the democratic structures, repeatedly 
undermining minority participation, at the social level just as at the political level 
discussed in chapter 7, by enacting the structures of 'securitisation'. Conclusion 
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Chapter 10: Conclusion 
10.1 Introduction 
This concluding chapter aims to pull together the threads that were laid out in the first three 
chapters of the thesis and elaborated in the empirical study detailed in chapters 4 through 9. 
I begin by emphasising the contributions the study has made to the broader research on 
interethnic relations in Central Eastern Europe. I move on to recall key arguments by 
discussing the benefits of the theoretical approach chosen for the study. I discuss how the 
theoretical backdrop of my research is reflected in the layout of the thesis and recall why 
the methodological approach – a double case study – was applied (10.2). In section 10.3, I 
discuss the impact minority agency has had on institution-building and group formation 
drawing from the main findings of the two case studies of Slovakia and Estonia. Section 
10.4 identifies interesting aspects for future research that would build upon the results of 
the present study. 
10.2 Contributions to understandings of interethnic relations in Central 
Eastern Europe 
The main purpose of the study was to shed light on an aspect of interethnic integration in 
Central Eastern Europe that has been understudied, namely the role of non-dominant ethnic 
groups in shaping intergroup relations. Estonia and Slovakia are cases in point for the 
complex, and partly conflictual processes of state- and nation-building in the face of ethnic 
diversity and unequal interethnic power relations. The study thereby sought to respond to 
the gap left by the volume of literature concerning ethnic group relations in the region. The 
primary focus of existing literature has been to identify the ways in which state policies 
have designed the institutional framework for minority accommodation and how the 
integration of CEE states with international structures has constrained domestic policy 
making on the issue. It is argued in the introductory chapter that this literature has 
portrayed minorities largely as passive objects within the process of integration, victims of 
oppressive states, or else rational elite actors in the process of conflict escalation or 
resolution. My study contributes to scholarship on interethnic relations in CEE by 
focussing primarily on the agendas and strategies of minorities as political and social group 
actors. The creative responses of these actors to the disadvantageous structures of the 
nation-state bring to the fore an important factor that (co-)determines the trajectories of 
interethnic relations. Structurationist theory, which is elaborated in chapter 2, reminds us 
that agency is embedded in the structural contexts from which it evolves. In line with this Conclusion 
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theoretical approach, the main contribution of the study lies in its analysis of minority 
group agency in terms of agency's dual relationship – in the sense that agency modifies the 
very structures in which it is embedded – to the normative and regulatory institutions, and 
the structures of interaction with the majority group.  
Structuration theory has inspired the thinking about integration that forms the foundation 
of the research study. The approach was selected first and foremost because it offers a 
theory of agency that avoids both purely behaviouristic and voluntaristic understandings of 
social action. Only in this way, I argue throughout the thesis, is it possible to account for 
the dynamics of interethnic relations. Hence, non-dominant groups are conceptualised as 
heterogeneous actors who adjust to and resist structural constraints in parallel processes 
simultaneously, and re-interpret institutional constraints, enacting these as resources to 
support their own agendas. As my study demonstrates, this does not mean that political and 
socio-economic structures cease to limit minority group action. The 'dialectic of control' 
(Giddens 1984) however means that the creative forms of engagement with the political 
and legislative institutions have the potential to re-direct the course of intergroup relations. 
Decisively, structuration theory proposes that the particular actions of socially positioned 
actors – whether institutional actors like the state or group actors – 'take their final shape in 
the process of interaction itself' (Mouzelis 1991, p.198, quoted in Stones 2005, p.101). It 
follows that integration (and disintegration) can never be fully controlled by any given 
actor in the interaction process that shapes interethnic relations.  
In order to account for the centrality of interaction between the minority groups and their 
institutional and structural contexts for the dynamics of integration and disintegration, the 
empirical study was divided into two parts (part II and III). In this respect the layout of the 
thesis follows the (analytical) distinction between the structural contexts of minority 
agency and the social action of the minority groups. Chapters 4 through 6 offer an analysis 
of the normative and legislative institutions that form the interpretative and regulatory 
contexts for interethnic relations in Estonia and Slovakia. These chapters focus on the 
states' institutional frameworks for state- and nation-building and their embeddedness 
within the international context, both aspects which have been analysed in previous studies 
mainly in terms of their constraining impact on group interaction as well as domestic 
decision-making. The current study builds purposefully upon, as well as extends, the 
existing work concerned with these elements of interethnic relations. It emphasises 
especially the historical background and normative framework of group antagonism and Conclusion 
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elaborates on how these have been drawn upon by political actors to institutionalise 
and extend majority dominance in the political processes.  
Chapters 7 though 9 account for the responses to these contextual factors by minority 
actors. Shaped by arguments detailed in theories of social movement and collective action 
(outlined in chapter 3), part III of the thesis examines the political and societal level actors 
associated with and formed by the Russian-speaking and the Hungarian minority groups. 
These chapters analyse the action frames that guide the strategies of minority actors in their 
interaction with state institutions. As demonstrated throughout these three chapters, the 
frames entail the interpretative schemes minority members deploy in order to explain their 
current situation, develop scenarios by which to generate alternative relations between the 
ethnic groups, and mobilise support for their actions. The discussions linked to both case 
studies show that minority actors are far from homogeneous in terms of their overall 
composition, with different actors utilising different strategies both simultaneously and at 
different times. Furthermore, actors can pursue multiple parallel framing and action 
strategies in an effort to use efficiently the limited structural resources available to them in 
their interactions with the dominant groups. Overall the chapters argue that minorities have 
been far from passive; rather, they have altered the conditions of interethnic relations by 
addressing the political-institutional framework as well as by attempting to increase 
minority 'actorness.'  
Much of the theoretical originality of this study is owed to structuration theory. This theory 
enables us to understand the 'dialectics of control' and encourages the analysis of minority 
agency. As a theory of processes rather than causal relationships, structuration theory 
allows us to understand better, why majority-minority interaction in Estonia has further 
marginalised Russian-speakers despite their many attempts to establish structures of 
participation at the political and social level, while it has engendered limited minority 
participation in Slovakia. However, the applicability of the theory to empirical research is 
limited, both in general and in the specific context of this thesis. As has been criticised in 
the debates on structuration theory since the 1980s, 'for Giddens, every "instantiating" 
moment is one of unspecifiable change and the unexpected' and he cannot 'answer "when" 
questions' (Parker 2000, p.107; cf. also Held & Thomson 1989; Mouzelis 1995; Archer 
1995; Stones 2005). This critique points to the need to make structuration theory applicable 
for empirical research, which has also been highlighted in the present thesis. In addition to 
the limitations of structuration theory mentioned, the theory's highly abstract concepts and 
language also limit its explanatory power for understanding situational social action; Conclusion 
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however, its abstract language makes the theory suitable as a meta-theory with which 
to reformulate minority agency and social action as dual and relational capacity to impact 
social processes.  
In order to overcome the limitations of structuration theory and analyse when minority 
agency in Estonia and Slovakia becomes 'historically consequential' (Parker 2000, p.109), 
my study revisited discussions and reformulated, from a structurationist perspective, core 
concepts from nation-state-building, nationalism, ethnopolitics, assimilation theory and 
social movement studies. This enabled empirical research of minority activism and 
institutional change, however reflecting the structurationist understanding of structure-
agency. Essentially, it is the dual relationship of structure and agency that structuration 
theory proposes, which captures the process of social integration as dependent on 
(minority) agents' actualisation of societal structures in the interaction with majority agents 
and highlights the interdependency of majority and minority agency for social change.  
The empirical findings of my research allow for some generalisability of the dynamics of 
interethnic integration in post-Communist CEE. Slovakia and Estonia were chosen as well-
researched post-Communist country cases in which non-violent interethnic tensions have 
characterised political and social developments of the past two decades. The primary bases 
for the comparison were the following structural and institutional similarities which are 
relevant for the trajectories of (potential) integration. First, the histories of interethnic 
relations between Estonians and Russians/Russian-speakers, and Slovaks and Hungarians 
respectively, are related to long conflictual histories of oppression and enmeshed in the 
specific histories of national movements, communism and post-Communist nation-
building in CEE, impacting the normative discursive institutions of group relations. 
Second, both states are officially conceptualised as the 'property' of the respective titular 
nations, which in turn generates boundaries between titulars and non-titulars and 
establishes a power relation between them. Third, Russian and Hungarian 'diasporas' more 
broadly have been a key focus of studies in this area; these minority groups are also among 
the largest in CEE, so that their (partial) exclusion from political and social processes can 
have notable effects for the social stability of the home country. Fourth, both minority 
groupings have 'kin-states' in neighbouring countries with which the home countries of 
Slovakia and Estonia have difficult relationships; this allows fears of geopolitical security 
threats to surface frequently and influence domestic decision-making. Fifth, both states are 
embedded within the structures of post-Communist international (and specifically EU) 
integration – the institutional demands for democratising interethnic relations have Conclusion 
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constrained domestic policy-making according to the foundations of the international 
minority rights framework. At the same time, both minority groups differ in particular with 
regard to how they are conceived of by the Estonian and Slovak states. While Hungarians 
are framed as a 'traditional' or 'historical' minority in Slovakia, Russian-speakers in Estonia 
are conceptualised as 'new' minority or 'migrants'.  
Overall, the comparison of two cases – which are similar enough, but also different enough 
– has showed that the different conceptualisations of minorities play a role in how minority 
groups can establish themselves successfully as political and social collective actors and 
how, in turn, they are being responded to by their home state. At the same time the analysis 
demonstrated that this is by far not the only factor determining minority actorness and the 
dynamics of integration. In the next section I discuss other key factors impacting 
integration in Slovakia and Estonia identified by my research.  
10.3 Minorities' impact on the structures of integration 
The theoretical discussions in chapters 2 and 3 proposed that a concept of integration 
which seeks to investigate the impact of minority activism on interethnic relations needs to 
be based on a participatory understanding of the term. Moreover, such a concept 
necessarily has to refrain from defining integration in terms of its (desired) institutional 
and structural outcomes. I have pointed to the limitations of studies which focus on 
outcomes based on, for example, changes to domestic minority legislation as an 
institutional response to external pressures. Ultimately, such studies tend to ignore the 
creative and autonomous agency of minority members, since they determine from the 
outset what integration is, rather than recognising that the actors involved have a role in 
shaping their mutual relations. In the light of this, the present study analysed the 
opportunities and limitations of non-dominant actors' participation in institution-building in 
order to determine whether integration can take place, or is indeed aspired to by the 
participants in the process. My discussion of minority activism in chapters 7 to 9 
demonstrates that the existing minority agendas and strategies say a lot about the ideas 
minority members have in relation to how interethnic relations should be shaped and how 
their current state is perceived by the minority actors. Furthermore, the responses minority 
members receive for their efforts from state institutions and majority actors indicate the 
larger problems that underlie the limits of integration in Slovakia and Estonia today. 
Essentially, the question these chapters – and ultimately the overall thesis – asked is how 
the participation of minority actors and their interaction with majority actors is 
characterised in the two countries.  Conclusion 
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The strategies that minority actors deployed in the two countries bear similarities in 
some respects but differ in others. In general, all minority strategies discussed here have, in 
one way or another, aimed to challenge 'nationalising' statehood of the Estonian and 
Slovak institutional frameworks. Although alternatives to the unitary nation-states were 
discussed by minority members and more democratically-minded majority members, 
especially during the early phase of democratisation, majority nationalists soon won the 
upper hand. In reaction to the nationalising policies implemented in both countries during 
most of the 1990s, the minorities formed their political representation based on an 
opposition to nationalising policies, demanding the inclusion of minority members within 
the political community of the respective state and the elaboration of an institutional 
framework that would reflect the needs and demands of minority members.  
Particularly in the early 1990s, both minority groups claimed far-reaching minority rights 
and even recognition as a 'partner nation', as seen in the case of some Russian-speakers' 
demands for adopting Russian as a second official language in Estonia and the plans for 
power-sharing in Slovakia. Their primary aim was to allay the impact of the nationalising 
policies which was detrimental to the minorities' participation in and their chances to 
benefit from democratisation. However, not all minority actors agreed with the radical idea 
of two equal 'nations' to inhabit the common state. Sharing the desire for the renunciation 
of the 'nationalising' state with the radical minority actors, others developed scenarios that 
would accept the minority population as equal citizens, rather than equal nations. This 
second notion of pluralism was not based on the equality of groups, but the democratic 
argument that all members of society should participate meaningfully and equally in the 
decision-making on common state institutions; this argument nonetheless entailed that the 
legal framework reflected the state's responsiveness to the interests of its minority citizens. 
For Russian-speakers and Hungarians this approach to majority-minority relations emerged 
as the dominant argument during the course of the last twenty years. Both forms of 
pluralism were developed in direct relation to the states' nationalising strategies and the 
minorities' fears of losing their community institutions, such as minority language 
schooling and the right to use the minority language in public. More importantly perhaps, 
the minority demands emphasised the equality of minority and majority members of 
society, claiming the right to participate in the decision-making in general, and in relation 
to issues that concerned minority members specifically.  
These demands elicited limited response due largely to the general politicisation and 
securitisation of ethnicity, as demonstrated in relation to the frequent play of the 'ethnic Conclusion 
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card' when minority issues were at stake in the political decision-making. The group 
belonging of a political actor became increasingly decisive for their ability to make 
legitimate claims about state institutions, as seen for example in the debates on the 
possibility of a Hungarian speaker of the Slovak parliament. Institutional change that 
would have increased the decentralised and autonomous decision-making or the minority's 
formal participation in political processes was undermined, as in the case of Slovakia's 
1996 administrative and regional reform and Estonia's citizenship policies. In political 
practice this ethnicisation meant that contributions to the political debate and political 
demands in the realms of linguistic, educational and cultural questions as well as issues 
related to historical memory – in other words, the areas that according to the fundamental 
institutions of the Estonian and Slovak states were essential for forming the nation and 
determined the exertion of national sovereignty, as discussed in chapters 4 through 6 – 
became non-negotiable in terms of minority demands. The institutional framework of the 
two states provided the normative and regulatory basis for the politicisation of ethnicity. 
They ranked the claims of the titular nation to 'national sovereignty' higher than interethnic 
democratisation or conflict resolution, especially until the change in Slovakia's government 
in 1998 and Estonia's implementation of the integration strategy from 2000 onwards.  
Integration in Slovakia 
The discussions of chapters 7 though 9 have showed that minority actors in both countries 
have attempted to de-politicise ethnicity for the reasons discussed above. However they 
have deployed different strategies to do this in relation to differing political contexts. In 
Slovakia, the political change of 1998 brought the Hungarian Coalition Party (MKP) into 
government and enabled significant change to majority-minority relations. At government 
level, minority representatives were recognised as formally legitimate actors, at least 
symbolically. The position in government and the co-operation with Slovak political forces 
made the MKP moderate their political demands vis-à-vis the coalition partners and the 
state in general, by agreeing not to strive for territorial-based autonomy. The MKP did not 
cease its demand for an institutional solution to the, at times, precarious situation of the 
existing minority institutions. Since 1998, the political representation of the Hungarian 
minority has increased the coherence of their political agendas, and made efforts to 
establish functional autonomies in order to take certain minority institutions, primarily 
education and culture, out of the everyday politicking. Essentially, while hoping to 'de-
politicise' ethnic belonging, the Hungarian representatives still wanted a political solution 
to the difficult relationship between the ethnic groups. Although this strategy failed to a Conclusion 
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large extent even with the MKP in government, the Hungarians were able to increase 
their decision-making authority in the second stage of the 2001 administrative reform – 
albeit on the basis of a general democratic argument of decentralisation rather than a 
group-based argument – and in relation to the foundation of the Hungarian University in 
Komárno.  
The discussion in chapter 8 showed that the Hungarian minority has continuously 
mobilised an ethnic representation in order to protect the minority's position in the Slovak 
nation-state and defend the specific interests of minorities that are produced by the nation-
state. The mobilisation has worked, because the Hungarian electorate was aware that 
without a minority party the prospects for minority institutions in Slovakia were very 
limited. The relatively even split of the Slovak majority population into nationalists and 
moderates has provided a political resource for the minority political actors: in order to 
form a government in 1998, 2002 and 2010, moderate Slovak parties have depended on the 
MKP and Most-Híd. The existence of a coherent and comparatively strong minority 
representation has also meant that the Hungarian population has not had the chance to vote 
on the basis of socio-political interests rather than ethnicity. However, while the political 
divide along ethnic lines persists, the recent success of Most-Híd has allowed the minority 
to send less divisive signals to the majority and repeatedly achieve limited change of the 
institutional framework.  
My analysis of the political strategies of the Hungarian minority has shown that overall its 
coherence as an actor, whilst moderating its demands in order to enable co-operation with 
the majority on issues of specific minority concern as well as in general politics, has 
allowed for gradual change in the institution-building of the Slovak state. Even though 
minority demands are still highly disputed also among moderate Slovak political actors, 
the Hungarian minority has become increasingly incorporated within the institutional 
framework of the state. The involvement of civic actors has further helped voice minority 
demands as part of the ongoing democratisation in Slovakia, such as in the activities of the 
recently established Civil Society Roundtable or the continuous work of the Fórum Intézet. 
Overall the situation in Slovakia has demonstrated gradual change in the institutional 
structuring of ethnic group relations. In turn, the guarantees for minority institutions, 
however limited, have maintained the structures that provide for an alternative to the 
assimilation of Hungarians to the Slovak nation-state as envisaged by majority nationalists. 
This was further supported by the Hungarian state, which has contributed to the sustenance Conclusion 
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of minority institutions in Slovakia to the extent that minority members claimed that 
'without the help of Hungary, this culture would not exist here' (Öllös 23/09/2009).  
The coherent aspiration of the Hungarian minority to be part of the Slovak state as a 
minority however also gradually alienates minority members who live in both Slovak and 
Hungarian communities. Essentially, the ethnic divide of the political sphere has 
undermined the ability to vote according to socio-political preferences, and between 1998 
and 2009 Hungarians did not even have a realistic choice to support an alternative to an 
exclusively ethnicity-based minority party. It is these constraints within the organisations 
of the Hungarian minority that have generated increasing demand for a political 
representation that promotes integration rather than segregation. Parts of the Hungarian 
cultural and civic organisations and societal level minority representation have elaborated 
ideas for the increase of Hungarian participation in the decision-making process, especially 
on issues of minority concern such as southern Slovakia's regional development, minority 
language education and the teaching of Slovak to minority members. As long as the 
political situation does not allow minority concerns to be taken into the general consensus 
of the political community, minority parties will consider themselves forced to maintain a 
strong minority position. This in turn is likely to impact the political and social choices of 
those minority members, who would prefer more institutions that support the reconciliation 
and accommodation of minority and majority citizens and more opportunities to practice, 
for example, bilingualism. Ongoing 'assimilation' of the Hungarian minority to Slovak 
society partly reflects such choices, as discussed in chapters 6 and 9. The dilemma of 
gaining political strength out of a strong political position on minority issues however has 
left Hungarian political actors hesitant about the further moderation of their demands. The 
situation is likely to continue as long as there is no strong Slovak political partner to co-
operate with Hungarians or to represent Hungarian demands, and as long as underlying 
tensions between the groups are not reduced.  
As argued in chapter 8, the permanence of a strong minority party is also likely to maintain 
a situation in which the Slovak state and 'Slovak' parties do not see the need to develop 
responsibility for minority members. The politicisation of ethnicity has therefore limited 
the choices of the Slovak electorate, not just those of the Hungarians. Over the past two 
decades it was parties of the (neo-)liberal-conservative and Christian spectrum that have 
showed preparedness to co-operate with the Hungarian parties. The Dzurinda- and 
Radičová coalitions have increased their support for minority cultures such as the 
Hungarians and the Ruthenians on the basis of shared ideas about the infringement on Conclusion 
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aspects of individual liberties expressed in the nationalist governments' minority 
policies. They have devised policies that are said to negatively impact for example the 
Romanies, as well as having generally lowered social security and increased, for example 
labour market flexibility, private funding of health services (CVEK 2011; Pažitný et al. 
2007; D'urana et al. 2007). Voters critical of liberal economics who support interethnic 
accommodation have difficult decisions to make at the ballot box. Overall, the politics of 
ethnicity in Slovakia have limited Slovakia's democratisation especially, but not only, with 
respect to intergroup relations.  
Integration in Estonia 
The situation in Estonia differs greatly from that in Slovakia. As chapters 7 and 9 show, 
where minority strategies to co-operate with the state and majority actors were discussed, 
minority members have attempted to de-politicise ethnic relations by 'de-ethnicising' 
politics. Since the failure of the political representation of the Russian-speakers' parties, if 
not before, most minority citizens have supported Estonian parties according to both their 
socio-political preferences and the stance the different Estonian parties represent with 
regard to minority. This process was paralleled by the societal level strategies of the 
greater part of minority organisations to de-politicise ethnicity, by co-operating with state 
institutions in the realm of ethno-cultural interests. Chapter 9 demonstrated that many 
minority representatives at the societal level refrain from relating their cultural demands to 
questions of political decision-making and participation in the socio-economic agenda-
setting. Russian-speakers have established cultural organisations since the early phase of 
Estonia's independence onwards. However, it was not until 1997 and the introduction of 
the Council for Ethnic Minorities as well as the elaboration of the integration strategy that 
their activities however have become an explicit aspect of the Estonian consensus on 
statehood.  
As discussed in sections 5.4 and 7.2, the integration programme was enabled by the limited 
liberalisation of state-minority relations under the impact of European and international 
conditionality policies. Although the Estonian state allowed for minority inclusion in the 
political community on the basis of naturalisation since 1991, it was only in the late 1990s 
that this became deliberate state policy. The fundamental arguments for inclusion however 
were not the democratisation of majority-minority relations and the reduction of social 
exclusion. The 'modernisation' of Estonia as a liberal state that does not 'waste' its human 
resource capital and enables social stability and geopolitical security in relation to the Conclusion 
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Russian Federation. The state integration programme also entailed and elaborated the 
Estonian approach to multiculturalism. It argued that multiculturalism allowed for the 
inclusion of minority members and responsiveness to those minority demands that were 
seen as legitimate by the state, namely the support for their activities in the realm of 
national culture. Many minority organisations have used these structures in order to 
increase their impact on decision-making, at least in cultural issues. However, co-operation 
in this realm has limited the Russian-speaking minority's political actorness as such. As 
demonstrated in sections 9.2 and 9.3, Russian-speakers' organisations are often sanctioned 
for the political activities of their members and do not receive funding for activities that 
challenge the status quo of majority-minority relations.  
My discussion of both political and societal level organisations of Russian-speakers has 
identified two fundamental problems in the relation between the state and minority 
organisations that raise political or social demands. On the one hand, the 'division of 
labour' between state and not elected representatives, which limits the political claims of 
societal level actors, thus the de-politicisation of state-society relations. On the other hand, 
the politicisation of ethnicity has shaped the political sphere. As a result, in the political as 
well as in the social sphere, minority attempts to bring political demands into the debates 
with state authorities and majority political actors – for example by organisations like the 
Legal Information Centre for Human Rights or the umbrella organisation EVEK – are 
either 'securitised' or dismissed. Essentially, from the Estonian elite's perspective, minority 
politics cannot be discussed by and with minority members, since first, politics are in the 
realm of the state and separate from society, and second, minority issues are matters that 
touch upon state security and majority sovereignty, and are therefore taken out of the 
normal political deliberation.  
In contrast to the Hungarian community, Russian-speakers' resources to sustain community 
institutions and create alternatives to the 'integration Estonian-style' are very limited. The 
funding system that channels EU funds for societal level activities through the state; the 
problems for organisations that receive funding from the Russian Embassy in Tallinn or 
from foundations that are located in Russia – these conditions have additionally 
undermined Russian-speakers organisation and their political or civic representation. Both 
minorities share, however, the problem of limited dialogue with majority societal level 
activists and majority political actors. The Estonian integration strategy has enabled 
increased opportunities for minority and majority members to interact on the basis of the 
Estonian language and some societal level initiatives. However, because of the complexity Conclusion 
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of the de-politicisation of state-society relations and the 'securitisation' of minority 
affairs, such initiatives are unlikely to evoke change in relation to the obstacles of 
intergroup dialogue. The lack of institutions that allow Russian-speakers' discontent to be 
heard in Estonia and the clear signs by state officials that no change is to be expected in the 
approach to integration means that protest is likely to be channelled by movements or 
protest activities in the future. Recent developments in the political agendas of parts of the 
Russian-speaking minority mean that these movements may emphasise segregation rather 
than integration. In Slovakia, protest movements are unlikely to occur; both majority and 
minority structures give minority members some choice with regard to their preferences for 
social relations. However, in Slovakia as well as Estonia the question of minority-majority 
tensions will remain a decisive factor of political and social relations, for as long as the 
underlying obstacles to intergroup dialogue are not included in society's deliberation, 
facilitated by the political framework.  
Throughout this thesis I have demonstrated that the Hungarian and Russian-speaking 
minorities in Slovakia and Estonia are far from passive and their activities are not limited 
to either accepting the status quo nor resuming minority nationalism and ethnic 
mobilisation. Only the Hungarian minority has managed to exert meaningful and direct 
impact on the institution-building in Slovakia. However, Russian-speakers in Estonia have 
also at different times over the past twenty years achieved limited recognition by the state's 
institutional framework. The integration programme, while largely enabled by international 
actors and on the basis of the unchanged 'consensus' on the Estonian political community, 
responds to some of the minority's demands, if mainly indirectly. The Russian-speaking 
societal level actors in Estonia have used and extended existing structures of minority 
cultures and attempted to use these in order to evoke intergroup dialogue on the basis of 
de-politicised interaction. Increasingly, however slowly, minority members participate and 
interact with majority members in the social sphere. Individual group members have also 
attempted to achieve political inclusion of the Russian-speaking group, by bringing 
minority positions into 'Estonian' parties. In this way, minority members have helped 
provide alternative structures for the political and social marginalisation of Russian-
speakers, which has shaped most of the past two decades. However, actual policy-making 
during the same period has created expectations that individual based inclusion could bring 
about responsiveness to group demands unrealistic. While in Estonia minority members 
can now opt between assimilation and marginalisation, in Slovakia the alternatives are 
assimilation and segregation. Existing community structures have served to absorb some 
effects of nationalising policies. Essentially, in both states the opportunities for interethnic Conclusion 
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relations to develop according to the participatory understanding of integration outlined 
in the first part of the thesis seem very far off.  
10.4 Directions for future research 
In this final section I suggest some areas that promise fruitful elaboration of some 
questions that were generated by my own research study.  
The discussion in the concluding chapter in particular highlighted the divergent relations 
minority politics had in both states with the spectrum of (neo)liberal political actors. The 
ability of Hungarian minority actors to frame their own agendas in terms of 
decentralisation, democratisation and reduction of the state infringement of individual 
liberties stands in stark contrast to the lack of success of Russian-speakers. The latter have 
sought support for their agendas also on the basis of democratic human rights, but failed 
due to the control majority actors aimed to maintain over issues of interethnic relations, 
despite the general support for the decentralisation of society issues. In turn, Estonia's 
integration programme is based on the mobilisation of human capital for Estonia's 
(economic) future. This economic argument has been a driving force of the integration 
strategy, much like the programmes for immigrant integration in other countries. In 
Slovakia, questions of interethnic relations and tensions have never been related to the 
prosperity of Slovakia, at least not in the rhetoric of majority actors. This converse relation 
generates interesting questions about the relation between (economic) liberalism and 
minority participation, and to what extent the background histories of minority existence in 
a country play a role.  
The categorisation of different 'types' of minorities – historical/indigenous vs. new/migrant 
– has played a part in this study throughout the fieldwork and the analysis of international 
and domestic documents. It is a crucial resource for the Hungarian minority both in the 
domestic debate and at the international level, for example within the EU institutions. My 
interviews have shown that many respondents in Slovakia were critical about my approach 
to compare Russian-speakers, who count as an immigrant minority, with the Hungarians. It 
was clear to them, as it is within many of the legal frameworks in CEE and other European 
states as well as in international agreements and conventions, that historical minorities 
should enjoy the same rights as titular nations, while this could not hold for migrant 
minorities. The Russian-speaking minority in Estonia is of course a specific case, since it 
consists of both 'historical' and 'migrant' members. Essentially, the case of Russian-
speakers shows clearly that the distinction between historical and migrant minorities is Conclusion 
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difficult to maintain. The policies of Estonia and Slovakia have also showed that most 
problems for minorities arise from the nationalising policies of the state rather than the 
question of how many generations in the state of residence a minority member can 
produce. Given the increasingly questionable distinction, especially in an ever-integrating 
Europe, future research could usefully look into the question of how this distinction 
constrains the democratisation of societal relations and the integration of society's 
members. Moreover, such research could be utilised to further develop the literature on 
European integration. The distinction between migrant and historical minorities is essential 
for many western European states also. Future research could make valuable contributions 
to the question of how Estonia and other new members of the EU have impacted minority 
policies in 'old' EU member states.  
The directions for future research have also indicated that Estonia and Slovakia are but two 
cases where interethnic integration is a disputed field. The participatory approach to 
intergroup integration has contributed valuable insights about the obstacles to integration 
that are based on institutional or structural analyses, which can help understand processes 
of integration in general. Like most research studies this PhD thesis raises far more 
questions than it can answer in the limited space. Nonetheless this final chapter highlights 
the important contributions of my study to scholarship on interethnic integration in post-
Communist Estonia and Slovakia. 
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  Valeria Jakobson  NGO OMOS; researcher 
(social communication) 
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Tallinn University, Centre 
for Civil Society Research 
and Development, 
researchers 
Tallinn  17 April 2009 
  Raivo Vetik  Tallinn University, 
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  Vello Andres Pettai  Tartu University, researcher   Tartu  05 December 
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  Igor Rosenfeld  Member of Keskerakond 
Tartu, author 
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  Aleksandr Dusman,  Ida-Virumaa Roundtable, 
chairman of the Jewish 
community in Estonia 
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2009 
  Alexander Astrov  Lecturer CEU Budapest  Tartu  17/05/2010 
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  Novikov  Deputy mayor of 
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Tallinn  18/05/2010 
  Margus Vaus  Tallinn municipality, 
responsible for Koduraha 
strategy 
Tallinn   18/05/2010 
  Mikhail Kõrvalt  Chairman of Taekwondo-
Union and youth organisation 
Generation; member of 
Tallinn City Council, 
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  Sergey Tydyakov, 
Klaus Dornemann 
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  Martin Ehala  Tallinn University, 
researcher 
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 Slovakia 
  Juraj Marušiak  Slovak Academy of Sciences  Bratislava  April 2008  
  Zuzanna Poláčková  Slovak Academy of Sciences  Bratislava  April 2008 
  Jozef Kiss  Slovak Academy of Sciences  Bratislava  April 2008 
  Grigorij Mezešnikov  IVO Institute, analyst  Bratislava  14 April 2008 
  Lászlo Gyúrgyík  University of Komárno, 
researcher 
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daughter, 2 parents 
present 
CSEMADOK, Association of 
Hungarian Parents in 
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students organisation 
Bratislava  18 June 2009 
  Marika Homišinová, 
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University of Košice, 
historians 
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  József Berényi,  Parliamentarian MKP  Bratislava  30 June 2009 
  Károly Domsitz  Mayor of Šamorin  Šamorin,   16 September 
2009 
  Gejza Tokar  Former Vice-President of 
Hungarian student network 
Bratislava  17 September 
2009 
  Zoltán Bara,  International Secretary, MKP  Bratislava  21 September 
2009; 24 
September 2009 
  Pál Zachar  President of Hungarian 
student network 
Šamorin  22 September 
2009 
  László Öllös  Forum Minority Research 
Institute, political scientist 
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  Károly Tóth  Forum Minority Research 
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  Kálmán Petőcz  Forum Minority Research 
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Appendix B 
Plain Language Statement 
1. Introduction 
•  The research working title is Social integration processes in Estonia and Slovakia.  
•  The research is being conducted by Ada-Charlotte Regelmann, a PhD student at the 
Department of Central and East European Studies, University of Glasgow.  
 2. Details of involvement in the study 
•  Participants agree to be available for at least one face-to-face interview with the 
researcher.  
•  Interview length can be flexible, but should not be under 30 minutes.  
•  The researcher may request that interviews be recorded (audio only) in order to facilitate 
data gathering and subsequent data analysis. Participants retain the right to decline the 
researcher's request to record an interview.  
3. Potential risk to participants arising from involvement in the study 
•  It is not envisaged that there are any risks to participants arising from involvement in the 
study.  
•  Participants retain the right to discuss any fears about potential risks that might arise 
from involvement in the study at any point before, during or after the interview. Should 
this occur will researcher and participant agree on further procedure.  
4. Benefits to the participants 
•  Participants have the right to request an electronic copy of the thesis once the 
examination process is completed. It is hoped that participants will find the results of the 
study interesting.  
5. Procedures aimed at protecting confidentiality 
•  The data collected will be analysed by the researcher alone.  
•  Interview recordings and transcripts will be held by the researcher and stored in a secure 
location.  
•  Participants are offered the opportunity to remain anonymous.  
•  Throughout the interview, participants have the chance to decide whether they may be 
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